HISTORY
of POLAND
by
ALEKSANDER GIEYSZTOR
Professor of Warsaw University
STEFAN KIENIEWICZ
Professor of Warsaw University (editor-in-chief)
EMANUEL ROSTWOROWSKI
Professor in the Polish Academy of Sciences
JANUSZ TAZBIR
Pofessor in the Polish Academy of Sciences
HENRYK WERESZYCKI
Professor of Cracow University
2nd edition
PWN—POLISH SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHERS - WARSZAWA, 1979
Acknowledgement
The authors owe a great debt to Professor R. F. LESLIE
of Queen Mary College, University of London, and Doctor GEORGE SAKWA
of Bristol University, for their invaluable contributions in kindly
agreeing to undertake the revision of the English text.
Translation from the Polish manuscript :
KRYSTYNA CEKALSKA, ILONA RALF-SUEZ, JANINA RODZINSKA
LEON SZWAJCER, ANTONI SZYMANOWSKI
Maps :
JOZEF HUMNICKI, BOGUSLAW KACZMARSKI, WANDA LEWANDOWSKA
TADEUSZ LADOGORSKI, WLADYSLAW PALUCKI, ZBIGNIEW PUSTULA
HENRYK RUTKOWSKI (editor), ANNA ZABOKLICKA DUNIN-WASOWICZ
Diagrams :
IRENA GIEYSZTOR, STEFAN JACKOWSKI
Lay-out :
ZYGMUNT ZIEMKA, WITOLD MOTYL
Editor :
ZUZANNA STEFANIAK
© Copyright by
Pahstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe
PWN—Polish Scientific Publishers
Printed in Poland by DRP
ISBN 83-01-00392-8
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
by S. Kieniewicz
Translation: K. Cekalska
MEDIEVAL POLAND
by A. Gieysztor
Translation: K. Cekalska
Chapter I
BEFORE THE RISE OF THE POLISH STATE
Slavic Antiquity
The Slavic Wends and the Germans on the Fringes of Roman Influence
Slavic Migrations and the Age of Crises (The Fifth to the Seventh Centuries)
Chapter II
THE ORIGINS OF POLAND
Economic Foundations of Poland in the Eearly Middle Ages
The Social Structure and Organization of Regional States
The Origins of the Polanes
The Spiritual and Mental Culture on the Eve of the Unification of the Polish
State
Chapeer If
THE EARLY YEARS OF THE POLISH STATE
The Consolidation of the State and the Christianization of Poland in 966
Polish Boundaries Established in the Odra and Vistula Basins
The Polish Empire under Bolestaw the Brave
The Crisis of the First Polish Monarchy
Economic and Cultural Achievements of the Architects of the State
Chapter IV
THE AGE OF MATURITY OF THE POLISH MONARCHY
Struggle for International Position and the Establishment of Royal Authority
Feudal Disintegration Gains the Upper Hand (1138-1146)
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6 CONTENTS
Economic Foundations of the Oligarchy. Village and Town Prior to the Mid-Twelfth
Century
Cultural Relations in the Eleventh Century and in the First Half of the Twelfth
Century
Chapter V
THE CENTURY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL TRANSITION
Evolution of Settlements in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries
Foreign Colonization and the Introduction of German Law in the Thirteenth Century
The Duchies of Poland
The Growing External Danger
Efforts at Unification in the Late Thirteenth and the Early Fourteenth Centuries
Transition of Polish Culture from the Romanesque to the Gothic
Chapter VI
THE CORONA REGNI POLONIAE AT THE HEIGHT OF ITS POWER IN
THE FOURTEENTH AND THE FIFTEENTH CENTURIES
The State Apparatus Centralized
Political Problems in the Reigns of Wladystaw the Short and Casimir the Great
The Period of Angevin Rule
The Union of Poland and Lithuania. The Struggle with the Teutonic Order
Poland and Lithuania in the Hussite Period. The Union with Hungary
The Growing Political Role of the Gentry. The Restitution of Crown Lands
Casimir IV’s Foreign Policy in the Second Half of His Reign
From Land Diets to a National Parliament
Western Pomerania, Lubusz Land and Silesia in the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth
Centuries
Economic Life in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries
Culture in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries
THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE GENTRY
by J. Tazbir (VII-IX) and by E. Rostworowski (X-XIII)
Translation : L. Szwajcer and A. Szymanowski
Chapter VII
POLAND’S “GOLDEN AGE” (1492-1586)
General Characteristics of the Period
Between the Habsburgs and Muscovy
The Social and Political Foundations of the “Democracy of the Gentry”
The Movement for the “Execution-of-the-Law”
Sigismund Augustus’ Foreign Policy
The Reformation
The First Interregnum and the Period of Elective Kings
The Policy and Wars of Stephen Batory
Batory and the Gentry
Humanism in Poland
The Development of a National Culture
Renaissance Culture and Life
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$4
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{17
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143
145
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146
149
154
156
158
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167
169
170
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176
Chapter VIII
THE COMMONWEALTH AT THE TURNING POINT (1586-1648)
The struggle for power
The Political Crisis of the Commonwealth
The Zebrzydowski Rebellion
Attempts to Check Russia
The Conflict with Turkey
The Agrarian Crisis
The Growing Importance of the Magnates
The Situation of Towns and Burghers
The Doctrine of the Counter-Reformation
The Methods of the Counter-Reformation
The Election and Reign of Wiadyslaw IV
The Cossack Question
Chapter IX
THE COMMONWEALTH IN THE YEARS OF CRISIS (1648-1696)
The Main Features of the Period
The War with the Cossacks
The Swedish Invasion of 1655
The Peace of Oliwa and the Eastern Question
Attempts to Introduce Reform and the Lubomirski Rebellion
War with Turkey
The Anti-Turkish League
Economic and Political Crisis
Religious Problems
Sarmatian Baroque
Literature and Arts
Education and Learning
Chapter X
THE CRISIS OF SOVEREIGNTY (1697-1763)
General View of the Eighteenth Century
The Personal Union of Saxony and Poland
The Northern War and the Struggle for the Crown
The Confederation of Tarnogréd and the Arbitration of Peter I
The Struggle for the Polish Throne
Demilitarization and Neutralization of the Commonwealth
The System of “Anarchy”
Western Pomerania and Silesia under Prussian Rule
Sarmatian and Catholic Conformism
Late-Baroque Culture
The Forces of Progress
The Political Deadlock
Chapter XI
TENTATIVE REFORMS UNDER RUSSIA’S TUTELAGE (1763-1788)
The Russo-Prussian Alliance
The Plans of “The Family”
The Interregnum (1763-1764)
The First Years of Stanistaw Augustus
The Confederation of Radom and the Seym of 1767-1768
CONTENTS 7
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8 CONTENTS
The Confederation of Bar (1768-1772)
The First Partition
Constitutional Transformations (1773-1780)
Government by the Permanent Council
Chapter XII °
THE SOCIETY AND CIVILIZATION OF THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT
The Economic Revival
The Social Transformation
Conflict of Fashions and Ideals
The Intellectual Upheaval
Chapter XIII
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND FOR THE REFORM OF
THE COMMONWEALTH (1788~1794)
The End of the Guarantee
The Seym Control
Political Literature
The Constitution of 3 May, 1791
The Russian Intervention and the Second Partition (1792-1793)
The Emigration and the Situation at Home
The Insurrection of 1794
The Extinction of the Polish State
POLAND UNDER FOREIGN RULE 1795-1918
by S. Kieniewicz (KIV-XVII) and by H. Wereszycki (XVIII-XXI)
Translation : I. Ralf-Suez and J. Rodzinska
Chapter XIV
THE NAPOLEONIC ERA (1795-1815)
The Enfranchisement of the Peasants and the National Uprisings
Poland after the Third Partition
Attitude of the Population and the Independence Movement
The Legions
Adam Czartoryski and the Putawy Plan
Jena and Tilsit
The Constitution of the Duchy of Warsaw
Economic and Social Changes Within the Duchy of Warsaw
The Year 1809
The Downfall of the Duchy of Warsaw
Chapter XV
THE KINGDOM OF POLAND AND THE NOVEMBER INSURRECTION (1815-
1831)
Pesasant Reform in Prussian Poland
Establishment of the Congress Kingdom of Poland
The Agrarian Question in the Kingdom of Poland ‘'
The Beginnings of Modern Industry in the Kingdom of Poland
Opposition and Conspiracy
Neo-Classicism and Romanticism
The Origins and the Outbreak of the November Insurrection, 1830
The Political Struggle to Control the Insurrection
277
280
283
285
288
288
293
297
300
305
305
307
310
315
320
322
325
332
335
337
337
338
340
342
345
346
348
351
354
356
360
360
363
367
369
373
377
380
382
The Polish-Russian War
The Revolutionary Left and the Peasant Question
The International Situation and the Collapse of the Rising
Chapter XVI
ON THE EVE OF AN AGRARIAN REVOLUTION (1832-1849)
Reprisals after the Insurrection
Economic Development in the Three Partition Zones
The Liberal Camp and “Organic Work”
The National Question in Silesia and Pomerania
The Great Emigration
Conspiracy Within Poland
The Disaster of 1846
The Poznan Rising of 1848
Galicia in 1848
Poles in European Revolutionary Movements
Polish Culture in the Romantic Period
Chaprer XVII
THE PERIOD OF THE JANUARY INSURRECTION (1850-1864)
The Revolutionary Situation in Russia and Poland
Patriotic Demonstrations
The National Organization
The Armed Struggle of 1863
CONTENTS 9%
384
385
388
391
391
392
394
397
398
405
409
413
418
420
422
431
431
435
438
441
The Emancipation of the Peasants and the End of the Period of National Risings 445
Chapter XVIII
POSITIVISM AND TRI-LOYALISM. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE WORKING-
CLASS MOVEMENT (1864-1885)
The Aftermath of Disaster
The Post-1863 Emigration
The Russianization Policy in the Kingdom
449
449
450
451
The Polish Provinces of Prussia. The Kulturkampf and the National Revival in
Silesia
The Autonomy of Galicia
The Development of Industry in the Congress Kingdom
Positivism
The Beginings of the Polish Working-Class Movement
The “Proletariat”
The Beginnings of the Peasant Movement
Three Provinces and One Nation
Chapter XIX
456
458
463
465
473
476
478
479
THE FORMATION OF MASS POLITICAL PARTIES. NATIONALISM AND
SOCIALISM (1885-1904)
The Prussian Expulsions. The Colonization Commission
The Polish League
The Socialist Movement
Attempts at Compromise with the German and Russian Governments
Polish Nationalism at the ‘Turn of the Century
The Peasant Movement in Galicia
The Defence of Polish Nationality in the Prussian Area
482
482
484
486
489
492
493
495
10 CONTENTS
Economic Emigration 498
“Young Poland” and the Arts 500
Chapter XX
THE PERIOD OF REVOLUTION AND THE APPROACHING EUROPEAN
WAR (1904-1914) 505
Changes in Russian Economic Policy Towards Poland 505
The 1905 Revolution in the Russian Empire and Poland 506
The Reorientation of the Policy of the National Democrats 513
The Expropriation Decree in Prussian Poland and the National League 515
Political Changes in Galicia 516
The Debate on Political Attitudes on the Eve of the World War 518
Chapter XXI
THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE REBUILDING OF THE POLISH STATE
(1914-1918) 521
Pitsudski and the Legions 521
The Austro-German Occupation of the Kingdom 525
The Declaration of 5 November, 1916 526
The Downfall of the Tsarist Régime, 1917 528
The Regency Council 530
The October Revolution and the Peace Treaty of Brzesé Litewski (Brest Litovsk) 531
Germany’s Defeat. The Declaration of the Powers on the Polish Question, 1918 533
The Liberation of the Austrian Area 535
The Swiezynski Government 536
The Lublin Government 537
Liberated Poland 538
POLAND 1918-1939 541
by H. Wereszycki
Translation: J. Rodzinska
Chapter XXII
THE DEMARCATION OF THE FRONTIERS AND THE ENACTMENT OF.
THE CONSTITUTION (1918-1921) 543
The First Moments of Independence 543
The Legislative Seym 546
The Peace Treaties 549
The War with Soviet Russia 550
The Demarcation of the Western Frontiers 552
The March Constitution, 1921 555
Chapter XXII
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT (1922-1926) 558
The 1922 Elections » 558
Wiadystaw Grabski and the Stabilization of the Currency 560
The Ukrainian and Byelorussian Questions 563
The Communist Movement 564
Polish Foreign Policy and Locarno 565
Education, Science and Culture 567
CONTENTS tit
Chapter XXIV
PROSPERITY AND THE CRISIS: THE STRUGGLE TO LEGALIZE
PILSUDSKI’S DICTATORSHIP (1926-1931) 577
The May coup a’état 577
The Social Aspect of Pilsudski’s Dictatorship 579
The Struggle between the Government and the Seym 580
Gdynia and Moscice 582
The Centre-Left and the Brzes¢ Affair 584
The Great Economic Crisis of 1929-1931 586
Chapter XXV
TOWARDS TOTAL DICTATORSHIP (1931-1939) 588
The Foreign Policy of Pilsudski 588
The Death of Pilsudski. The Conflict in the Ruling Party 590
The Growth of Opposition 595
The National Unity Camp 596
Beck and the Cieszyn Question 599
Facing German Aggression (1938-1939) 601
CONCLUSION 605
by S. Kieniewicz
Translation : K. Cekalska
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES 611
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 622
INDEX 636
PLATES
Sleza mountain, Wroclaw voivodship. Woman with Fish
Leg Piekarski, Konin voivodship. Roman imports, 2nd-3rd cent.
Proboszczowice, Sieradz voivodship. Stronghold, 9th cent. Photo from a helicopter
Lezno, Torun voivodship. Cult stone, 10th cent.
Denarius of Bolestaw the Brave “Gnezdun Civitas”, c. 1000, National Museum,
Cracow
Cieszyn. Katowice voivodship. St. Nicholas’ Chapel, 11th cent.
Wloctawek cup, 10th cent. National Museum, Cracow
Gniezno Doors, c. 1170-1180. Holy Wirgin Mary’s and St. Adalbert’s Cathedral
Strzelno, Bydgoszcz voivodship. Holy Trinity Church, second. half of the 12th cent.,
detail of a Romanesque column
Trzebnica, Wroclaw voivodship. Cistercian Nuns Church, c. 1220-1230. Tympanum
Wachock, Kielce voivodship. Cistercian Monastery, 13th cent. Chapterhouse
Sulejéw, Piotrk6w Trybunalski voivodship. St. Thomas’s Church, first half of the 13th
cent. Keystone
Cracow, St. Florian’s Gate, 14th cent.
Cracow, St. Catherine’s Church, 14th cent.
Cracow, Church of the Virgin Mary, 14th cent.
Cracow, Barbican, 1498-1499
Nicolaus Copernicus. Portrait by an unknown painter, first quarter of the 16th cent.
Regional Museum, Torun
Cracow, Wawel. Envoys Hall. 1529-1535
Stanislaw Samostrzelnik, Investing the Szydtowiecki Family with Coat-of-Arms, 1522.
Title page of Liber geneseos. National Museum, Poznan (Kérnik branch)
Poznan, Town Hall, 1550-1560, Architect : Giovanni Battista Quadro
Jan Kochanowski. Tombstone at Zwolef, Radom voivodship, 1584
Thomas Treterus, Disputation of Cardinal Stanislaw Hozjusz with Torun Protestants,
16th cent. Drawing from Theatrum virtutum d Stanislai Hosii, Pelplin, 1928
Portrait of a nobleman, 16th cent. National Museum, Warsaw
Krasiczyn, Przemy$l voivodship. Renaissance castle, 1598-1614. Architect : Galeazzo
Appiani
Kazimierz Dolny, Lublin voivodship. Przybyta House, 1615
Powroznik, Nowy Sacz voivodship. St. James’ Orthodox Church, c. 1643
Bialystok. Palace,’ rebuilt 1728-1758. Architects: Jan Z. Deybel and Jan H. Klemm
Canaletto (Bernardo Belotto), Election of Stanislaw Augustus, 1778. National Museum,
Warsaw
Warsaw. Lazienki Park. The Water Palace, 1784-1795. Architect : Dominik Merlini
Ignacy Krasicki. Copperplate by Jan Ligber. Adam Mickiewicz Museum, Warsaw
26
27
39
40
53
54
69
70
81
82
96
97
109
110
123
124
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152
163
166
177
178
193
194
205
209
259
260
273
274
PLATES 13
Hugo Kolfataj. Portrait by Jézef Peszka, c. 1792. National Museum, Warsaw (Wila-
néw branch)
Jan Sniadecki in the observatory of Wilno University. Water colour by unknown
painter, second half of the 18th cent. Adam Mickiewicz Museum, Warsaw
Tadeusz Kosciuszko. Portrait by Karol Schweikart, 1789-1792(?). National Museum,
Warsaw (Wilanéw branch)
Ozaréw, Tarnobrzeg voivodship. Manor House, second half of the 18th cent. State
Institute of Art, Warsaw
General Jan Henryk Dabrowski entering Poznan on November 6, 1806. Gouache by
Michat Stachowicz. Polish Army Museum, Warsaw
Sielpia Wielka, Kielce voivodship. Factory shop, first half of the 19th cent.
Stanislaw Staszic. Medallion by unknown artist, first half of the 19th cent. National
Museum, Warsaw
Warsaw, Polish Bank, 1825. Architect: Antonio Corazzi. Aquatint by Friedrich
Christoph Dietrich. Institute of Art, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw
Attack on the Belvedere Palace, November 29, 1830. Aquatint by Friedrich Christoph
Dietrich, based on a drawing by Jan Feliks Piwarski. Polish Army Muzeum,
Warsaw
Joachim Lelewel. Lithography, probably of a drawing by N. Maurin, c. 1832, Adam
Mickiewicz Museum, Warsaw
Poles in Berlin after their Release from the Moabit Prison. From a contemporary
drawing published in the “Illustrierte Chronik”, Leipzig 1848
Adam Mickiewicz. Portrait by Aleksander Kaminski, 1850. National Museum,
Warsaw
Juliusz Stowacki. Engraving by J. Hopwood, according to a drawing by J. Kurowski
from 1838. Adam Mickiewicz Museum, Warsaw
Cyprian Kamil Norwid. Heliography according to a Paris photograph from 1856.
Adam Mickiewicz Museum, Warsaw
Fryderyk Chopin. Portrait by Eugéne Delacroix
Piotr Michatowski, Portrait of an Old Peasant. National Museum, Cracow
Artur Grottger, Battle from the series Lithuania, 1864-1866. National Museum,
Cracow
Jacek Malczewski, The Last Stage, 1883. National Museum, Warsaw
Bolestaw Prus. Photograph, 1910
Maria Konopnicka. Photograph, 1910. National Museum, Warsaw
Henryk Sienkiewicz. Portrait by Kazimierz Pochwalski, 1890. National Museum,
Warsaw
Jan Matejko, Starczyk, 1862. National Museum, Warsaw
Maria Sklodowska-Curie. Photograph, 1913
Aleksander Gierymski, Sand-diggers, 1887. National Museum, Warsaw
Ludwik Warynski. Photograph
Stanislaw Wyspianski, Self-portrait, 1902. National Museum, Warsaw
Leon Wyczétkowski, Digging Beetroot, 1892. National Museum
Olga Boznanska, Self-portrait, 1900. National Museum, Warsaw
Stanislaw Lentz, The Strike, 1910. National Museum, Warsaw
Stanislaw Mastowski. Spring of 1905, 1906. National Museum, Warsaw
Stefan Zeromski. Photograph, 1924. Property of Monika Zeromska
Tadeusz Zelenski (Boy). Head. Sculpture by Alfons Karny
Xawery Dunikowski, Bolestaw the Bold. Tombstone, 1916-1917. National Museum,
Warsaw (Xawery Dunikowski Museum branch)
Whiadystaw Skoczylas, Stone Stairs, s. 1930. National Museum, Warsaw
Henryk Kuna, Christ, 1926. Sculpture in wood
Gdynia. Harbour
313
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329
347
365
371
372
381
403
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423
424
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428
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447
467
468
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501
502
503
509
511
569
572
573
574
575
583
MAPS IN THE TEXT
Migrations of Slavic tribes, 5th-7th cent. by H. Rutkowski
Gniezno before the 12th cent. by J. Humnicki, H. Rutkowski
The separate Polish duchies, 1138 by A. Gieysztor
The expansion of the Teutonic Order State, 1230-1329 by H. Rutkowski
The Polish Kingdom, 1320 by J. Humnicki, H. Rutkowski
Monuments of Romanesque architecture in Poland by Z. Swiechowski
The battle of Grunwald, 1410 by H. Rutkowski
Cracow, 15th cent. by J. Humnicki, H. Rutkowski
The dominions of the Jagiellonian dynasty, 15th/16th cent. by H. Rutkowski
Major centres of the Reformation in Poland, 16th and 17th cent. by A. Zaboklicka
Dunin-Wqsowicz
Jesuits’ and Dissenters’ schools, 16th-18th cent. by W. Lewandowska
The Chmielnicki uprising, 1648-1653 by H. Rutkowski
Main residences of magnates, 17th and 18th cent. by A. Zaboklicka Dunin-Waqsowicz
Warsaw, second half of the 18th cent. by J. Humnicki, H. Rutkowski
The school system under the Commission for National Education by W. Lewandowska,
E. Rostworowski
Major military actions during the Kosciuszko Insurrection by H. Rutkowski
The Duchy of Warsaw by H. Rutkowski
The Congress Kingdom of Poland and the Free State of Cracow, 1815 by H. Rut-
kowski
The November Insurrection, 1830/1831 by H. Rutkowski
Textile inudustry in the Kingdom of Poland, c. 1850 by A. Zaboklicka Dunin-Waso-
WiCZ
Blast furnaces in the Kingdom of Poland and Silesia, c. 1857 by B. Kaczmarski
Industry in Poland and neighbouring countries, c. 1910 by Z. Pustula, H. Rutkowski
Poland, 1918/1919 by T. Ladogorski
The Silesian uprisings, 1919-1921 by T. Ladogorski
Plebiscite areas by T. Ladogorski
Density of population, 1931 by H. Rutkowski
Population of Poland according to occupation, 1936 by W. Lewandowska
Industrial centres in Poland, 1918-1939 by T. Ladogorski
32
61
73
94
100
103
118
130
147
162
201
207
249
291
301
330
349
366
386
432
434
507
544
553
554
581
592
594
INSERTED MAPS
Poland, c. 963-1034 by J. Humnicki, H. Rutkowski
Poland in the second half of the 12th cent. by J. Humnicki, H. Rutkowski
The Polish Kingdom under Casimir the Great, 1370 by H. Rutkowski
Poland and Lithuania, 1466 by H. Rutkowski
The Polish Commonwealth after the Union of Lublin, 1569 by A. Zaboklicka Dunin-
Wasowicz
The Polish Commonwealth during the partitions, 1772-1795 by H. Rutkowski, W. Pa-
tucki
Polish participation in the European Revolutions, 1848 by A. Zaboklicka Dunin-Wq-
SOWICZ
Poland under foreign rule, c. 1870 by H. Rutkowski
Poland, 1923 by H. Rutkowski
The Polish People’s Republic
48
64
112
128
160
320
416
464
560
608
DIAGRAMS
I. Growth of population in central Poland, 1000-1800 and 1800-1914
II. Growth of population in Poland, 1900-1940
III. Structure of peasant farms in Poland, c. 1900s
IV. Emigration from Polish lands, 1870-1914
V. Structure of small holdings in Poland, 1921 and 1938
VI. Growth of population in Poland, 1000-1975
DIAGRAMS
I, II, VI by I. Gieysztor ; III, IV, V by S. Jackowski
Genealogy of the Piasts
Genealogy of the Jagiellons and the Vasas
18
20
497
499
591
608
138
182
INTRODUCTION
Poland is a country which inherited and, at the same time, played her part
in the development of European culture. Situated in the heart of the conti-
nent, between the Carpathian Mountains and the Baltic Sea, between Ger-
many and Russia, Poland came under the influence in the course of ten cen-
turies of all the major migrations, conflicts and crucial economic and social
changes experienced by Europe since the Middle Ages. There were times
when Poland was a power of continental dimensions. There were times also
when she disappeared from the political map of the world. She enjoyed on
occasion great esteem in world opinion but she also sank at times into utter -
oblivion.
Today Poland is the seventh largest country in Europe in size and the
seventh in population. She is a member of the group of socialist countries
which is associated with the Soviet Union by ties of alliance and friendship,
but she also maintains lively economic and cultural relations with the na-
tions of the West. From being an agricultural country, exporting grain, tim-
ber, and later coal to the more prosperous communities of the West, Poland
has become an industrial country and an equal partner with them in inter-
national trade. The land of Copernicus, Chopin and Maria Sktodowska-Curie,
of Kosciuszko and Mickiewicz is still contributing its share to common
achievements of human thought and creative art.
At different times, according to the current political climate of opinion,
Poland’s historical role was variously defined as that of the “bulwark of
Christianity”, of the “Western bastion of the Slavs”, or of the “bridge be-
tween East and West”. Poland’s rich and varied past cannot be interpreted
and described by any one facile formula. In the course of history, every
European country has experienced vicissitudes of fortune. Yet in this part
of the world there is probably no country which can claim to have under-
gone such an erratic development as Poland.
The fully developed Polish State appeared upon the stage of history in
the second half of the tenth century. Dominion over the Vistula and Odra
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INTRODUCTION 19
(Oder) valleys was exercised with a firm hand by a hereditary ruler, asserting
his sovereignty and taking part successfully in critical political struggles
with the Empire, Rome, Kiev and Byzantium. The first monarchy in Poland
did not survive long. In the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries we find in
Polish territories a score of contending petty duchies, harrased by Tartar
raids, threatened by the expansionist policies of German lords marcher and
by the peaceful infiltration of German settlers, both burghers and peasants.
In spite of parcellization and weakness Poland’s cultural development
nevertheless followed the west European model. Settlements spread through-
out the country and urban life flourished. The country experienced more-
over the growth of constitutional institutions normal in the Middle Ages.
Parcellization, however, was succeeded by a fresh consolidation when the
last rulers of the Piast dynasty reunited Poland at the dawn of the fourteenth
century. Although only a landlocked state pushed back from the Odra river
and cut off from the Baltic Sea, Poland nevertheless had a vigorous life of
her own and was capable of defending her independence. A political union
with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania concluded at the close of the fourteenth
century, suddenly extended the frontiers of the Jagiellonian monarchy to the
sources of the Dnieper and to the shores of the Black Sea. In this way the
country became one of the major powers of Europe. Poland absorbed the
learning of the Renaissance and became a wealthy and brilliant community,
a granary of Europe and cradle of scholarship providing patronage to artists
and a haven of refuge for thinkers who suffered persecution elsewhere.
This golden age of Poland’s history was followed by a period of decline.
In modern times the development of central Europe followed a course differ-
ent from that of the leading countries of the West. Polish wheat was shipped
to the Low Countries and England while Poland imported industrial pro-
ducts from western Europe. The balance of trade was always unfavourable
to the east European States, a fact which had repercussions on the develop-
ment of the economy in the peculiar growth of demesne farming and the
so-called “second serfdom”. The carefree and hospitable life of the Polish
gentry was accompanied by a decline in the crafts, the stagnation of the
towns and the oppression of the peasants. The overwhelming political su-
periority of the gentry over the townsmen and the peasants destroyed the
basis for the rise of an absolute monarchy in Poland. At the close of the
sixteenth century the Polish Commonwealth could proudly point to its par-
liamentary system, to the toleration, equality and freedom enjoyed by the
gentry. In the following century however the Commonwealth was trans-
formed into an oligarchy of magnates with a feeble parliament and an admin-
istration reduced to impotence. The country, with a wide area open to attack
on all sides and torn internally by the uprisings of Ukrainian peasants, was
destined to fall victim to the greed of its powerful neighbours. Too late, in
the second half of the eighteenth century, Poland began to rise out of her
intellectual, economic and political sloth. It was nevertheless precisely her
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INTRODUCTION 21
achievements in the field of administration and military reforms which
induced Russia, Prussia and Austria to destroy the state which might become
an obstacle to their expansion.
There was indeed another paradox. Having lost their own state owing to
centuries of misgovernment, the Polish people were to fight with undaunted
resolve for the restoration of independence, appealing to the conscience
of Europe by their military endeavours, playing upon the antagonisms of
rival powers and establishing alliances with the European revolutionary
movements. Superficially it appeared that all these efforts were of no avail.
One insurrection after another ended in defeat until finally after 1864 noth-
ing was heard of the Polish cause in Europe. The whole of eastern Europe
and with it Poland in fact witnessed the destruction of the last vestiges of
feudalism and experienced an industrial revolution. As a consequence of the
transformation induced by the capitalist era, the population of Poland more
than doubled in the second half of the nineteenth century. National con-
sciousness, moreover, reached the mass of the population even in areas like
Upper Silesia and Pomerania which seemed near to being completely Ger-
manized. When the three partitioning Powers were brought to defeat and
ruin by the First World War, the Polish people were ready and capable of
demanding a state of their own.
This awakening of dormant nationalism may be seen in many other
European countries in the nineteenth century. Unlike the Czechs and Hun-
garians and even more unlike the Balkan peoples, Poland had existed as
a state up to the close of the eighteenth century and the advent of industriali-
zation. Consequently, Poland had not lost her aristocracy and gentry, but
on the contrary had even assimilated the upper classes in the Lithuania and
parts of the Ukraine. The society which lost its independence at the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century, a century of growing national awareness,
still retained a social structure and a political tradition inherited from the
epoch of self-government. This explains the exceptional dynamism of the
Polish national struggle and the fact that it was regarded by the leaders of
European revolutionary movements as a disruptive element within the Holy
Alliance. This fact also explains many peculiar characteristics in the political
life of Poland’s more recent history. It was the poorer, declassed section of
the gentry that fought for independence up to 1863. This element was to
transmit its ideals and traditions to the Polish intelligentsia, a large propor-
tion of whom came from the gentry. Here are the sources of the particular
role played by the radical representatives of the intelligentsia at the turn of
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It was they who stimulated the
growth of workers’ and peasants’ movements, though unable to identify
themselves entirely with them. This political tradition explains the high-
minded ambition of the Polish intelligentsia apparent in the years between the
two world wars, their aspiration to play the part of rulers and leaders of
the nation. Those singular characteristics which have emerged in the political
22 INTRODUCTION
and social upheaval of the post-war years, and which distinguish Poland
from other People’s Democracies, may perhaps be traced to this same source.
Poland’s history was determined only to a certain degree by her geo-
graphical position and her role in Europe’s development. Like the rest of
the continent, Poland lived through the Middle Ages, participated in the
Renaissance and the age of Enlightenment and experienced the consequences
of the industrial revolution. Unlike the countries of central and eastern
Europe, however, Poland began to suffer, by the eighteenth century, the
consequences of an economy which was retarded by comparison with that
of the western European countries. In this broad frame of reference this
history seeks to analyse the salient features of Polish historical development
in both the decline of the Commonwealth and in the national revival after
the loss of independence.
At home and abroad widely differing views of the Polish nation’s char-
acteristics have been held. Poland “the Christ of nations” and “the con-
science of the world”, Poland ruined by misgovernment and incapable of
throwing off her anarchy, these are the widely disparate judgements. Reject-
ing these concepts many historians of recent years veer towards an opposite
extreme in refusing to admit that Polish history has claims to singular char-
acteristics of its own and in detecting in it only the refllections of universal
processes.
The truth lies somewhere between these two points of view. Account
ought to be taken both of the European character of Poland’s history and
of her specific and peculiar contribution to the history of Europe. This short
history aims at examining the course of these two themes as they run through
Poland’s past.
MEDIEVAL POLAND
by Aleksander Gieysztor
Chapter I
BEFORE THE RISE
OF THE POLISH STATE
SLAVIC ANTIQUITY
Mention of Poland and the Poles first appears at the close of the tenth cen-
tury in the pages of foreign chroniclers who had obtained more exact infor-
mation about this people. This single fact, however, cannot serve as a point
of departure for an examination of the evolution of the Poles or Poland. At
this early date the names as well as the ideas which these terms represented
reveal a centuries-old heritage which remained in constant evidence through
the Middle Ages and into the present. The Polish language, the most signifi-
cant cultural phenomenon in Poland’s history, began to emerge in a remote
antiquity. Other features of a geographic, historic and ethnographic nature
also hark back to the period before the rise of the Polish State.
Most probably, a pronounced language division occurred among the
Slavs in the last centuries B.c. The two large groups which emerged from this
division were the West Slavs, who occupied an area north of the Carpathian
and Sudeten Mountains and east of the Odra river, and the East Slavs whose
settlements spread east of Volhynia up to the middle Dnieper.
There was an affinity between the material cultures and the social sys-
tems of the early Slavs. The language differences between the two groups
were the result of geographic conditions, namely a large expanse of area in
which it was impossible to maintain one uniform language despite the com-
mon ethnic background designated by the old native term Slavs. However,
the principal factor was the different historic evolution of each of these
groups. Their individual histories were affected by the cultural and political
conditions of neighbouring peoples, some of whom were integrated with the
Slavs and exerted varying influences on the Slav culture.
The West Slavs emerged in the first centuries B.c, in an area occupied
earlier by an older stratum of Indo-European inhabitants, from whom they
most probably took the name Wends (Veneti). The subject under considera-
tion is the ethnic affiliation of the people of what the archaeologists call the
Lusatian culture. Though it belonged probably to an earlier ethnic stratum
26 BEFORE THE RISE OF THE POLISH STATE
Sleza mountain. Woman with Fish
Leg Piekarski. Roman imports, 2nd-3rd cent.
than the Slavs, the Lusatian culture was nevertheless absorbed completely by
them. The peoples of the Lusatian culture occupied virtually the whole of
contemporary Poland and reached far to the west and south west beyond
the present Polish frontiers. The long centuries of peaceful development,
from about 1300 to 400 B.c., years untroubled, it seems, by alien incursions,
promoted a considerable uniformity in the features of the material culture.
From these days and up through the Middle Ages and on, the cultural thread
in our country remained unbroken, which can be seen in the features of the
timber buildings, the settlements and their anthropological substratum. It
may be assumed that the Lusatian culture played an important part in the
formation of the West Slav culture.
It has been possible to study the cultural achievements of this people in
the large fortified settlement of about 400 B.c. which has been excavated at
Biskupin in the Bydgoszcz voivodship. The principal features were : primi-
tive farming methods and animal husbandry, a high skill in carpentry and
pottery, and the use of iron to forge weapons and some of the tools. A con-
siderable section of the Biskupin settlement has been uncovered on a lake
island. The old settlement comprised about 100 houses of the same size
28 BEFORE THE RISE OF THE POLISH STATE
lining eleven parallel streets all ending in one street that inscribed a sur-
rounding oval line. A 15 to 19 feet high powerful wooden rampart and
a structure that broke the floes and the force of the waves, surrounded the
settlement. A large gate opened on the bridge that joined the island with the
mainland. It may be assumed that fortified settlements of this type were the
seat of the wealthier patriarchal families who protected their growing
wealth from greedy neighbours.
The genesis of the West Slavs may be traced to the modification of this
Lusatian culture under the influence of the Slavs. It is no accident that this
change coincided with economic changes, related on the one hand to the
development of iron metallurgy—with the ore mined locally from the
second and first centuries 8.c.—and on the other to improvements in agri-
culture. It seems that the proximity of federations of Celtic tribes helped the
ancient Slavs to adopt a number of technical innovations. In the late fourth
and the early third century 3B.c. the Celts reached across the lands on the
Danube and the territory of Bohemia as far as Silesia where they established
a settled community in the region of the Sleza mountain. The magnificent
sculptures ascribed to them which are scattered on the slopes and at the foot
of the mount would indicate that this was their chief centre of worship,
inherited later by other peoples. Another settlement was established in Upper
Silesia while Celtic influence also extended as far as western Little Poland.
The assumption is that the tribal name of the Lugii may refer to those Celtic
groups. Other scholars, however, place them among Slavic tribes.
THE SLAVIC WENDS AND THE GERMANS ON THE
FRINGES OF ROMAN INFLUENCE
Starting with Herodotus (fifth century B.c.) the Slavic peoples were recorded
by geographers in the Mediterranean basin under a variety of names. More
definitive remarks pertaining especially to the Wese Slavs appear in the
first and second centuries a.D. The later chroniclers speak of the Wends who
lived on the Baltic seacoast west of the Vistula, east of the Sudeten Moun-
tains and north of the Carpathians, occupying an area that extended to the
river Dnieper. Close study of the records left by Roman writers has led to
the conclusion that the Wends are Slavic in character. Approximately at the
beginning of the Christian Era, these peoples were threatened by the pressure
of Germanic tribes who, in a period of political activity, invaded and settled
for varying lengths of time various parts of the Wend lands.
Among these Germanic peoples were the Goths who in the first decades
of the Christian Era came to Pomerania from Scandinavia. They remained
in a part of Gdansk-Pomerania until the third century and established trade
between the lower Vistula and the Moravian Gate and the Ktodzko Pass.
ON THE FRINGES OF ROMAN INFLUENCE 29
The name of the Lugii was eventually extended to include all Celtic, Ger-
manic and Slavic tribes which, no matter what their origins, lived in this
area. At first the federation of the Lugii showed good will toward the Marko-
manns (a Germanic tribe) but at the end of the first century concluded an
alliance against them with the Roman Empire. The Burgundians, originally
from Bornholm and other Scandinavian countries, lived at that time on the
lower reaches of the Odra but they were soon to continue their Odyssey
towards the west and the south. The Gepidae lived at the mouth of the Vis-
tula. Larger German groups departed from the territories of the Slavic Wends
between the second and fourth centuries and moved closer to the Roman
frontier. Thus about 250 a.p. the Goths reached the Black Sea. Soon after
the Gepidae followed them bringing others in their wake. It may be accepted
that in the fourth century the Slavic Wends became again the sole masters
of the Polish territories. In the first centuries a.D. the Wends occupied some
regions of these original territories side by side with other peoples although
they remained the sole inhabitants of the major section of these lands. This
period marked also a broad social and economic transformation of the
Wends.
Written records contain little information about this. Much more can
be gleaned from abundant archaeological evidence which indicates that the
Polish territories were on the fringes of the influence of Mediterranean cul-
ture. When the Romans crushed the Celtic power in Gaul and in the Alpine
countries, they opened trade routes to the north and east of Europe, to lands
inhabited by German and Slavic peoples whose elders purchased Roman
goods imported from the imperial provinces of the Rhineland, Gaul and the
Danube valley. One may conclude that some of these communities knew how
to set aside means for the purchase of such luxuries as glassware, vessels which
bore the stamp of far-off producers (terra sigillata), amphorae filled with
wine and bronze and silver vessels.
Some of the graves of that period, called the “princes’ graves”, contain an
astonishing wealth of objects. Valuable Roman imports, bronze vessels, silver
goblets, dice and stones used in games and statuettes of Hellenic and Roman
gods indicate, that the chiefs adopted a style of life which imitated that of
the upper classes in Roman provincial society. The less opulent though more
numerous graves of the warriors indicate that members of wealthier families
maintained a personal relationship with the leaders.
The luxury trade route from the countries of the Roman Empire ran
from the direction of the Rhineland and Aquileia through the Polish terri-
tories to the Baltic seaboard. Pliny the Elder wrote of the amber trade which
attracted a wealthy Roman trader, who in the days of Nero set out for the
Baltic from the Danubian Carnuntum near Vienna. He made such large
purchases of amber that the whole Roman amphitheatre could be adorned
with it. He was one of the first Romans to explore the trading conditions
and routes of this region. However, it seems that go-between agents played
30 BEFORE THE RISE OF THE POLISH STATE
the dominant part in this trade. They carried skins, furs, honey, wax, some
slaves and, above all, amber to frontier trade outposts in the Roman prov-
inces. Impressive quantities of amber, called “the gold of the north”, were
exported to the south, especially in the second century A.D. One of the stores
discovered at Partynice near Wroclaw contained three tons of this valuable
material. Roman silver coins made their appearance in the Slavic lands, and
were in abundance in the second century, but became increasingly rare from
the third century on.
News of distant lands lying north of the Carpathians reached the Med-
iterranean writers through the traders. Thus in the middle of the second
century, Claudius Ptolemy, the Alexandrian geographer, placed on his map
the first place name in the Polish territories. Ptolemy’s Kalisia, identified
with present day Kalisz on the Prosna river, lay on the amber route.
In the southern Polish territories the crafts, practiced in an earlier per-
iod to satisfy domestic needs, were taken over later by specialists in some
branches of production in certain regions of the territory. The development
of iron smelting was based on turf ores mined in strip pits and partly, as in
the Swietokrzyskie Mountains, on mined red iron ore or haematite. From the
third to the fifth centuries, after the departure of the Germanic tribes who
did not engage in smelting, other important smelting centres operated in an
area near Cracow where fifteen centuries later there was to be built one of
the most powerful metallurgical combines in the country, known as Nowa
Huta. A great many primitive smelting furnaces were discovered and studied
at the time when Nowa Huta was built. It is assumed that the iron produced
here was exported south beyond the Carpathians.
The family community which continued as the basic unit of the social
structure was undergoing diversification. Owing to the contact between the
Slavic Wends and the martial Celtic and Germanic groups, certain families
became engaged in fighting and looting, others in trading or even perhaps in
the organization of industrial production on quite a large scale. The system
employed in the production of pottery near Cracow in the first centuries A.D.,
has been compared with that of the Pannonian workshops which employed
slave labour.
However, these phenomena were neither permanent nor prevalent. In
spite of the activities of these leading families, the Polish territories were
still a land of free farmers and cattle breeders who lived on self-sufficient
farms. As among all the Slavs, so here too, land was held in common. This
organization was based on the principle of military aid and agricultural
cooperation among neighbours. The common use of pastures and forests
was widespread, though families tilled their own land individually. The
existing farm tools enabled some leading families to work the same strips of
land continuously. However, new areas of settlement were usually brought
under the plough by the majority of farmers by the more primitive burnbeat
method of cultivation. A noticeable rise in the number of settlements signi-
SLAVIC MIGRATIONS AND THE AGE OF CRISES 312
fied a growth in the population. Archaeologists and historians put the hypo-
thetical density of population in the second century a.D., in the area which
corresponds to that of present-day Poland, at about 1.2 to 2 persons per
square kilometre, or roughly a population of about 375,000.
The distribution of the settlements and the concentration of Roman im-
ports would indicate several territories which correspond to the later region-
al division of Medieval Poland. Several groups seemed to have gained con-
siderable importance in the first centuries a.D. They settled in the vicinity of
Wroctaw, Cracow and Sandomierz. This may have been the beginning of an
important political organization in southern Poland, each of which embraced
several tribes. In the plains of central Poland, the more significant groups
of this type were settled around Poznan, Kruszwica, Leczyca and Plock.
Similar communities were known in Pomerania and in the Baltic region of
Pruthenia and Sudovia (Ja¢wiez). It is not known whether this
phenomenon carried the seed of the rise of states on a regional scale. Not-
withstanding their political activity, it would seem that these groups never
advanced beyond the stage of tribal federations and that the twilight of the
Ancient world engulfed in its descending shadows the Polish lands as well,
retarding the formation of social classes by a few centuries.
SLAVIC MIGRATIONS AND THE AGE OF CRISES
THE FIFTH TO THE SEVENTH CENTURIES
The tribal federations of Slavs were at the peak of their prosperity in the
third and fourth centuries. This fact enabled large groups of Slavs to spill
beyond their native area between the Odra and the Vistula and the upper
Dniester and middle Dnieper.
Warrior leaders of the tribal federations of Slavs stood at the head of
these expeditions which turned, especially in the fifth and sixth centuries,
into migrations of large sections of the population. The economic, social and
political reasons behind the Slavic migrations are not entirely clear. At any
rate, it seems that the Polish lands were experiencing a period of a compara-
tive population growth, because large groups of settlers issued from these
regions and, as early as the fifth century, moved south to Bohemia, Moravia
and Slovakia, areas which were completely absorbed by the Slavs. In the
course of the fifth and sixth centuries they moved westwards to the area
between the Odra and the Elbe which for many centuries hence was to be
occupied by Slavs, who by their language and customs were most closely
related to the Poles.
Conclusive evidence is available regarding the original Veleti settlements
in the Polish territories, especially in Pomerania, before this people moved
west to the Odra. The Serbs lived here before they moved into the Lusatian
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area, and south to the Danubian lands. The Obodrits lived on the Odra be-
fore they moved to the lower Elbe. The Croats probably inhabited the upper
Vistula before they moved off in different directions ; their main body was
carried to the Sava river. In the age of Slavic migrations, some of these
names denoted only enterprising groups of warriors led by princes. The
Slavic population subjugated by them in the Balkans came from the great
East Slavic language family.
In contrast with the impressive German march across the lands of the
Roman Empire and its peripheries, the main feature of Slavic settlement
SLAVIC MIGRATIONS AND THE AGE OF CRISES 33
was the complete mastery of the occupied areas by planting settlements and
by effecting a permanent slavification, embracing not only the mass of in-
coming Slavs, but also other ethnic groups which assimilated the Slavic lan-
guage. This expansion was facilitated by the economic, social and political
cataclysm that struck the Roman Empire, and by the migrations of other
barbarians across its territories. The westward thrusts of the Huns set off
a chain reaction. Numerous German tribes surged in the direction of the
Roman Empire and at the end of the fourth century the Slavic peoples
moved into the Danubian lands which were left vacant by the departing
Germans and Roman garrisons.
It is supposed that in the second quarter of the fifth century during the rule
of Attila, the peoples which lived in the Polish territories were subdued by
Huns. The signs may be read in the archaeological finds of southern Poland.
The graves discovered in Jakuszowice southwest of Cracow have yielded
a bow embossed with gold, a symbol of authority among the Huns. Teophy-
laktos Simokattes, a Byzantine historian, wrote (book VI, chapters 2-4) that
at the close of the sixth century an Avar Chagan (khan) sought the aid of Slav
chieftains who lived on the Baltic and sent gifts to them. Their strength must
have been considerable if the formidable Avars appealed to them for mili-
tary and political aid against the Byzantines. In 562-567 the Avars probably
not without the cooperation of some Slavic tribes, assaulted the Merovingian
Kingdom, launching the attack from southern Poland, which may have
been under the control of the Avar empire in one way or another. Whatever
the dependency it must have been rather loose, for archaeology provides very
little evidence of the presence of Avars north of the Carpathians. The Polish
word olbrzym, which means giant, may have come from the name of the
Avars in the same manner, as the old French term ogre may be traced to the
Hungarian invasions of the tenth century.
No outline shall be given here of the Slavic migrations to the Balkans,
particularly in the sixth and seventh centuries, where the East Slavs dis-
played a greater vigour in establishing their settlements. It is sufficient to say
that this period witnessed a regrouping of the Slav peoples. In addition to
the East and West Slavs there now emerged a third group, the South Slavs.
The main role in the creation of this group was played by the East Slavic
elements though not without an admixture of certain West Slavic elements.
Later a further diversification made itself felt among West Slavs, in the
form of a split into the Southwest Slavs, the ancestors of the later Czechs
and Slovaks, and into the Northwest group, comprised of the Polish and
Polabian Slavs.
The material culture of the inhabitants of Poland declined on account
of the emigration of large groups of the Slavic population — west beyond
the Odra and up to the Elbe, and south across the Sudeten Mountains and
the Carpathians, and owing to the severance of trade ties with the now
depopulated Roman provinces. There was a pronounced slump in the living
3 History of Poland
34 BEFORE THE RISE OF THE POLISH STATE
standards of the tribal elders as trade with distant lands deteriorated. The
descendants of the elders depended more on domestic products than on loot
from distant lands and on external trade.
This reversion to primitive culture affected chiefly the leading families.
It was, however, not quite as catastrophic as in the case of the downfall of
Roman grandeur and the ruin of its high intellectual culture. The Slavic pop-
ulation which continued to live in rural conditions and whose demands or
means of satisfying them were not exorbitant, may have breathed more freely
when great potteries and metallurgical workshops, which were in no way
integrated with their peaceful and easy-going life on territories held in com-
mon, were abandoned or destroyed following the nomadic invasions.
The subsequent years did not bring peace. The Roman model was replaced
by others. Most significant, however, was the development and expansion
of the heritage of the by-gone epoch, that is the cultivation of soil and stock-
breeding. Extensive burnbeat cultivation was still prevalent. It led to great
mobility of settlement and internal colonization. Although intensive farm-
ing with the use of the ard was still limited yet it was common enough in
southern Poland as early as the fourth and fifth centuries, as is borne out by
the discovery of ploughshares. As the migrations of German tribes and no-
mads came to a halt, the seventh century ushered in a steady economic
expansion which, though modest at first, bore promise of qualitative growth.
Meanwhile, the Slavic peoples in the Polish territories were still organ-
ized into territorial tribes living under a democratic system. Byzantine ob-
servers reported that all problems whether favourable or not were discussed
by the Slavs at assemblies attended by all the people. Here differences among
the leaders were brought to light. The assemblies appointed princes whose
authority was limited, because the general assembly had the power to vote
for or against war and to make grants to the chosen ruler.
In this type of society, conservative as all groups with little internal
stratification, there were, however, the seeds of cultural change. Economic
progress required time, but the impatience of certain sections of the com-
munity speeded development. The impetus came from the narrow group of
lords who were eager to turn their influence to profit by the division of la-
bour, the concentration of political power, and an extension of territorial
organization. With the dawn of the new age the proto-Polish tribes and
peoples stood on a similar culture level to the other Slavic, Baltic and Scan-
dinavian peoples. Their entry into medieval civilization still required a con-
siderable re-structuring of all aspects of their social life:
Chapter IT
THE ORIGINS OF POLAND
ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF POLAND
IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES
The research of the last few years has established the fact that Poland and
Polish nationality did not emerge suddenly in the middle of the tenth century,
nor did they spring full grown from the head of Mieszko I, son of Siemomys},
the first Polish duke who is better known owing to written records and who
was by and large an excellent ruler. The origin of Poland is spread over
several centuries. The statesmen of that period remain anonymous. Their ac-
tivity is but vaguely known while events and details are submerged in ob-
livion. The period of Poland’s origins in these centuries is marked mainly by
the daily effort of the people who changed the features of history by clear-
ing primeval forests for arable land, by building settlements and homes
and by their concern to transmit to their successors the growing material,
social and spiritual heritage.
The period of emergence from obscurity, from the end of the Slavic
migrations in the seventh century to the rise of a Polish State in the tenth
century, was remarkable for events of special significance and long lasting
consequences. The foundations of a new and diverse medieval society fol-
lowing the course of feudal evolution and the development of Polish ethnic
traits as distinct from the Slavic family as a whole and the West Slavs in
particular, may already be perceived. Modern research has enabled closer
study to be made of the economic foundations of the changes that occurred
concurrently on many levels of human activity.
The general progress noted in agriculture and stockbreeding before the
formation of the State, was a factor in overcoming the social and political
crisis, which marked the Slavic migrations. In the early Middle Ages social
organizations again began to gain control over their natural surroundings in
order to increase the yield of the soil. By the clearing of trees, and the burn-
ing of brushwoods, human settlements cut deep swaths into the forests, and
with the use of iron ploughshares the lands around the settlements could be
cultivated intensively. Grain crops, especially important in view of the
growing population, seem to have been produced in larger quantities between
3°
3% THE ORIGINS OF POLAND
the seventh and tenth centuries, a time when the major parts of the Slavic
lands adopted the ard and abandoned, except in remote or outlying settle-
ments, the older and more primitive methods of agriculture.
The soil was the chief source of wealth in the Polish land. Its produc-
tivity was related directly to the improvement of farming implements. The
lighter soil of Great Poland, Pomerania and Mazovia were easy to plough.
When ploughshares were armed with iron during the late period of Roman
influence, it was possible to till the heavy and fertile soil of Silesia and Little
Poland. The prevalence of the ard and the sickle must have effected
changes in the quality of Polish agriculture as early as the tenth century.
The pursuit of agriculture and cattle farming gave the landscape of early Po-
land an appearance of uniform husbandry. There were regional differences
of lesser importance, resulting from the abundance of wild life or bees’ nests
in the forests, or from an abundance of fresh water fish. The chief mineral
mined in this period was bog iron ore which was found in virtually all Polish
territories. In many parts of Poland iron smelting was conducted most prob-
ably as a seasonal occupation secondary to farming. Salt was extracted
from salt springs by evaporation, principally at Kolobrzeg in Western Pom-
erania, in the Kujawy region, near Cracow and in other local salt springs.
Skills in various crafts spread gradually. Having survived the critical period
between the fifth and seventh centuries, such crafts as pottery and metallurgy
revived under the influence of new stimuli. Domestic products still fell far
short of the luxury handicrafts imported from both near and distant coun-
tries to satisfy the needs of the leading social groups.
As the upper ranks of society established their position on the new eco-
nomic foundations, the severed or tenuous trade ties with other countries
were reestablished. Though not numerous, the archaeological sites of the
seventh, eighth and ninth centuries indicate that the economy of the Slavic,
proto-Polish and Baltic tribal federations, though they still bore the traits
of a primitive, natural economy conducted within settled groups, neverthe-
less had contacts with the external world. The trade of this period involved
a small number of goods which were especially attractive to the ruling
group. The most important items were weapons which domestic producers
could not supply in sufficient quality and number ; next came luxury goods,
such as gold and other ornaments. It is known, although this information
pertains to other Slavic countries, that horses were used in the barter trade.
One of the frontier posts through which goods from and to the West
had to pass was Magdeburg on the Elbe, designated by Charlemagne’s
decree as one of the places to which Frankish merchants, chiefly Jews, could
come to trade with the Slavs. In the ninth and tenth centuries, the items
exported were principally furs and slaves despatched usually from Mainz,
the emporium from which the goods were carried to Gaul, northern Italy
and even Islamic Spain, where Slavic slaves were highly valued. In southern
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF REGIONAL STATES 37
Germany, Ratisbon (Regensburg) was an important market centre of a far-
flung trade.
Trade with Rus (Ruthenia) was established at an early date. One of the
routes between Ruthenia and central and western Europe ran through Poland
as early as the ninth century. The route led from Kiev to Cracow and
thence through Bohemia and Bavaria. Imports of Moravian metallurgy
were also known in Polish territories.
Sea commerce on the Baltic with the distant Frisian and the closer Scan-
dinavian ports gains in vigour in the course of the ninth century. Wulfstan,
the voyager and informant of King Alfred of Wessex, sailed at the close of
the tenth century from Haithabu (Hedeby) at the base of the Jutland penin-
sula and down the Slavic coast eastwards to the market settlement of Truso-
Druzno, an active buying and selling centre lying in the Vistula delta in
the Slav-Pruthenian border area, not far from present lake Druzno and
Elblag.
It may be inferred from written evidences supported by archaeological
data that in the early Middle Ages the forest frontiers between the lands of the
Balts and the Slavs were crossed by both sides. In addition to the sea and
coastal routes from the mouth of the Vistula to Sambia, renowned for hez
amber, the roads between the settlements of Chelmno region and the bor-
ders of Pomerania led deep into the Prussian region; an important Mazovian
route joined by a southern branch from south Poland ran up the Narew
towards Sudovia, a region situated between Poland, Ruthenia, Lithuania and
Pruthenia, which was for many centuries a neuralgic cross-road of economic
and political interests in this part of eastern Europe.
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION
OF REGIONAL STATES
The early medieval trade expanded concurrently with the organization of
the larger states which were capable of insuring a steady supply of the raw
material sought by foreign merchants. The materials were collected from
the tributes exacted from the population by their rulers. The rulers also guaran-
teed a supply of slaves, principally, though not exclusively, war hostages.
In the Polish territories, as among the neighbouring peoples, this trade
satisfied the demands of the higher social classes which cut themselves off
from the territorial rights held in common. These people accumulated more
arable land and more cattle because they worked their farms with slave
labour made up of war captives and native serfs. As the accumulated movable
wealth was inherited, the lords had a greater opportunity for conducting
wars, for pursuing political interests and for leading the free population.
Representatives of this group stood at the head of larger territorial federa-
38 THE ORIGINS OF POLAND
tions and compelled the population to make free gifts and imposed tributes
for the ducal treasury and for their own political activity. Wars of expan-
sion and loot were conducted by means of a standing group of warriors and
also troops raised by levy in the whole of the political organization.
The new type of organization was heralded by the emergence of the
castle-town (gréd, castrum), a fortified settlement raised as a centre of
authority by several powerful families whose political influence extended
over the surrounding still fairly small territories. The archaeological remains
of these wood and earth works are studied today as evidence of Polish his-
tory. The oldest, built between the seventh and ninth centuries, are of two
types. There are the small forts built as seats of the leaders which were
known in Great Poland, Lower Silesia and also in western Mazovia. The
second type are the large structures which served as a refuge for the whole
population of a given area. We know, however, from Little Poland that
the whole of the fortified area was not occupied permanently. Political
power vested in the most powerful economic groups tended to concentrate
in both types of such castle-towns. The political centres began to show great
vigour. This fact may be ascribed to the aspirations of lords who, in the
struggle with their rivals and with the population from whom they exacted
tribute, created the military and financial foundations of the state structure.
Among the Slavs and the Balts the political struggle for power took
place most likely at the general assemblies of freemen called the wiec. Here
the antagonisms between the interests of the freemen and the ambitions of
the notables and between the rival tendencies of individual notables, came to
light. Actually, policies of war and peace were resolved by the assembly’sbody
of aldermen drawn from among the notables, who also chose or deposed
their leader, the duke (Polish knedz, later ksiqdz and ksigze, latin dux).
The dukes were originally, and for a long time, only military command-
ers, but they strove to increase their wealth and to secure office for life.
Later they tried to make this honour hereditary also. The success of their
endeavor depended on what interest could be excited among the notables
in external expansion. Among the Polish and Russian Slavs, this expansion
led to concentration of political power in the course of the ninth and tenth
centuries. Among the Balts, this power did not cross the low threshold of
territorial and castle-town districts until the emergence of the Lithuanian
State in the thirteenth century, their expansion having been checked by
powerful Polish and Russian neighbours.
In the early Middle Ages, the duke led a small group of warriors which
the Slavs called a druzyna. This institution was indispensable to the success
of authority, though the warrior group alone did not constitute a state. The
state emerged from a struggle waged by the duke, the notables and the war-
riors on the one hand, against the free members of territorial communes on
the other, upon whom they sought to impose heavy burdens to support the
treasury and to defray military costs. The enactment of tribute and gifts
Proboszczowice. Stronghold, 9th cent.
signified that a State machinery was in operation. The ruling groups had a
share in the income of the treasury and by this fact indentified their inter-
ests with the policies of the highest authority, working to strengthen its po-
sition internally and externally.
The factors which secured an uneasy balance in this antagonistic social
structure are noteworthy. One of these, and not the least important, was the fact
that the free population still constituted the overwhelming majority in the
expansionary and defensive enterprises undertaken by the political organi-
zation, which also offered a chance of development for many of the inhabit-
ants. They were still integrated by a common faith and belief, a common lan-
guage and culture, a fluidity between the social groups and the way of life
of individual groups of the population.
A record written in the eastern part of the Carolingian Empire, most
probably immediately after 843, and called the Bavarian Geographer (De-
scriptio civitatum ad orientalem plagam Danubit), gives an account of the
organization of the Slavic and Baltic political associations of the ninth
century. Several other ninth and tenth century texts fill in the picture and
disperse the mists of anonymity surrounding certain phenomena, which at
this date had a long history of evolution. Informants of the Carolingian of-
40 THE ORIGINS OF POLAND
4
7
Lezno. Cult stone, 10th cent.
ficials knew comparatively a great deal about the nearest neighbours of the
Frankish State ; but less was known about the territorial organizations that
lay on the trade routes to the east and very little indeed about the political
institutions of the lands of the Slavs and the Balts in the remoter areas.
What were the oldest Polish territorial organizations ?
In Silesia we find at least five territorial organizations : the Dziadoszanie
(Dadodesani), Bobrzanie, Slezanie (Sleenzani), Opolanie (Opolini) and Go-
leszyce (Golensizi). A large group of the Polanie (Polanes) inhabited all of
central Poland. Some scholars hold that the term Polanes was preceded by
Ledzice (Lendizi) and that this term was extended from central Poland to
embrace various other regions as far as the Ruthenian boundary, where the
Poles were known as Lachy ; they were called by the Baltic peoples the
Lenkai and by the Magyars (Hungarians) the Lengyel. It is probable, how-
ever, that the term Ledzice was first applied to the south-eastern strip of
proto-Polish lands on the forefield of Sandomierz. Written evidence reveals
two smaller regions, one of the Wolinianie (Velunzani) and the Pyrzyczanie
(Prissani) and of other smaller groups whose names have become extinct.
Another large regional group known as the Vislanes (Wislanie) lived in south-
ern Poland on the upper Vistula and its tributaries.
Virtually nothing is known of the rest of the Polish lands and of their
THE ORIGINS OF THE POLANES 41
é
organization. The geographic extent of these groups mentioned above is often
an object of scholarly controversy. It is possible to determine the territorial
delimitations, bounds with permanent settlement, by the names which these
large and small organizations carried, but only in rare instances did the
names survive a greater length of time. This is eloquent evidence of the po-
litical ferment in which the peoples who bore these names lived. Unrecorded
battles and invasions, attempts to consolidate large areas and their subsequent
disintegration, was most likely the content of their political history.
Two major centres proved capable of survival. One of these formed
around Cracow, the capital of the small State of the Vislanes, and the sec-
ond rose around Gniezno, the capital of the Polanes.
In the second half of the ninth century the Moravian neighbours con-
sidered the Vislanes “very powerful” for having opposed the political ex-
pansion and the attempts at conversion to Christianity that came from
Moravia. However, this opposition ended in disaster for the duke of the
Vislanes and his ]ands were incorporated into the Moravian State. The Life
of Methodius, an apostle from Moravia, gives an account written by a con-
temporary: “The pagan duke, very powerful among the Vislanes, defied the
Christians and caused them harm. Methodius sent to him and said ‘My son,
it would be well for you to accept baptism of your own free will in your
own land, for otherwise, taken captive you will be forced to accept Christi-
anity in a foreign land. Remember my words!’ And so it came to pass”. .
Despite its favourable geographical situation and it would seem a swift-
er, economic development, southern Poland could no longer fulfil the role
of being the nucleus of a growing State, owing to the pressure of more
powerful neighbours to the south, Moravia and Bohemia, and later to the
influence of the Polanes to the north. ;
THE ORIGINS OF THE POLANES
The Polanes inhabited a territory on the middle Warta. Their expansion
was most fruitful in political consequences. The term Polanes—Polanie is
undoubtedly derived from the Slavic pole, the word for field. This testifies
to the agricultural nature of settlement in an area under permanent culti-
vation, though surrounded and cut up by forests. Very little is known as
yet about the earliest history of this political federation. The large expanse
of territory inhabited by the Polanes in the tenth century would indicate
that their conquests must have begun at least in the middle of the ninth
century. The duke, who ruled in Gniezno, succeeded in uniting in a state of
consjderable scope the smaller territories around such castle-towns as Poz-
nan, Kruszwica, Lad and Kalisz and to set it on a course of continued terri-
torial expansion.
42 THE ORIGINS OF POLAND
Recent archaeological excavations have yielded tangible evidence about
the castle-town of Gniezno, which the written records name as the capital
of the Polish duke in the tenth century. This well fortified town was founded
between the eighth and ninth centuries and expanded later several times. The
names of the dynasty to which Mieszko I belonged are known. The name
itself testifies to the fact that the ruling house was of native origin. Mieszko I
succeeded to a throne upon which not a few predecessors had sat : his father
Siemomysl, his grandfather Leszek (also Lestek or Lestko) and great grand-
father Siemowit preceded by yet another duke, called ChoSciszko, a person
who cannot be identified with the legendary Piast. There is a vague tradition
that this dynasty ascended the throne by an act of violence committed most
probably in the second half of the ninth century. Medieval history created
the legend that the dynasty was founded by Piast, a peasant of the Duke
Popiel from the preceding dynasty. Modern history of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries bestowed upon the ruling house the dynastic name of
Piast, although in the Middle Ages these rulers called themselves “the fam-
ily of Polish dukes”.
The shaping of the Polish State started a hundred, if not more, years
earlier than about the year 963 when Mieszko I led Poland onto the stage of
European history. Mieszko I and his predecessors expressed the interests of
the small group of lords who surrounded them. The organization of a strong
Polish State accorded not only with the goals and interests of the centre
of authority with its seat at Gniezno and not only did it protect the popula-
tion from foreign invasion, but also insured a distinct ethnic and cultural
evolution to the native elements. The bell of history had sounded for the
West Slavs. The fact that the German State had frustrated the political
devélopment of the Polabian Slavs, led eventually to their loss of independ-
ence and to their gradual, but final disappearance from the map of Europe.
After 955, following the twin victory of Otto I over the Hungarians and
the Slavs, the Polanes brushed against the mounting influence of large power
that was rising in the west.
The leaders of the Polanes showed considerable political sense at this
hour of the birth of their State. The prospects awaiting them were clearly
extremely attractive unlike those offered to the small Polabian or Pruthenian
States. It was incumbent upon them to meet the challenge of history. The
prospects were of expansion which promised to strengthen the central organi-
zation of the State, which was the repository of every type of revenue, loot
and prisoners. One of the consequences in the evolution of an expansionary
political organization was the early emergence among the Polanes of the
authority of a hereditary duke. However, this did not preclude the fact that
the lords had to give their approval to the manner in which the title was
transferred to the descendents.
A large area was united in the course of the ninth and tenth centuries.
It embraced, even before the reign of Mieszko I, a wide expanse of plain,
THE SPIRITUAL CULTURE ON THE EVE OF THE UNIFICATION 43
and therefore all of central Poland, the later Great Poland, the lands of
Leczyca and Sieradz and all of Mazovia. It is quite probable that at this
early date the Polanes had already reached across the Land of Chetmno for
suzerainty over Gdansk-Pomerania, which was conveniently connected with
central Poland by the course of the lower Vistula and roads alongside both
its well populated banks. Apart from this loosely-connected territorial group
there was still the northern zone of the lake and coastal countries of Western
Pomerania ruled by various dukes and local lords, and the uplands of Si-
lesia and Little Poland, embraced by Bohemian influence.
Most of these territories were drawn together by their similar social evo-
lution. Physical-geographic links between the basins of the Odra and the
Vistula, as well as the cultural, ethnical and lauguage similarities, were con-
ducive to unification. These factors were very important to the cohesion of
early medieval states, although their architects did not always take them
into account, trying instead, with varying success, to extend their rule beyond
the related ethnic groups.
THE SPIRITUAL AND MENTAL CULTURE ON THE EVE
OF THE UNIFICATION OF THE POLISH STATE
What common cultural heritage could attract to each other the population
of the Polish territories in the tenth century ? It is not easy to distinguish
the features inherited from earlier developments and the flowering of the
Slav community, from the changes introduced when the new political system
began to emerge.
A most notable feature of the beliefs held by the Slavic peoples is the
subservient role of their pagan religions to the needs of the agricultural pop-
ulation. They worshipped fire and the sun, a mysterious power to the people
of that age which gave them the means of livelihood, warmth and a good
harvest, but one that could show its anger by causing drought, by hurling
lightning bolts and wreaking fire. They worshipped the life giving properties
of the mother earth. A few relics that survive in folk customs would indicate
that there was worship of water, of the springs, rivers and lakes, though
this was not as important among the pagan Slavs. Mythical creatures were
invoked in forests under trees of venerable age or of unusual appearance, and
in enclosures designated as sacred groves. Here the people worshipped. Here
auguries were taken and large sacrificial feasts were held with gifts from
the first fruits to insure a good harvest for the year.
The most important cult, however, was sun worship, which must have
come down from a very remote past as evidenced by the fact, that the
chief god heaven and thunder was known by the common name of Perun
to many of the Slav peoples. According to ninth century Arabic
44 THE ORIGINS OF POLAND
accounts about the harvest rites practised by the Slavs, a handful of grain
was cast upwards to the sky to propitiate the gods. Until the late Middle
Ages, the Polish nobility took the oath by raising the hand to the sun.
Inherited from ancient times, this cult of the gods and of the phenomena
of nature was practised on a family or local scale. The sacrifices were made
by the head of the family or by one of the elders on behalf of the community.
There were soothsayers who told fortunes and cast spells, who turned back
evil and foretold good luck and who also acted as medicine-men.
There is reason to believe, that as the new society emerged in the Polish
lands, attempts were made to extend the scope of some cults and to invest
them with political meaning, or at any rate, to bind them to the centre
of authority. Among the Polabian Slavs this was accomplished by evolving
more elaborate sacrificial rites and by establishing special servants around
the personification of the chief god. There are traces of a similar effort in
the Polish territories. We know that the Sleza-Sobétka mountain, whose
lone peak looms in the middle of the fertile plain of Lower Silesia was
a centre of a pagan cult at the close of the tenth century. “It was greatly
honoured by all inhabitants”, wrote Thietmar Bishop of Merseburg (lib. VII,
c. 59), “owing to its hugeness and purpose, for magic rites were performed
here.” Archaeological evidence of a ninth century cult centre was discovered
on the summit of Mount Lysiec, later called Swiety Krzyz (Holy Cross) in
the central Polish massif. This was a 1.5 kilometres (about a mile) long
stone wall that surrounded the summit of that mount.
The people had stone images and wooden gods. The heads of some of
the oak statues have come down to our times. A bearded and moustached
head of a natural size (22.5 cm together with the neck) carved in oak with
a sure hand was found on a lake island at Jankowo, southeast of Gniezno.
The hole at the base of the neck was made for fixing the head on a figure or
post. Another head was discovered in the basin of the upper Warta, thereby
offering tangible proof of the Old Ruthenian chronicle’s story of the eradi-
cation of pagan cults, by casting the images into the water. Several large
roughly carved stones have been preserved in central and northern Poland.
They are anthropomorphic in character as may be seen by the three images on
the rock of Lezno in Gdansk-Pomerania. The Life of St. Adalbert charged
that the Slavs worshipped stone and wood instead of god (Vita, I c. 1).
The people worshipped their ancestors by invoking the ghosts of the
forefathers. There was a gradual change in the funeral ritual. Owing to the
influence that came from the south, from the Christian area of Moravia,
cremation was abandoned and the bodies of the dead were buried. The vic-
tory of Christianity accelerated this process of change which, however, was
completed only as late as in the twelfth century. The Mazovian custom of
surrounding and covering the body with rocks has remained to this day as
a trace of local beliefs.
Although little is known of the cult and the rites, there is reliable evidence
THE SPIRITUAL CULTURE ON THE EVE OF THE UNIFICATION 45
furnished by folklore and ample illustration provided by later day medie-
val records, regarding the various kinds of magic spells and taboos, which
the Christian clergy combated for many centuries.
The general level of intellectual ideas may be assessed by means of lin-
guistic data, and especially the vocabulary, and from the abundant ethno-
graphic evidence common to all the Slavs. On this basis it may be accepted
that prior to the ninth and tenth centuries, when new and intensive intel-
lectual and cultural contacts were established with the outside world, all
the Slavic peoples, including those in the Polish territories, had a consider-
ably diversified vocabulary. They had words not only to describe ideas re-
lating to concrete objects used in their daily life, to the material culture and
technical knowledge and to information about nature, but also words design-
ating quite elaborate abstract ideas, which would testify to a knowledge
of the basic phenomena of abstract thought.
The Slavs were broken up into language groups and began to evolve
internally along different lines at an early period. The language group that
settled the valleys of the Vistula and the Odra was uniform for genetic rea-
sons because for centuries, at least from about 500 B.c., it had lived on the
same territories, which may be regarded as the cradle of the Slavs. The ver-
nacular spoken in these lands began to differ in the early Middle Ages from.
that spoken by the neighbours to the west, the Polabian and Czech Slavs,
although the precise chronology of this event is a controversial matter.
Archaeological excavations offer a better view of various aspects of cul-
ture among the earliest Poles. The modest finds provide evidence of an art
that was as little varied as the society of the early Middle Ages. The
need for monuments found expression in the mounds of earth raised as trib-
ute to a great leader, or duke of the regional political organization. Few
of the mounds have survived to our times. The most prominent height is
the mound, called the tumulus of Krakus, which looms above Cracow on
the right bank of the Vistula, a work of the seventh century, which is an
impressive technical achievement of a society in which the territorial com-
munities of free farmers were still a dominant feature. The mound is about
17 m (56 feet) high with a diameter of about 61 m (200 feet) and a volume
of 16,000 cubic metres (571,000 cubic feet).
Art handicrafts, metal objects, especially weapons and ornaments, were
imported from the Rhineland, Scandinavia, the land of the Avars and Mo-
ravia. By the early ninth century, Arabic silver coins and objects made by
Oriental silversmiths, were brought in by way of the Baltic. Before the
middle of the tenth century, the Slavic countries on the Baltic organized
their own handicraft industries, imitating the Arabic filigree work, to satisfy
the growing demands of their native lords. From Ruthenia there were the
weaver’s shuttles made of pink Volhynian slate glazed baby rattles.
Pottery used in daily life which appear in great abundance in excavations
from before the tenth century represent a definitely native trend in orna-
46 THE ORIGINS OF POLAND
mentation. The simple though varied decorative themes could be executed
under primitive conditions of production, and it seems highly probable that
they were performed by women as a home craft. On the vessels from north-
ern Poland the grouping of all kinds of lines, zigzags, herring bone design
and arcs exhausted the decorative possibilities. We may assume that the
geometric design was strongly entrenched and had a long history here. In
southern Poland the designs were arranged in stripes. This pattern may have
resulted from the fact that the pots, or parts of them, were shaped on a pot-
ter’s wheel. This technique spread across the whole of Polish territory by
the tenth century, and the making of pottery became a trade performed by
men, who worked in shops that were attached to the castle-towns.
Although the level of the Slavic civilization cannot compare even with
the reduced and barbarianized heritage of the Mediterranean culture, and
even less with Oriental culture, yet it did not differ from the culture of other
Scandinavian and Baltic peoples, who were new members of the large fam-
ily of European races. The Slavic civilization was based on many centuries
of native achievement which survived and defined their distinct character
through the ages and to the present day. From earliest times, the Polish
people participated in the heritage of the general Slavic traits and made
contributions which were distinctly their own. Only later, after the accept-
ance of Christianity, did they establish cooperation with the more distant
German and Latin neighbours, and also with the closer neighbours, Ruthenia
and Hungary.
Chapter III
THE EARLY YEARS
OF THE POLISH STATE
THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE STATE
AND THE CHRISTIANIZATION OF POLAND IN 966
The second half of the tenth century marked the consolidation of the State
machinery placing it on firm territorial foundations. Although the Polish
State arose from the former state of the Polanes, there are reasons to view
the political organization ruled by that energetic Duke Mieszko as in many
respects a novel achievement, effected during a turbulent transition to a high-
er form of organization. Ibrahim ibn-Yaqub, a Jewish traveller from dis-
tant Spain, wrote in 966 that the country of Mieszko, the King of the North,
was the most extensive of the four known Slav states (the Obodrits—in
present day Mecklenburg ; the Bohemians ; the Bulgars ; and the Poles). Ac-
cording to his report, the Polish State had an elaborate fiscal system, with
tribute paid to the ducal court which performed the function of the country’s
central administration. Tribute was used to pay the rank and file of the
knights living in the environs of the castle-towns and to maintain a stand-
ing and battle seasoned squad (druzyna).
Archaeological data reveal that at least a score of castle-towns were re-
built in the second half of the tenth century or built afresh on new founda-
tions, and that there were important changes in the re-distribution of the
castle-towns to locations that suited the needs of a more extensive State.
The network of administrative, fiscal, defense and judiciary organs extended
to all parts of the land and united the components into a single whole, which
was governed personally by the duke and a circle of lords associated with
him. The towns enjoyed the services of the peasant population which was
compelled to pay tribute and to render services for the benefit of the lords
of the castle-town and their garrisons of knights. Almost all these garrisons,
whether deep in country or on its borders, were protected by a network of
obstacles and fortifications in their approaches. Traces of these constructions
remain in contemporary place names such as Zawady (Obstacle), Stupie
(Post), Stréze (Guards) and others. The organization of the administration
48 THE EARLY YEARS OF THE POLISH STATE
must also have led to the fixing of State boundaries by the annexation of small
peripheral territories which, though independent, nevertheless vacillated in
their fealty between one more powerful neighbour and another.
Mieszko’s personal ability is evident in his initiative and energetic mili-
tary and diplomatic activity. His vision embraced Europe from Rome to
Kiev and from Hungary to Scandinavia. Owing to his great talent he could
successfully undertake to carry out tasks which were also supported by his
lords. The first task was to buttress the internal structure of a State organi-
zation constructed with admirable ingenuity, and then to extend the State’s
administration over territories which were gravitating towards the Polish
State by ethnic kinship, indispensable to a Polish State if it was to emerge
safe, and sound from the competition with the states of central and east
Europe, which were also consolidating their power in the tenth century. The
second of these tasks was completed in the last few years of Mieszko’s rule,
from 989 to 992. The frontiers of the State were extended to the Baltic
coast, from the mouth of the Odra to the mouth of the Vistula, and in-
cluded all of southern Poland from the western boundaries of Silesia to the
upper reaches of the Wieprz river. The success may be ascribed to the pro-
nounced internal cohesion in which a major role was played by the consoli-
dation of the apparatus of authority further strengthened by the acceptance
of Christianity in 966.
The consequences of Christianization extended to all aspects of life,
though not to all at one and the same time. The introduction of Christianity
by the court was in the first place a political act. The conversion of the
country was a necessity to the group which was building a powerful new
State. Not only in Poland but also in other Slavic and in Scandinavian
societies was this group alive to the fact, that a new system of beliefs and
views was necessary to consolidate the group itself, and at the same time to
exert an influence on the whole of society at large, in order to integrate it
with the new State organization. Not without reason did the local Pruthenian
leader of the opposition to the Polish mission of Bishop Wojciech (Adalbert)
fear the alien Christian law under the cover of which the Poles sought to
expand their power over their northern neighbours. In the same manner, the
tribal duke, in the borderland town of Sudovia preferred to trust his own
gods when he welcomed Brunon of Querfurt.
There was no elaborate hierarchical system in the pagan religion of the
Poles. Slavic rulers, who sought to reinforce their new States with a system
of ideas, tried occassionally to reorganize and centralize the pagan religions.
Tribal beliefs were organized and firmly implanted, as was the case in Kiev,
before the Christian religion was ultimately accepted. Elsewhere the hier-
archy of the priests of the chief god was raised in status, examples of which
may be found among the Polabian Slavs and in Pomerania. At that time
Pomerania reverted to pagan beliefs and cast off Polish suzerainty. The
most advantageous and effective solution of both the internal and the exter-
» —_—
(Wtodzimier2)
Dan,
Co | | Conquests of Boleslaw thé Brave
Pressburg i
(Bratislava)
O Boundaries of the Polish State in 1031
os T Archbishoprics, bishoprics
+ Monasteries
am. 9074/79-X-30 218-10 285 agz
PWN Warsaw 1979 mprint PPWR.
THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE STATE 49
nal political pressures exerted by the neighbouring Christian countries upon
the pagans was to accept Christianity while independence was maintained.
This course was followed in the late eighth century by the Slovene and
Croat dukes, in the ninth century by the Bulgarian, Moravian, Bohemian
and Serb dukes, in the tenth century again by the Bohemian as well as by
the Ruthenian and Hungarian dukes ; in the north by the Scandinavians.
The Christian Church gave its sanction to the new social structure, lent
support to and extended the authority of the duke. It provided models of
organization and people well equipped to conduct correspondence and main-
tain international relations as well as to carry on the internal administration.
The Church threw the gates wide open to the cultural heritage of the ancient
world and to the achievements of the early Middle Ages by introducing
writing, that basic tool of culture, and by establishing contact with more
highly developed centres of culture, education and art.
The political conditions attendant upon Poland’s conversion were ad-
vantageous to the country. Nothing is known of any kind of foreign pres-
sure to christianize Poland. It is clear, however, that the decision to accept
Christianity was made in order to strengthen her position with regard to
the two Catholic neighbours in the west, Germany and Bohemia. Hence,
this decision was justifiable as a measure of political expediency and to in-
sure Poland equal rights in international relations. The choice between the
Eastern and Western Church was determined by Poland’s proximity to
countries that professed the Roman Catholic faith and by the close political
ties with Catholic Bohemia. Embers of the Slavic rites, surviving from the
Moravian State, still flickered in Bohemia, but the Court and the Church
of Bohemia had close ties with the Church organization of Bavaria. There
is no conclusive evidence available that the Slavic rite survived the Moravian
period in Cracow or that it had been implanted there in the tenth and elev-
enth centuries.
The baptism of the Polish duke and his courtiers occurred in 966 in an
agreement with the Bohemian Premyslids, a dynasty which had a year ear-
lier provided Mieszko with a wife named Dobrava. Emperor Otto I de-
clared his support and confirmed the appointment of the first Polish bishop.
The first mission, comprised of churchmen from the Holy Roman Empire,
was headed by Bishop Jordan who, it is presumed, came from lower Lor-
raine, perhaps from Liége or from Italy. Bishop Jordan assumed the govern-
ment of an embryonic Church organization. There may have been only one
diocese extending over the whole of Mieszko’s State and directly subordi-
nated to the Apostolic See. The Polish mission’s independence of the German
Church must be regarded as evidence of the political perspicacity of the
Polish ruler as well as evidence of his advantageous position in relation to
Otto I who needed the Polish duke’s support in his struggle with the more
powerful State of the Veleti that lay west of the Odra river. The Christian
name of Lambert, which recurs in the ducal family (carried by Prince Lam-
4 History of Poland
50 THE EARLY YEARS OF THE POLISH STATE
bert, son of Mieszko I, and by his grandson, King Mieszko II Lambert) was
the name of the patron saint of the cathedral of Liege. Other western in-
fluences noted in the earliest Polish clergy came from Ratisbon (Regensburg)
and Augsburg. Mieszko I was known to worship at the grave of St. Udalrich
at Augsburg.
Although the Church organization of Poland subsequently reverted to
the model established by the Holy Roman Empire, it was nevertheless Bo-
hemia, then still without a bishop of her own, which first helped the Poles
adopt the Church terminology through the agency of her clergy and con-
tacts between the Bohemian abbeys and the earliest Church of Poland. In
consequence the terminology of the Polish Church is derived from that of
Bohemia, Moravia and indirectly of Bavaria. It ought to be remembered
that for many years before this, Christianity had exerted an influence on
Little Poland, which was not governed by Mieszko I, preparing the ground
for the conversion of his country. The Moravian mission which came to
the land of the Vistanes at the close of the ninth century did not find the
political conditions favourable to its aims, and there is reason to doubt
whether the faint traces of a cult of the Moravian saints found in southern
Poland can be connected with the mission of Methodius. On the other hand,
the Bohemian mission of the tenth century did achieve its aim. For a time
the Church of Prague maintained Bohemian influence north of the Car-
pathians.
POLISH BOUNDARIES ESTABLISHED
IN THE ODRA AND VISTULA BASINS
The Polish-Bohemian alliance helped Mieszko I adopt certain elements of
State organization which opened the door to foreign cultural influence. In
the political sense this alliance covered Mieszko’s southern flank during his
campaign to conquer Western Pomerania. The country at the mouth of the
Odra played an extremely important role in the economy of the ninth and
tenth centuries, and the Baltic littoral with some of its ports, such as Wolin
and Szczecin on the southern coast, became a powerful factor in the exten-
sive commerce through the northern Ruthenian lands and to the Arab East.
Large amounts of silver extant among the great many treasuries of Pomer-
ania, Great Poland and Mazovia came this way from the Near East. In the
tenth century, Poland entered the orbit of world commerce and politics via
the Baltic. In the course of several decades, Mieszko tried to establish him-
self on the Baltic seabord from the mouth of the Odra as far as Pruthenia.
For a number of reasons Western Pomerania became the most alluring prize.
About 963 Mieszko I, rex Misaca as the Saxon chronicler Widukind
called him, suffered a defeat at the hands of the Veleti who, living beyond
POLISH BOUNDARIES IN THE ODRA AND VISTULA BASINS 51
the Odra, also reached out for the whole area at its mouth. Trying to safe-
guard his position with regard to the Holy Roman Empire by paying tribute
for the contested territory, Mieszko arrived at the mouth of the Odra in
967. In 972, he defended his prize by defeating Margrave Hodo, who had
been greatly disquieted by Mieszko’s progress, at Cedynia at the confluence
of the Warta and the Odra. In 979 Mieszko successfully repulsed a German
expedition led by Otto II and soon established relations with the regency
which ruled the Empire. The Polish State held its boundary on the Baltic
and the Odra and also established political relations with Scandinavia. Evi-
dence of these ties is established by the marriage of the daughter of Mieszko I,
Swietostawa, identified by historians as Sigrid Storrada, first to Eric Seger-
saller, King of Sweden and Denmark, and then to Sweyn Forkbeard, King
of Denmark. She is known as the mother of Canute the Great.
Under Mieszko Poland’s main problems came down to matters that were
of vital importance to the Polish plans, in short establishing access to the
Pomeranian ports and participating in the goods and metal exchange of
that time. Apart from the ties with the Bohemians Mieszko allied himself
with the Holy Roman Empire to fight the common foe, the federation of
the Veleti. This agreement proved valuable when the Poles parted company
with Bohemia.
The territory of the Polish State was finally rounded off in the war with
Bohemia for Silesia and Cracow, which in 989-992 Mieszko incorporated
into his dominions. The order and chronology in which these lands were
conquered is still a subject of controversy. The latest historical and archaeolo-
gical data point to the different characteristics and to the high level of the
economy and culture of the Polish highlands. Incorporated in the Piast
dominions they immediately began to play a prominent role and drew the
country into political problems resulting from the proximity of Bohemia,
Hungary and Ruthenia.
Mieszko I took it upon himself to perpetuate his acquisitions in the
south and in the north by strengthening the Church. It is likely that he had
hoped to achieve what was ultimately accomplished by his son, that is to
set up a Church metropolis and a Polish archbishop who was to crown the
future sovereigns of Poland. Evidence of these diplomatic moves is provided
in a document known by the first two words as Dagome index. The document
contained a description of the Polish boundaries and of the dedication of
the capital town of Gniezno and its environs to St. Peter by Mieszko, that
meant a submission of Poland to the special protection of the Pope, a re-
ligious rather than political tutelage, for Papal power was weak at this time.
Poland, like some of the Scandinavian and Slavic countries and like
Hungary, turned away from the archaic phase of development of her own
free will. Poland accepted Christianity and by the same token entered the
Christiana respublica, as this loose cultural federation was called by the
contemporaries. Unlike the Polabian Slavs, Poland was not the object of the
$2 THE EARLY YEARS OF THE POLISH STATE
missionary policies of its Christian neighbours. On the contrary, Poland her-
self intended to perform a missionary role among her heathen neighbours :
the Pomeranians, Pruthenians and Petcheneguians. The architects of
the new States were quick to see that the values represented by the
Church and the acceptance of its cultural contributions went beyond the
core of the policies professed by an Empire which called itself Roman, but
which in its essence was Teutonic. The conflict that arose between the ambi-
tions of these rulers and the intentions of the German State with regard to
the Church was to be resolved by a test of strength on the diplomatic arena
and the battle field.
THE POLISH EMPIRE UNDER BOLESLAW THE BRAVE
Upon the death of Mieszko J in 992, the majority of the lords declared them-
selves in favour of maintaining the unity of the State. This attitude enabled
Bolestaw, eldest son of Mieszko, to drive out his three younger brothers,
born to Mieszko’s second wife, Oda, daughter of Dietrich, Margrave of the
North March. Another ruler endowed with a powerful personality ascended
the Polish throne. He gave the country thirty three years of energetic po-
litical activity and brilliant military operations as he fought to extend his
country’s boundaries beyond the territory of the State.
In the first years of his reign, Poland continued the policy of cooperation
with the Empire, established by Mieszko in the waning years of his life. The
Holy Roman Empire evaluated the events that had come to pass east of the
Odra as the birth of a new and vigorous State whose alliance would be of
immense value. Interesting prospects of an agreement seemed to have pre-
sented themselves during the reign for Otto III, who in the year 1000 came
to Gniezno to visit the grave of his friend St. Adalbert who had died a mar-
tyr for the Christian faith while conducting a mission to Pruthenia on the
instructions of Bolestaw. The negotiations at Gniezno were a conspicuous
Polish success. Gniezno was established as a metropolis of the Church, new
bishoprics were set up in Wroclaw, Kolobrzeg and Cracow, and the inde-
pendence of the Polish duke was recognized. The political programme of
Otto III, which proposed to bring Poland into the universal empire as an
equal of the German, Italian and Burgundian kingdoms, failed to win the
support of the German lords. Under his successor Henry II they launched
and continued a long war against Poland.
This meant a reversal of alliances. The pagan Veleti became allies of the
Christian King of Germany who also received aid from Bohemia. Poland
turned, for assistance to Hungary.
Bolestaw proved to be a formidable neighbour to the Empire. At the
close of the tenth century he strove to extend his rule beyond the ethnic
THE POLISH EMPIRE UNDER BOLESLAW THE BRAVE 53
Bolestaw the Brave, c. 1000
boundaries of Polish territories. In 1004, he tried to unite Poland and Bo-
hemia under his way, but was checked by Henry II and by the Bohemian
lords. Luzyce (Lusatia) and Milsko (Milzenland), lands of the Polabian
Slavs which Boleslaw the Brave wished to annex in order to secure the
western boundaries of Silesia, became the bone of contention in the subse-
quent Polish-German conflict. Bolestaw managed to hold on to Moravia for
several years thus establishing an analogous Polish march in the south.
Bolestaw the Brave conducted war with the Holy Roman Empire in
three separate stages : from 1004 to 1005, from 1007 to 1013 and from 1015
to 1018. The war was concluded by the peace of Bautzen (Budi$yn) which
left the controversial territories in Polish hands. The war revealed the mili-
tary power and the abilities of the Polish commanders as well as the political
acumen of Bolestaw who used every means to penetrate Germany with the
purpose of weakening the opponent. Through the marriage of Mieszko, his
THE CRISIS OF THE FIRST POLISH MONARCHY 55
son, with Richeza, the daughter of Herenfried Ezzon, the Palatine of Lor-
raine, Bolestaw allied himself with the lords of the western borders of the
Empire who were in opposition to the German King. Bolestaw opposed the
power of the Empire, superior to that of Poland, with a front that embraced
lords, knights and peasants who were roused to take arms in defense against
the invader. Despite the heavy burden imposed upon the country, the war
was ultimately of benefit to the Polish State. The war led the social forces and
more specifically the Polish ruling group to consolidate their ranks.
In 1018 Bolestaw led a successful war of intervention in Kiev on behalf
of Prince Svatopolk, his son in law, and annexed to Poland the disputed
borderland territory on the upper Wieprz and Bug with the principal castle-
towns of Czerwien on the Huczwa river and the lands on the upper San
including Przemy$l. The Polish ruler stood at the peak of his success. From
Kiev he sent triumphant letters to the Byzantine and Roman Emperors.
In 1025, at the very end of his life, Bolestaw took advantage of the
uneasy internal situation of Germany and assumed the royal crown. His
son Mieszko II, who succeeded him that same year, also had himself crowned,
emphasizing by this act the rank of the Polish monarch, the indivisibility
of the State and the consecrated character of his authority.
THE CRISIS OF THE FIRST POLISH MONARCHY
In the first years of his reign, Mieszko II successfully continued the policies
initiated by his father. In 1031, however, he found himself face to face with
dire peril both inside the country, where his brothers led a rebellion against
him, and outside the country, where he was threatened by a coalition of the
Holy Roman Empire and Ruthenia. When the Hungarians abandoned their
alliance with him, the Polish King found himself in a hopeless situation and
fled the country.
His brother, Bezprym, took over the government but had to give up the
royal insignia of his brother and father and to renounce title to their con-
quests, to Lusatia, Moravia and to the area on the upper Wieprz and Bug.
The brief reign of duke Bezprym was filled with terror to which he himself
fell victim. Mieszko II returned to the throne but he had to recognize the
suzerainty of the emperor and grant to his two brothers a share in the rule
of the country. Several months before his death, Mieszko JI succeeded in
reuniting the country. He died in 1034, leaving nothing but ruins to his son
Casimir.
During the crists, the structure of the State created by the efforts of sever-
al preceding generations, showed grave fissures, all the graver because they
were internal. Their essence was the trend towards decentralization noted
Cieszyn. St. Nicholas’ Chapel, 11th cent.
$6 THE EARLY YEARS OF THE POLISH STATE
among the lords who had strengthened their social and economic position in
the victorious wars led by Bolestaw the Brave, and now looked with less
favour upon the machinery of a strong central authority. As in many other
countries of Europe so in Poland, the lords sought greater economic auto-
nomy, that is they themselves aspired to the right to exploit the subject
population. Some of them even aimed at territorial independence. The incen-
tives for expansion, that were instrumental during the reign of Mieszko I and
in the first decades under Bolestaw the Brave, were now lacking. The boom
of the luxury trade on the Baltic and the influx of silver broke down in the
early eleventh century. The economic growth within the country was slow
and could not hope to fill the royal coffers left empty when the once vigor-
ous, though actually primitive trade, of the heroic age of the Slavs and
Varangians in the ninth and tenth centuries began to wither. Ducal authority
was broken in the eyes of the lords.
In 1034 Poland broke up into several regions. Power was seized by
various lords and Casimir was driven out into Germany. Only one of these
lords is known by name, he was called Mieclaw or, as some other sources
would have it, Mojstaw or Mastaw, cupbearer to Mieszko II. He ruled over
Mazovia for ten years and it seems, that he conducted an active policy of
alliances with Pruthenia and Sudovia, which was threatened by the expansion
of Kievan Rus (Kiev Ruthenia). There is some speculation whether Mieclaw
intended to expand his rule over other Polish lands. Faced by the danger of
peasant revolts, a part of the ruling group hastened to join Miectaw’s
colours.
The crisis of the monarchy released in a section of Polish territories
a mass movement against the social order that had been established by the
firm hand of the architects of the Polish State. Soon after power had been
seized by the impostor dukes, a peasant insurrection broke out and spread
quickly to include the population threatened by the yoke of feudalism, the
slaves and lesser officials of the State and to the estates of powerful lords.
The insurrection turned against the lords secular and spiritual and at the
same time took on an aspect of a pagan resurgence. The Church suffered
serious losses in some parts of Poland.
Bretislav I, Duke of Bohemia, took advantage of the anarchy that broke
out in Poland. He seized Silesia and pillaged and looted the towns of Great
Poland. We know of an impressive list of treasures taken from Gniezno at
that time. Among them was the reliquary with St. Adalbert’s remains, which
were a spiritual necessity for the organization of an independent Church of
the State, which Bretislav needed, in order to promote his plans of establish-
ing a bishopric in Prague as an independent See.
The Bohemian invasion, and especially the annexation of Silesia, was
a warning signal to the German lords. They were not happy to see a strong
Bohemia and professed in this respect the principle of an international
equilibrium with the participation of Poland. The exiled Casimir, who had
ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL ACHIEVEMENTS 57
powerful relatives on his mother’s side, including his uncle the Archbishop
of Cologne, was given military assistance. He quickly returned to Poland
and mastered the situation by 1040. He also found allies among the Polish
lords. For many of them the insurrection of the people was a dire warning.
The neighbouring Ruthenian lords also took heed when they experienced simi-
lar peasant unrest. Shortly afterwards Casimir concluded an alliance with
Ruthenia which was further strengthened by his marriage to Dobronega-
Maria, sister of Duke Yaroslav of Kiev. Keeping his own interests in view,
Duke Yaroslav helped Casimir in the battle of 1047 waged against Mieclaw
of Mazovia.
Ultimately, the maturing social system emerged victorious from the contest
while the monarchy suffered painful setbacks which weakened it considerably.
Silesia was regained at the price of tribute and the territories of Poland were
again restored to their extent as under Mieszko I, although without Western
Pomerania and other lands which had been won by Bolestaw the Brave, but
it is probable that Gdansk-Pomerania had to accept Polish suzerainty. Under
the pressure of adverse circumstances and surrounded by more powerful
neighbours, the weakened state had to renounce any plans of regaining her
previous acquisitions. The internal situation had changed from that which
had prevailed under the Slavic and Nordic empires of the tenth century and
during the first decades of the eleventh century. Significant structural changes
became apparent in the situation of the Polish oligarchs. Having blazed a trail
to the expansion of their estates by subjugating the free population, they
would not countenance a reversion to the old order. The knights who ap-
peared in this period were intent upon exerting an influence on the superi-
or authority. The early medieval monarchy, rebuilt by Casimir the Restorer,
entered a period of economic, social and political transformation.
ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL ACHIEVEMENTS
OF THE ARCHITECTS OF THE STATE
Before continuing the history of the people and the State from its revival in
the middle of the eleventh century, it may prove interesting to survey briefly
the principal features of the achievements of Mieszko I, Bolestaw the Brave
and Mieszko IJ. The most striking feature was the dynamic growth of the
new social system and similar progress in the diversification of the culture.
The first castle-tcowns which arose in the Polish territories were inhabited by
a few lordly families and their retainers. The castle-towns built by the
centralized State on the other hand were an agglomeration of large groups of
lords and strong military garrisons that evinced a growing demand for
consumer goods. The demands were satisfied by the extensive luxury trade,
but they also stimulated domestic production.
58 THE EARLY YEARS OF THE POLISH STATE
In order to make use of and to spur rural production, a system of services
for the castle-towns and ducal courts were set up by the Piast monarchy,
according to a carefully conceived plan. The system operated within its
fundamental framework from the middle of the tenth century to the end of
the eleventh century. Artisans and servants (ministeriales) pursued up to fortv
different crafts ; cobblers (sutores), shield and bolt makers, bakers (pistores),
cooks (coci), men collecting wild bees’ honey (mellifices) and beaver hunters
(castorarii) were still included among the agricultural people. The authorities
enforced a division of labour in subsidiary occupations for the performance
of special duties or provision of articles produced by the different artisans.
In this division only a portion of the output capacity and specialized services
were organized and then only where they were indispensable to the function-
ing of the medieval state. This autarchic method was soon found inefficient.
Although place names like Szewce (Cobblers), Kuchary (Cooks), Bobrowniki
(Beaver-hunters) and Bartodzieje (Honey-collectors) have survived, indicating
the elaborate organization of these services, this type of organization was
declining and began to disappear in the second half of the eleventh century.
First to go were the craft services, followed much later by these of cattle
breeders and hunters. The handicraft industry has arisen independently of this
official organization of services. Agricultural surpluses and stocks of cattle
increased in the course of the tenth and eleventh centuries ; a variety of
workshops were set up and a local exchange of products gradually came into
being.
The first centre of this economic development was the castle-town (grod)
and suburbs (suburbium—podgrodzie), a situation similar to that of the
English towns and boroughs in the early Middle Ages, together constituting
the first form of town life in Poland and in the neighbouring countries. At the
foot of the castle-town proper (described as the castrum or castellum in the
Latin terminology of that time) there sprang up a suburbium, beneath the
castle walls. The suburbs were usually surrounded by a wall of earth and
timber like the castle-town itself. Each performed a different social and
economic function.
The castle-town enclosed the residence of the ruler ready to receive him
at all times, or the seat of his representative in the person of the lord of
the town, later called the castellan, entrusted with wide military, administra-
tive, judicial and fiscal powers over the people residing in the neighbourhood.
In densely populated areas, the radius of influence of the centre did not exceed
14 km (c. 9 miles), though this could be more on the fringes of the inhabited
areas. The suburbs consisted of small built up areas with streets paved with
wood, housing a motley population, ranging from members of the ruling
group and the rank and file knights of the castle-town, themselves often
engaging in foreign trade, to innkeepers, artisans and servants of all kind, as
well as fishermen and peasants brought here by the will of the prince, or who
settled there of their own accord.
ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL ACHIEVEMENTS 59
In the eleventh century the castle-towns and suburbs attracted rural ar-
tisans and were responsible for the development of the crafts into permanent
and distinct trades. Archaeological evidence reveals a beginning of specializa-
tion and consequent technical improvement as early as the tenth century in
pottery, shoemaking and tanning, in articles made of horn, gold, as well as
metalwares. The social conditions of life and work of the artisans are not
sufficiently well known to us. It seems that they were dependents of the duke
and were compelled to make contributions in kind, both in articles produced
by themselves as well as in personal services. Fishermen and ploughmen, for
example, were obliged to provide the castle-towns with food the production
of which remained the major concern of the entire population.
As centres of growing consumption, castle-towns and suburbs encouraged
the expansion and diversification of handicraft production. The margin of eco-
nomic initiative expanded despite the fact that the craftsmen were burdened
with obligations to the State. They could exchange their articles for food
and other goods and valuables. Money, or more strictly speaking silver, both
in the form of Arab coins as well as ornaments, soon made its appearance
among them. In the tenth and eleventh centuries silver was weighed and there-
fore coins and ornaments had to be cut to make smaller transactions pos-
sible. Domestic money coined under Mieszko I was not abundant and was
a symbol of ostentation rather than a medium of exchange. Markets were
known in Poland already during the reign of Bolestaw the Brave as places
of public trade and were under the protection of ducal law.
The network of castle-towns and suburbs in the large expanse of Polish
territories—250,000 square kilometres—were in direct conjunction with the
density of settlements and other factors which encouraged people of princi-
pally non-agricultural persuasions to assemble and live together.
On the Baltic littoral most prominent were the early port towns of Western
Pomerania, especially those at the mouth of the Odra, like Szczecin, founded
as a castle-town at the close of the ninth and the beginning of the tenth
century, Wolin, established a whole century earlier and Kamien, founded
most likely in the early tenth century, Kolobrzeg was built at the mouth of
the Prognica river; the sale springs and salt works of Kolobrzeg operated
as early as the ninth century. All these towns experienced a period of economic
prosperity in the tenth and eleventh centuries both because of the Baltic trade
and of the domestic production of pottery and metal and amber articles. The
lords who lived in these castle-towns conducted an independent policy and
successfully opposed Polish overlordship, which established a firm foothold
here only during the reigns of Mieszko I and Bolestaw the Brave. The
independence of the towns was demonstrated by the elaborate pagan cult. The
temples of Wolin and Szczecin built in the eleventh century vied with the
splendour of the churches raised by the Christian rulers of Poland. Archaeo-
logical evidence, however, bears out the fact that the material culture of
Pomerania, hence the manner of constructing towns and techniques employed
60 THE EARLY YEARS OF THE POLISH STATE
in the crafts, was homogeneous with that of the remaining towns of central
Poland. There is also abundant evidence of mutual trade relations between the
coastal and the inland towns.
In the central plains, as well as in the southern highlands, the urban centres
of this period were identical with the network of early fortified seats of the
dukes. It can be estimated that there were about eighty such castle-towns in
the Polish territories under Mieszko I, Bolestaw the Brave and Mieszko II,
Pomerania excepted. These castle-towns were not distributed evenly through-
out the country, but were communities separated by large forest areas. Some
of the castle-towns rose to prominence from the earliest days of their founding
as main capitals of the State, or as significant provincial centres. Con-
temporary sources endow these centres with the term civitas, by which is
meant a large community with diverse functions. Among the most prominent
were Gniezno, a fortified ducal seat which expanded to one and then three
suburbs in the eleventh century ; Poznan on the Warta was established as
a grod at the close of the ninth century and raised to the rank of castle-town
of the monarchy in the tenth century with a large suburb from the same
period ; Kruszwica on the Gopto lake in existence in the ninth century with
a suburb dating from the end of the tenth century and expanded later ;
Wloclawek (known as Wlodzistaw) on the Vistula, an important military
camp from the early eleventh century, whose suburb originated also in
this period ; Plock on the Vistula, founded as a castle-town at the end of the
tenth century together with its suburb, was the Piast capital of ancient
Mazovia ; Sandomierz on the Vistula, whose gréd and environs lead to the
assumption that it was a large community in the tenth and eleventh centuries ;
Cracow fortified in the course of the tenth century enclosed a grdéd on the
Wawel hill and a suburb together with other neighbouring settlements ;
Wroclaw, the castle-town and suburb lying on an island in the middle of
the Odra, the most important town centre of Silesia since the end of the
tenth century. Finally in the second half of the tenth century, Gdansk, the
castle-town, port and suburb, flourished at the mouth of the Vistula, in
that part of Eastern Pomerania, which was more closely bound with the
Polish State than Western Pomerania. Several more names may be added to
these nine centres which were either temporarily as important, such as Giecz,
or but slightly smaller, such as Legnica, Glogdw, Opole, Kalisz, Sieradz,
Leczyca or as Wislica, Lublin, and Przemysl in the eastern borderlands.
The early Piast castle-town performed a multitude of new functions in
the broad areas that surrounded them. They were seats of the State administra-
tion, points of armed resistance and military outposts, trade centres for
articles and services, religious and cultural centres. The towns were not only
related to each other by a common state system, but also, though much more
loosely, by trade routes. The routes served more often for the transport of
luxury goods designated for the thin upper stratum of society rather than the
population at large. The lords of the castle-town eagerly purchased such
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62 THE EARLY YEARS OF THE POLISH STATE
articles, exchanging for them raw materials and slaves which Poland of
Mieszko I and of Bolestaw the Brave was so capable of providing. The routes
travelled by foreign and native traders, served above all as links between the
chief castle-towns and between Poland and her neighbours. In addition to
the Baltic trade which continued strongly until the first decade of the tenth
century, later turning its attention to other commodities than metal from the
Orient, one may note the functioning of a whole web of overland routes.
They led from Kiev Ruthenia through Mazovia or, crossing the middle
Vistula, to Gniezno and other castle-towns in the cradle of the Piast State.
The roads continued from here to the mouth of the Odra, or through Lower
Silesia and Meissen to Magdeburg and the German countries. Another route
from Ruthenia led through Przemysl, where a colony of Jewish merchants was
settled in the first years of the eleventh century, and Sandomierz or along the
fringes of the foothills to Cracow, and from there either to Gniezno or Wroc-
law, and finally through the Moravian Gate to Prague and farther west.
Undoubtedly there were also overland routes to Pruthenia which began in
Gdansk-Pomerania and Mazovia and roads to Hungary along the Dunajec
and Poprad valleys and perhaps also the Dukla Pass.
This trade flowed in a very narrow channel and trickled to the local
markets in a very limited assortment. Although it imparted a certain glory to
the early towns, trade by itself was not a decisive factor in their growth.
The lords who lived in the towns benefited from special economic, social
and political opportunities which in turn led to distinctions in dress, housing
and diet. Here, their mounting demands in the intellectual sphere were readily
satisfied. The outstanding feature of these times was the desire of the Court
and of the lords to hoard their wealth. That is why treasures of silver bullion
money and other objects, which could be readily concealed in a safe place, are
being discovered at the present time. They were stored as a reserve to use
when luxury goods often haphazard in their appearance might arrive. Stores
were the mark, the measure and at times the very foundation of the rank and
standing of the lords and the monarch. The written records which describe
the magnificence of the Court and of the generosity of the dukes are highly
credible, an example of which were the gifts which Mieszko I sent to the
German emperors and kings, as well as to the Cathedral of Augsburg, and
Bolestaw the Brave’s rich gifts to Otto III.
In this period the culture of the Polish lands was preponderantly the
native product of developing productive forces. The broad masses of the
people were both producers and consumers of this culture. Here we also note
a mounting demand and an expanding ability to satisfy their needs. The most
tangible evidence are the wooden buildings of the tenth and eleventh centuries
raised by carpenters whose skill was admired by Ibrahim ibn-Yaqub and the
stone structures which appeared with the conversion to Christianity.
The large complex of church buildings in the suburbs of Poznan, consisting
of several structures and a three-nave basilica which served as a cathedral, was
ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL ACHIEVEMENTS 63
built according to the findings of modern research immediately after 968, as
was also the oldest three-nave church of Gniezno whose original foundations
have been preserved. It was reconstructed after the fire of 1018 with
a coloured majolica floor added at the same time. More modest structures of
the same age are two monastery churches, one in Trzemeszno and the other in
Leczyca. The palatium, the adjacent palace chapel, that echoes the style of
northern Italy and the monastery on an island on the Lednica lake near Gnie-
zno, were all constructed at the close of the tenth century. These buildings
provide eloquent testimony to the fact, that the Polish monarchs aspired to
the level of the neighbouring countries. The palatium is reminiscent of similar,
though bigger residences of the German emperors. On the island of the Led-
nica lake the stone architecture was combined with masterly timber work
which provided the palace with fortifications, using up 40,000 cubic metres
(1,420,000 cubic feet) of material. The Lednica complex included a harbour
and a 700 metre (2295 foot) long road bridge that joined the island town with
both shores of the lake. The royal residence of Giecz, also a centre of authority
in Great Poland, was never finished. The construction was interrupted by the
Bohemian invasion. Traces of eight such residences have been established.
The church of the Virgin Mary' on Wawel hill at Cracow, built on a comp-
licated four-leaf plan with the addition of a front porch, was also constructed
at the close of the tenth and the beginning of the eleventh century. It served
as a chapel and stood a little apart from the stone dwelling houses of the
castle-town.
Other arts and crafts evolved and improved in skill and technique. From
the middle of the tenth century, great improvement was noted in the tech-
niques employed in pottery. Geometric designs were adapted to the shape of
the vessels and for the next hundred years the art of pottery was marked by
a very ornate style. Silversmiths likewise achieved their own distinct artistic
forms. In the tenth and eleventh centuries the silversmiths attained great
technical skill thanks to their imitation of Oriental wares. The local style that
evolved contained a wide variety of designs. Apart from non-figurative
patterns there were noted, in the eleventh century especially, influences of
Romanesque art coming from west Europe and Scandinavia and influences
from Ruthenia which embraced motifs of the steppe art, and from Byzantium.
Iron and nonferrous metal work also offered scope for the art of ornamenta-
tion. Articles of horn and bone found in archaeological excavations reveal
a complete technical mastery of these materials and the artists who were
capable of producing articles of daily use and for decorative purposes. In
contrast with the rather rigid and geometric patterns used to ornament metal,
horn and bone, soft woods were ornamented with Scandinavian basket-weave
motifs. Anthropomorphic and zoomorphic designs came from the outside
world, but they found their way into domestic workshops and gave greater
flexibility to the strict limitations of non-representational art. There are
individual figurines in wood which may have served some magic purpose and
64 THE EARLY YEARS OF THE POLISH STATE
figures in stone as, for example, the mysterious stone figure of an ox found
near the chapel of the Virgin Mary on the Wawel hill.
Simultaneously an intellectual transformation was taking place among the
people. Through contacts with the outside world and as a result of sosial
transitions, an incompatibility made itself felt between the archaic form of
life of the Slavs and the new feudal system. At the close of the tenth century,
Christianity began to make a wider and deeper impact. We know from the
records of the times that the daughters and sons of magnates took holy vows.
The defenders of Niemcza (1017) raised the cross with pride and at the same
time with political shrewdness, against the besieging pagan Veleti whose aid
had been enlisted by the Christian emperor. The Polish Court used the
martyrdom of St. Adalbert as an argument for establishing an independent
Church organization and provided the initiative for the writing of his life.
Soon afterwards Bruno of Querfurt composed the life of the Five Brothers,
Eremites connected with St. Romuald, who had been killed in Poland in 1003
and whose cult was propagated by the ruler and by the Polish Church. The
annals brought to Poland by foreign clergy from other countries were contin-
ued at the Polish Court. Noteworthy political and ecclesiastical events were
recorded there. The annals open with a description of a dynastic event set
down under the year 965 relating to the arrival of the Bohemian Princess
Dobrava to Mieszko I. The first version of these accounts was collected by
the presbyter Sula, later Bishop of Cracow under Casimir the Restorer. This
was the beginning of a literature written in Latin which opened for the upper
strata an avenue to cultural contacts with the outside world. It has been
established that King Mieszko IT knew both Latin and Greek. Contacts with
Germany and Ruthenia instructed the Polish Court in a feudal style of life.
The foreign clergy played an important role in transmitting it from abroad.
Poles may be found among their ranks quite early, for one of the first
archbishops of Gniezno had a Polish name: Bossuta-Bozeta.
Besides the distinct culture and political factors which served to create
a national Polish community, there were also the conscious attemps to mould
a sense of unity among its prominent members. The most tangible evidence
is offered by the adoption of one name, both in the native tongue and in the
language of the neighbours, to designate the people of this area which was no
longer an amorphous grouping of various component parts. This occurred in
the lands between the Odra and the Bug rivers at the close of the tenth century
when the foreigners began to call these regions by a lasting name of native
derivation, a name which was taken from the original core, the small State of
the Polanes (Polanie), and extended it to include the whole state. The terms
Poland and Poles (Polonia, Poloni), accepted in international usage, reflected
the essential fact that the nation and the State had already come into existence.
The Latinized form of the country’s name was known in Old High German
as Polan, in Old French as Polaine, Paulenne, Puille.
a
}
}
{
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GDANSK ( WARMIA
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ae
Poland in the second half of the 12th cent.
Oo 100 Kms
0 50 Miles
= Boundaries of the Polish State and other States
——— Boundaries of the Ducal Provinces under Bolestaw
, the Curly
POZNAN Capital towns CRACOW Capitals of States
e Castellaneries
+. + Archbishopric, bishoprics
5 imprint PPWK. Zam. 9074/79- X-30 218-10 285 egi
Monasteries |
PWN Warsaw 1979
Chapter IV
THE AGE OF MATURITY
OF THE POLISH MONARCHY
STRUGGLE FOR INTERNATIONAL POSITION
AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ROYAL AUTHORITY
The reconstruction of the State machinery, though on a more modest scale
than under his predecessors, together with the organization of the Church,
was the real achievement of Casimir the Restorer who died in 1058. The
centre of gravity of the State shifted after the reconstruction to the south of
Poland, to Cracow, which acquired the status of a ducal seat. Thanks to the
consolidation of the monarchy, Casimir’s oldest son Bolestaw II the Bold
could pursue the ambitious policy of winning independence from the Holy
Roman Empire.
This policy yielded a most impressive result, namely the third coronation
of a Polish monarch in the eleventh century. To achieve this end the Polish
ruler offered his support to Pope Gregory VII in the conflict with Henry IV.
But the most decisive factor was the revival of Poland’s military strength in
the struggle with Bohemia, to whom Bolestaw ceased to pay tribute for Silesia.
He also waged wars of intervention against Ruthenia on behalf of his brother-
in-law Izaslav, later a protégé of Gregory VII, and against Hungary where
Bolestaw supported those dukes who were opposed to Germany. The corona-
tion of Bolestaw on Christmas Day of 1076 at Gniezno was performed by
Archbishop Bogumil assisted by Papal legates, who strengthened the new
organization of the Church and reestablished the archbishopric of Gniezno
and the bishoprics of Poznaf, Cracow, Wroclaw and Ptock. The coronation
was to guarantee the internal consolidation of the monarchy. However, there
was not to be another coronation for a few centuries to come. The policy of .
Bolestaw spurred on a mobilization of centrifugal forces among the lords, who
organized a conspiracy in which Bishop Stanistaw of Cracow and the King’s
brother, Wladystaw Herman, took part. The conspiracy was quelled by
Bolestaw the Bold. The Bishop was sentenced to death and executed. The
King failed, however, to gain control over the situation and had to flee to
5 History af Poland
i)
66 THE AGE OF MATURITY OF THE POLISH MONARCHY
Hungary (1079) where he was killed. The reign of his successor, Duke
Whadystaw Herman was fraught with conflicting tendencies represented by
the powerful lords. In the international arena, Wladyslaw Herman abandoned
all independent political plans and surrendered claims to the royal crown.
Poland again found herself a part of the imperial sphere of influence. Wlady-
staw Herman married Judith, the sister of Henry IV, and again paid tribute
for Silesia to Bohemia.
Sieciech (Sethec), a magnate and powerful palatine of the Court, was for
a long time the actual ruler of the country, a fact which rallied the magnates
in their opposition to the central authority. Taking advantage of the coming
of age of the two sons of the old prince, the magnates demanded that the
country be divided between him and his sons. The division occurred in 1097.
Attempts to reestablish Polish suzerainty over Pomerania were without effect.
The Polish monarchy was given one more chance to rise to power by
taking advantage of the social forces favouring a strong central authority.
A Polish ruler who wished to maintain a unified state could rely upon the
lower ranks of the knights for they counted on benefits arising from political
expansion, namely, prisoners, loot and financial assistance from the prince,
and they also attached themselves to influential magnates holding office at
Court. Bolestaw III the Wrymouth, the younger son of Wladystaw Herman,
undertook and successfully completed this political gambit. Upon the death
of his father in 1102, he took the field against his elder brother, Duke Zbi-
gniew who ruled in Great Poland and Mazovia. Assisted by the knights, and
having finally established an alliance with Hungary and Ruthenia, Bolestaw
drove his brother out of the country in 1107. In 1109 he repulsed the expedit-
ion of intervention led by the German King Henry V which was shattered
against the ramparts of Glogéw and checked in the forefelds of Wroctaw. The
chronicler speaks of the “resistance of the dogged peasants” who, together
with the knights, repelled the German invasion. As a result of this conflict
Bolestaw won complete independence and in 1114 Bohemia renounced all
claim to tribute for Silesia. About 1119 he brought Gdansk-Pomerania under
direct Polish administration.
To a great extent Bolestaw the Wrymouth owed his successes to the fact
that he offered his knights a noteworthy goal as early as 1102, in the invasion
and annexation of Western Pomerania, with its inviting attractive centres of
industry and maritime trade such as Kolobrzeg, Kamien, Wolin, Szczecin and
Uznam (Usedom). In the period of independence from Poland, Western Pom-
erania created a state organization which, though unconsolidated internally,
was nevertheless aggressive toward her neighbours. The raids of the Pom-
eranians were a thorn in the side of Great Poland ; Zbigniew’s attempt to
establish an alliance with them compromised him in the eyes even of his
followers. On the other hand, Bolestaw the Wrymouth’s plans to subordinate
Pomerania secured him the support of the preponderant majority of the
Polish lords and knights. About the year 1122, following several military
FEUDAL DISINTEGRATION GAINS UPPER HAND 67
expeditions, the suzerainty of the Polish duke was imposed upon and tribute
was exacted from Warcistaw I of Western Pomerania.
Polish arms were followed by missionary activity. The first missions were
led by the Spanish missionary Bernard and later with complete success by
Bishop Otto of Bamberg. Initially Bishop Otto came to Western Pomerania
at the bequest of Poland and with a group of Polish clergy. Later, however,
he hoped to subordinate the Church of Pomerania to the influence of the
Empire. A new expedition launched by Bolestaw the Wrymouth in alliance
with Denmark secured Polish rule up to the Odra river by 1129. The bishopric
of Lubusz (Lebus) on the left bank of the Odra, founded in 1124, rounded off
the territorial organization of the Polish Church in the west, and the Western
Pomerania bishopric, established before 1140 (in Uznam and later in Wolin
to be finally moved to Kamien), was to bind these acquisitions to the me-
tropolis of Gniezno.
After a period of brilliant successes achieved by the ruling circle, the lords
again began to foment discord. The Palatine Skarbimir, the duke’s closest
collaborator, rose in rebellion in 1117. Thus at the close of his reign, the
international position of Bolestaw the Wrymouth suffered a painful setback.
His intervention in Hungarian affairs on behalf of Boris, the anti-German
pretender to the throne, failed and invited several retaliatory raids by
Bohemia. Eventually Bolestaw the Wrymouth had to submit to the arbitration
of Emperor Lothair III and in 1135 paid hommage to the Emperor for the
right to Western Pomerania and the island of Riigen on which the Polish duke
aimed to establish himself against Danish influence. At this time also the
influential Archbishop Norbert of Magdeburg undertook steps to abolish the
Polish Church metropolis, but his efforts were successfully checked by the
Polish duke and clergy about 1136. The reign of Bolestaw the Wrymouth was
drawing to a close in comparative stability which guaranteed the economic
and social development of the country.
FEUDAL DISINTEGRATION GAINS THE UPPER HAND
(1138-1146)
Like some other European countries in the twelfth century, Poland was to
enter upon the course of transformation from old ways of life to new and
more highly developed forms. The Polish Court was alive to the fact that some
old institutions were obsolete. The concentration of State authority in one
person was no longer tenable. As we have seen, the monarchy was embroiled
in the conflicting aspirations of local oligarchs, who turned the dynastic
quarrels, claims and counterclaims of the ducal brothers to their own im-
mediate advantage.
An interesting attempt at compromise with these centrifugal trends was
ge
68 THE AGE OF MATURITY OF THE POLISH MONARCHY
the testament of Bolestaw the Wrymouth, drawn up with the agreement of the
bishops and lords, which took effect upon his death in 1138. The act accepted
the principle that the country could be divided into duchies between the
ruler’s sons, each composed of several castellanies, which corresponded roughly
to the old provinces. Three of the sons received their districts immediately,
while the remaining two, who were still minors, had to wait for the lands
held for life by Dowager-Duchess Salomea, from the house of the Counts of
Berg. The testament ruled that the oldest living brother was to be the Grand
Duke and that he ‘would enjoy considerable prerogatives in foreign and
military affairs and in ecclesiastical matters relating to the country as a whole.
In addition to his hereditary district, the Grand Duke was to be heir to Little
Poland and acquire suzerainty over Western and Gdansk-Pomerania. Every
duke who succeeded to these regions gained an economic, military and
political advantage over the other Polish dukes.
In 1138 Wladyslaw II, the oldest son of Bolestaw the Wrymouth, suc-
ceeded to Silesia, whose boundaries embraced the dioceses of Wroclaw and
Lubusz, and the Grand Duke’s dominions of Cracow and Sandomierz, hence
the diocese of Cracow ; he thus stood at the head of the Polish State. The
second son, Boleslaw the Curly, held Mazovia and Kujawy, hence the diocese
of Plock and a part of the dioceses of Wloctawek and Poznan. The third son,
Mieszko III, received Great Poland with the Poznan diocese and part of the
archbishopric of Gniezno. The remainder of the archdiocese of Gniezno,
included in the territory of Steradz and Leczyca, fell to the Dowager-Duchess
Salomea, who died soon afterwards in 1145. The Grand Duke took possession
of her lands and immediately came into conflict with his brothers who
hastened to the defense of the expected inheritance of the two youngest dukes,
Henry and Casimir.
The first trial of strength demonstrated that neither the compromise
devised by Bolestaw the Wrymouth nor the restoration of the monarchy were
feasible. Wtadystaw II, secure in the feeling that his brother-in-law, the
German King Conrad III, would come to his assistance, tried to unify the
State at the expense of his brothers. The centrifugal forces reflected a certain
course of historical evolution and, as in other eastern and central European
countries, led Poland inevitably to feudal disintegration. The powerful
magnate Piotr, son of Wlost, declared himself against Wladyslaw and was
blinded for his insubordination. Archbishop Jakub (James), Palatine Wszebor
and other great lords joined the party of the cadet dukes. A unified State in
the old political sense was no longer possible.
Having lost the battle of Poznan in 1146, Wtadystaw II, called the Exile
from this time onwards, was succeeded by his brother Bolestaw the Curly
in the Grand Duke’s dominions and in Silesia. At the same time Bolestaw
continued to hold Mazovia creating a separate duchy of Sandomierz which
he gave to his brother, Henry. Boleslaw the Curly and the other dukes paid
a ransom to Conrad, the German King, but established relations with the
ast Sanden a.
Wloclawek cup, 10th cent.
opposition inside Germany. Neither the Polish episcopate nor the dukes
accepted the excommunication pronounced by the Papal legate nor the inter-
diction cast upon the country by Pope Eugene III. In consequence of the
second German intervention led by Frederick Barbarossa, Bolestaw the Curly
had to pay another ransom in 1157 and pledge fealty to the Emperor but
nothing could bring back Wladystaw the Exile.
The division into regional duchies was impressed upon the mind of the
society and accepted by it. New subdivisions were made by bequest. Upon
the death of Henry of Sandomierz in 1166 in an expedition against pagan
Pruthenia, part of his dominion reverted to Casimir, the last of the brothers,
as the small Duchy of Wislica. Mieszko the Old, the third Grand Duke, who
as the senior of the family ruled from 1173, tried to invest his sovereign
THE AGE OF MATURITY OF THE POLISH MONARCHY
70
1180
c. 1170-
?
Gniezno Doors
VILLAGE AND TOWN 71
authority over the whole of Poland in the full sense of the term, but his
actions spurred an open revolt of the lords temporal and spiritual and led to
his expulsion from the capital in Cracow.
Contrary to the principle of seniority, Casimir, called the Just, the
youngest son of Bolestaw the Wrymouth, was installed on the throne in 1177.
In continued conflict the throne of Cracow gradually lost its suzerain status
and sank to the rank of the other duchies. Although the authority of the
Grand Duke was not formally abrogated, it became extinct however and the
Polish State now consisted of a group of independent and sovereign duchies
whose numbers continued to grow through the thirteenth century.
ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF THE OLIGARCHY, VILLAGE
AND TOWN PRIOR TO THE MID-TWELFTH CENTURY
The old form of the Polish State in the middle of the eleventh century, after
its reconstruction, encountered many obstacles and a concerted opposition
which it could not surmount. The new social, economic and cultural content
of the state aggravated the political difficulties throughout the twelfth cen-
tury. As early as the eleventh century, large tracts of land were concentrated
in the hands of bishops and abbots who were not satisfied with the old
method of payments from the duke’s treasury and asked for a more permanent
material basis in the form of large landed estates.
In this manner by 1136 the archbishop of Gniezno had over 1000 peasant
farms with about five thousand subjects. Similarly, though at a slower pace,
the foundations of the oligarch’s power changed. They tried to create large
consolidated estates though most estates still remained dispersed. Family
solidarity was cemented by the fact that the estates were hereditary and
henceforth Polish law acknowledged the custom of retrait lignager, i.e. the
right of all kin to the estate of a deceased without issue. At the close of the
eleventh and the beginning of the twelfth centuries, there emerged several
clans of oligarchs with a decisive voice in the affairs of state. The members
of these clans held important offices of Church and State from which they
drew sizable benefits for their families.
The estate of a great lord of the eleventh or twelfth century may be
estimated at from 200 to 600 chimneys, but many lords enjoyed an additional
income in salaries paid for services rendered at Court or as a castellan. The
lord’s estate was inhabited by peasants who had been free and who in the
past had rendered services only to the duke. The peasants now became a mass
of dependent subjects exploited mainly by the feudal lords who, enjoying the
privilege of immunity, were intent upon restricting the duke’s rights upon
their estates. After the suppression of the peasant insurrection in the second
quarter of the eleventh century, the population did not rise again in mass
72 THE AGE OF MATURITY OF THE POLISH MONARCHY
rebellion. An elaborate system of names was used to designate various degrecs
of subjection of the peasant population, ranging from the free rustici ducis
and heredes to the non-free decumi and servi.
The organization of the duke’s own estate also was subject to change.
The system of villages following particular crafts or rendering specific ser-
vices, both types ministering to the fortified seat of the duke (grdéd), was
mostly abandoned. The dukes created their own curiae, expanded the fiscal
system and organization of customs and adopted more elaborate monetary
and other operations. Although the dukes made land donations to the Church
and secular lords, yet it is estimated that in the twelfth century the dukes still
held half the land under cultivation in the country.
The rural population sought to alleviate its lot by fleeing to areas that
were less developed and where feudal! exploitation was not as harsh. Progress
in agriculture, resulting from improved farm implements and a rising popu-
lation, factors also noted in the neighbouring countries, stimulated a lively
internal colonization in the border regions of the state and on the fringes
of old settled regions, such as the south of Great Poland and the foothills
of the Swietokrzyskie Mountains.
There are two ways by which it is possible to designate quite closely the
eleventh century date that marked the turning point in the life of the castle-
towns and suburbs of Poland. Coins provide evidence that the first abun-
dant supply of metal coins minted in Poland appeared under Bolestaw the
Bold (before 1079). Silver could not be supplied in unlimited quantities to
the mints because the flow of foreign silver from the East had stopped com-
pletely, the quantities that arrived from the West were negligible, and the
output of domestic silver mines was low. Poland, nevertheless, managed to
mint her own coins as an indispensable means of exchange and measure of
value, bearing the ducal and royal stamp. Silver treasures, characteristic of
the period of the rise of the new society, became rare in the second half of
the eleventh century. Crude silver was required as coins of nominal value
by the money and commodities market still predominantly local, but money
was quickly adopted and became a daily necessity, too valuable to be
hoarded. In the event of shortage of coins, payments were made in ermine,
martin and fox furs, or in barrels of salt. Metal coins were the prevailing
currency as witnessed by the fact that in the twelfth century payment of
tribute and customs was made partly or wholly in money. Other evidence is
provided by the system introduced in Poland between 1136 and 1146 of
frequent and compulsory renewal of coinage, under which old money was
called in periodically; the operation was carried under the supervision of
the ducal mints and new coins were issued.
Not without significance also is the fact that more numerous documents
relating to markets appeared in the second half of the eleventh century.
Among them are markets growing up beside the castle-towns and in the
suburbs, and those that operated in other localities. In the course of the
DOMINION OF THE
GRAND DUKE
MIESZKO III
ZY
GRAND DUKE
. %
O >.
” EZ.
S nf Dy
‘
. -_C. foes
1e separate Polish duchies, 1138
Oo 100 Kms
———
V7-e__—o—_
(9) 60 Miles
az, Soundaries of States during the reign of Bolestaw |
the Wrymouth in 1138
““< Boundaries of the duchies
twelfth century, the number of markets rose to total about 250. This figure
also includes Western Pomerania which was closely united with Poland in
this century.
The number of centres of trade manufactures and services doubled in com-
parison with the end of the tenth century. This increase may be explained
not only by a rise in population figures alone. It it estimated that under
Bolestaw the Brave, in about 1000, Poland (Silesia, Pomerania, Great Po-
land, Mazovia and Little Poland) had a population of about 1,250,000.
Assuming that the annual population increase of Poland was 0.16 per cent,
that is the same as the estimated annual increase for Europe, then it may
be reckoned that two hundred years later Poland had a population of about
74 THE AGE OF MATURITY OF THE POLISH MONARCHY
1,700,000, or an increase of 37 per cent. We see that the expansion of towns
and markets is connected not so much with the population increase as with
the changes that occurred in the social and economic structure of the popu-
lation.
The stimulus was provided both by the growing production of urban
handicrafts and the rising output of farms which was due in this period
principally to the expanding acreage of farmed land and an upward trend
in the number of livestock. More noticeable improvement in farming tech-
niques was to occur in the following period.
On the other hand, the list of urban crafts, whose products are found
in archaeological excavations, increased markedly in the course of the elev-
enth and twelfth centuries. While there is evidence of only a few crafts
being practiced in the rural areas, and these only as subsidiary occupations,
with the exception of metallurgy and mining, about a score of different
crafts may be enumerated in the towns. Polish archaeologists have identified
over 20 crafts and trades in all: ferrous and non-ferrous metalwork, pottery,
tanning, shoemaking, bone and horn work, wheelwrights, shipwrights, glass
work, stonecutting and others. The evidence for this is supplied by the traces
of workshops, tools, articles of production and waste products, discovered
at Gniezno, Gdansk, Opole and elsewhere. The artisans attained great skiil
in their trades and produced a wide assortment of articles. Some artisans
also combined their crafts with other occupations.
There is more information available about the social conditions among
craftsmen. They made articles to order and also produced commodities for
direct sale on the market. Sufficient corroboration is provided by the casts
for large scale production of metal articles and the large volume of semi-
finished products, waste products and raw material found in the excavations
as well as written records of “artisans selling their goods” at the market. Less
is known of the range of distribution, but it is likely that it varied with
each trade and was regulated by the demands of a socially diversified do-
mestic market. The subsistence economy of the Polish rural areas existed side
by side for a considerable length of time with the commodity-money econ-
omy, to which some of the dependent peasants had only sporadic access,
being restricted to the purchase of knives and salt. Part of the rural popula-
tion as well as the knights and lords made wide and frequent use of the
market. From the second half of the eleventh century, the lords began to
expand their large land holdings intensively and established residences out-
side the towns.
At the close of the eleventh century, even the smallest rural centres had
their weekly market day which drew off some of the pressure from the town
markets. Some of the new market places were called after the days of the
week, such as Wtorek (Tuesday), Sroda and Srddka (Wednesday), Czwartek
(Thursday), Piatek (Friday), Sobotka (Saturday). Others were called by
some modified form of the word market (targ in Polish). Some of these
VILLAGE AND TOWN 75
were Tarczek, Targowisko, Targowa Gorka. Others took new names in an
attempt to designate their new social and economic role in relation to their
former function as exclusively a settlement, took the name of miejsce—
miescie—which in the Polish of that time is equivalent to the modern miasto
(locus according to the Latin sources). The term miasto (town—city) was to
become widely used in the Polish, as it did in the Czech language. It soon
supplanted the once popular term grdéd (castle-town) in reference to urban
centres.
The principal commodities traded at all the markets were articles pro-
duced by native artisans in the large and in some small centres. Of some
significance also was the import of such mass commodities as western Euro-
pean cloth, which appeared in the excavations of Gdansk at the close of the
eleventh century, Baltic herring salted in Kotobrzeg, salt from Pomerania,
Kujawy, Ruthenia and Cracow, iron in bars and in articles, pottery, glassware
and other articles produced by goldsmiths and silversmiths. The hour of
Polish grain and livestock export through the Baltic ports had not yet struck
and, besides a short Arabian and Scandinavian episode in the tenth and elev-
enth centuries, the country concetrated above all on the development of
its local economic possibilities for domestic consumption. In exchange for
town produced articles, the markets and towns received farm and forest
products, principal among which were honey, wax and furs; the towns were
likewise consumers of grain, cattle and pigs. The towns, even the larger
ones, were still engaged to some extent in farming, fishing and stock breeding.
Market towns and hamlets, in which the crafts were at an early stage of
their development, acted as middlemen in contacts with the larger centres
of manufacture, but they rose and were supported not only by commerce.
Services, an important component of urban function, developed in these
centres. By the eleventh century, inns or taverns appeared in large numbers
in large as well as in small centres. Every market had its inn (forum cum
taberna). The inn served as a place where the people ate, drank beer, caro-
used and slept and operated on other than market days as well. Customs and
import duties, minting, sale of salt and other manufactures—all these were
activities carried on in the inns.
Urban and market settlements also offered cultural services to the sur-
rounding villages. Churches, often built near the markets, created a close
network of parishes. The rural district was subordinated to the urban church.
The ducal administration operating in the towns of the castellan still exten-
ded to the peasants, despite the immunity enjoyed by the lords spiritual and
temporal, and the market days were the occasion to show the power of the
ruler even in the times of Bolestaw the Brave. It may be added here that
certain urban trades, such as the butcher’s and baker’s stalls that appeared at
the close of this period, provided services that stimulated rural consumption.
The large Polish towns of this period found favour in the eyes of foreign
observers who compared them with the towns they knew. The Sicilian geo-
16 THE AGE OF MATURITY OF THE POLISH MONARCHY
grapher, al-Idrisi, wrote about Poland in 1154, in a work based on infor-
mation gathered over many years from merchants and Jews, that “her
(Poland’s) towns flourish and the population is numerous”’—‘“Among her
towns are Cracow (Kraku). It is a beautiful and large town with a great
many houses, inhabitants, markets, vineyards and gardens”. He writes in
the same manner about Gniezno, Wroclaw, Sieradz and Szczecin. It may be
averred on the basis of archaeological excavations, traces of town plans,
monuments of church architecture and the more abundant written records
of this period, that towns of this category could have become large agglome-
rations in the course of the twelfth century, each with a number of settle-
ments scattered over a fairly wide area. The settlements performed different
functions and were held under different titles. The duke’s castellan’s resi-
dential castle-town, played the most important role in the agglomeration.
The castle-town frequently had its own chapel and a fortified suburb.
As a rule a cathedral or a few churches rose in the provincial or diocesan
capitals. From the end of the eleventh century, if not earlier, the population
overflowed out of the suburbs and established separate settlements, each
with a market, inns and chapels.
The social and legal condition of the people who lived in these centres
of urban life was widely differentiated, especially in such large towns as
Szczecin and Wroclaw, Gniezno or Cracow. All the inhabitants of the towns,
as well as the artisans, merchants and buyers (irrespective of their social
derivation) who came to the market, were protected by the law called mar-
ket mir (peace) of the duke. The safety of person and goods was guaranteed
by the castellan and his deputy. In the twelfth century, if not earlier, the
trading centres received a magistrate for the market, who, in addition to
this jurisdiction, also performed general administrative duties and acted as
an agent of the treasury.
CULTURE IN THE ELEVENTH CENTURY AND IN
THE FIRST HALF OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY
It may be assumed from the fairly large number of early Polish towns, with
a widely diversified population, that they were centres of culture which
gradually grew distinct from the culture of the Polish countryside. There the
traditional Slavic way of life persisted, but the towns readily accepted and
adapted to local needs the influences of both near and distant neighbours.
The regional traits were softened and transmitted into original new forms.
The decline of the early medieval monarchy was marked by the univer-
sal acceptance of Christianity. The close network of eight dioceses, with
Gniezno as the metropolis, was established for centuries to come during the
reign of Bolestaw the Wrymouth. The castle-towns each had their own
CULTURAL RELATIONS 77
chapel built in the suburbs or in the market place. At the close of the elev-
enth century secular canons were appointed ; this helped reform the cathe-
dral chapters and supplemented them with a network of provosts and preb-
ends. By the middle of the eleventh century Benedictine abbeys connected
with the reform movement of Lorraine were set up, among them Tyniec in
Little Poland, Lubin in Great Poland and Mogilno in Kujawy. King Bo-
lesltaw the Bold was most generous in building abbeys. In the second quarter
of the twelfth century, the canons regular appeared in Trzemeszno and the
Cistercian Order was established between 1140 and 1149.
Diplomatic missions and pilgrimages to St. Gilles-en-Provence, to Rome,
to the Imperial Court and to Kiev, sporadic travels to the Holy Land, mar-
riages contracted with the dynasties of Bohemia, Hungary, Ruthenia, Swabia,
Lorraine, Austria and of other principalities of the Empire, not excluding
ties with the Imperial Court, Denmark and Sweden, all these factors served
to broaden the horizons and link the culture of Poland with the cultural
centres of the Latin, Germanic, Scandinavian and Ruthenian countries. Poland
and Polish affairs made their appearance on the pages of the chronicles and
annals of the neighbouring countries. Some echoes may be found in the
learned and literary works of western and southern Europe and in the intel-
lectual climate where the Chanson de Roland was composed. The Cru-
sading movement, however, never affected the Polish dukes and knights.
Only a few rare exceptions, such as Wladyslaw the Exile, or the powerful
lord Iaxa, who brought the canons of the Holy Sepulchre to Miechéw, were
swept up in the Crusades or pilgrimage to the Holy Land. Polish rulers and
knights and the Polish Church were busy fighting the pagans in Pomerania,
and later in the twelfth century the more troublesome Pruthenians. Poland
also remained largely unaffected by the popular heretical movements which
did not find a favourable climate in a country where, though the population
was Christian, it nevertheless reconciled for many centuries the teachings of
the Church with the folklore of its daily life.
There is evidence that cathedral schools were in existence in the eleventh
century. A growing number of Poles occupied the bishop’s thrones and if
the Sees were ceded to strangers then this was done by the dukes for the pur-
pose of maintaining contact with the world and of sheltering them from the
influence of the magnates. We know that Casimir the Restorer and Zbigniew
were educated in foreign monasteries. Gertrude, the daughter of King Miesz-
ko II and wife of Izaslav of Kiev, wrote Latin prayers and remained faithful
to the Roman rite even in Ruthenia. A psalter has been preserved that contains
the compositions of this earliest Polish woman writer, set down most prob-
ably in her own hand. According to two inventories taken at the beginning
of the twelfth century, the library of the Cracow chapter possessed the ba-
sic church and secular literature. Polish pupils found their way to leading
schools of the West, such as in Laon and Paris. The area of present day
Belgium, especially the country on the Meuse produced two outstanding
78 THE AGE OF MATURITY OF THE POLISH MONARCHY
prelates, Alexander and Walter, born in Malonne, who became the Bishops
of Ptock and Wroclaw respectively. Their cultural patronage is commemo-
rated in several outstanding works of art in Poland.
The court annals were continued. Separate excerpts were made for the
use of individual bishoprics and abbeys. The transitory supremacy of cen-
tralist trends at the Court of Bolestaw the Wrymouth yielded a work of
exquisite literary elegance which defended with great ardour and zeal the
policy of state unity and of the specific role of the ducal dynasty, the do-
mini naturales of Poland. This Cronicae et gesta ducum sive principum Polo-
norum was written in 1116-1119 by an unknown foreign Benedictine monk
called by historians as Gallus Anonymus. Based upon years sojourn in the
country and infornmtion furnished by persons from the ruling circle his
outline of the heroic deeds of Bolestaw the Wrymouth, projected against the
background of the history of Poland and of the dynasty, is composed with
profound perspicuity and provides evidence of the patriotism of Poles of
this age.
In addition to these Gesta ducum there were also the gesta of the mag-
nates who, as has been pointed out from the example of Chronicon comitis
Petri constituted a grave danger to the former. Piotr of Silesia, son of Wlost
was a legendary figure even during his life. Married to a Ruthenian princess,
he was reputed to possess a fabulous fortune which he obtained from the ran-
som paid for a captured Ruthenian prince. He maintained contacts with many
monastic centres of the West from where, namely from Arrovaise, he brought
monks whom he installed in the monasteries which he founded at the mount
Sleza-Sobétka and Wroclaw. Soon after he was blinded and died, he became
the hero of a Latin poem, a genuine Polish chanson de geste which has come
down to our times in several versions of a later date.
A similar social phenomenon may be observed at the close of this period
as regards monuments of architecture. Like the dukes before them, the lords
now appeared as benefactors endowing building construction.
The earliest Romanesque art of Poland bears an unmistakable mark of
the influence derived from the ethnically heterogeneous, but culturally rich
archidiocese of Cologne as did the whole Polish Church reconstructed after
the cataclysm. The western dioceses of the Cologne archbishopric among
which Liége was the foremost again exerted an influence on Poland.
Romanesque cathedrals erected mainly in the suburbs according to the
style prevailing in western Europe, though adapted to local needs and pos-
sibilities and usually reduced in scale, were raised by the effort of dukes and
the resourcefulness of the bishops. The most impressive Romanesque structures
are preserved to our day within the precincts of Wawel, the castle and
cathedral hill of Cracow where the ducal residence was established. The
church of St. Gereon and the cathedral of St. Wenceslaus with the St. Leo-
nard’s Crypt and nearby the churches of St. Michael and St. George, were
built beside the stone-built town. At the close of the eleventh century, Gnie-
CULTURAL RELATIONS 79
zno, the archbishop’s See, was endowed with a new cathedral, built on the
classical plan of three naves. The cathedrals of Plock, Wloctawek, Poznan
and Wroclaw received a new form of stone in the twelfth century. The abbey
churches of Kruszwica, Mogilno and Tyniec were built earlier in the eleventh
century. Other churches like that of Trzemeszno, joined their noble company
in the first half of the twelfth century. The wave of Romanesque architec-
ture lapped the shores of less notable towns. Chapels, usually rotundas with
a tower or one-nave churches were constructed to take the typical example
of the church of St. Nicholas of Cieszyn.
In the middle of the twelfth century, the lords with their growing finan-
cial power challenged the supremacy of the dukes. The previously mentioned
Piotr, son of Wlost, comes Poloniae, as he is called in the obituary of the
St. Giles abbey, made a truly princely foundation: the St. Vincent abbey at
Olbin in Wroclaw. This imposing complex of churches and buildings domi-
nated by the abbey basilica with its granite columns was destroyed in the
sixteenth century. Other lords, such as the Odrowqz clan at Prandocin,
began with smaller chapels built within their residences, where emphasis was
laid on sculptured and painted ornaments.
Very few early paintings survived the holocausts of war. Chapter libra-
ries contain remnants of Romanesque illuminated volumes which had been
acquired in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Notable among these are the
magnificent Sacramentarium of Tyniec, originally from Cologne, which
dates back to the middle of the eleventh century; from the same period is
the Pultusk Codex aureus formerly at Plock, written in gold letters on pur-
ple. It has been established that one of the codices, namely the Cracow
Pontificale, was definitely produced in Poland at the close of the eleventh
century. Manuscripts of Musica scolarum of the eleventh and twelfth cen-
turies were also brought to Poland.
Monumental sculpture was much more modest in scale than that found
in Lombardy, its place of origin, or in the country of the Walloons, Exam-
ples may be found in the rare surviving capitals, portal jambs and other
fragments of architectural ornamentation. This art flickered into a bright
flame after the middle of the twelfth century and shines with undimmed
brilliance in several peerless and impressive works. In spirit, however, it
seems to belong to the succeeding period. The monarchy of the early Polish
Middle Ages descended into the grave in a severe garb.
Chapter V
THE CENTURY
OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
AND SOCIAL TRANSITION
EVOLUTION OF SETTLEMENTS IN THE TWELFTH
AND THIRTEENTH CENTURIES
The victory of particularism led to the rejection of an obsolete political or-
der which, in many instances, constituted an impediment to the new social
and economic forces. A new century of progress was inaugurated although
a high political price was exacted for it. The defensive forces of the state
were weakened, external pressure was not always successfully countered,
and its true nature not always recognized.
The index of development is the increase of population mentioned in the
previous chapter. An accelerated rate of population growth, resulting from
improved economic conditions, is observed in the twelfth century. The gen-
eral proliferation of rural settlements proceeded from the wider use of im-
proved farming tools, most notably the wheeled plough and from the inte-
gration of peasant lands within the framework of large estates. In the course
of the thirteenth century this second factor made possible the introduc-
tion of the three field system, which marked a great step forward in farm-
ing efficiency throughout Europe, to replace the old methods whereby the
fields were allowed to lie fallow in alternate years. Agricultural improve-
ment was affected in part spontaneously, in part as the result of pressure
of the Jords, who were interested in a settled farming system which enabled
them to exact consistently large contributions. Encouraged by the higher
revenues, the lords eagerly supported the planting of settlements in the vast
forest areas. On the other hand, the population of the established settlements
must likewise have derived certain advantages from this new situation, be-
cause only a pronounced improvement in their conditions could have in-
duced them to remain in their old homes.
New settlements were established on the basis of a new Polish law called
mos liberorum hospitum, or the customary right of free settlers. The earliest
settlements were in Silesia, Little Poland and somewhat later in Great Po-
land. In essence the Polish law superseded the earlier services by strictly de-
fining a rent in kind or money. It corresponded to the trend which prevailed
Strzelno. Holy Trinity Church, second half of the 12th cent., detail of a Romanesque
column
St. ~~ 2
Re: m
2
-
—
—
me
a
Py
\
i
ema 1G
A blie\/
Trzebnica. Cistercian Nuns Ghurch, ¢. 1220-1230. Tympanum
in the eleventh century Europe, namely the freeing of peasants from earlier
services rendered to the lord. This measure was combined with an agrarian
reform. Analogous to the feudal conditions appearing in other, and especially
in western European countries, landed estates grew in size in Poland also,
partly at the expense of the once boundless ducal estates and partly by in-
creasing the area of arable soil by moving into uninhabited regions. These
lands were acquired by what was called interdictio or inhibitio hereditatis,
that is by occupation with or even without the approval of the duke. The
most profitable system both in the old and new settlements was to unite all
lands in one area by purchase and getting rid of enclaves. The boundaries
of lay and Church estates were staked out by circumequitatio, circuitio,
a custom whereby the duke himself or his agent rode around and marked
out the boundaries of the area. Judicial and economic immunities granted to
these estates brought great economic advantages. The estates were granted
independence and immunity in varying degrees from the intervention of
the duke’s officials. The Church as well as larger lay estates, founded their
fortunes upon these liberties in the course of the thirteenth century.
This new development promoted a division between the estates of the
knights. The position of certain groups of knights who owned more land
with a larger dependent population was strengthened while that of the
lower ranks of knights was weakened. A contemporary observer notes in the
Liber fundationis claustri Mariae Virginis in Henrykow in Lower Silesia, the
EVOLUTION OF SETTLEMENTS 83
wane of small land holdings in the thirteenth century and the rise of large
estates in the vicinity of the Cistercian monastery which had itself stripped
the lower ranks of knights of their property. As was customary in the West,
so in Poland many knights took service with a bishop or a lord. A number
of knights survived by virtue of being directly subordinated to the duke.
A great many knights of lesser rank, derived from the earlier free population,
continued to live in the districts of Mazovia where the growth of large es-
tates was slow. The main reason for their survival was the fact that this duchy
was in constant danger of Pruthenian and Lithuanian invasion. Consequently
it was necessary to organize a permanent force by calling into service the
knights who as a rule did not own serfs.
The growth of the towns was promoted by similar economic incentives.
At the close of the twelfth and in the early thirteenth centuries, a small
group of wealthy persons may be noted among the urban population, most
certainly the merchants, who, on the basis of personal privileges, granted
them by the duke or the bishop as overlords of the urban settlement, came
to occupy a leading position among the inhabitants. This group corresponds
to what were known in other central European towns as the meliores, the
nucleus and backbone of the community, who organized the towns. In Po-
land the towns were headed by a scultetus and infrequently by a villicus or
procurator, appointed by the duke to what was generally a hereditary
office. In the early years of the thirteenth century, the scultetus administered
the laws on market days and controlled the settlement, but principally he
was the chief magistrate of the growing urban community. This community
did not embrace all the permanent or temporary residents of the town, but
was restricted to citizens (cives, burgenses) or denizens (hospites) enjoying
this privilege in hereditary right. In several known instances these were local
men, some of them knights. It comes as no surprise that in seeking the ap-
propriate form of legal privilege, Plock granted its hospites the rights of
Mazovian knights. From the earliest years of the thirteenth century it is pos-
sible to observe the presence of growing numbers of foreign, and especially
German merchants. They strengthened the economic and social importance
of the burghers of such large townships as Cracow, Wroclaw, Poznan and
Gdansk and obtained separate liberties for their language group. Foreign
craftsmen also were introduced into the towns. In the twelfth century, Wal-
loon weavers settled in the suburbs of Wroclaw and the Italian and German
experts who came to Little Poland, enjoyed special mining privileges from
about 1220.
At the close of the twelfth century, towns and markets were granted the
forum liberum, or rights of a free market, in return for a specified rent. Grant
of a forum liberum meant that all were free to use it and were not liable to
ducal taxation or subject to the jurisdiction of the castellans and voivodes.
No payments in kind, services or money were made to the ducal treasury or
to the ducal officials. The scope of immunities was related to the role of the
6*
84 THE CENTURY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL TRANSITION
town. The immunities thus evolved into what became the Polish municipal
law. The smaller towns adopted this method of organizing their social and
economic life throughout the thirteenth, fourteenth and even the fifteenth
centuries, abandoning it quite late in favour of another law, the ins Teutoni-
cum, which had been tried and tested by the towns of Silesia since the second
decade of the thirteenth century.
FOREIGN COLONIZATION AND THE INTRODUCTION OF
GERMAN LAW IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY
In order to evaluate correctly the role played by foreigners in releasing the
social energy that gave impetus to the transition of the material and social
life of Polish towns and villages, it is first essential to grasp the fact that
Polish towns had already acquired self-government and that they already
had a complicated social and administrative structure before the close of the
twelfth and the beginning of the thirteenth centuries. Foreign settlers, prin-
cipally Germans, but Flemings and Walloons and Jews as well, all contrib-
uted in the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to the acceler-
ation of progress with regard both to the volume of production and to the
quality of urban life.
The foreign immigrants were not evenly distributed in the Polish lands.
The largest wave of rural and urban colonists swept into Lower Silesia,
Western Pomerania and Pruthenia, bringing about in the course of several
centuries a linguistic change in these areas, because the ruling class, the
courtiers of the dukes and the feudal lords, came under the influence of the
German Janguage while German peasant colonists squeezed out the Slavs
and Pruthenians and restricted their development. In Upper Silesia, Great
Poland, Gdansk-Pomerania and Little Poland, however, the foreigners left
their mark only on a few large towns and only in a very small degree upon
the villages. In the majority of cases these foreigners were absorbed into
Polish society at the beginning of the modern epoch. In a few important in-
stances, such as Gdansk and Torun, they preserved their language within
the framework of the then multinational Polish State. In Central Poland,
Mazovia and Podlasie, and from the fourteenth century in Ruthenia and
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the German element was of no numerical
significance and was assimilated with the local urban and rural population.
Even in towns ruled by patricians whose language was German and
inhabited by German artisans and merchants, the proportion of Poles in
crafts and services was quite considerable. The mounting social and political
tensions rarely erupted, however, into a conflict of nationalities. Class divi-
sions were very complex, causing plebeians of both language groups to unite
against the German patricians. Although there was open conflict between the
FOREIGN COLONIZATION 85
German community and the Polish feudal lords, as for example in the revolt
of mayor Albert in Cracow in 1311, there were long periods of peaceful
cooperation, and many patricians of foreign birth formed the ranks of Polish
nobles.
The acceptance of German law by Polish towns was called locatio civi-
tatis. It was widely adopted in the first half of the thirteenth century by
agency of foreign merchant colonies which enjoyed the protection of Henry
the Bearded, the shrewd ruler of Silesia. His urban policy was similar to
that pursued by rulers in the neighbouring western states and its aim was to
adapt tried legal forms to the country’s commodity-money economy. Without
doubt Henry the Bearded was guided not only by fiscal considerations, but
also by the desire to invigorate the economy by bringing into the area both
foreign merchant capital as well as expert artisans and miners. Henry the
Bearded by way of experiment restricted this policy to smaller settlements.
Before 1211 he granted the hospites coming to Ziotoryja (in Auro), a famous
mining centre of precious ores, the charter given under the law of 1188 to
the burghers of Magdeburg by its archbishop. A few years later, but before
1223, a similar charter of a Novum Forum ducis Henrici was granted to
Silesian Sroda, a settlement located in fertile farming country on the im-
portant route from Lusatia through Glogéw to Wroclaw; this was based on
Magdeburg law but with elements of the Flemish law. This was adopted
without any changes in Nysa in 1221. Other locationes civitatum in Silesia
kept to the version of the Magdeburg law worked out at Sroda and called
it the law of Sroda—ius Novi Fori Sredense. It was later generally applied
on the whole of the extensive region of central and southern Poland.
As early as 1237 the German merchant community of Szczecin in West-
ern Pomerania, was exempted from the jurisdiction governing the urban
Slav settlement, while in 1243 Duke Barnim I put the town’s administration
according to the Magdeburg law in the hands of the German community.
On the other hand, the initially small German colony in Gdansk and several
other Pomeranian cities that were linked with the Hansa, adopted the Liibeck
law. Another centre of municipal reform established by the Teutonic Order
in the course of the thirteenth century, had a much profounder influence. In
the area of Pruthenia that the Teutonic Knights had conquered, they destroyed
the burgeoning Baltic trade and crafts in the markets and suburbs (called
liszki, pilate, palte). The Polish territory, especially the Chetmno Lands,
where a new town rose in 1233 close to the old fortified town of Chelmno,
became the springboard of their activity in the economic field as well. The
Chelmno charter became the model not only for the towns of the Teutonic
Order but also for the towns of all northern Poland, including Mazovia,
and was known as the ius Culmense.
Despite the wide influence that the administrative system of some towns
had upon that of others over the next few centuries, it must not be assumed
that the period of the earliest locatio civitatis, which ended in southern Po-
8 THE CENTURY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL TRANSITION
land with the Mongol invasion of 1241, constituted a rigid dividing line
between one period and another. The search for the best solution was con-
tinuous, though some of the methods devised were a failure, others proved
hardly adequate. Occasionally the founding charters were renewed, as in
Wroclaw in 1242 and 1261. In Cracow evidence of the locatio of a settle-
ment near Trinity Church goes back to the reign of Leszek the White, or to
be more exact to about 1220; in 1257 Bolestaw the Chaste granted a definitive
locatio for the town. The first founding act provided only for the appoint-
ment of a scultetus and exempted settlers, usually but not always foreigners
from Polish law which remained binding on the native inhabitants of the
settlement. The early charters were-a far cry from the charters establishing
a municipal self-government. The scultetus remained an official of the duke
and the interference of the duke and his administration though still effective
was restricted to matters relating to the market facilities. The original privi-
lege established standards of court and trade law, but did not concern itself,
even in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, with the political system of
the town administration, which was allowed to evolve from local practice
that was the outcome of the socio-political power struggle.
In the second period that began in the middle of the thirteenth century,
the town charters embraced a broader area of Poland and a greater number
of towns, such as Poznan (1253) followed soon by Kalisz (1253-1260),
Cracow (1257) and many others. In the thirteenth century 38 towns were
reorganized in Great Poland alone. Although privileges under Polish law
granted to some inhabitants to the towns are mentioned in the sources still
at the end of the thirteenth century, the constant use of identical legal forms
led ultimately in the fourteenth century to a situation ‘where the law called
German law applied to all the burghers of towns which had been granted
the locatio civitatis. For this reason the ius Teutonicum became synonymous
with the ims civile, the rights of the citizens of towns. The chief magistrate
was the advocatus, though still known as the scultetus in Gdansk-Pomerania.
This official was responsible to the duke, but his office was hereditary; he was
independent of the town community and collected a large revenue from rents
and court fees. Pomeranian communities were the first to aspire to free them-
selves from this subjection by purchasing the office and by establishing a town
council. In this respect success was achieved by the town of Tczew as early
as 1258. Other towns were less fortunate and had to wait many long decades
and even centuries for this privilege.
The transformation of the municipal administration was the result of the
economic role of the town, both in the local market and in far-flungcommerce.
The thirteenth century witnessed changes in rural life (villages founded
on the principle of rent law), in consequence of which a considerable
part of the peasantry, once they had settled their dues in the form of rents,
became valuable trade partners for the burghers. The peasants supplied grain,
cattle and pigs and in turn demanded articles produced by the artisans. Such
FOREIGN COLONIZATION 87
products as cloth and ironware reached even remote villages in Poland over
a number of centuries.
The growing commodity and money exchange in the local markets led to
the slow formation of economic regions and of a hierarchy of towns, ranging
from the regional capital through the smaller townships and market settle-
ments, a growing number of which were granted the German law. The total
number of towns did not change, or grew only slightly. Owing to their diverse
functions, however, they performed a new economic role. Large towns, like
Cracow, Wroclaw, Poznan, Toran and Gdansk, conducted trade on a local
and regional scale and ventured farther afield in their commercial endeavours,
attracting goods to their fairs and their markets from the farthest regions of
Poland and from abroad. The scope and assortment of luxury goods were
extended to include silks and expensive cloth from Flanders and spices. More
important were articles of general consumption, such as cheaper cloths, metal
goods, precious metals, salt, herrings and beer of a better quality than could
be obtained locally. The importance of the Baltic as an area of operation of
the Hanseatic towns increased in the second half of the thirteenth century.
The town of Liibeck had secured the cooperation of the larger towns on the
Vistula which was soon to become the chief waterway of the Polish lands.
The Hungarian copper and wine trade, passing through Cracow, Torun,
Gdansk or Elblag reached the Baltic. The East-West trade extending from the
Black Sea and Ruthenia to the Baltic as well as to Bohemia and Germany car-
ried furs, hides, cattle, silk and spices in one direction and metal goods, haber-
dashery (called Nuremberg wares) and cloth in the other. Polish towns added
their own goods, agricultural produce, mineral salt and lead to the foreign
transit trade. The ducal treasury profited from this trade by enforcing the
right of way whereby the merchants were allowed to travel along stipulated
routes, where they had to pay dues at the numerous land and water customs
offices.
The towns sought to obtain a partial or total exemption from custom
duties at all the customs houses in the given duchy. Poznan obtained the
exemption in 1283, Cracow in 1288-1306. Occasionally, towns like Wroclaw
managed to buy the customs houses and themselves collected duties from
foreign merchants. In the competitive struggle some towns obtained rights of
staple (ius stapulae, depositorii) which obliged foreign merchants in transit to
offer their whole cargo for sale to the local merchants, or to put it on sale for
a specified number of days. Wroclaw had obtained this privilege in 1274,
Szczecin in 1283 and Cracow in 1306.
The changing pattern of urban occupations, the development of crafts and
trading, the transformation of the social structure of the burghers and the
influence exerted by foreign town charters, brought about a far reaching
reform in the lay out of Polish towns. It is noticeable in the large towns but
the change was apparent also in the small towns. The fortified castle-town
with a suburb and several market settlements, which together formed the
88 THE CENTURY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL TRANSITION
twelfth-century Polish town, was replaced in the thirteenth century by closely
built up areas, housing the population with streets laid out in a regular plan
with a fairly large quadrangular market. The basic element of the town plan
was an elongated plot, on whose narrow side contiguous with the square or
street, a dwelling with a workshop or merchant shop was built, the rear being
occupied by a yard and outbuildings. Despite the striking regularity of the
town plans based on central European experience in measuring and city plan-
ning, the plots, squares and streets were laid out in diverse patterns and the
public buildings, such as the town hall, the public scales, the mercer’s hall,
meat and bread stalls, the parish church, walls or ramparts and wooden
palisades, the gates and fortified towers were located in different ways.
The choice of a site for a new town development was restricted by the
property rights of lords and the clergy, or determined by topographical condi-
tions. There were cases, as for example at Trzebnica, where an old settlement
was redeveloped within the old boundaries, or where new towns, as in the
instance of Gniezno, were located on the site of one of the markets lying close
to the castle-town and suburb.
Very often, however, the old town site was abandoned and the new centre
was founded by charter some distance, even several kilometres away from the
earlier settlement which, though it still bore the name of stare miasto (the old
town), declined to the level of village or a suburb. This is what happened at
Sandomierz, Leczyca, Radom, Kalisz and a great many other urban centres.
Some transfers were fairly complex in nature, as for example in the Sacz
valley beneath the point where the Poprad joins the Dunajec and where
Podegrodzie (suburb) as well as Stary and Nowy Sacz (Old and New Sacz)
are a considerable distance apart (8-12 km). Even when the new chartered
towns were located close to the earlier settlement, part of the population left
the old town which then became a risidential centre. This may be illustrated
by the example of the cathedral or collegiate isles called Ostr6w Tumski in
Poznan, Wroclaw and Glogéw. Once a castle-town with its suburb, the Os-
trow Tumski now became a religious centre, the residence of the clergy and
the servants of the church alone. In some towns there are still fairly distinctive
traces of old settlements which have become merged with the planning of the
new chartered towns. Grodzka Street in Cracow, for example, was the axis of
the old settlement Okél. On the other hand, on the land of Pruthenians the
Teutonic Order founded the Prussian towns, in a virgin area, which were
notable for their particularly rigid geometric plan, of which one of the finest
examples is Reszel.
Occasionally, the new town area failed to accomodate local and foreign
trade. This was the case at Torun. The Teutonic Knights settled in Gérsk—Old
Torun in 1231. In 1233 they founded a charter town about 10 kilometres up
the Vistula. The town was laid out on an irregular pentagon with the Teutonic
castle on its eastern wall. In 1264, the New Town of Torun, mostly inhabited
THE DUCHIES OF POLAND 89
by artisans and with its own town government, sprang up next to the castle
and the Old Town.
As a rule, however, there was adequate room for construction within the
early ramparts or later within the town walls, thanks to the ample allowance
made in staking out the plots. The walls were built with the aid of the duke.
In a great many cases he moved his seat from the old earth and wood castle-
town to the stone castle, which was constructed as a part of the new town’s
defense system. This was the case in Wroclaw, Poznan, Leczyca and many
other towns.
THE DUCHIES OF POLAND
There were a great many dukes in thirteenth century Poland. The prolific
Piast dynasty divided its heritage among its heirs. The dynasty was split into
several lines : the Piasts of Great Poland, Little Poland, Mazovia, Kujawy,
Lower and Upper Silesia. The dynasty that ruled Western Pomerania was of
local origin and was founded by Warcistaw I, who has been mentioned in
another connexion, 2 member of a lordly family and a vassal of Bolestaw
the Wrymouth. Sobiesltaw who died about 1178, one of the viceroys of
Gdansk-Pomerania appointed by the supreme duke, founded another dynasty
which soon usurped sovereign power in this region.
The last representative of the system established by Bolestaw the
Wrymouth was Mieszko III the Old who died in 1202. He ascended the
throne of Cracow on four different occasions amid the conflicts between
various groups of lords. The last demonstration of the Grand Duke’s claims
was the journey to Gdansk made in 1227 by Leszek the White, successor of
Mieszko III in Cracow and son of Casimir the Just. The journey resulted in
the tragic death of the Grand Duke which occurred on his passage home,
following the conspiracy of two allied regional rulers, the dukes of Great
Poland and Gdansk. Beginning with 1202, the formed senior duchy of Cracow
and Sandomierz was treated as a province subject to the same laws of
succession as the other provinces.
We may now turn to consider the salient political events that took place
in each of the duchies into which the Polish State had been split.
Upon the death of Leszek the White, power in the Cracow-Sandomierz
duchy passed into the hand of the great lords, who during the minority of
Bolestaw the Chaste, the son of Leszek, placed various princes on the throne.
One of them, Wladyslaw Spindleshanks of Great Poland, son of Mieszko the
Old, granted the lords in 1228 a privilege at Cienia in which he promised
to observe “just and noble laws according to the council of the bishop and the
barons”. The privilege of Cienia is recognized as the first charter of a general
nature granted to the higher nobility. Henry the Bearded and Henry the
90 THE CENTURY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL TRANSITION
Pious, dukes of the Silesian line who for several years were the rulers of
Cracow and Sandomierz, tolerated the government of the Palatine Teodor
of the Gryf clan, who styled himself “We by the Grace of God Palatine of
Cracow”. With the aid of the clergy Bolestaw the Chaste, faithful servant
of the Church, tried to enlist the clergy to weaken some of the lordly families
and their retainers, but he met with rebellious opposition as did his successor
Leszek the Black (1279-1288), a duke of the line of Kujawy, who died
without an heir. Leszek the Black clashed with the Bishop of Cracow, Pawel
of Przemankowo, and the Palatine Janusz of the Starza clan. Both in Silesia
and in Cracow, the burghers were emerging as a new social force. They
defended Cracow from the rebels and upon Leszek’s death installed on the
throne Henry IV Probus of Wroclaw, one of the first champions of the
reintegration of Poland.
In 1163 Silesia returned to the sons of Wiadystaw II the Exile with the
agreement of Bolestaw the Curly, Grand Duke of Poland. They were allowed
to inherit the lands of their father. They soon divided the Silesian territories
into three provinces which in the course of the thirteenth century disintegrated
further into still smaller districts. The swift economic growth of these lands,
the leading economic role of the Duchy of Wroctaw in particular, enabled
Henry the Bearded, who ascended the throne in 1202, to attempt to expand
his dominions. He managed to seize different titles of succession from various
relatives, or to set himself up as the guardian of the juvenile heirs to the
territories of southern Great Poland, most of Silesia and the whole of Little
Poland. In 1238, these considerable though still loosely integrated possessions
were inherited by his son, Henry the Pious. Upon his death in 1241 his sons’
succession was restricted to Lower Silesia which they divided between them-
selves. Eventually Henry IV Probus reestablished his supremacy over the lords
who strove to break his power. Most dangerous was the Bishop of Wroclaw,
Thomas II, who fought for the privilegium fori for the Church lands. Henry
IV formulated the programme of the integration of the Polish territories ;
he seized Little Poland and attempted to revive the royal title, but he did not
live to carry out this plan. When he died in 1290 he bequeathed Little Poland
to Przemyst II, the energetic Duke of Great Poland, who a few years later
was to place the royal crown on his head.
Great Poland entered upon the course of disintegration belatedly and then
only for a short period. It was guided for 64 years by the firm hand of Miesz-
ko the Old, the exponent of traditions of the old monarchy. Mieszko assigned
to his sons separate provinces only under pressure and then only for a brief
period. His successor and son, Wladystaw Spindleshanks, restricted and later
removed his nephew and co-ruler Wladystaw, son of Odo, who yielded to the
bishops and the abbots. Wladyslaw Spindleshanks was a representative of the
traditional relations between the duke and the Church ; he opposed the Gre-
gorian emancipation of the Church. Hence such measures as the election of
bishops by chapters, freedom from taxes and celibacy of the clergy, were
THE DUCHIES OF POLAND 91
delayed in reaching Poland by almost hundred years. The Archbishop of
Gniezno, Henryk Kietlicz, won this battle by turning for help to other dukes,
who were hostile to Wladyslaw Spindleshanks and his plans for expansion.
Two meetings of the dukes, the first in 1210 at Borzykowa and the second
in 1215 at Wolborz, laid the foundations for the evolution of the economic
and judicial immunity of the Church in Poland. In 1247 Great Poland was
finally divided by Bolestaw the Pious and Przemyst I, nephews and heirs of
Wladystaw Spindleshanks. When Przemyst I died, shortly afterwards the two
areas were merged again. Thus Great Poland formed a solid base for all plans
that aimed at the reintegration of the Polish duchies, especially under the rule
of Przemyst II (1279-1296), the son of Przemyst I.
In Mazovia and Kujawy, however, the process of disintegration went far
deeper. The irresponsible policy of Conrad of Mazovia, the younger brother
of Leszek the White, who was established in the duchy from 1202, ultimately
failed to deliver into his hands the coveted throne of Cracow. On the contrary,
his policy prevented Mazovia from carrying out its principal task, in regard
to the rest of the Polish territories, namely to defend them from the raids of
the Baltic peoples. Conrad’s sons were the founders of two dynastic lines.
Casimir I founded the dynasty of Kujawy which produced Wladyslaw the
Short, the toughminded ruler who was to unify the Polish Kingdom. He was
surrounded by a countless progeny of brothers and nephews whose sway
frequently extended over one castellan’s district only. The Mazovian line,
descendent from Siemowit I, was even more prolific, dividing and subdividing
Mazovia and ruling over it until the first quarter of the sixteenth century.
The territories of Pomerania were for years composed of two separate
units, Western Pomerania and Gdansk-Pomerania, each with its separate
history. At the close of the twelfth century Gdansk-Pomerania dissolved its
ties with the Grand Duke. The rulers of the country came from a family of
court officials and consequently designated themselves until 1227 by the Latin
title of princeps rather than dux, the title used by other Polish rulers. This
family also divided the country about 1220 with unreserved support of the
lords who were hostile to powerful rulers. The country prospered owing to the
grain trade of the Vistula valley and by its water-way, of which there is
evidence as early as the thirteenth century. Gdansk, the capital of the chief
duchy in this region, began to play a decisive role by its ties with German
ports on the western Baltic coastline through the small colony of Libeck
immigrants who settled among the native population. Gdansk-Pomerania was
a prize coveted from different sides. On the one hand the margraves of
Brandenburg, moving through Lubusz (Lebus) Land from the middle of the
thirteenth century, drew menacingly close to the Pomeranian duchies ; on the
other hand, in the east, the Teutonic Order was to become a still more formi-
dable neighbour. Caught between the two, Duke Mestvin II (Mésciwdj), who
succeeded to the whole of Gdansk-Pomerania after the death of his kinsmen,
concluded in 1282 a secret pact with Przemyst II of Great Poland, whom he
92 THE CENTURY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL TRANSITION
named heir to the duchy. In the face of this deadly external peril, the lords
of Pomerania agreed to the terms of the pact, which became one of the first
steps toward the integration and the revival of the Kingdom of Poland.
In the twelfth century, Western Pomerania was divided into the duchies
of Wotogoszcz (Wolgast) lying on the left bank of the Odra and Szczecin
mostly on the right bank. In 1177 Duke Bogustaw I of Szczecin appeared at
a meeting held in Gniezno by the Grand Duke Mieszko the Old. In order
to escape becoming vassal of the Danes, he paid homage to Frederick Bar-
barossa in 1181. This fact did not deter Denmark from exacting fealty from
Western Pomerania three years later, but as the power of Denmark declined
at the beginning of the second quarter of the thirteenth century, Western
Pomerania owed fealty to no one for a brief span of time. Despite the
opposition of the dukes, the Bishop of Kamien won in the course of the
thirteenth century virtual territorial sovereignty for his ecclesiastic estates in
the Kolobrzeg region, and strove to create an independent episcopal princi-
pality. At the close of the twelfth century he dissolved all ties by which he
was bound to the archdiocese of Gniezno and became instead directly sub-
ordinated to Rome. The rapid growth of the towns of Pomerania, in which
the German element became dominant in the first half of the thirteenth
century, led to a close association with the Hanseatic towns. The Court and
the nobility succumbed to Germanization in the thirteenth century, the
monastic orders as the Cistercians of Kotbacz, brought in German colonists.
The Slavic population lost all political influence. The castellan system in
Pomerania developed upon the Polish model now decayed and was replaced
by town administrations headed by advocati and burgraves. In 1278, upon
the death of Barnim I, the ruler over the whole of Western Pomerania, the
territories were again divided into the two duchies of Szczecin and Wolo-
goszcz. The towns and the lords organized themselves into a state representa-
tion and compelled the dukes in 1283 to sign the land peace of Rostock. They
acquired thereby a share in the government and the right to resist rulers, who
failed to observe the provisions of the pact.
Brandenburg likewise constituted a formidable external threat to Pom-
erania as well. In the course of the thirteenth century the margraves imposed
vassalage upon territories extending as far as Szczecin. For this reason Bogu-
staw I concluded an alliance with Mestvin II of Gdansk and Przemyst II of
Great Poland in 1287. Neither, however, was able to help Western Pomerania.
The dukes of Szczecin finally severed their feudal ties with the March of
Brandenburg in 1320, and in 1338 became vassals of the Holy Roman Empire.
The dukes of Wologoszcz did not recognize the sovereignty of. the Emperor
until 1348. One line had its seat after 1340 in Stawno and Slupsk, on the
eastern border of Western Pomerania, and was bound politically with the
renascent Kingdom of Poland.
GROWING EXTERNAL DANGER 93
THE GROWING EXTERNAL DANGER
The political disintegration of the former monarchy was accompanied by the
ambitious plans of its neighbours to expand their power over Polish territories.
The tributary and feudal relations with the Holy Roman Empire estab-
lished by individual Polish dukes in the course of the twelfth century, the last
of these being in 1184 by Casimir the Just, were actually very loose. The
decline of the power of the Hohenstaufens frustrated all hope of reestablishing
the imperial position. Meanwhile Pope Innocent III at the express wish of
several Polish dukes extended his protection to Poland. In the middle of the
thirteenth century virtually all the Polish dukes established a feudal relation-
ship with the Papacy for the purpose of neutralizing the claims of William of
Holland, King of Germany. This formal dependence did not produce any
political effects. Its tangible consequence was the reform of St. Peter’s Pence
which had been levied upon the population probably since the times of
Mieszko I, and in the second half of the thirteenth century the increased
activity of Papal legates in matters affecting the Polish Church.
Of real danger was the open or hidden aggression of the German rulers in
the west and north, and the destructive Baltic and Mongol invasions from
the east. The Tartar armies, as the contemporary European documents called
the Mongols, wrought havoc wherever they passed. In 1241 their first invasion
swept through the southern and central part of Poland up to Legnica in Lower
Silesia. Here the knights of Silesia and Great Poland, the miners of precious
ores and the peasants of Silesia, with some detachments of the Templar,
Joannite and Teutonic Knights, united under the command of Henry the
Pious. The Duke fell in battle and the remainder of his army fled to seek
cover at the castle-town of Legnica, which resisted the Tartar onslaught. The
nomads turned back and set out for Hungary. From 1240, the year the
Mongols overran Ruthenia, Poland found herself on the borders of the
powerful Mongol Empire from which further destructive raids were launched.
In 1259 Lublin, Sandomierz, Cracow and Bytom were burned down, and in
1287 only the fortified towns of Sandomierz and Cracow could resist the
invaders.
The north-eastern frontier lands of Poland were harrassed by the looting
and pillaging invasions of the Baltic peoples, Pruthenians, Sudovians and
Lithuanians. The attacks grew in intensity as the political organization of
these peoples grew in size and permanence. In the thirteenth century the
duchies of Mazovia, Cracow and Sandomierz, together with Halicz Ruthenia,
opposed Sudovia and Lithuania. Futile attempts were made to convert Sudovia
by missions sent from the ephemerial diocese in Lukow (1257), and likewise
Lithuania where a Polish Dominican went as a missionary bishop in 1255.
The Lithuanian raids repeated at intervals of several years wrought great
damage and made incursions into central Poland. In the attack of 1262 the
castle-town of Jazdéw at an important ford on the Vistula was razed by fire,
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Some thirty years later the town of Warsaw was built a little below Jazdéw
in order to guard this important route. The raids of the Sudovians ended with
the last quarter of the thirteenth century when the power of this people was
weakened by a Polish-Ruthenian coalition and afterwards completely crushed
by the Teutonic Knights.
The Order emerged as a formidable military force in consequence of the
short-sighted policy of Conrad of Mazovia. Despite the many military efforts
and attempts at trade and missionary penetration in the twelfth century and
the early thirteenth century, a solution of the Pruthenian problem was beyond
the strenght of a divided Poland. A Polish bishopric for Pruthenia was created
in 1216 and Bishop Christian of the Cistercian Order established himself in
the castle-town of Chelmno. Polish dukes organized coalitions against the
Pruthenians who replied with renewed attacks against the Chelmno Land,
Mazowia and Gdansk-Pomerania. Other measures were taken to strengthen
the defense of the frontiers, in Mazovia with the aid of the small order of the
Knights of Christ, called the Dobrzyn friars after the castellanship granted to
them, and in Gdansk-Pomerania with the aid of a small Spanish colony of the
Calatrava Order established in Tymawa. These measures proved useless.
GROWING EXTERNAL DANGER 95
Conrad of Mazovia therefore resolved in 1226 to invite the Teutonic Knights
to Chelmno for the purpose of organizing its defense and the counter-attack.
The German Order of St. Mary, called in Poland the Knights of the Cross,
settled on Polish soil when their large convent was banned from Hungary
for trying to establish the sovereignty of their lands and to throw off the
authority of the Hungarian kings. From the start the Teutonic Knights set out
to establish by fire and sword their territorial authority at the expense of their
Polish benefactor and patron. Before they had settled in Poland they had
received an Imperial golden bull which granted them Pruthenia as a fief. Some
years later they also acquired Pruthenia from the Pope as an “estate of St.
Peter” and forged a document by which Duke Conrad in 1230 had allegedly
made them a gift of the Chefmno Lands and of all of Pruthenia. In 1253 Chel-
mno and Torun were granted town charters according to the German law.
The Teutonic Knights launched a systematic and cruel campaign of conquest
against the pagan population of Pruthenia. For this purpose they brought in
reinforcements of western knights and built fortified castles. In 1237 the
Livonian Order of the Knights of the Sword joined as a separate branch the
Teutonic Order. Despite the resistance of the conquered population, Prussia
was subdued by about 1283. Thus a powerful centralized state rose north to
Poland, hostile both to Poland and Lithuania. German colonists came in
number to a country whose Pruthenian population had been decimated. The
new towns organized the exploitation of the country under the watchful eye
of the Order and established close contacts with the Hansa through the town
of Elblag, founded in 1237.
Another enemy grew and expanded in the west, namely the March of
Brandenburg. It rose in the twelfth century in the territories of the Polabian
Slavs and now cast its covetous eye upon Polish lands. The first to fall to the
expansionary pressure of Brandenburg was Lubusz (Lebus), a frontier castle-
town on the left bank of the Odra which succumbed in the middle of the
thirteenth century. From then on the margraves began to drive a wedge up the
Warta at the expense of Great Poland and Western Pomerania. The area cal-
led New March with its capital in Gorz6w (Landsberg) was the springboard
for the plans of further conquest in Gdansk-Pomerania, where the Teutonic
Order had similar plans of conquest.
Though these two bases of aggression, the Teutonic Order and the March,
foreshadow the dual power of the Prussian state of the modern era, attention
must be drawn to the rapid economic expansion of the Polish territories which
offered ample opportunities for the settlement of large numbers of German
colonists. How dangerous the colonists came to be was soon learned in these
parts of Poland which in the last quarter of the thirteenth century made an
effort to rebuild a united state. A rebellion of German burghers against the
Polish duke occurred in Cracow in 1311 and was put down only with great
effort. Western Pomerania dissolved its political ties with the remainder of the
Polish territories owing to the influence of the German lords who infiltrated
Wachock. Cistercian Monastery, 13th cent.
EFFORTS AT UNIFICATION 97
Sulej6w. St. Thomas’ Church, first half of the 13th cent. Keystone
the feudal class of the province, to the Germanization of the Duke’s Court
and the Church, as well as to the preponderance of Germans in the towns.
The same factors may be noted in Silesia, although German influence was
much weaker there and weakest above all in Upper Silesia. The State of
Poland, which became reunited in the fourteenth century, recovered only
small portions of Silesia and Pomerania.
EFFORTS AT UNIFICATION IN THE LATE THIRTEENTH
AND JHE EARLY FOURTEENTH CENTURIES
The territorial disintegration did not nullify the previously enumerated factors
that kept the State and the people together. The concept of gens Polonica sur-
7 History of Poland
98° THE CENTURY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL TRANSITION
vived and acquired added value in a period of external danger and foreign im-
migrations. Even the fiercely independent Piast dukes who jealously guarded
their petty dominions, had a sense of belonging to the Regnum Poloniae.
In the eyes of her neighbours it continued to exist as a geographic and political
concept, further enhanced by the fact that its territories corresponded to one
ecclesiastic province with a see established in Gniezno. Occasionally several
‘provinces were united under one sovereign head by family ties between the
various lines of the dynasty. In the second half of the thirteenth century
a number of contracts for life tenure and bequests were made which played
an important role in initiating the process of reunification.
In this period moreover economic and political conditions were conducive
to the renewal of the severed ties in order to form a united State. Economic
expansion which pressed for large regional markets stood in direct conflict
with the political disintegration and feudal anarchy. The Mongol invasidn of
1241 brought to naught the attempt of the Silesian Dukes, Henry I the
Bearded and his son Henry II the Pious, to unite the whole of southern Poland
from Lubusz and Wroctaw to Sandomierz and Lublin. Other social forces took
over the task of uniting the country at the close of the thirteenth century.
The first to declare in favour of the programme of integration were the
burghers who were interested in removing the barriers to free commerce. For
this reason they supported the dukes who stood for the unity of the State.
However, because the German element was strong among them, these burghers
preferred to see foreign sovereigns in authority, and consequently they were
instrumental in helping the Bohemians to establish a shortlived supremacy
over most of the Polish territories.
King Wactaw (Venceslaus) II of Bohemia directed the expansion of his
powerful state toward Silesia and later the whole of Poland. He claimed the
inheritance of Henry IV Probus. Despite other dispositions made by Henry’s
will, Wactaw II seized the territories and in 1291 granted the clergy, towns
and knights of Little Poland the privilege of Lutomy$] in which he vowed
that he would not impose any new taxes upon them. He occupied Little
Poland despite the resistance of Wladystaw the Short, the pretender to Cracow
and Sandomierz and brother of Leszek the Black. Waclaw made several of the
Silesian duchies his vassals.
Another kind of attempt to integrate the Polish territories came from the
feudal classes, the clergy and the broad masses of knights. The increasingly
coherent Polish gentry was hostile alike to foreign intervention and to lords
descended from powerful old families, the champions of disintegration. That
is why this class formulated a programme of national unification. With
a flourishing economy, ruled efficiently by its dukes and fully aware of the
external dangers, Great Poland was the centre of this integration moygment.
The metropolis of Gniezno played here an important and positive role.
Archbishop Jakub of the Swinka clan elevated Przemyst II of Great Poland
and served as his political adviser in the acquisition of Gdansk-Pomerania.
EFFORTS AT UNIFICATION 99
In 1295 he crowned him King of Poland in Gniezno. The people who strove
for unity were proud of the revival of the Kingdom. after an interval of so
many centuries. Evidence of it may be found in the inscription on the royal
seal of Przemyst II : Reddidit Ipse Potens Victricia Signa Polonis.
The programme of' integration was merely initiated. Polish territory,
however, was never restored to the size of the first Polish monarchy and the
Polish rulers found it extremely difficult to keep the royal crown on their
heads. Przemyst II died in the winter of 1296, treacherously murdered by
assassins sent from the March of Brandenburg and cooperating with the native
opposition led by two local clans.
Przemyst II bequeathed his kingdom to Henry of Glogow, a Silesian duke
whom Wactaw barred from his birthright in Wroclaw. Henry was a pro-
ponent of the Silesian concept of the integration of Poland. The lords of
Great Poland resented the fact that Henry surrounded himself with Germans
and that he based himself on the German patricians in the towns. They there-
fore gave their support to Wladyslaw the Short, Duke of Kujawy, who failed
however to fulfil their hopes in putting down the anarchy of the knights, in
combating highway robbery and other abuses. In consequence of his quarrel
with Bishop Andrzej of Poznan the lords deposed Wladyslaw the Short in
1300 and installed Waclaw II on the throne of Great Poland. In this year
Waclaw II was crowned King of Poland at Gniezno and further strengthened
his position by marrying Richeza, daughter of King Przemyst II.
The reign of Wactaw II (to 1305), and of his son Wactaw III (to 1306),
demonstrated to Polish political circles the perils that arise when foreigners
lay hold of the throne. Both monarchs based their power upon the German
patricians and German monasteries. They placed Germans and Bohemians
in high posts. Immediately upon his coronation Waclaw II accepted Poland
as an imperial fief from Albrecht of Habsburg, and concluded alliances with
Brandenburg and the Teutonic Order. Waclaw III negotiated with the Mar-
grave of Brandenburg an exchange of Gdansk-Pomerania, which was to go to
Brandenburg, for Meissen, which lay closer to Bohemia. The rising opposition
in Little Poland found a leader in the undaunted pretender Wiadystaw the
Short. He spent his years of exile planning alliances with Pope Boniface VIII,
with Charles Robert d’Anjou, King of Hungary, and with Halicz Ruthenia.
Simultaneously a conviction was taking root among the privileged classes
of Poland that the State must be united on the principle of self-determination.
After the death of Waclaw III in 1306, the claims of the successive Kings of
Bohemia, Rudolf of Habsburg and John of Luxemburg, to the Polish
succession were both rejected. Wladyslaw the Short drove out the Bohemian
garrisons and took possession of the province of Cracow-Sandomierz as well
as Gdansk-Pomerania. The lords of Great Poland remained hostile and gave
the throne of their province to Henry of Gtogéw. The path to integration
bristled with adversity.
The cause of Wiadystaw the Short was betrayed in Gdansk-Pomerania by
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EFFORTS AT UNIFICATION 101
the powerful Swieca clan. They submitted the duchy to the Brandenburgers
when they laid siege to Gdansk in 1308. Bogusza, judge of Pomerania,
defended the town, but as he could not hope for prompt aid from his duke,
turned for help to the Teutonic Knights in return for which he promised to
defray all the expenses of war. The Teutonic Knights repulsed the invaders
but then treacherously got inside the town of Gdansk, drove out the Polish
garrison and slaughtered the population of the suburbs, which they destroyed.
They slaughtered also the settlement of German merchants who competed
with their own town of Elblag. They occupied eventually the rest of the
country by force of arms and in this manner captured the mouth of the Vis-
tula.
The newly uniting Polish State was at that time composed only of Little
Poland, Kujawy, Leczyca and Sieradz. Its ruler looked on helplessly as alien
rule entrenched itself in one of his principal provinces. Only with great effort
was the dangerous conspiracy of the burghers and German monasteries
organized in favour of John of Luxemburg put down in 1311 by Albert,
magistrate (advocatus) of Cracow and Bishop Jan Muskata, a Bohemian.
It was Great Poland which took the step towards reunification when the
collective rule of the five sons of Henry of Gtogéw proved to be inconsistent
with the interests of the Polish knights and lords. The Archbishop of Gniezno
laid a curse on the dukes and the knights of Great Poland defeated them arms
in hands. In 1314 the conquest of Great Poland by Wladystaw the Short was
completed.
Being very knowledgeable about international politics, Wladystaw the
Short was able to establish his position in spite of the constant threats from
the Luxemburg dynasty in Bohemia, as well as from the March of Branden-
burg and the Teutonic Order. Wladyslaw continued the alliance with Hungary
and concluded new alliances with Denmark, Sweden and Norway, and with
the dukes of Western Pomerania, Mecklenburg and Lithuania. In 1320 he
was crowned King of Poland in Cracow, if not with the assent, at least with
the assurance of Papal neutrality at the price of regulating Peter’s Pence.
As Poland united, the political horizons of Wtadystaw the Short and of
his advisors, chosen from among the lesser nobility, grew wider. Wladyslaw,
once an insignificant Duke of Kujawy, became by his own ability and efforts
a monarch who was fully enlightened on the subject of European political
coalitions. His modest royal court became the school of political thought for
people who had spent their youth in the atmosphere of regional particularism
and the limited possibilities of rival duchies. Now they faced a challenge to
which the capacity of the restored Kingdom was equal. The tasks clearly
defined by the international and internal situation were : the defense of unity
against foreign intervention and the reorganization of the State, its moderniza-
tion to meet the conditions of the times—in short the consolidation of the
Polish Crown.
102 THE CENTURY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL TRANSITION
TRANSITION OF POLISH CULTURE FROM THE
ROMANESQUE TO THE GOTHIC
The territories most seriously menaced by the foreign influx, became in the
thirteenth century the scene of the first national antagonisms. In Silesia, for
example, some bishops of Wroclaw conducted the defense of Polish holdings
in Church benefices. Papal interests were threatened by the failure of the
Germans to pay Peter’s Pence. At the synod of Leczyca held in 1285, the
Polish Church adopted a resolution which provided that in order to nurture
and develop the Polish language, “only those might be appointed masters of
the cathedral, monastery and other schools who spoke Polish well, for they
must be able to explain authors’ works to the boys in Polish”.
The written word was widely used, especially in legal practice, where
a written document had the power of tangible evidence of transactions.
Beginning with the thirteenth century the ducal chanceries protected the
monopoly of notaries by registering all land transactions. The school system
was expanded and parochial Church schools made their appearance in the
towns. Quite early, in the thirteenth century, the German language was used
in administrative court acts in towns where the Germans constituted a large
proportion of the population.
The thirteenth century witnessed the first preserved examples of Polish
prose and poetry, for the most part Church sermons and hymns. The Benedic-
tine chorale was supplemented by the Cistercian chorale in the twelfth century.
Far more popular became the Roman version of the Franciscan chorale and at
the same time appeared a distinct diocesan chorale. These styles are fully
illustrated by well preserved musical scores. Some of the compositions which
have survived may well have been composed in Poland.
The historical chronicles are deeply national in their tone. Master Win-
centy, Bishop of Cracow, who died in the Cistercian monastery of Jedrzejéw
in 1223, wrote a chronicle noted for its elegant rhetoric. He conceived the
ambitious plan of linking the history of Poland with ancient history. This
explains the literary versions of dynastic legends written in Latin, which in
Poland performed the role of the chanson de geste. Although Master Vincent’s
chronicle praises the government of the lords and records the existence of
regional duchies, yet Poland emerges in the chronicle as an ethnic whole.
The Chronicle of Great Poland, written in the late thirteenth century, is
a notable document, among other historical works outlining the ideology of
state union and proving the fact that the West Slavs constituted a single
community. The programme of state integration as noted in hagiographic
literature was represented by the cult of St. Stanistaw Bishop of Cracow, who
was canonized in 1253 as patron of Poland. According to the Vita maior
Sancti Stanislai, written by Wincenty of Kielce who lived at the time of the
canonization, the quartered body of the martyr bishop miraculously grew
together again—and this was also to be the fate of partitioned Poland.
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The growing network of schools multiplied the number of educated clergy,
and in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the dukes and lords showed
progress in learning Latin. Henry IV Probus, Duke of Silesia and advocate
of Polish unity, composed love lyrics in German in the mode of the minstrels.
The urban population rivalled the feudal courts in the field of intellectual and
artistic proficiency. In the thirteenth century, Silesia produced the author of
the historic treatise on optics, Vitelo, of a Polish mother and a Thuringian
father, who worked in Italy and France. Silesia also produced Franco de
Polonia, an astronomer, who improved one of the measuring instruments of
the period. At the close of the thirteenth century and the beginning of the
104 THE CENTURY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL TRANSITION
fourteenth century there lived and worked in Montpellier Nicolaus of Poland,
professor of medicine, physician to Leszek the Black and author of medical
works. In the field of jurisprudence and history the Dominican friar, Martin
the Pole, born in Opava, nominated Archbishop of Gniezno and author of
a popular chronicle of popes and emperors, was to become famous in the
second half of the thirteenth century. Poles studied at the universities of Italy,
mainly Bologna, and of France, principally Paris.
A few surviving fragments provide evidence of court and folk literature
in the Polish vernacular, of ballads sung by the people about Duchess Lud-
garda strangled on the order of her husband Przemyst II, of the battles fought
by Poles, like the battle of Zawichost where Roman, Duke of Halicz, was
killed in 1205 and vanquished by two brothers, Leszek the White and Conrad
of Mazovia. Itinerant ioculatores appeared in the towns and markets bringing
with them parables and satirical songs many of which criticized the social
order of the times.
The social order was in greater danger from the heretical movement which &
also spread among the urban population of Poland. In the thirteenth century,
the Valdensians preached liberty and equality. They were especially numerous
in Silesia and despite the efforts of the inquisition were not suppressed. Some
of them survived until the times of the great Hussite movement. Long proces-
sions of flagellants, who rejected the Church and its organization, passed
through the Polish towns. The Beguines and Beghards, who remained longer
within the Church, were persecuted in Silesia and completely suppressed
in 1319.
The network of Cistercian monasteries grew in the course of the twelfth
and the thirteenth centuries. The monasteries maintained close ties with the
French, German and Danish abbeys from which they were derived, and had
the obligation to take part in the general chapters at Citeaux in Burgundy.
The thirteenth century saw the rise of new monasteries which had no connex-
ion with large estates as did the Cistercians, but were closely bound with vital
urban centres. Mendicant orders spread quickly throughout Poland. The
Dominicans and Franciscans appeared in the third and fourth decades of the
thirteenth century and enjoyed the protection of some dukes of Silesia and
Little Poland. They came with a different programme and introduced new
religious ways and principles among the urban population and the rural
population which flocked to them. They also introduced new forms of devo-
tion and were influential in increasing the meagre number of Polish saints
by new canonizations, most notable of St. Stanistaw, the Bishop, and St.
Hedwig, the Silesian Duchess. In addition to the missionary work in Poland
they also sent expeditions to Ruthenia and Lithuania, and in 1245/1246 Friar
Benedictus Polonus from Wroctaw reached the capital of the Khan of the
Mongols in the northern part of the Gobi desert.
Church influence grew with the expansion of the network of parish
churches, based on the early castle-town chapels and private churches of the
\
FROM THE ROMANESQUE TO THE GOTHIC 105
«
lords. In the course of the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries, this organiza-
tion grew wider as new rural and town churches were founded. From the
twelfth century the diocesan structure was remforced by the creation of
archdeaconries. In extent the diocese of Cracow was perhaps the largest in
Catholic Europe. The episcopate was almost entirely Polish at the close of the
twelfth century. Foreign clergy, however, were eager to come to Poland
because they had better prospects of a career in Poland than in their own
countries, as Guibert de Gembloux noted about 1150-1170. The number of
foreigners in the Cistercian monasteries and Premonstratensian convents was
noticeably larger. On the other hand the old Benedictine abbeys and the new
mendicant monasteries were largely Polish.
The social and intellectual ferment of the age was not without effect on the
arts. The two periods, the first covering the tenth and the eleventh centuries
and the second starting with the middle of the twelfth, reveal a marked Latin
influence. The journeys, pilgrimages and the dynastic and other contacts
between the Polish ruling class and the western countries were important
factors in sustaining this influence. The ruling group had both the opportunity
and the means to satisfy its curiosity about the western countries. The climate
was favourable for the acceptance of the intellectual and artistic questions
which absorbed the minds of Europeans. Romanesque art, with its philosophic
ideas and its moralistic and eschatological outlook, reached Poland through
the agency of manuscripts, imported art objects and visitors to the country.
Church art presented a vision of a society and a world designed to appeal to
all the faithful. This society was nevertheless hierarchical, and the established
hierarchy corresponded with the upper ranks of the ruling class. The cultural
elite carried out the concept which held that certain branches of art were the
domain of aristocracy. A striking example of this is the convent of the
Premonstratensian nuns at Strzelno, a town on the border of Kujawy and
Great Poland. Established here by a lordly family in the last quarter of the
twelfth century, the nuns created in the course of a few decades a world that
was distinctly their own. The pivotal centre of this world was the basilica
with its finely-wrought sculptures imbued with the moral and philosophical
erudition prevalent in this period. The desperate conflict of soul and body
depicted in the columns, the discovery of some aspects of nature and the
polymorphic symbolism, all were executed with the sure hand of stone carvers
who skilfully adapted the sculptural styles of the Rhineland, Burgundy and
Lombardy.
Although somewhat late in its reception, a flourishing Romanesque art
found expression in quite a large number of major cathedrals and collegiate
churches, like that of the Virgin Mary and St. Alexius in Leczyca, and in the
abbeys, like that of the Canons regular at Czerwinsk. Frequently ornamented
with murals, it was the sculpture in the buildings which always represented
a high standard of art. The most valuable works of Romanesque art are the
great portal, found today in the Magdalene church in Wroclaw, and a group
~
106 THE CENTURY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL TRANSITION
of tympana found also in Wroclaw. The Cistercians introduced an archi-
tectural style best illustrated by the monasteries in Sulej6w, Wachock and
Koprzywnica. There the austere Romanesque ornamentation is wedded with
the early Gothic forms of vault construction. The twilight of Romanesque art
is represented by the works of the élegant stone-cutter workshop of Trzebnica.
There we find work clearly inspired by the reminiscences of Provengal art.
The concert of David and Bathsheba on the portal of the abbey church, is an
interplay of form and poetic allusion in the mode of a refined courtly culture.
The most notable examples of metal work are the portals of Gniezno which
were produced in the last quarter of the twelfth century. The influence of the
Meuse valley art is clearly in evidence here. The scenes, based on a native
scenario, contain a wealth of ideological plots woven around the story of
St. Adalbert, patron saint of Poland and Gniezno, and depicted in a style
reminiscent of the love of nature that radiated from the school of Chartres.
With the second quarter of the thirteenth century a new building material
made its appearance which revolutionized architecture and enabled countries
which, like Poland, were poor in construction stone, to embark more ambitious
church and secular buildings. Brick was used at first in Romanesque architec-
ture, notably in the St. James’ church at Sandomierz and the Cistercian
churches at Kotbacz, in Western Pomerania. The introduction of brick affected
architectural forms (noted at the earliest in Silesia) and was one of the creative
components in the nothern version of Gothic art. The Franciscan churches in
Wroclaw, Cracow and Zawichost are the earliest examples of the new style.
Particularly rich in early Gothic structures is Western Pomerania, notably
Kamien, and Gdansk-Pomerania, Gdansk itself, Pelplin and Oliwa.
The second half of the thirteenth century marked the beginning of a large
construction programme in towns, including churches, town halls and urban
walls. The peak was reached in the next period. The churches were ornament-
ed with Gothic sculpture including architectural detail, tympana and portals.
The most impressive works were the early fourteenth-century tombs of dukes
and bishops (Wroclaw, Krzeszéw, Lubiqz in Silesia and Wawel in Cracow).
Only small though significant fragments of Early Gothic mural paintings have
been preserved. An example is that found in the church of St. John at Torun.
The scriptoria of the cathedrals and monasteries, where gifted illuminators
were at work, handed down a rich heritage. Manuscripts were also imported
from foreign countries. One of the richest storehouses of manuscripts was the
library of the Gniezno chapter.
Chapter VI
THE CORONA REGNI POLONIAE
AT THE HEIGHT OF ITS POWER
IN THE FOURTEENTH AND THE
FIFTEENTH CENTURIES
THE STATE APPARATUS CENTRALIZED
The growth of both town and country enabled Poland to regain a position
in the international market at the close of the thirteenth century as an exporter
of grain, cattle and hides, forest products and lumber, and soon afterwards of
articles manufactured by craftsmen. Low priced Polish cloth competed
successfully with cloth manufactured in the West. There is evidence that in
the last years of the fourteenth century Polish cloth was known in southern
Germany, in the region of modern Switzerland and among the southern and
eastern neighbours of Poland. An economic and cultural community of central
and eastern Europe emerged in the fourteenth century. It engaged in a lively
trade which showed vigour up until the Turkish conquests. The community
embraced an area from the Black Sea through Halicz Ruthenia and Novgorod
Ruthenia, Lithuania and Poland to the Baltic Sea, Bohemia, Hungary, the
German countries and northern Italy.
The political organization of central and eastern Europe showed a trend
toward the creation of multinational monarchies with a major language group
as backbone of the structure. In the course of the fourteenth century the
Luxemburgs, Habsburgs, Angevins of Hungary, the Giedymins of Lithuania,
the Piasts of Poland and soon afterwards the Jagiellons of Lithuania and
Poland vied with each other to extend their sway over the widest possible
economic and cultural areas.
The Polish Kingdom was called the Corona Regni Poloniae by the contem-
poraries to describe the moral if not political affiliations and the feudal, if not
direct relations of all the Polish lands to the Crown. From the beginning, the
Polish Kingdom pursued a national programme of reconstruction and rejected
any attempt at linking these lands with other political organisms under
a foreign sceptre. The Kingdom consolidated its machinery of power within
the course of a few decades and then embarked upon a course of territorial
expansion beyond its ethnic frontiers.
The unification of the State, or rather the creation of a Kingdom of Poland
by uniting the major duchies demanded a continued political effort within the
108 THE CORONA REGNI POLONIAE (14TH AND 15TH CENTURIES)
country, as well as for the purpose of establishing its frontiers. The greatest
effort toward these ends was made during the reign of Casimir III the Great
(1333-1370), the son of Wladyslaw the Short. The programme of the unity
of the State carried with it the concept of the King’s authority over all the
lands, both those ruled directly by the monarch and those still held by regional
dukes. The introduction of the system of vassalage roused at first considerable
resentment fed and fanned by foreign powers. Wladyslaw the Short became
the suzerain of the dukes of Kujawy and in the middle of the fourteenth
century the dukes of Mazovia, who had vacillated between Poland, the
Teutonic Order and Bohemia, became the vassals of the Polish Crown. As the
Piast dynasties of Kujawy and Mazovia became extinct, their regions reverted
to the Crown.
In the territories where the kings writ ran the earlier system of voivodships
(palatinates) and castellanships as well as other offices to which the king
appointed for life members of the lordly families continued to exist. These
officials retained a wide authority and received grants, but the property
immunities of the Church and the knights limited the scope of their efficiency.
They still attended political assemblies representing the lords. However, in
order to establish a more efficient administration directly subordinated to the
king, it was necessary to appoint royal governors, the brachia regalia who on
behalf of the king could rule the whole nation, over and above any
immunities. In Poland this was the role of the capitaneus or starosta, an office
first introduced by Waclaw II of Bohemia and continued by Wtadystaw the
Short. The capitaneus was appointed or removed at the royal will. He kept
a court register (acta castrensia) and the registers of Great Poland also
included from the very beginning uncontested “perpetual” jurisdictional acts
while other districts followed suit only much later.
The treasury and the chancery were centralized institutions. Because the
old system of contributions levied by the dukes had broken down as a result
of granting immunities, the chief tribute imposed by the kingdom was the
relatively high and ruthlessly exacted plough tax (poradIne, collecta generalis).
Further sources of income were the customs duties as well as the royal estates
which were formed in the fourteenth century after an energetically conducted
revindication of the lands lost by the Crown. The monetary system was a new
feature of fourteenth century fiscalism. It developed apace with the growth
of the money economy. The administration of the treasury was centralized
in the hands of the Royal Treasurer who replaced the former treasurers of
regional dukes.
During the reign of Casimir the Great, the regional chanceries of the
earlier duchies ceased to exist. Through the agency of learned jurists at court,
they were replaced by one efficient royal chancery headed by a chancellor
and a vice-chancellor. The chancellor’s office became the administrative centre
of the internal and external affairs of state and widened its original role of
secretariat by taking over the legal and judicial work of the Crown.
Cracow. St. Florian’s Gate, 14th cent.
Cracow. St. Catherine’s Church, 14th cent.
POLITICAL PROBLEMS 11)
Whereas the towns were governed by the ivs municipale and the tenures
of peasants by a variety of German law, the nobles and peasants who
remained under Polish law were subject to the ius terrestre. The oldest record
of Polish common law, generally called the Ksiega Elblqska (Elblag Book)
after the place where its manuscript was kept, was compiled in the second
half of the thirteenth century. Casimir the Great caused the Polish common
law for Little Poland and Great Poland to be recorded in the middle of the
fourteenth century. Local courts (indicia terrestria) that operated in the
individual territories had their powers strengthened, a kind of judicial self-
government of the gentry also kept records of legal transactions, which was
an extremely important function in a country where the public notary
operated exclusively within the framework of Canon law.
Royal jurists subscribed to the principle of unus princeps, unum ius, una
moneta in toto regno haberi debet. Separate ordinances regulated economic
matters in such fields as mining, roads and customs duties. On the other
hand a unified monetary system achieved with the introduction in 1338 of
the big Cracow grosz (grossi Cracovienses) did not bring stability to the
currency because of subsequent debasement by the royal treasury. The Hun-
garian gold ducat was most often used in foreign exchanges.
General assemblies of the lords were rarely convoked in the fourteenth
century. The king’s council appointed by the monarch assumed their pre-
rogatives. As the royal residence was established in Cracow and the lords
of Great Poland simmered with discontent throughout the reign of Casimir
the Great, the lords of Little Pol&nd (or Cracow lords) exercised an over-
whelming influence in the royal council. From the beginning of the fifteenth
century all the most outstanding dignitaries (bishops, palatines and castellans)
sat in the council, with the king presiding over it, the council took all deci-
sions with regard to foreign affairs and public appointments.
POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN THE REIGNS OF WLADYSLAW
THE SHORT AND CASIMIR THE GREAT
The boundaries of the Kingdom were established by war and negotiation.
Wladystaw the Short consolidated and left to his son alliances with Hun-
gary, Lithuania, Halicz Ruthenia and Denmark. The claims of John of
Luxemburg to the Polish throne brought an action against the Teutonic
Knights for the return of Gdansk-Pomerania and other annexed territories
before a Papal tribunal in 1319/1320. The case ended with a verdict in
favour of Poland against which the Teutonic Knights appealed to the Pope.
An armed struggle followed in which Polish forces won the battle of Plowce
in 1331, but both the lawsuit and the war failed to produce the desired result.
The attempt to reunite Lubusz with the Kingdom by an alliance with West-
ern Pomerania against Brandenburg also ended in failure.
412 THE CORONA REGNI POLONIAE (14TH AND 15TH CENTURIES)
From 1327 the Bohemian Crown began to reduce the Silesian dukes to
vassalage, which the Polish Kingdom was powerless to resist. Thus political
failure loomed along the whole of the western and northern frontiers. Both
the military and diplomatic actions of the diminutive but valiant Wlady-
slaw I, revealed the painful fact to the founders of the revived Kingdom
that international forces were not balanced in favour of Poland whose
military and financial resources were severely limited.
A realistic evaluation of the situation gained ascendency at the royal
court when Casimir, the son of Wladyslaw I, succeeded to the throne in 1333.
The young King paid John of Luxemburg a large indemnity to buy off his claim
to the throne and strengthened his own alliance with Hungary. In 1339
Casimir brought afresh lega] action against the Teutonic Order, but the re-
sult was the same as before. The 1343 treaty of Kalisz, however, provided
a compromise solution by which Casimir gave up his efforts to recover
Gdansk-Pomerania in return for the restoration of Kujawy and the Dobrzyn
Land by the Teutonic Order. The Order for its part recognized the King of
Poland as its founder. Casimir also gave his approval, specifically by the
peace of Namysiéw in 1348, to Bohemia’s overlordship over the majority
of the Silesian duchies. Only towards the end of his life did the King begin
military and diplomatic preparations to take up the Silesian question again.
By adopting Casimir, Duke of Stupsk in Western Pomerania, he created
a possibility that as least part of that country might be incorporated with
Poland. However, Casimir the Great left no Jegal heir and the heavy com-
mitments of the Cracow lords in the e&st ruled out this political trend
forever. The Polish-Lithuanian understanding, initiated by his father and
furthered by Casimir at the close of his life, prepared the ground for a deci-
sive stand against the Teutonic Order, whose growing power was a threat
to both the states.
Poland’s expansion to the East began in the middle of the fourteenth
century as a result of the efforts of the Cracow lords. These were partly
descendants of new clans advanced in power by Wladystaw the Short and
Casimir, such as the Leliwas of Melsztyn and Tarnow, the Porajs of Kurozwe-
ki, and also scions of old noble clans, like the Topors of Teczyn and others.
The policy of expansion in the East was welcomed by the patricians of Little
Poland and by the Church. Like the King they were interested in the occu-
pation of Halicz Ruthenia which at this time was coveted by Lithuania and
Hungary. The western section of Halicz Ruthenia was thickly populated; it
was also a gateway to the fertile fields of Podolia and farther eastward. The
trade routes to the Genoese colonies of Kaffa, Kilia and Akkerman on the
Black Sea passed through Halicz Ruthenia by way of Wlodzimierz in Vol-
hynia and Lwow.
In 1323 the Halicz branch of the Ruric dynasty died out and the boyars
called Prince Bolestaw George of Mazovia to the throne. He was subsequently
poisoned by the boyars in 1340, but he had named King Casimir his succes-
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POLITICAL PROBLEMS 113
sor, which gave Poland a claim to intervene in Ruthenia. While Lithuania
promptly extended her grasp upon Volhynia, King Casimir conducted a grim
struggle with the boyars for the remainder of the duchy which by its size
and riches was to compensate for the failures in the West. There was one
other element which the Polish statesmen kept in view. Besides Lithuania
and Hungary, the Tartars still remained potential rivals of Poland for su-
premacy over Halicz and Wlodzimierz, and their political activity made itself
felt throughout the fourteenth century. Ultimately a fairly sizeable area of
Ruthenia was united with Poland between 1349 and 1366. At first there was
some hesitation whether to preserve a distinct Regnum Russiae, as the territory
was called in the usage of the Royal Chancery. In the end, however, the
territories were incorporated in the Polish Kingdom. In 1434 they were
placed under the Polish land law as the voivodships of Ruthenia, Volhynia
and Podolia. A Catholic archbishopric was established first at Halicz and
later transferred to Lwow as the metropolis for several bishoprics of the
Latin rite. It was instrumental also in assimilating the ruling classes of this
province with the Polish community. At the same time, however, Casimir
the Great reestablished a metropolis of the Greek rite in Halicz which was
directly dependent on the Patriarch of Constantinople. In this manner the
Polish State expanded beyond its ethnic frontiers and entered in the middle
of the fourteenth century upon a multinational stage in its development.
The reign of Casimir the Great has become the subject of a nationial
legend. Casimir has been extolled as a great builder and a monarch who was
just to all the estates. He was even called the “Peasant King”. Indeed the
King was a wise statesman and diplomat with wide interests, ranging from
economics, the promotion of peasant settlements, culture, science and learn-
ing. Surrounding himself with a group of devoted ministers, notably Chan-
cellor Janusz Suchywilk, Vice-Chancellor Janko of Czarnkéw and Spytko
of Melsztyn, the Castellan of Cracow, he managed to carry through the
programme of internal consolidation despite separatist tendencies and to
stabilize Poland’s position and give it prestige. The Polish King’s envoy
could state to Emperor Charles IV that his lord owed allegiance to no one,
whether to the Emperor or the Pope. The Congress of Cracow in 1364 was
a demonstration of the Polish King’s authority and of the international re-
spect accorded him. It assembled the Emperor, the kings of Hungary and
Denmark and many other princes in order to help Peter of Lusignan, King
of Cyprus, to promote a crusade.
As King Casimir had no male progeny, the Polish crown had long ago
been designated to his nephew, Louis d’Anjou, King of Hungary. Casimir
tried, in his last will, to secure for his grandson Casimir, Duke of Stupsk,
a privileged position in Poland and the eventual succession to the throne
after Louis. This will was, however, annulled by the Polish lords. At the end
of the fourteenth century Poland was turning away from the political scene
in the West and looking to the North and East.
8 History of Poland
114. THE CORONA REGNI POLONIAE (14TH AND 15TH CENTURIES)
THE PERIOD OF ANGEVIN RULE
After the death of Casimir the Great in 1370 there were noticeable signs of
feudal anarchy in Great Poland, when Casimir of Stupsk and another pretend-
er, Wiadystaw the White of the Piasts of Kujawy, tried to overthrow the
foreign dynasty. However, the Angevin episode (1370-1386) succeeded in
maintaining the supremacy of a centralized government. The attempt was all
the more significant as King Louis did not rule Poland in person. The regency
was held by an old woman, Queen Elisabeth, mother of Louis and daughter
of Wladystaw the Short. Louis d’Anjou strengthened Hungarian influence in
Halicz Ruthenia by handing over the administration of the country to a reli-
able viceroy, Duke Wtadystaw of Opole, who enhanced the prestige of the
Roman Catholic Church in that area. From 1381 Poland herself was gov-
erned by a regency of five persons representing the lords of Little Poland and
headed by Zawisza of Kurozweki, Bishop of Cracow.
The major problem of the Angevin House in Poland was to secure the
throne for the daughters of Louis against the opposition of the episcopate
and a section of the nobles. The candidacy was, however, looked upon with
favour by the towns which saw a promise of wide foreign trade in personal
unions of the royal dynasties of that part of Europe.
In 1372 Louis granted the privilege of KoSice by which he secured the
support of the nobles for the succession of his daughters to the Polish throne
at the price of reducing taxes, while soon afterwards he gained the consent
of the clergy by granting them similar concessions. Upon the death of Louis
in 1382, however, the lords ruling the country would not accept his plans
in full. The regents were determined not to allow a German prince to occupy
the Polish throne. They were decidedly opposed to Sigismund of Luxemburg,
husband of Marie, the daughter of Louis d’Anjou who had been named as
successor to the Polish throne. They rejected as well Wilhelm of Austria,
engaged to Jadwiga (Hedwig), Louis’ second daughter. Siemowit of Ma-
zovia, another pretender to the Polish throne, was also repulsed by an armed
intervention of Hungary. Jadwiga was placed on the Polish throne and the
personal union with Hungary was broken. In 1384 the 10-year old young
Jadwiga entered Cracow, the royal capital, and assumed the title of King
(rex). In fact Poland since 1370 was actually governed by a group of oli-
garchs who were fully aware of their aims and possibilities.
THE UNION OF POLAND AND LITHUANIA.
THE STRUGGLE WITH THE TEUTONIC ORDER
The Cracow lords were fully aware of the benefits to be derived from an
expansion in the East when Casimir the Great was still alive. At the close
UNION OF POLAND AND LITHUANIA 15
of the fourteenth century a new and significant factor made its appearance,
the desire to draw closer to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and to establish
a partnership with her against the Teutonic Order, as well as to settle the
affairs of Halicz Ruthenia in accordance with Polish plans.
The Lithuanian State was founded as a monarchy in the middle of the
thirteenth century. In the second half of the fourteenth century it had reached
the peak of its political power. Under the rule and alliance of two brothers,
Kiejstut (Kestutis), Duke of Troki, and Olgierd (Algirdas), the Grand Duke
of Lithuania, the State stubbornly defended its western frontiers from the
encroachments of the Teutonic Order. At the same time Lithuania extended
her original territories (AukStote, the highlands, and Samogitia (Zmudz), the
lowlands) to embrace vast areas of the future Ukraine and Byelorussia up
to Smolensk, Bryansk and the Black Sea steppes. The military nature of the
challenge that faced the State helped to concentrate all authority in the hands
of the Grand Duke. While Lithuania proper clung to pagan beliefs despite
the repeated attempts made from the middle of the thirteenth century to con-
vert the Lithuanians, the Ruthenian population in the major part of the
Grand Duchy professed Orthodox Christianity. Ruthenian customs and
Ruthenian literary culture characterized the whole ruling class, including also
the reigning house, but the native Lithuanian lords still played the leading
role in the State government and were loth to share their power with the
Ruthenian boyars. The population was not distributed evenly throughout the
large state but its economy was by no means backward.
Jagiello (Iogailas), son of Olgierd, removed from power his uncle Kiej-
stut, became the head of the Grand Duchy in 1382 and took the guidance
of the political issues into his own skilful hands. The first concept of his
entourage was a closer understanding with the Grand Duchy of Muscovy.
Jagietto was to accept the Orthodox faith together with the hand of the
daughter of Demetrius Donskoi. Muscovy, however, as the centre of an
effort to unite the Ruthenian lands, appeared already as a dangerous rival of
Lithuania which was attempting the same task. Consequently the cause of an
alliance with Poland prevailed among the Lithuanian lords. The direct threat
to the western frontiers, especially in Samogitia and hence a community of
interests with Poland against the Teutonic Order, was an argument in favour
of the Polish alliance. Poland was fully aware of the value of such an al-
liance, which would enable her to regain lost territories with the help of the
Lithuanians and would moreover strengthen her hold on her conquest in
Halicz Ruthenia. These prospects seemed so attractive to the ruling groups in
Cracow that they were willing to arrange a marriage between Jadwiga and
Jagietlo. The conversion of the pagan part of Lithuania to the Roman Catho-
lic Church played a major role in conciliating the Polish clergy to the union.
This conversion also struck out the major argument used internationally by the
Teutonic Order to justify its actions against Lithuania, and cast doubt upon
the missionary programme of Teutonic expansion.
116 THE CORONA REGNI POLONIAE (14TH AND 15TH CENTURIES)
By an act drawn up at Krewa in 1385, a union was effected between the
Polish and Lithuanian States. Jagietlo took the name of Wladyslaw when he
was baptized and upon marrying Jadwiga became King of Poland in 1386.
Poland and Lithuania had actually established only a personal union. By
this union, however, both States could prepare to carry out their external
objectives, such as the removal of Hungarian garrisons from Halicz Ruthenia
and the exaction of homage from the voivodes of Moldavia and Valachia,
to be paid to Jagiello and Jadwiga. Poland helped Lithuania to strengthen
her eastern frontiers. Catholics obtained a privileged position within the
Lithuanian State. The more important cultural and social consequences of
the union were to emerge only with time.
There was however an unfavourably disposed group in Lithuania which
was particularly hostile to the interpretation given to the union by Polish
lords that the Grand Duchy had been incorporated into Poland. This fac-
tion was led by Witold (Vytautas), the able son of Kiejstut, who was at
first allied with the Teutonic Knights and who after 1392 was accepted by
Jagietlo as co-regent of the whole of Lithuania. Witold’s ultimate aim was
the royal crown which he planned to acquire after establishing Lithuanian
supremacy over the whole of Ruthenia and subduing the Tartars with the aid
of Khan Tochtamish, who had been driven out by Tamerlane. Witold’s plans
regarding the Tartars suffered a setback in the defeat of 1399 inflicted upon
him by the Tartars on the Vorskla river, where a number of Polish knights,
who had been sent to Witold’s assistance, were killed in the battle. In 1401
Witold was recognized as the Grand Duke of Lithuania under the suzerainty
of Wladyslaw Jagietlo, as “Supreme Duke”. The Teutonic danger was now
the factor that drove them both into closer cooperation. At the same time
Lithuania’s relation to Poland was satisfactorily explained as a personal
union in the person of Jagietlo. Although Jadwiga, heiress to the Polish
throne, died without issue in 1399, Jagiello was nevertheless recognized by
the Polish lords as King of Poland.
The Teutonic Order found itself in a dangerous position. The Knights tried
to take advantage of the difference within Lithuania and Poland arising
from the interest of parties in both the States in an eastward expansion. Yet
the Order could not avoid the “great war” in 1409-1410. A decisive encoun-
ter and one of the largest battles of the Middle Ages was fought on the flelds
of Grunwald in 1410. The Polish and Lithuanian army, commanded by King
Wladystaw, routed the Teutonic Knights at the end of a day’s heavy fighting.
The Grand Master and many dignitaries of the Order fell in battle. The Or-
der was no longer a dangerous military neighbour. The peace condition
satisfied only the war aims of Lithuania by returning Samogitia to the Lithu-
anian State. The military and financial power of the Teutonic Order, how-
ever, was considerably weakened by the war. Nascent political movements led
several decades later to the solution which Poland desired in Pomerania.
The victory at Grunwald enhanced the prestige of the Polish-Lithuanian
POLAND AND LITHUANIA IN THE HUSSITE PERIOD 117
monarchy and added vigour to its political activity, while the circles that
favoured Church reform were deeply impressed by the defeat of the Teu-
tonic lords. The mood was reflected in a letter of congratulations addressed
to Wladyslaw Jagiello by John Huss. The military and diplomatic struggle
with the Teutonic Order drew the lords of Lithuania and Poland closer
together. In 1413 a new treaty of union was signed at Horodto on the Bug
and 43 Polish clans adopted a corresponding number of Lithuanian lords
who were allowed to use the Polish family crests. Wladyslaw and Grand
Duke Witold granted the Lithuanian lords the same fiscal and judicial privi-
leges as were enjoyed by the Poles. ,
The Polish delegation to the Council of Constance began to play an ac-
tive role in 1415. The delegates to the Council were Mikotaj Traba, archbish-
op of Gniezno ; Paulus Vladimiri of Brudzen, rector of the Cracow Univer-
sity and a brilliant jurist; Andrzej Laskarz of Goslawice, Bishop designate
of Poznan, a fervent conciliarist; and the famous knight Zawisza Czarny
of Garbowo. The Council was also attended by a delegation of recently
converted Samogitians, and by Gregory Tsamblak, Metropolitan of Kiev,
and political adviser to Jagietlo and Witold. The Poles rose to the defense
of John Huss. They presented also a treatise written by Paulus Vladimiri
which dealt with the exercise of Papal and Imperial power over the unfaith-
ful; the author opposed conversion by the sword and defended the rights of
pagans to their land. These principles as stated by the Poles provoked a con-
troversy and excited a sharp rebuttal from the defenders of the Teutonic
Order. The Poles were supported, among others, by the University of Paris.
War with the Teutonic Order broke out again, but the Knights were
forced by the peace of the Mielno lake of 1422 to give up all claim to Samo-
gitia. In this manner the German expansion on the Baltic was halted for
many centuries and with it the ambitious plans for creating a consolidated
Prusso-Livonian State governed by German lords.
POLAND AND LITHUANIA IN THE HUSSITE PERIOD.
THE UNION WITH HUNGARY
The Polish-Lithuanian federation now assumed the role of a great power in
central and eastern Europe. Once the bastions of German expansion to the
North had begun to crack, there emerged fresh possibilities of creating a front
against its effective operation. The Bohemian national movement gained in
vigour while Hungary’s policy in the southern area of German expansion
grew noticeably independent. Jagiello and his descendants attempted to take
advantage of this situation, but soon restricted their ambitions to the interests
of their dynasty alone, without regard to Poland’s vital interests on her
western frontiers. Although several excellent opportunities arose for regain-
1°. a
i e ‘ os,
The battle of Grunwald, 1410
(8)
2 Kms
0 1 Mile
Camp of the Palish army =: Camp of the Lithuanian army <= Army of the Teutonic Knights
Polish army > Lithuanian army 0 Station of the Grand Master
The King’s station & Camp of tne Tartar army + The site where the Grand Master fell in bat
The Royal tent = Camp of the Teutonic Knights t}) = Artillary
ing the lands of the Piasts, the political plans of the court were not con-
cerned with the issue.
With the outbreak of the Hussite war in Bohemia in 1420, the circles
which supported a national monarchy with a moderate social programme
put forward the candidature of Wladyslaw Jagiello as a successor to the
throne of Bohemia. The King declined the offer at the insistence of the Polish
magnates who feared international complications and pro-Hussite sympathies
among the gentry. The Grand Duke Witold, however, accepted a similar
offer with the knowledge of the King and appointed as Victory of Bohemia
the King’s nephew Prince Sigismund, the son of Korybut.
All attempts at an alliance with the Hussite insurrection were frustrated
by the Polish episcopate and the lords, headed by Zbigniew of Olesnica, an
outstanding figure in the politics of that period, who was Bishop of Cracow
and at the end of his life also a Cardinal. At his bidding King Wtadystaw
recalled Prince Sigismund and in 1424 issued at Wielun a severe edict against
the Hussites and their allies. But the following year Sigismund played for
a brief time the role of a “King elect” and even joined the uprising of the
radical Taborites in Silesia.
At the birth of Crown-Prince Wladyslaw, born to Jagietto by his fourth
wife Sophia, a Lithuano-Ruthenian Princess of Holszany, the King, became
entangled in negotiations with the Polish lords to secure his right of succes-
sion. Jagiello’s son was sure of his succession to the title of Grand Duke of
Lithuania because Witold had no heirs and the questions regarding the gov-
ernment of the Grand Duchy had already been settled. In Poland, however,
the old King had to buy the right of succession for his son by granting a num-
ber of liberties restricting the royal power. Principal among these were: the
1425 privilege of Brzes¢, called Neminem captivabimus nisi iure victum, and
the privilege of JedInia in 1430. Upon Witold’s death in 1430, whose coro-
POLAND AND LITHUANIA IN THE HUSSITE PERIOD 119
nation had been prevented at the very last moment by the opposition of all
the Polish lords, the King appointed Swidrygietto (Svitrigailas), his last sur-
viving brother, as Grand Duke of Lithuania. Swidrygiello’s programme for
Lithuania aimed at complete independence from Poland and at equal rights
for Russian and Lithuanian lords inside their State, while abroad his foreign
policy stood in direct contradiction to the interests of Poland. The Grand
Duke allied himself with Sigismund of Luxemburg and the Teutonic Order.
Not until the death of the eighty-year old King Wtadystaw Jagietto in 1434
did Witold’s brother, Prince Sigismund, son of Kiejstut, leading the Lithua-
nian opposition and its Polish supporters, finally quell Swidrygielto’s re-
bellion. Equal privileges for the Orthodox boyars and the Catholics, however,
remained a permanent achievement of Swidrygielto’s reign.
The regency of Bishop Zbigniew of Olesnica, which started in 1434,
marked the ascendency of new magnates, principally from Little Poland,
whose source of economic and political strength was derived from Halicz Ru-
thenia which they used to extand their power over the entire Kingdom. These
actions evoked the dissatisfaction of the gentry and indeed of the peasants,
who for many years have been coming under the influence of the radical
movement whose fountain-head was Hussite Bohemia. The death of Sig-
ismund of Luxemburg again gave the Hussite nobles and burghers of Bo-
hemia the opportunity to propose a Polish candidate for the Bohemian
throne. This time their choice fell on Wladyslaw Jagiello’s second son, Prince
Casimir. In the event of the candidate being supported by Poland, the suze-
rainty of the Polish monarch would then have been recognized by the dukes
of Silesia. The royal court, under the leadership of the widowed Queen
Mother Sophia, was favourably disposed to the idea and, despite the oppo-
sition of Bishop Zbigniew of Olesnica, made military commitments against
the Hapsburgs who clamoured for the throne of Bohemia. At the same time
a section of the gentry, led by the fervent Hussite Spytek of Melsztyn, grand-
son of the Spytek who had collaborated with Casimir the Great, formed in
1439 at Nowe Miasto Korczy# a “confederation” against the bishop. The
movement began to spread to the peasants, a fact which discouraged some of
the nobles who, though opposed to the magnates, were nevertheless alarmed
by the revolt of the peasants. The Polish Hussite revolt was broken in the
battle of Grotniki on the Nida and the magnates compelled the Court to
relinquish all dynastic plans in Bohemia.
The union with Lithuania ended in 1440. The Lithuanian lords murdered
the stern Grand Duke Sigismund, son of Kiejstut, and the youthful Prince
Casimir was sent to Wilno to rule as viceroy on behalf of his brother Wia-
dystaw III. The lords of Lithuania, however, acclaimed him Grand Duke
and thus dissolved the personal union with Poland. Without foregoing attempts
to revive the union, the Polish lords quickly observed that they could com-
pensate for this loss by reestablishing a personal union with Hungary.
After the death of Albert of Hapsburg, the Hungarian lords approached
120 THE CORONA REGNI POLONIAE (14TH AND 15TH CENTURIES)
the court of the Jagiellons and offered the throne of Hungary to the Polish
King. The main underlying reason was the threat of Turkey to the Byzan-
tine Empire and Hungary. In spite of the opposition of the pro-Hapsburg
faction, Wladyslaw III was crowned King of Hungary at Buda in 1440 and
thus allied himself with the anti-Turkish diplomatic and military coalition
organized by Pope Eugene IV. In 1443 the King won a briliant victory in
Bulgaria and signed a highly favouraBle truce, but he broke the agreement
in the following year at the instance of Papal diplomacy, which induced
him to conduct a war along the Black Sea coast, for which he was poorly
prepared. Wtadystaw III was slain in 1444 in the battle of Varna. Among
the casualties were also the Papal legate and a great many Hungarian and
Polish knights. The defeat sealed the fate of the Byzantine Empire and the
Balkan Slavs, and the Turkish danger moved closer to central Europe.
THE GROWING POLITICAL ROLE OF THE GENTRY
THE RESTITUTION OF CROWN LANDS
The Polish lords called to the throne Casimir IV, the Grand Duke of Lithu-
ania and brother of the slain Wltadystaw III, hoping not only to reestablish
the union with Lithuania, but also to incorporate its territories with Poland.
Upon his arrival in Poland in 1446, the King recognized only the “fraternal
union” of the two countries now under his rule, guaranteed Lithuania’s fron-
tiers as established in Witold’s time and refused to recognize the privileges
that restricted royal power in Poland. A talented and astute statesman, Ca-
simir ascended the Polish throne with a programme which provided for the
restoration of a strong central authority, for an extension of royal influence
over central and eastern Europe with the purpose of forwarding the interests
of the dynasty, and the restitution of the Crown lands. He carried out most
of his plans in the course of a fifty years’ reign.
In his struggle with the opposition represented by the magnates and
Zbigniew of Olesnica, the King was supported by the gentry and the “young
barons of the Kingdom” who had been raised from the ranks of the gentry
as well as by Great Poland. In the early years of his reign, Casimir also
depended for support to some extent upon the towns. The royal party suc-
cesfully opposed the financial system of the Papal Curia, broke the oppo-
sition of the clergy regarding the appointment of bishops, and transferred
this prerogative to the King. Casimir also acquired two small Silesian terri-
tories which were of vital importance because of their proximity to Cracow.
In 1457 he obtained the Duchy of Oswiecim and suzerainty over Zator
which together with the 1443 purchase of Siewierz for the see of Cracow
moved the State frontiers to the west. In 1493 Zator became the property
CASIMIR IV’S FOREIGN POLICY 121
of the Crown. Casimir IV also mustered the support of the gentry for his
plans for the restitution of Pomerania and the defeat of the Teutonic Knights.
To further his ends the King granted the privileges of Nieszawa in 1454
which opened the way to the parliamentary system by widening the liberties
of the gentry while restricting those of the oligarchy. The King swore on
behalf of the Crown not to raise troops or impose new taxes without the
approval of a convention of nobles known as land diets (sejmiki).
The State of the Teutonic Order was undergoing a political crisis. The
wealthy towns, such as Gdansk, Torun and Elblag, together with their
German patricians, rose in revolt against exploitation by the Knights of the
Order. The vassal knights of the Order, Poles as well as Germans, founded
the secret “Salamander Society”. After 1440, the Prussian estates, that is the
knights and towns, established an official “Prussian Alliance” which conducted
negotiations with the Teutonic Order, regarding tax matters chiefly. The
repression of the Alliance by the Order was the direct cause of the outbreak
of an insurrection by the Prussian estates. In 1454 Casimir IV received
a delegation of the insurgents among whom were German speaking represent-
atives of the towns and knights. Appealing to the claims of the Polish Crown,
Casimir promulgated a writ of incorporation for Prussia. A Thirteen Years’
War with the Teutonic Order followed, and its hardships were borne without
the aid of Lithuania. International opinion was not favourably disposed to
the elimination of the Teutonic State. The Pope intervened with an anathema
against Poland, but this was ignored by the whole population, including the
clergy. The war ended in 1466 with the peace of Toruh, by which Gdansk-
Pomerania as well as parts of West Prussia reverted to Poland. The new
province was known henceforth as Royal Prussia. The sovereignty of the
Teutonic Order was reduced to the remaining Prussian territory but without
Warmia, Elblag and Malbork. The Grand Master moved the capital from
Malbork to K6nigsberg and bound himself to pay homage to the King of
Poland whom he recognized as a suzerain of the Teutonic Prussia.
CASIMIR IV’S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SECOND
HALF OF HIS REIGN
The sole aim of Casimir’s foreign policy in Bohemia and Hungary was to
guarantee the thrones of these countries to his sons born of Elisabeth of
Hapsburg. The Polish Crown’s vital interests in Silesia were disregarded.
Casimir would not be drawn into the Catholic coalition against George of
Podiebrad, King of Bohemia, but tried to act as intermediary between him
and the Emperor and Matthias Corvinus, King of Hungary. George agreed
to name Wladyslaw, Casimir’s eldest son, as his successor to the throne of
122 THE CORONA REGNI POLONIAE (14TH AND 15TH CENTURIES)
Bohemia. Upon the death of George in 1471, the Czech diet actually elected
Wladystaw King of Bohemia, but Matthias Corvinus established himself in
Silesia, Lusatia and Moravia.
Matthias’s death in 1490 offered Wladyslaw of Bohemia a chance to
ascend the Hungarian throne as well. With the support of the Hungarian
magnates Wladyslaw supplanted his younger brother, John Albert, the candi-
date of the gentry. John Albert was rewarded by being appointed a governor
of Silesia. In this manner the Jagiellonian dynasty came to rule over vast, but
not homogeneous territories, extending from the Baltic to the Black and
Adriatic Seas. The diplomatic success of the dynasty failed to rouse enthu-
siasm in Poland, because it brought no political advantages to the Polish State.
The fruit of the Jagiellonians’ efforts, this harvest of royal crowns and lands,
was to be seized by the Hapsburgs in the next generation. Meanwhile Casimir
IV’s policies averted the attention and the energy of Poland from growing
complications in the East.
The Turkish capture of the Genoese Black Sea colonies of Kaffa (1475),
Kilia and Akkerman (1484) was a severe blow to the trade with the East
conducted by Lwéw and Cracow. The Crimean Tartars ruled by the khans
of the Girey dynasty became vassals of Turkey. They now became a hostile
force raiding the borderlands of Poland and Lithuania. Casimir IV came to
the assistance of Stephen, the Prince of Moldavia, who became Casimir’s
vassal in 1485. In the subsequent years Polish forces were successful in the
military encounters with the Tartars. There was, however, no consistent policy
in Poland. The King became embroiled in Hungarian affairs and signed a truce
with Turkey thus recognizing her conquests and alienating the rulers of
Moldavia.
Poland’s entanglement in the dynastic struggle for territory had unfor-
tunate consequences in the country itself, where the royal authority established
by Casimir in the first half of his reign was now undermined. Issues of
primary importance such as reform of the fiscal system and organization of the
army were left unsolved. Royal policy had recourse to half measures.
FROM LAND DIETS TO A NATIONAL PARLIAMENT
The freedom granted by the King at the beginning of the Thirteen Years’ War
increased the prerogative of the land diets, assemblies of the gentry which
congregated in each separate region. In the first half of the fifteenth century
the King summoned the gentry only three times to obtain their approval for
extraordinary taxes. By 1454 it became a fiscal and political necessity to
convene the gentry every few years in order to win their support for war
and other measures. This practice laid the foundations of the Polish parlia-
mentary system and opened the way to the political supremacy of the gentry.
FROM LAND DIFTS TO A NATIONAL PARLIAMENT 123
Cracow. Church of the Virgin Mary, 14th cent.
Cracow. Barbican, 1498-1499
The genesis of the Polish parliament may be traced to the colloquia or
assemblies of the lords and the gentry, which in the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries were ‘convoked in various regions and, less frequently, on a nation
wide basis. Such conventions, attended by lay and Church lords and a small
number of representatives of the gentry and the chapters, were summoned
four times by Wladyslaw the Short, but less often by Casimir the Great. They
became a basis of government, however, at the close of the fourteenth century
and were convoked once a year, generally at Piotrkéw, a town chosen for its
central position. Apart from the general assemblies (conventio magna) pro-
vincial assemblies (conventiones generales) were held more frequently in the
fifteenth century, separately for Great Poland—at Sroda, Koto or Sieradz,
and for Little Poland with Ruthenia at Nowe Miasto, Korczyn or Wislica.
The provincial assemblies were attended by the dignitaries of the province
and by all the gentry who appointed representatives to the closed conference,
and approved by acclamation the results announced to them. The assemblies
debated issues of domestic policy, legislation and finance placed before them
by the King. They manifested a great deal of initiative, especially at times
when they acted as court of law.
WESTERN POMERANIA, LUBUSZ LAND AND SILESIA 125
The 1454 privilege of Nieszawa strengthened the third link in the
parliamentary system, the land diets (conventiones particulares) of which
there were eighteen at the close of the fifteenth century. The land diets were
attended by local dignitaries and all the gentry. They established provisions,
of common law, gave their approval to the levy of extraordinary taxes, and
chose two plenipotentiaries or regional deputies (nuntii terrestres) to attend
the deliberations of the provincial and general assemblies. The provincial
assemblies were more important in the second half of the fifteenth century,
because they were more convenient to the king as well as to the gentry.
With the ascension to the Polish throne of John Albert (1492-1501),
successor and son of Casimir IV, the general assembly (Seym) became an
established parliamentary form, and the provincial assemblies were summoned
less and less frequently.
The course along which the Polish parliamentary system developed in the
fifteenth century did not lead to a full representation of the privileged estates,
but to the transfer of legislative power into the hands of two feudal groups,
the lay and ecclesiastical magnates, and the gentry. The parliamentary life
flourishing during the reign of the last of the Jagiellons was filled with the
conflict and the struggle for supremacy waged between these two groups.
WESTERN POMERANIA, LUBUSZ LAND AND SILESIA
IN THE FOURTEENTH AND THE FIFTEENTH CENTURIES
The break-up of Western Pomerania into small duchies precluded any
modernization in the political sense. The dukes of Western Pomerania main-
tained their comparative independence in the fourteenth century as a result of
the friendly assistance of Poland, and also of Denmark in the fifteenth century.
They were backed later by the three united Scandinavian kingdoms, headed by
Eric I, a Duke of Slupsk. These factors saved Pomerania from becoming
a vassal of Branderfburg. The spread of German influence continued however.
Germans predominated among the knights. Towns like Stralsund, Szczecin
and Kolobrzeg were completely Germanized, and Slavs were not allowed to
become merchants or craftsmen. In the Church, too, the more important posts
were filled by Germans. The University of Greifswald, a centre of intellectual
activity, was founded in 1456. The majority of the rural population remained
Slav. The peasants were subjected to harsh economic exploitation by the lords
and by towns which conducted a vigorous trade as members of the Hansa.
In the struggle with feudal anarchy and in the face of the danger from Brand-
enburg, Western Pomerania formed a political union in the second half of the
fifteenth century. Boguslaw X (1474-1523), the husband of Anna, daugh-
ter of Casimir IV, whose support he sought, introduced successful adminis-
trative and financial reforms. He established his capital in Szczecin where he
ruled in collaboration with the estates represented in the diet.
126 THE CORONA REGNI POLONIAE (14TH AND 15TH CENTURIES)
From the fourteenth century Lubusz Land became known as the New
March of Brandenburg. Frequent changes of the dynasties of the margraves
offered Poland in the fifteenth century a number of missed opportunities for
recovering this vital area. The Templars, and especially the Hospitallers,
‘established here by the margraves, colonized the towns and villages with
Germans. A major role was played by Frankfurt on the Odra, a town which
controlled the trade in grain and timber. Frankfurt interfered with the
transport of these products by its staple law that applied on the Odra and
indirectly on the Warta. Both Great Poland and Western Pomerania voiced
their grievance against these laws.
Silesia continued to lead the Polish lands in the economic field. Both the
villages and towns, headed by Wroclaw, prospered in the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries. The province was linked with the Polish Kingdom by
major international trade routes leading to Gdansk on the Baltic and through
Cracow and Lwéw to the Black Sea. The Polish territories supplied the raw
materials for the crafts of Silesia, notably weaving, tanning and iron works.
The towns of Silesia imported food from Poland and exported manufactured
goods to her. The second half of the fifteenth century was marked by social
discontent in the towns, unrest in the countryside, and an attack by the
Church against the influence of radical ideas coming from Bohemia. Far
reaching changes were noted in the political system. In the fifteenth century
the kings of Bohemia gained direct control over several Silesian duchies, such
as Wroctaw, Swidnica, Ziembice and Olesnica. Others were still governed by
the Silesian Piasts as vassals of the Bohemian Crown. The last of these Piasts,
the Duke of Legnica and Brzeg, died at the close of the seventeenth century.
In 1471 Matthias Corvinus placed the whole of Silesia under a general
magistrate (starosta). Wladyslaw of Bohemia upheld these conditions by the
franchise of 1498. Two of his brothers, John Albert and Sigismund held
temporarily the office of viceroy of either the whole or part of Silesia. This
Jagiellonian episode, however, left no lasting political imprint. As a province
of the Church, Silesia remained under the authority of thé Polish Archbishop
of Gniezno.
By the fourteenth century German influence made deep inroads among
the feudal lords and the clergy. The Piast dynasty was bilingual in Polish
and German, and even spoke three languages on account of the strong
influence of Bohemia, but was for the most part hostile to the Polish Kingdom.
Among the exceptions was Bolko II, Duke of Swidnica and ally of Casimir
the Great, and towards the end of the fourteenth century Louis I of Brzeg, an
admirer of Silesia’s national past. Both languages, Polish and German, were
spoken in the towns because of the large influx of Slavs from the rural areas.
The influence of Bohemian and Polish culture spread across the frontiers into
the whole of Silesia. Many Silesians studied and lectured at the Jagiellonian
University ; the culture and art of Silesia influenced above all Little Poland
and to a lesser degree Great Poland.
ECONOMIC LIFE 127
ECONOMIC LIFE IN THE FOURTEENTH
AND FIFTEENTH CENTURIES
The Polish Kingdom owed its political success to the many-sided development
of its energies, including its economy. The number of newly planted rural
and urban settlements rose under Casimir the Great and throughout the
fifteenth century. The scourge of the Black Death swept across Little Poland
and Pomerania in 1348 and 1349, but it did not wreak such havoc as it did
in western Europe. In the middle of the fifteenth century the population of
the Polish State, within the frontiers of the Crown and without Royal Prussia,
is estimated to have been over two and a half millions, with about 10 in-
habitants to a square kilometre.
A vigorous colonization movement embraced, in the fourteenth century,
the foothills of Little Poland. In the next century one may observe an ethnic
expansion to western Ruthenia. Similarly Poles from Mazovia colonized
Podlasie and the lake region of Teutonic Prussia (later called Mazuria).
The growth of settlements and increased population enabled the spread of
more intensive forms of farming in which the three field system became.
general. Peasants began to rear cattle for sale. Various kinds of rent prevailed
and were the most widespread form of feudal exploitation of the peasants.
The German law embraced about half the villages ; but the villages governed
by Polish law were enjoying virtually the same legal and economic position.
In the fifteenth century, the monastic estates were the first to expand their
manorial farms, in order to increase grain production for the new and
expanding markets. These farms were to base production on serf and not hired
labour. These ambitions were carried out at the expense of the lands owned
by the village mayors (scu/teti), who according to a law of 1423 were “useless
and recalcitrant”. The holdings of the peasants were also reduced. The
peasants were compelled to work for the lord one day a week per mansus
(about 16 hectares) of land. The peasants resisted increasing exploitation by
flight from their holdings and by fomenting local unrest. In 1496 legal
restrictions were placed on the drift of peasants from the villages. These were
the first symptoms of a social and economic regression of the Polish rural area.
Until that time, during the fourteenth and a considerable part of the fifteenth
centuries, Poland saw an expansion of settlement and production, while
western Europe suffered an agrarian crisis.
Mining made progress in Silesia and Little Poland. Deposits of iron ore,
copper, lead, zinc, sulphur and rock salt were discovered in the fourteenth
century. In the course of the next century the mining centres of Olkusz and
Wieliczka attained a high level of organization and technology.
The ascendancy of the commodity-money economy in exchanges between
town and country, the formation of economic regions covering large districts
and later the provinces of a united Polish Kingdom or parts of neighbouring
countries, as in the instances of Silesia, Pomerania, Prussia and Mazovia were
128 THE CORONA REGNI POLONIAE (14TH AND 15TH CENTURIES)
all factors contributing to the growth of towns. The progress of urbanization
can be measured by the granting of municipal charters. In Great Poland
93 towns received charters in the fourteenth century and 153 in the fifteenth
century ; 40 and 83 towns in Mazovia received charters in the same cen-
turies.
Local trade expanded and external commerce linked the Polish towns with
western Europe and the Black Sea area. New roads to Lithuania were linked
with the old network of trade routes. The total volume of trade grew to
impressive proportions. For example, 30,000 ells (postawy) of cloth were
brought each year to Cracow. The turnover in trade and money-lending grew
from one decade to another, money being in general use in the sale of
manufactured goods and agricultural products.
Technological organization of the crafts was improved. Appearing only
occasionally in twelfth century Poland, but becoming more popular in the
thirteenth, the watermills multiplied in the processing of iron, wool, timber,
hides and grain. Better knowledge was gained of the raw materials and in
various specialized crafts the production methods were refined. Craftsmen
became highly skilled in their work and could produce in sufhcient quantities
to satisfy the demands of the whole population, which caused a decline of the
crafts practiced in the countryside, though to compensate for this, less
emphasis was placed on a higher output of farm products. In the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries, as a result of the division of labour and the use of
money, trade activity reached a peak never again achieved in Poland under
feudal conditions. The role of merchants as brokers between the peasant and
the craftsman, became more important in the local market. The craftsmen
were forbidden by law to engage in retail trade and in the course of the
fourteenth century the merchants concentrated in their hands the trade in
manufactured articles, raw materials and food. The burghers were not entirely
freed from the necessity of growing their own food. Even larger towns
cultivated the land granted to them under their charters. In small market
towns, the burgher farmer devoted part of his time and effort to tilling the soil
and to raising domestic animals.
At the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth centuries
the guild was established as an association protecting the interests of craftsmen
and enabling its members to perform their trades. The members of guild were
masters, each working in his own workshop with his apprentices and jour-
neymen. In the second half of the fourteenth and throughout the fifteenth
centuries some of the masters owned several workshops and employed
other masters as well as women, but the guilds opposed and prohibited this
practice. An apprentice spent several years in learning his trade. He was then
freed as a journeyman. At the end of a long period, which also included
a journey that lasted at least a year and six weeks to other workshops within
the country and abroad, the journeyman could render proof of his mastery
in the trade by submitting evidence of his skill in the form of a specimen
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ECONOMIC LIFE 129
piece of work upon the basis of which he could be made a master. The
exploited journeymen staged revolts against their masters. Notable was the
rebellion of the bakers of Cracow in 1375. The guilds were ruled by statutes,
with which the town councils interfered. Owing to the advance in techniques
employed in production there was an upward swing in the quality of the
articles and greater specialization in the crafts. At the beginning of the
fourteenth century there were 29 different craft guilds in Wroclaw. In the
leather trade alone distinctions were made between the tanners, white-,
red- and black-leather craftsmen, suéde and morocco leather craftsmen, purse-
makers, belt, glove and robe makers, bookbinders, vellum makers, and furriers.
In the metal trades there were blacksmiths, pewterers, coppersmiths, needle-
makers, bell founders, goldsmiths, gold platers, gunsmiths, tinsmiths, spur-
makers, cuttlerers and swordsmiths, armourers and locksmiths. It is obvious
that all these specialists were not necessarily represented in every town, even
in larger ones, nor did they always have their own guilds, being organized
according to the raw material they used in production or according to some
other criterion. In small towns all craftsmen who could not set up their
individual guilds were members of a general guild. Finally, the guilds did not
all possess the same economic status nor were they always able to maintain
a balance of forces inside their organizations.
The guilds were interested in the collective purchase of raw materials,
the processes of production, the quality and sale of articles, and regulated
prices. They fought with the town councils, composed of merchants, for
a share in the government of the town, in decisions on taxes, for revocation
of the decree that compelled artisans to use merchants as middle-men in trade.
The rising of weavers in Wroclaw in 1333 which embraced all the poor of the
town was directed against the town council. The guilds guarded the monopoly
of production with varying success. The monopoly was gravely undermined
by journeymen who, though not yet emancipated, worked in houses exempt
from municipal jurisdiction or lying outside the town walls. Jewish craftsmen,
not admitted into the guilds, were also competitive, as well as village
craftsmen, like the weavers of the foothill villages of Silesia and Ruthenia.
The stratification of the town population varied and was related to the
size of the town. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, large towns, such
as Wroclaw and Gdansk with a population of 20,000, Cracow with about
14,000 and the smaller towns, like Poznan with about 4000 and Sandomierz
with about 2000, were inhabited by three distinct groups of burghers, ex-
clusive of the gentry and clergy who often constituted a sizeable proportion
of the population. At the head stood a small group of merchant patricians
who in the course of the fourteenth century assumed complete control over
the political and economic life of the towns. They removed from power the
hereditary advocatus and kept others away from the councils or at best
admitted a small number of other representatives. In the years 1320-1350
among the 88 town councillors of Cracow only 14 were craftsmen. The
9 History of Poland
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11. St. Catherine’s Church, 12. Corpus Christi Church, 13. Synagogue.
ECONOMIC LIFE 13!
majority of these patricians were of foreign extraction and their native tongue
for the most part was German, but there were also Italians (in Cracow) or
Armenians (in Lwéw). Nevertheless, when the conflicts during the period the
Polish Kingdom’s unification subsided, the patricians joined forces with the
secular and church lords and with the Polish Crown, which gave them
political support in exchange for financial aid. The patricians of Silesia
adopted a similar attitude toward the Kings of Bohemia. On the other hand,
the patricians of the Prussian towns, exploited by the Teutonic Order,
pronounced in 1454 in favour of incorporation into the Polish State.
A second, far more diverse group as regards wealth, was the large mass of
common craftsmen, who remained in both open or concealed conflict with
the patricians. The third group were the poor, the servants and unskilled
labourers, who remained outside the pale of town law. Thanks to the com-
moners and the poor the Polish language retained a strong influence even in
towns like Wroclaw which had been exposed to the constant influx of foreign
elements. Elsewhere, Polish was either the predominant or the only language
spoken. In Prussia, by contrast, in both large and small towns almost
exclusively German was spoken. National antagonisms still yielded to class
and political differences. The first powerful wave of unrest inundated Silesia
and Little Poland in the 1360’s. Opposition to the fiscal policies of the councils
and strikes of local guilds continued until the close of the century. A second
wave of revolts followed directly, inspired by Hussitism, culminating in the
Wroctaw insurrection of 1418, during which the town hall was captured and
the councillors killed. The Polish Hussite movement was suppressed in the
middle of the fifteenth century. Urban disorders, particularly in Great Poland,
were suppressed in consequence. The counter-action of the Church by the
Franciscan order took the form of the foundation of Bernardine monasteries
in various towns.
The Jewish population of the towns constituted a separate national,
religious, cultural and legal group. The liberties, granted initially by the Duke
of Kalisz, Bolestaw the Pious, in 1264, and some Silesian dukes were extended
by Casimir the Great to the whole Kingdom, and confirmed once more by
Casimir IV in 1453. It is true that these privileges were soon revoked by the
Nieszawa Statutes ; nevertheless they remained the fundamental guarantee of
personal safety, inviolability of places of worship and freedom of trade of the
Polish Jews. They were directly subject to the royal treasury and the jurisdic-
tion of the voivode. The State, on the other hand, recognized the jurisdiction
of the courts of the Jewish communities. These communities were established
in the larger towns and were not very numerous. At the close of the fourteenth
century the mass exodus of Jews fleeing from persecution in Germany swelled
the numbers of the Jewish population in Poland and diversified the social
structure of their Jewish communities. The Jews devoted themselves tradition-
ally to money lending, an activity which promoted growth of the commodity-
money economy, particularly when the Church remained adamant in its inter-
ge
132 THE CORONA REGNI POLONIAE (14TH AND 15TH CENTURIES)
dictions of usury as a trade for Christians. In the fifteenth century the Jews turn-
ed to the crafts, a fact which evoked a conflict with the town guilds. An agree-
ment signed in Cracow in 1485 tried to regulate the standing of Jewish crafts-
men in the guilds. There were clashes and even local riots as well as religious
violence which were generally subdued by the State authorities despite the
intolerant pronouncements of the lay and secular clergy. In the course of the
fifteenth century many towns restricted Jewish residences to several streets
and even set up separate districts (e.g. Kazimierz near Cracow). In isolated
instances, as in Warsaw in 1483, the Jews were compelled to move outside the
town walls.
The Armenian religious communities in the incorporated territories of
Ruthenia retained their legal identity. Armenian merchant communities lived
in the towns where they had settled in the middle of the fourteenth century.
They were governed by Armenian law which they had brought with them.
This law was codified in a statute granted to the Armenians by Sigismund I.
Unlike the Jewish population, the Armenians were allowed to mix with the
town population which professed other faiths and spoke other languages and
were permitted to assume posts in the municipal government. Though they
retained the Armenian language in the church services the communities began
in the sixteenth century to adopt Polish culture and to speak Polish.
The Polish towns of that period were as varied in appearance as they were
in size, ranging from Cracow, the capital of the Kingdom, Gdansk and
Wroclaw which could be compared to any European town of that age, to the
sleepy wooden hamlets with a population of several hundred which sprang
to life only on market days. In the large towns the fifteenth century witnessed
the construction of more brick buildings, including dwelling residential houses.
The town accounts provide ample evidence of the concern for cleanliness,
paved streets, order and precautions against fire. There was a marked
expansion of municipal facilities, with construction of town halls, drapers’
halls, yardarms, cloth cutters shops, baths, stalls, benches and booths in the
markets, hospitals which were also asylums, parish churches, monasteries and
mills. By the orders of Casimir the Great over 20 towns of his Kingdom were
surrounded by walls. The towns continued to put up walls after his death.
The Turkish danger that reared its head at the close of the fifteenth century
was influential in changing the appearance of Polish towns into that of
fortified strongholds, the kind that was to spring up in the early years of the
introduction of firearms. The Barbican of Cracow was built in these years.
The town churches were generally built of brick and stone as were the castles,
residences of kings and of the starosta (capitaneus).
CULTURE 133
CULTURE IN THE FOURTEENTH
AND FIFTEENTH CENTURIES
The style of life at court and in the towns approached, especially in the
fifteenth century, international standards in what has been called the autumn
of the Middle Ages. Court festivals and tournaments, sumptuous feasts and
rich dress contrasted sharply with the dire poverty of the towns with wooden
and perpetually filthy streets. A life of pomp and splendour was led by the
bishops and the new class of secular magnates, who had come into sudden
wealth with the expansion to the East and who immediately adopted
a princely mode of living.
There were no such sharp distinctions among the rural population. The
wealthy tenant farmers lived on the same standard as the majority of the
gentry. The wealthier knights lived in close harmony with the town patricians
and eagerly adopted foreign habits either imported to the country or learned
abroad in the course of travels. Regional differences began to emerge in the
rural areas. Silesia and Little Poland led in the development of material
culture followed by a part of Royal Prussia with Gdansk, Elblag and Torun,
then Great Poland with Mazovia at the very bottom of the scale. The new
acquisitions of Poland in the East developed at an uneven rate.
From the middle of the fourteenth century, important events took place in
education and in the organization of cathedral, parochial and town schools.
A growing number of pupils were not so much candidates for the church
clergy, as sons of burghers and the wealthier nobles who desired to acquire
a minimum of knowledge and the ability to write, a skill they needed in
commerce and in the municipal offices, such as the keeping of accounts and
minutes in the city, land and provincia! courts. The parish schools maintained
by the town councils and the churches frequently evolved, as was the case in
Legnica, into fairly large educational centres which prepared the pupils for
university studies as did the cathedral schools. The sons of Polish burghers
and nobles were enrolled in European universities. Maciej Kolbe of Swiebodzin
in the diocese of Poznan was the rector of the Paris University in 1480.
The University of Cracow, the second to be established in this part of
Europe, was founded in 1364, shortly after the University of Prague, founded
in 1348, but before the University of Vienna, founded in 1365. Casimir the
Great introduced the Italian model where law was the principal subject of
study, enabling the students to be state officials. Later reforms in 1400 fol-
lowed the models set by the universities of Paris and Prague and included
the study of theology. Maintaining contact with the intellectual circles of
virtually all of Europe, the University of Cracow exerted an influence on
neighbouring countries, among them Lithuania. The ferment caused by
religious disputes aroused by the Hussites inspired many debates at the
university. A passionate polemicist was Master Andrzej Gatka of Dobczyn, an
adherent of the Hussites. In philosophy the university tended toward the doc-
134 THE CORONA REGNI POLONIAE (14TH AND 15TH CENTURIES)
trines of nominalism and subscribed to the principles of practical philosophy,
while in politics it espoused, as did virtually the whole Polish episcopate and
clergy, the conciliar doctrine within the framework of religious orthodoxy.
There were also social accents in the activity of the university. In 1447
Rector Jan of Ludzisko greeted Casimir IV with a speech in which he
protested against the injustices inflicted upon the peasants of Poland. Members
of the staff voiced their convictions outside the confines of the university.
These were the theologians of European fame: Mateusz of Cracow and
Jakub of Paradyz, the notable jurists Stanistaw of Skalbmierz who developed
the doctrine “de bellis iustis” in 1411 and Paulus Vladimiri of Brudzen who
has already been mentioned, author of the thesis stating that pagans had the
right to their land and that neither the Pope nor the Emperor could dispose
of it in any way. The school of astronomy and mathematics was founded in
the middle of the fifteenth century through the agency of Marcin Krol of
Zurawica, Jan of Glogdw, Wojciech of Brudzewo and others. Nicolaus Coper-
nicus, one of the most illustrious scholars of the university, studied in Crac-
ow from 1492 to 1496. Polish names appeared on the registers of the universi-
ties of Germany, France and Italy.
In the second half of the fifteenth century, Italian humanism was introduc-
ed in Poland by travellers and circulating manuscripts. Grzegorz of Sanok,
Archbishop of Lwéw, who died in 1471, had attracted a group of people seek-
ing new literary forms and new secular themes. About 1490 another circle
organized in Cracow was led by Filippo Buonaccorsi (Kallimachus) who
opened the way for rationalism and criticism. The “Sodalitas Litteraria
Vistulana” of the poet Conrad Celtis was active in the same period.
Latin still prevailed as the written language, as did Church writings. Many
manuscripts were produced by the universities and schools. There was
a proliferation of poetry, echoes of the vagari (strolling minstrels), songs,
verses, political satire and didactic verse, a mountain of evidence of consistent
and intensive literary pursuits. The keen awareness of history emerges in
chronicles and accounts. Notable is the lively political memoir, hostile to the
Angevin rulers, written by Janko of Czarnkéw, the Vice-Chancellor of the
Kingdom, directly after the death of his beloved Casimir the Great. Another
work, the Chronicon principum Poloniae, expressed the patriotism of its
author, Piotr of Byczyna a Silesian burgher. There were collectors of ancient
historical texts like Master Jan Dabréwka, and writers of annals, like the
mansionarii of Cracow chapter, who in this manner amassed a reference
library for Jan Dlugosz. This fine historian, equally at home in diplomatic
circles and as a teacher of princes, has left in addition to other works a history
of Poland—Annales seu cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae composed in the style
of an annual and brought up to the year 1480. Fashioned after Livy in style
and technique and based on extensive research in primary sources, the work
is a monument to patriotism and historical knowledge. Mention must be made
of Jan Ostrordg, a secular political writer, whose memorandum on the system
CULTURE 135
of the Polish State written in Latin in 1467 contains a broad programme of
administrative and even social reforms.
National culture manifested itself more and more frequently in the Polish
vernacular. There were translations of long works, like the Psalter for Queen
Jadwiga and the Bible for Queen Sophia, the last wife of Wiadystaw Jagietto
and a long list of translations of Hussite works for the populace. The Latin
originals of the statutes enacted by Casimir the Great and by the dukes of Ma-
zovia were translated into Polish in the fifteenth century. The first treatises on
Polish orthography were written about 1440. Abundant evidence is provided
by poetry written in Poland, which though still rough in form, covered
a broad range of subjects from the religious to the profane. Secular music was
written for one voice and set to Latin texts or to the vernacular like Panno
mila nie bedziesz li ty bedzie inna (Sweet Maid, if it be not you, will be
another), of the fourteenth century thrived side by side with large numbers
of Church songs, some of them very fine in quality. There is evidence that
from the late thirteenth century attempts were made to induce the faithful
to take a more active part in the church services by participating in musical
recitations of the symbols of faith, the decalogue and prayers. Soon afterwards
in the fourteenth century Easter songs were composed in Polish. Bogurodzica
(Mother of God) was the song of the knights ; it was sung in the fields of
Grunwald in 1410. This fine piece of music calls for great skill on the part
of the performers. In the fourteenth century or a little earlier, Franciscan
cantors learned to sing in polyphony. The organ of Torun was installed in
1343 and Polish organ tabulators appeared in the fourteenth century. Mikolaj
of Radom, a famous composer of polyphonic music, emerged about 1430.
There was likewise wide interest in the theory of music at this time.
Poland belongs to the countries which adopted and evolved printing at
a fairly early date. The first printing shop was established in Cracow in
1473/1474. The first book to be printed in Polish appeared in Wroclaw
in 1475. The Cyrillic alphabet in printed books for the eastern and southern
Slavs was used for the first time anywhere in Cracow in 1491. The libraries
were filled with manuscripts and incunabula. There is relizble evidence of
a relatively wide distribution of books in Latin and in vulgari in the last
quarter of the fifteenth century.
In fine arts the activities of the artists underwent their own form of
democratization. Most works were produced within the framework of the
guild. The works of painters, sculptors, architects and goldsmiths were com-
missioned by clients, ranging from the royal court, the episcopate and the mag-
nates to the urban communities and rural parishes.
Gothic style prevailed in architecture. The three leading provinces in art,
Silesia, Little Poland and Prussia, interacted upon each other and were linked
by numerous threads with the art of central and northern Europe. The most
impressive buildings of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth
century built within the area of the Polish State, were: the churches of St.
13% THE CORONA REGNI POLONIAE (14TH AND 15TH CENTURIES)
Mary, St. Catherine and the Corpus Christi in Cracow and the Cathedral
of Archbishop Jarostaw Bogoria in Gniezno. The most notable buildings
outside the Polish Kingdom were : the town hall, cathedral and several large
ecclesiastical buildings in Wroclaw, the church of St. Mary in Gdansk, one
of the largest fortified complexes of Europe, the castle of Malbork, and the
town hall and the churches of Torun. The fact that the majority of the leading
architectural centres were integrated into the Kingdom of Poland in the
middle of the fifteenth century promoted an even more vigorous exchange
of art experiences. A new form in architecture began to emerge at the close of
the fifteenth century with such notable examples as the small fortified castle of
Debno and the Collegium Maius of the University of Cracow.
The churches and chapels were richly embellished with stained glass
windows, murals and plaques, wood and stone sculptured figures, gold articles
and textiles. Silesia and Little Poland led in sculpture and painting. Some of
the works of that age, like the tomb of Wladyslaw Jagiello, represent a high
level of European sculpture. Other works of art, paintings and sculptures, the
product of guild workshops, reflect contemporary trends of European art and
are faithful to the current ideas of the townsmen, gentry and wealthy peasants,
who founded numerous small parish churches. The realism of daily life evident
in their works helped immensely in conveying the reigning ideology to the
enthralled spectators. Among outstanding works there is the exquisite figure
of the Madonna of Kruzlowa and the paintings produced by the Cracow and
Sacz schools of artists, preserved in their best examples at Cracow and
Tarnow. Wit Stosz (Stwosz), the celebrated sculptor of Nuremberg and Crac-
ow, is preeminent among his contemporaries. His most important work is the
altar of St. Mary parish church in Cracow, produced in 1477-1485, a gift of
the town community. The precision of his observation of life and the sophis-
ticated and stylized manners of the Late Gothic period is remarkable. In the
vast expanse of the Polish and Lithuanian federation the influence of the Late
Gothic period penetrated as far east as Wilno and Lwéw. On the other hand,
the influence of Ruthenian mural painting, developed in the days of Wlady-
staw Jagielto in the Volhynian school and bearing the strong imprint of Balkan
styles, and the art from the environs of Pskov in the days of Casimir IV
reached the Wawel of Cracow, Lublin, Sandomierz and Wislica. Many a no-
table work bears witness to this influence. The illumination of manuscripts
spread, indicating that this select form of art frequently enjoyed the patronage
of the Polish episcopate and some of the monasteries. Late Gothic gold articles
attained a perfection of form and design which was to continue far into the
sixteenth century.
The nationalities of the Jagiellonian State, the Poles, Ruthenians, Lithuan-
ians, Germans, Jews and Armenians, played an important role in the lively ex-
change of cultural experience. Poland guaranteed privileges to the estates
that emerged in the course of the fourteenth century, to the lords spiritual
and temporal, the gentry, and the patricians. They were all united by senti-
CULTURE 137
ment and a common desire for a strong political foundation. The broad
masses of the urban and rural population, of Polish and non-Polish language,
were united by a loyalty to the State and its territory, a trait typical of
the late Middle Ages. They saw an advantage in this political union. The
mobilization of national forces in the period of the battle of Grunwald
produced expressions of Polish nationalism in many ways, while the growth
of a literature written in the vernacular strengthened the bases of Polish
social consciousness. Writers of the second half of the fifteenth century were
aware of the fact that the Polish gens et natio embraced all the people who
speak Polish, from the royal court to the lowly peasant. The Tartar and
Turkish danger gave rise to the belief in the mission of the Poles as defenders
of Europe.
It may be recalled that on the eve of the outbreak of the Thirteen Years’
War many of the citizens of Prussia who spoke German, declared their
support for the Polish State in its form and substance. The Regnum Poloniae
stood for a broad social and political union of many nationalities. This is the
legacy that was bequeathed to the age that followed.
Genealogy of the Piasts (1)
(The tables include only the most important members of the dynasties until the end of the 12th century)
Choéciszko
Siemowiet
|
Ll
Lestko
Siemomyst
Mieszko I, ¢. 920-992 ; first wife Dobrawa, ?-977
+
Boleslaw I the Brave, ¢. 967-1025
|
‘i
Bezprym, 986/7-1032 Mieszko II, 990-1034 ; wife Richeza, 1063
|
Casimir T the Restorer, 1016-1058
—e
+
Bolestaw II the Bold, ¢. 1040-1081 Wladyslaw Herman, c. 1040-1102
¢-
Zbigniew, ?-1112 Bolestaw III the Wrymouth, 1085-1138
mew al
L
Wiadystaw II Boleslaw IV Mieszko ITI Henry Casimir I
the Exile, the Curly, the Old, of Sandomierz, the Just,
1105-1159 e. 1125-1173 1126-1202 e. 1132-1166 1138-1194
+
4 |
(see: Table 2) (see: Table 3) see: Table 4)
Genealogy of the Piasts (2)
(Silesian branch)
Wiadysiaw II the Exile, 1105-1159 (see - Table 1)
+
pe :
Bolesiaw the Tall, after 1129-1201 Mieszko I the Stumbling, ¢. 1138-1211
+ ,
Henry I the Bearded, c. 1163-1238; The Racibérz-Opole branch (extinct 1532)
wife Jadwiga, c. 1174-1243 and the Cieszyn-Ofwigcim branch
| (extinct 1625)
|
+ ;
‘Henry II the Pious, ¢. 1191-1241
|
i v L
Boleslaw II che Bald Henry III the White, Conrad I, ?-1273/4
4Rogatka), 1224/30-1278 ce. 1229-1266
+ L 4
The Swidnica branch (extinct Henry IV Probus, The Glogéw branch (extinct 1472),
1368), and che Legnica ¢. 1258-129C the Zagan branch (extinct 1504),
‘branch (extinct 1672) and the Olesnica branch (extinct 1492)
Genealogy of the Piasts (3)
(Great Poland branch)
Mieszko III the Old, 1126-1202 (see : Table 1)
4 +
Odon, 1144-1194 Wladyslaw ILI Spindleshanks, 1161/7-123%
+
Wiadystaw Odonic, c. 1190-1239
L 7
Przemyst I, 1220/1-1257 Boleslaw the Pious, 1221-1279
+
Przemyst II, 1257-1296
+
Richeza Elisabeth, 1288-1335 ; first husband Waclaw IJ, King of Bohemia, Poland and Hungary, 1271-1305
!
Waclaw III, King of Bohemia, Poland and Hungary, 1289-1306
Genealogy of the Piasts (4)
(Little Poland, Kujawy and Mazovia branches)
Casimir If the Just, 1138-1194 (see: Table 1)
|
Leszek the White, c. 1186-1227
{
|
v
4
Boleslaw V the Chaste, 1226- Casimir I of Kujawy,
eGe—r———— ee
+
Conrad I of Mazovia, ¢. 1187-1247
Siemowit I,
1279 ; wife Kinga (Cunegunda), ¢. 1211-1267 1224-1262
1234-1292 |
| |
: 4 r
eszek the Black, Siemomysl, Wiadysiaw I The Mazovian
¢. 1240-1288 1241/5-1287 the Short, branch (extinct
the Kujawy branch ¢. 1260-1333 1526)
(extinct 1388) |
Casimir III Elisabeth, 1305-1380;
the Great, husband Charles Robert d'Anjou,
1310-1370 King of Hungary, 1288-1342
Louis of Hungary (d’Anjou), King of Huagary and Poland, 1326-1382
|
Jadwiga, ¢. 1374-1399 ;
husband Wladyslaw II Jagiello, Grand Duke of Lithuania,
King of Poland, 1348-1434
(see: Table of the Jagiellon dynasty)
THE COMMONWEALTH
OF THE GENTRY
Chapters VII-IX
by Janusz Tazbir
Chapters X-XIII
by Emanuel Rostworowski
Chapter VII
POLAND'S “GOLDEN AGE”
(1492-1586)
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PERIOD
The sixteenth century marked, in many respects, a turning point in Poland’s
history. It was a period of fundamental social, economic, political, cultural
and religious change, the consequences of which were to be felt (or counter-
acted more or less successfully) by the subsequent generations. In the Polish
Commonwealth of those days, though based on a voluntary and finally estab-
lished union of two nations, everything was fluid, and therefore both a drive
towards a strong central state authority and a further extension of the ruling
class’s privileges were still a possibility.
Whereas the seventeenth century could well be referred to as the “‘Gold-
en Age” of the high nobility, the period of the rule of the last Jagiellons (espe-
cially the reign of Sigismund Augustus) witnessed the high point of influence
of the middle gentry. They shifted their allegiance from the monarch to
the magnates, at times supporting the king, on other occasions opposing him
strongly. The limits of the gentry’s political thought were set by narrowly con-
ceived class interests ; the gentry undoubtedly desired to improve the machin-
ery of the State but, at the same time, they greatly feared anything that
smacked of absolutism whose growth in the neighbouring states they watched
with horror.
The gentry obtained considerable privileges for themselves which, simul-
taneously, resulted in restricting the freedom of activity, and even the free-
dom of movement, as in the case of the peasants, of other sections of the pop-
ulation. This class egoism, in a way a recurring and normal social phenom-
enon, would not have been so harmful in itself, had it been accompanied by
the introduction of proper reforms in the political structure of the country
reforms which were both feasible and within the limits of reality. Such re-
forms would have to lead to the creation of a standing army, a full treasury,
and a smoothly working administration, and—above all—the establishment
of an efficient parliamentary procedure. Too much, however, was left to the
good will, patriotic feelings and political wisdom of the citizen. When these
10 History of Poland
146 POLAND'S ‘“‘GOLDEN AGE” (1492-1586)
began to fail, it yielded immediately adverse effects on the entire system.
The full implications of this state of affairs became apparent only later, but
already in the sixteenth century certain signs of self-satisfaction with Polish
achievements and an unwillingness to be involved in any armed effort which
did not augur well for the future, became clearly visible among the gentry.
Humanism made them conscious of the pleasures of life, and its practical
side and for that reason they accepted most quickly and eagerly, a casual
utilitarianism.
The splendour of the “Golden Age” was most striking in the cultural
achievements of the period. They were often perhaps superficial and limited
in scope, but they are unquestionable and generally acknowledged. In the
sixteenth century therefore there were still no features which would point
to a backwardness of Polish civilization with regard to the West. Poland at
that period was, in every respect, superior to northern and eastern Europe
and kept pace with the West not only from the point of view of economic
development and political power, but also in the field of scholarly achieve-
ment, arts and literature. The greatest poet of the Polish Renaissance Jan
Kochanowski, was of the same stature as Ronsard, and its most eminent
political writer, Andrzej Fryc2-Modrzewski was on the level of Jean Bodin.
Scholars from all over Europe drew upon the magnificent discoveries of
Copernicus. Throughout the Middle Ages everything that Europe knew of
Poland could have been written in a few lines of print, usually confusing
and inexact. Only in the sixteenth century was Poland “discovered” by
Europe. The latter’s horizons were, at once, extended by the knowledge of
the New World and of Poland, a powerful and cultured country, perhaps
somewhat exotic in the manner of its people’s attire, but impressive in its
wealth and size. To the West, which was then plunged in the chaos of
religious strife, Poland appeared also as a sanctuary where a different man-
ner of worship did not lead dissenters to death at the stake.
BETWEEN THE HAPSBURGS AND MUSCOVY
The reigns of the two sons and direct successors of Casimir IV, John Albert
(1492-1501) and Alexander (1501-1506), were marked by bitter conflicts
between the gentry and the magnates and the final shaping of the modern
Polish parliamentary system. This period was of lesser importance for Po-
land’s external affairs. These were marked by the simultaneous engagement
of her forces in the East, against Muscovy and in the North, against the
Order of the Teutonic Knights, and by the pursuit of dynastic claims to the
Bohemian and Hungarian thrones. The dispersal of aims and forces was
obviously bound to yield only transitory and impermanent successes.
Every victory over the Teutonic Order proved to be only a partial success
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because it did not finally eliminate a state hostile to Poland on the Baltic.
At the time of John Albert the Grand Masters of the Order ceased to pay
homage to the Polish kings. Diplomatic measures to restore the former rela-
tionship were of no avail. Albrecht of Hohenzollern, who became the Grand
Master in 1511, sought Hapsburg assistance, the military aid of German
princes and even the support of Muscovy with which he concluded a formal
alliance in 1517.
The new King, Sigismund I (1506-1548), the youngest of Casimir’s sons,
faced with intensive military preparations by the Teutonic Knights himself
launched a war against them in 1519 in order to forestall an armed attack.
After two years of hostilities a temporary truce was signed. In 1525 a com-
promise peace was negotiated and confirmed by the act of homage in Crac-
ow, whereby Albrecht publicly recognized the suzerainty of the Polish
10°
148 POLAND'S “GOLDEN AGE” (1492-1586)
King: Poland abandoned the idea of completely dissolving the State of the
Teutonic Order, which was now transformed into a secular state owing
fealty to the Polish Crown. In secularizing the Order, Albrecht, at Luther’s
inspiration, adopted, together with his subjects, the Lutheran faith and
acquired for himself the title of duke. The Duchy of Prussia, as it was since
called, was to be ruled by his male descendants and, in the event of the
expiry of their line, by the descendants of his brothers. A few people were
then aware of all the negative implications for the future of this solution
of the Prussian question, among them the Primate Jan Laski, but even those
who protested, for example, the Papacy, were indignant above all with
Poland’s consent to the secularization of the Order whose possessions were
the fief of the Papacy. It was also the first case in Europe of a pact between
a Catholic ruler and a Protestant duke foreshadowing the future separation
of political and religious affairs.
In the East, the external policy of the last Jagiellons was aimed at recov-
ering the territories lost as a result of the Turkish invasions, but the expe-
dition undertaken in 1497 by John Albert not only failed to reach the Black
Sea ports of Kilia and Akkerman, held by the Turks, but suffered a defeat
whilst still on Moldavian soil. The defeat was inflicted by Hospodar Stephen
the Great of Moldavia, whom John Albert planned to dethrone in favour
of his own younger brother Sigismund. This failure, although its significance
was to be overrated by future historians, showed nevertheless how ineffective
was Poland’s military effort in those days. It acted as an encouragement to
Muscovy in its campaign to unify the Ruthenian lands begun in the second
half of the fifteenth century.
This campaign led inevitably to a direct armed conflict with Lithuania
which ruled over a considerable part of Ruthenian lands. The war, waged at
the turn of the fifteenth century, brought several territorial gains to Muscovy
which then seized a large part of the lands beyond the Dnieper and, in 1514,
occupied Smolensk. The Lithuanian victory over the Muscovite army at
Orsza, in the same year, did not change the situation. Taking part in the
battles were also the Tartars who invaded, in turn, the Muscovite and
Lithuanian lands. Their army was routed at Kleck (1506) during the reign
of King Alexander by Prince Michat Glinski. The Tartar troops, however,
did not form a regular army but only loosely linked detachments of cavalry,
and their power could not be smashed decisively in one victorious battle.
Poland’s growing engagement in the East, resulting from the activity
of Muscovy, prevented the pursuit of a consistent policy in relation to the
Danubian states. By the sixteenth century the ruler of Bohemia (including
Moravia, Lusatia and Silesia) and Hungary was Wiadyslaw, son of Casi-
mir IV. In 1515, at the Congress of Vienna, in which King Sigismund I also
took part, Wladyslaw concluded an agreement with Emperor Maximilian
which through dynastic marriages gave the Hapsburgs a right of succession
THE “DEMOCRACY OF THE GENTRY” 149
to the Bohemian and Hungarian thrones. These concessions were to induce
the Emperor to withdraw from cooperation with Muscovy.
Throughout the sixteenth century the attitude to the Hapsburgs was to
determine the two basic trends of Poland’s external policy as well as the
activity of two parties within Poland. The first of these parties, composed
of part of the magnates and some representatives of the bishops sought, in
alliance with Vienna, to provoke a war with Turkey and, later, in the
period of elective kings, to seat a Hapsburg on the Polish throne. The second
party represented the gentry and those of the magnates who opposed the
absolutism of the Hapsburgs. This anti-Hapsburg party wanted to prevent
Poland from becoming involved in a dangerous war with Turkey in the
interests of Vienna and strove, above all, to preserve peace on the southern
borders of the country. That peace was broken only once during the reign
of the last Jagiellons by the Turko-Tartar invasion of 1524. A later attack
on Pokucie (i.e. the Sniatyn and Kolomyja districts) by the Hospodar of
Moldavia was repulsed by the brilliant victory of Hetman Jan Tarnowski
at Obertyn in 1531. In 1533 an “eternal peace” was concluded with Turkey.
THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF THE “DEMOCRACY OF THE GENTRY”
The anti-Hapsburg party commanded strong support among the gentry which
hated the Hapsburgs, seeing in them, and to some extent correctly, the advo-
cates of absolutism and Germanization. It was the gentry (including 8-10
per cent of the population of the Crown), and especially the middle gentry
which took the lead in the political life of the country during the Renais-
sance period. As already mentioned, in the second half of the fifteenth cen-
tury the land diets of the gentry began to play an increasingly important
role and their representatives were invited to attend sessions of the Seym
in order to discuss common problems. In this way there emerged a separate
chamber composed of representatives of the land diets from all over the
country.
The earlier General Assembly to which only a few representatives of the
gentry were admitted, was divided into a Chamber of Deputies (composed,
for the time being, of some forty representatives of that class, two each from
every land of voivodship) and a Senate created from the former Privy
Council. Members of the Senate included all the bishops and those representa-
tives of the magnates who occupied high government offices (chancellor,
vice-chancellor, marshal, treasurer) or leading offices in the territorial admin-
istration (voivodes and castellans), in all over 80 senators. The principle
of a two-chamber parliament had been consolidated during the first year
150 POLAND'S ‘GOLDEN AGE” (1492-1586)
of the reign of John Albert (1493) who had supported that success of the
middle gentry over the magnates. The burghers were excluded from the
Seym, whose privileges included the voting of taxes and amending existing
laws. The representatives of Cracow and Wilno sat in the Seym but had
no right to vote.
The senators, who until 1537 elected half the number of deputies at the
land diets, did not surrender easily. Their conflict with the gentry was in-
tensified when, after the death of John Albert, his brother Alexander, the
Grand Duke of Lithuania, was installed on the Polish throne. The new act
of union with Lithuania issued in Mielnik (1501) again brought a victory
to the magnates because it placed all the matters of State in the hands of
the Senate presided by the king. The act also stipulated the senators’ right
to refuse allegiance to the king in the event of his infringing their privileges,
and made them responsible for all legal matters only to the Council of the
Senate. The act of Mielnik was not accepted by Lithuania and the mag-
nates soon lost their predominant position, following the adoption by the
Seym of a law proscribing the holding of several of the highest State offices
by one person (the so-called incompatibilitas). From then on, also, lands be-
longing to the Crown, which formed one of the foundations of the economic
preponderance of the magnates, were to be distributed exclusively by the
Seym and not, as hitherto, by the king according to his own will. Another
important success of the deputies and senators was the famous constitutional
law of Nihil Novi adopted by the Seym in Radom (1505) which stipulated
that the king had no right to legislate without the joint consent of the two
chambers. The same law established the scope of activity and the duties of
royal officials and formally recognized the existence of a two-chamber par-
liament.
The next king, Sigismund I, made frequent attempts to disregard the
principle of incompatibilitas. This inevitably led to a growing tension between
the Crown which had the support of the magnates, and the middle gentry.
The conflict, whose development was already evident in the 1520’s, was
brought to the surface as a result of the policy of Bona Sforza, King Sigis-
mund’s second wife. She sought to strengthen the King’s position partly
through winning the support of the aristocracy and partly also by increasing
the estates and revenues of the Crown, which could thus become financially
independent of the Seym. The court party composed of people won over by
the distribution of high offices of State exerted a considerable influence in
the land diets and the Seym, but the Queen’s accomplices, just as she herself,
were despised both by the gentry and by the old magnates who looked with
apprehension at any extension of the royal power. This gave rise in 1537 to
the “Hen’s War”, when the open display of opposition by the gentry gathered
near Lwéw in preparation for an armed expedition forced the King, Queen
Bona and the magnates around them to accept a compromise.
At the root of the gentry’s success lay also the consolidation of their
THE “DEMOCRACY OF THE GENTRY” 158
Nicolaus Copernicus
economic position. This was a result of the development of estates worked
by serf labour, the size of which grew at the expense of the peasants who
were removed from their holdings and given either smaller or less productive
plots of lands. The productivity of the soil also increased at this time and,
in the sixteenth century, the average grain yields amounted to 9 quintals per
hectare.
The growing internal demand for, and the increasing export of grain to
the West through Gdansk caused an increase in the amount of compulsory
labour and other duties rendered by the peasants to the manor. ,
Grain for export came chiefly from the large estates and, to a lesser extent,
from the medium estates, but the peasants, too, had their share in this export
THE “DEMOCRACY OF THE GENTRY” 153
trade, selling the grain to the merchants who shipped it to Gdansk. High
prices for grain ensured a relative prosperity to those peasants who had
a surplus for sale. The favourable prices, steadily maintained almost through-
out the sixteenth century, guaranteed high profits from land and stimulated
the expansion of the estates and the intensification of the labour services.
Numerous laws enacted by the Seym at the turn of the fifteenth century
tended to restrict the personal freedom of the peasants and to reestablish
serfdom, which had not been strictly enforced in the preceding period.
The settlement of matters concerning peasants was gradually shifted from
state to village courts thus strengthening the jurisdiction of the lord of the
manor over the peasantry. The law of 1520 introduced one day a week as
the minimum labour duty. The varied, though only sporadic, outbreaks of
peasant resistance could not halt the process. Social unrest and discontent
were partly relieved by the flight from the land. The labour duties, however,
were not all introduced simultaneously and, at first, the peasants participated
in the benefits derived from the continuous demand for grain. As a result,
no large-scale anti-feudal risings occurred in Poland in the sixteenth century.
In the course of the sixteenth century the Seym enacted a number of laws
directed not only against the peasants but also against the townspeople. The
impact of these laws on the prosperity of the Polish towns must, however,
not be overestimated. Throughout the Renaissance the towns continued to
play an important role both in trade and in the crafts. Cracow, Poznan,
Lublin, Warsaw, Gdansk, Lwow and Torun had a population each exceeding
10,000. The transit ports on the Vistula—Sandomierz, Kazimierz Dolny,
Bydgoszcz—expanded and developed. Many towns conducted a brisk trade
with foreign countries and the number of craftsmen’s workshops grew
continually. The developing exchanges in trade led gradually to the establish-
ment of a national market.
The economic prosperity of the towns could not be thwarted by the laws
of the Seym which exempted all goods purchased by the gentry and those
manufactured in their estates from taxation. Identical laws in other countries
did not have any adverse effects on the situation of the townspeople. There
existed also in Poland, at the time, numerous mixed burgher-gentry trading
companies which were faring quite well. The law of 1565, which barred
the burghers from trading in grain and forbade Polish merchants to sell
Polish goods abroad and import foreign goods to Poland, placed the big
towns in a rather advantageous position as they thus became the only inter-
mediaries in this trade. Foreign merchants were only allowed to display their
goods there. Moreover, the law of 1565 never went into effect. Nor could
the ban on the purchase of land by the burghers, which was enacted several
times by the Seym, hinder the development of towns. On the contrary, it
favoured investments of capital derived from trade in manufacturing enter-
prises.
Cracow. Wawel. Envoys Hall, 1529-1535
134. POLAND'S “GOLDEN AGE” (1492-1586)
THE MOVEMENT FOR THE “EXECUTION-OF-THE-LAW”
The success attained by the gentry during the “Hen’s War” gave rise to
a movement which soon was to become known as the “movement for the
execution-of-the-law”. The name itself was in a way characteristic of a mode
of thinking. The gentry believed that all evil resulted from the failure to
observe old established laws and regulations. It was thus considered that
the enactment of new laws was completely unnecessary, or even dangerous,
and that all efforts should be rather concentrated on the proper execution
of the existing, but inoperative constitutional laws. Contrary to what was
generally being said, however, the programme for the execution of the law
was a new one and consistent with the political and social aspirations of the
sixteenth century gentry. It called for improvements in the four main spheres
of the state’s activity, treasury, armed forces, judiciary and administration.
The purpose of the fiscal reform was on the one hand to raise the value
of the coinage (a number of not very successful steps were taken in this
respect) and, on the other, to increase the royal revenues, among other means
by abolishing the tax immunities of the magnates and the clergy. Attempts
were also made to force the latter to cover a part of the expenditures for the
defense of the country. The military value of the general levy, by which a levy
of all members of the gentry capable of carrying arms is meant, was
declining rapidly. Already the Thirteen Years’ War had to be waged with
mercenary troops, then a normal development in other countries, especially
in western Europe. The maintenance of regular defense forces, however, along
the open frontiers in the south and east was actually impossible in view of
the State’s meagre financial resources.
The “execution-of-the-law” movement sought, furthermore, to strengthen
the executive and to put the ministers of State and the starostas under control
of a superior body. This control was to be exercised either by the king him-
self, according to an earlier view or, as it was formulated in 1565, by the
“instigators” elected by the gentry. The gentry also demanded that judicial
organs be handed over to them through the establishment of elected tribunals.
The conception of a centralized administration was linked with the de-
mand for safeguarding the State’s sovereign rights in foreign relations,
particularly with the Papacy. The oath of obedience to each new Pope taken
by the King was considered, in part as a result of the influence of the Re-
formation, to be demeaning to national dignity. Individual leaders of the
“execution” movement advocated also the return of lands which were lost
to Poland in the fourteenth century. Poland’s claims to Silesia or to the
Lubusz Land were justified not by the fact that they were inhabited by
Poles, predominantly townsmen and peasants with whom the gentry felt
only very loosely connected, but by the feudal obligations of their rulers
to the reigning Polish dynasty.
It would be an unwarranted oversimplification to look upon the “execu-
THE MOVEMENT FOR THE “EXECUTION-OF-THE-LAW” 155
tion-of-the-law” movement as a uniform party pursuing a consistent policy.
Various groupings existed each differing in their degree of radicalism and
involvement in questions concerning the proposed reconstruction of the
State. Thus identical demands, for example, the codification of laws, assumed
different social content according to the particular person who had advocated
it. For the distinguished jurist, Jakub Przytuski it meant the introduction of
a uniform legal system for the whole country to replace the old Magdeburg,
Chetmno, Imperial or Papal laws. Andrzej Frycz-Modrzewski, on the other
hand, fought for a completely new code of laws seeing in this the opportunity
to put on an equal footing all sections of the population at least with respect
to the criminal law.
The endeavours of such leaders of the movement as Mikotaj Sienicki,
Hieronim Ossolinski, Mikotaj Rej or Rafat Leszczynski, all of whom were
dissenters, often went considerably farther than the aspirations and the read-
iness for an active struggle of the mass of the gentry who supported them.
As long as they shared certain demands, the Catholic deputies did not hesitate
to support their Calvinist or Arian leaders in the struggle against the temporal
and spiritual lords of the realm, but later that support was to be more and
more often refused.
In the struggle against the rights and privileges of the magnates, the
“execution-of-the-law” movement met also with the opposition of the King
who was allied with the upper classes. Only after 1562 did King Sigismund
Augustus, son of Sigismund I, favour an alliance with the middle gentry
which, however, viewed with mistrust the attempts to place far-reaching
powers in the hands of a monarch whose actions they wished to have under
control. The progressive character of that movement was limited, on the one
hand, by its fear of absolutism and, on the other, by apprehensions of competi-
tion from the burghers and an unwillingness to improve the lot of the peasants
because that would reduce the incomes of the gentry. The internal dissension
in the movement was thus responsible for its only partial success. This, in turn,
resulted in the weakening of the energy and scope of the movement’s further
action.
The struggle was carried on, above all, at the Seyms which were held
during the reign of Sigismund Augustus (1548-1572). The Seym of 1562-1563
passed a law which stipulated that the magnates must return to the treasury
all the royal estates which they had illegally acquired since 1504. The execu-
tion of this law was, however, a very protracted affair and a complete
restoration of these lands was never achieved. In 1567 the Seym agreed that
the law was applicable only to estates pawned or distributed, in which case
the royal rights of ownership were restored, but not to those leased or given
for life where the royal rights were unchallenged. Since then, a part of the
royal estates (so-called “table estates”) remained allocated to the needs of
the Court. The remainder were granted for life, partly as an endowment of
the starostas, partly in consideration of special merits (panis bene merentium).
156 POLAND’S “GOLDEN AGE" (1492-1586)
Both categories of estate were called starostwa. Their possessors were to pay
one quarter of their nominal revenues for the army. The regular mercenary
forces established under this provision were from then on called the “army
of the quarter”.
The demand for a reform of the high courts was pursued during the reign
of Stephen Batory (1576-1586). Before that reform the King was the supreme
judge for all estates. Now he renounced this right with respect to the gentry
in favour of a Court for cases involving the gentry, called the Crown Tribun-
al. This supreme court, established in 1578, convened alternately in Piotrkéw
for Great Poland and in Lublin for Little Poland. Shortly afterwards its
activity was extended to the Ruthenian voivodships (1581), Lithuania as well
as Royal Prussia (1585). This led to the further legal unification of Royal
Prussia with the rest of Poland and was after the final incorporation of
Mazovia (1526), another successful step towards the full integration of the
country.
After the establishment of the Crown Tribunal the gentry took over, in
part the rights of the judicial sessions of the Seym, passing verdicts in such
cases as high treason and /ése-majesté. This carried in its wake a further
considerable limitation of the royal powers. The King’s judicial power was
actually limited only to his subjects on the royal estates, whose cases were
tried by referendary courts. Thus the curtailment of the monarch’s judicial
prerogatives proved to be the most lasting achievement of the gentry
democracy.
SIGISMUND AUGUSTUS’ FOREIGN POLICY
Towards the end of the reign of Sigismund Augustus, the last of the Jagiellons,
a new conflict with Muscovy broke out. The struggle for the Dnieper basin
(in particular for Smolensk) shifted Livonia to the basin of the Dvina river.
From the thirteenth century onwards Livonia was dominated by the Order
of the Knights of the Sword (Livonian Knights) which, until 1525, was closely
linked with the Teutonic Knights in Prussia. After the secularization of the
Teutonic Order, Livonia found itself isolated in face of Muscovy. Ivan IV the
Terrible strove not only to open the route to the Baltic for Muscovy at the
expense of Livonia, but also to subjugate the entire territory. His attempts
were forestalled by Sigismund Augustus who, in 1557, by use of force com-
pelled Livonia to conclude a military alliance with Lithuania directed against
Muscovy. In the following year, Ivan the Terrible retaliated and invaded
the territory of Livonia. In 1561 the Grand Master of the Livonian Order,
Gotthard von Kettler, offered Livonia as a fief to both the Grand Duke of
Lithuania and to Poland. In return King Sigismund Augustus granted Livonia
self-government and guaranteed freedom for the Protestant faith. The same
SIGISMUND AUGUSTUS’ FOREIGN POLICY 157
year Sweden seized Estonia with Reval. The Order of Knights of the Sword
was disbanded and Kettler became a vassal duke ruling over a small portion
of southern Livonia (Courland and Semigalia). The remaining parts of the
territory became the joint dominion of Poland and Lithuania (1569). This
led to a prolonged conflict over Livonia which involved, apart from Poland
and Muscovy, also Denmark, allied with Poland, and Sweden which gave its
support to Muscovy. The war was waged, with varying success for seven years
(1563-1570) and ended with the peace treaty of Szczecin which, however,
did not recognize Poland’s right to Livonia. Independently of the treaty
provisions the territory was temporarily given, by the decision of Ivan the
Terrible, to Prince Magnus of Denmark as a fief, together with the Tsar’s niece
for wife, while Poland concluded a three-year armistice with Muscovy. The
price Poland had to pay for the war consisted not only in the lives lost on the
battle-fields and the huge expenditures from the royal treasury but also in the
fateful concessions in favour of the Prussian ruler Albrecht of Hohenzollern,
which were to bring disastrous consequences in the future. In exchange for
promises of cooperation and assistance in the war against Muscovy, Sigismund
Augustus granted the electoral branch of Hohenzollern the right of succession
in Prussia (1563). Thus the possibility of uniting Prussia with the Common-
wealth after the death of Albrecht was irrevocably lost.
This was, in part, caused by the ever deeper involvement of Polish policy
in the East. The wars with Russia, and in particular the Livonian campaign
showed that Lithuania could not by herself resist the pressure of Muscovy
which was from time to time supported by the Tartars. Simultaneously the
extent of political rights which the Polish gentry won for themselves became
a growing attraction for the Lithuanian boyars. A closer union of the two
States was also facilitated by the introduction in Lithuania, in the course of
the sixteenth century, of central and administrative institutions identical with
those already existing in the Crown. This situation called for a closer union
of the two countries than envisaged by the Mielnik act of union of 1501,
which was based on the person of a joint monarch. The establishment of such
a union was opposed by the Lithuanian magnates who feared an increased
Polish expansion in the territories of the Grand Duchy and the growth of
importance of the Lithuanian gentry, at their expense. Eventually, however,
the military threat from Muscovy compelled them to concede the consolida-
tion of the Polish-Lithuanian union.
On July 1, 1569, following protracted negotiations a union was sworn
in Lublin binding the two countries, Poland and Lithuania, into one State—the
Commonwealth. In accordance with its provisions the Polish King, henceforth
jointly elected, was to become at the same time the Grand Duke of Lithuania.
Both countries were to have a common Seym and monetary system as well as
joint decisions on alliances and declarations of war. On the other hand, the
treasury, offices of State and the entire judiciary and administration were
to remain separate. Sessions of the Seym were to be held in Warsaw situated
158 POLAND’S “GOLDEN AGE” (1492-1586)
nearer to Lithuania than Cracow, which lay in the distant south-western
corner of the country. Thus in the second half of the sixteenth century Warsaw
which, together with Mazovia, had only recently been incorporated into the
Polish Crown began to acquire the character of the capital of the united states of
Poland and Lithuania. It finally became the country’s capital in 1596 when
King Sigismund III transferred his royal residence there. In accordance with
the provisions of the Union of Lublin the territories of the Polish Crown
which thus far consisted of Mazovia, Great Poland together with Kujawy,
Little Poland and Ruthenia, were enlarged by Podlasie, Volhynia and the
Kiev region all of which were incorporated into Poland immediately prior to
the Lublin agreement. In this way most of the Ukrainian lands, which
formerly belonged to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were placed within the
frontiers of the Polish Crown. In this way the total area of the country which
before the union was about 260,000 sq.km (including Royal Prussia and
Warmia), after 1569 and after the incorporation of Livonia, increased to
some 815,000 sq.km and its population numbered about 7.5 million.
This multinational state was given the name of the Polish Commonwealth
(Rzeczpospolita—respublica) which in the terminology used in the sixteenth
century did not necessarily mean a republican form of government. The
Union, of course, did not eradicate all the social and cultural differences
between Poland and Lithuania. These were to be partly eliminated in the
future, as a result of the eastward expansion of the Polish element and
through the adoption by the Lithuanian gentry of the ways and habits of their
Polish counterparts. Yet simultaneously with this denationalization of the
Lithuanian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian gentry, went the assimilation of
numerous Polish peasants who, when settling in the eastern borderland of the
Commonwealth, usually assimilated the customs, the language and often the
religion of the local population. Another factor which played an important
role in hastening the Westernization of Lithuania, distrustful as she was of
the Catholic and Polish culture, was the Reformation reaching Lithuania
from the West by way of Poland.
THE REFORMATION
The call for the reformation of the Church, initiated by Luther, did not, at
first, find many adherents in Poland. It reached, in the first place, the
townspeople in both Prussia as well as Silesia and the fringes of Great
Poland—those regions which because of their national and commercial con-
nexions were especially receptive to ideas and influences coming from
Germany. These ideas contributed to the excitement of the already present
social conflicts, which became glaringly evident in the revolts of Gdansk
plebeians and of peasants from the Duchy of Prussia. Both revolts, ruthlessly
THE REFORMATION 159
and speedily suppressed, had inscribed on their banners the demands for social
and religious reforms.
The Polish gentry remained, for the time being, rather indifferent to the
Reformation, Despite their dogged disputes with the ecclesiastical authorities
in the Seyms of 1520-1537, over the Church’s participation in the defense
of the country, the abolition of tithes and ecclesiastical jurisdiction over
laymen, the gentry did not connect these matters with the demand for the
introduction of a new faith. Though adherents of the Reformation could
occasionally be encountered among various social classes in the 1520’s a mass
movement for religious reform did not emerge until 20 years later.
Even then only a small proportion of the gentry adhered to it, although
among those who did so were undoubtedly the best educated and politically
most active representatives of that class. In the demands set forth by the
Reformation they saw a very convenient weapon, though not the only one,
with which to conduct their struggle for the execution of the laws, a move-
ment directed against both the spiritual and temporal lords, but more against
its anachronistic privileges completely out of tune with the current political
and social trends. It was directed moreover against the huge landed estates of
the Church and the vast incomes of the clergy, especially the bishops and
abbots. The attack was all the more bitter because only a negligible proportion
of the clergy came from the middle gentry. Indeed, it was the bishops from
the aristocratic families, who disposed of the fattest benefices and the most
profitable prebendaryships.
A separate organization of the Protestant Church arose comparatively
early under the protection of the supporters of the Reformation among the
gentry. In 1554 the first synod of the newly introduced Calvinist Church was
held in Stomniki in Little Poland. This denomination was soon adopted by
the majority of dissident gentry who objected to Lutheranism because of its
nationally alien character and its submission to the ruler. In the Kingdom
of Poland Lutheranism remained predominantly the religion of the burghers
and gained a strong following in the towns of Royal Prussia which, during the
years 1557-1558, were granted full freedom of religion by King Sigismund
Augustus. The creed preached by the Bohemian Brethren, who arrived in
Great Poland in 1548, likewise had no particular appeal to the gentry,
despite its initial successes. The failure was partly due to the elements of social
radicalism which it contained and its preference for clerical superiority over
lay seniors.
In Calvinism, on the other hand, the gentry found the confirmation of its
superiority over the crown and its administration. Calvinism granted the
leading position in Church matters to lay elders and not to the reigning
monarch. From the outset of its existence the new creed became in fact
subservient to the interests of the gentry with the Calvinist ministers as mere
tools and never as equal partners in Church affairs. The gentry were unwilling
to cover the financial needs of the new religion, very seldom turning over to
160 POLAND'S “GOLDEN AGE" (1492-1586)
it the tithes which they now stopped paying to the Catholic Church. Thus
money needed for the construction of Calvinist schools and printing shops,
for the maintenance of churches and ministers was obtained with difficulty
and in meagre quantities. The ministers, mostly of plebeian origin, appealed
in vain to the gentry to relieve the lot of the peasants. The fact that the
Reformation brought practicaly no tangible improvements in the situation of
the peasants was probably one of the reasons for their indifference to the new
creed. Only a minute percentage of the peasants adhered to the Reformation.
The establishment of the Calvinist Church by no means signified the
abandonment of the idea of establishing a Polish National Church. At the
Seyms of the middle of sixteenth century the King was pressed to take control
of matters of faith in his own hands and demands were voiced for convening
a national synod, for the abolition of clergy celibacy, for giving the gentry,
or even all the faithful, the right to choose their own priests, for conducting
church services in the Polish language and for communion in both kinds.
Pope Paul IV, who was approached in 1556 on these matters, refused of
course to give his sanction to these demands. Nevertheless the Reformation
movement did score a number of important successes. At the Seym of 1562-
1563 the starostas were finally instructed not to execute verdicts passed by
ecclesiastical courts against laymen in cases of religion and disputes concerning
tithes. The 1563 Seym compelled the clergy to contribute to the costs of the
national defenses and the land tax was henceforth to be paid by the Church
and by the peasantry.
These gentry successes, though only partial, were accompanied by strenuous
efforts by the leaders of the Reformation to consolidate their camp through
‘the unity of the Reformed Churches. The first step in that direction was the
union which was concluded in 1555, in Kozminek, between the Calvinists and
the Bohemian Brethren. The unification of the Protestant Churches was also
the goal of the distinguished reformer Jan Laski, a nephew of the Polish
Primate, well known in western Europe as John a Lasco, who returned to
Poland in 1556. His death in 1560 was a severe blow to these aspirations and
the events of the next years hit them still more.
At the synods of 1562-1565 a split took place in the Calvinist Church
and there emerged a separate religious sect of Antitrinitarians (Arians) which
called themselves the Polish Brethren. They were joined by such eminent
Calvinist leaders as Marcin Czechowicz, Grzegorz Pawel, Marcin Krowicki
and Szymon Budny. At the root of the split there were differences in the doc-
trine ; the Arians followed the teachings of Italian Antitrinitarians which
were expressed, among other things, in their negation of the concept of the
Holy Trinity. There were differences in social matters. Their radical wing
condemned, especially in the early period of the sect’s development, the
enserfment of the peasants, the participation in war and the holding of office.
The social and religious radicalism of the Arians compromised, in a sense, the
entire Reformation and thus provided the champions of the Catholic faith
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THE FIRST INTERREGNUM AND THE PERIOD OF ELECTIVE KINGS 161
with convenient arguments against it. This was one of the reasons which led to
the exclusion of the Polish Brethren from the “Union of Sandomierz”
concluded in 1570 between the Calvinists, the Lutherans and the Bohemian
Brethren.
The Arians could still enjoy protection under the terms of the Confedera-
tion of Warsaw of 1573, during the interregnum after the death of King
Sigismund Augustus. This act, issued at the time of fierce religious strife in the
West, guaranteed the gentry full freedom to practise any religion of their own
choice and forbade the secular authorities from persecuting people of other
faiths. The dissenting gentry often accorded protection to their plebeian
coreligionists. This assured an unhampered development of the Reformation
movement though at the same time it perpetuated its division into many
competing sects and groups.
The importance of the Reformation movement was not restricted to the
religious and political life of the country. The struggle for the wider usage
of the Polish language, the expansion of cultural activities, the development of
printing houses, schools and writing, the striving for free discussion of matters
of religion—all this was linked with the Reformation and had a proportional
effect on Polish intellectual life during the Renaissance. It was therefore not
accidental that all the leading intellectuals of that period were, in one way or,
another, connected with the Reformation. Even if they did not formally
accede to any of its groups, they certainly sympathized with many of the
demands advanced by the dissenters as did Andrzej Frycz-Modrzewski and
Jan Kochanowski.
THE FIRST INTERREGNUM AND THE PERIOD
OF ELECTIVE KINGS
The long interregnum (1572-1574) which followed the death of Sigismund
Augustus and, with it, the end of the Jagiellon dynasty had serious repercus-
sions on the constitution of the Commonwealth. The manner of electing the
new king as well as the fundamental privileges he had to grant in favour of
the gentry influenced the formation of Poland’s political system for the next
200 years. Despite various proposals submitted by the deputies at several
Seyms, all these matters were not regulated during the lifetime of Sigismund
Augustus. His death without issue left the country facing not only the burning
problem of electing a new king but also the still unsettled question how this
election was to be conducted. It became a subject of controversy between
various factions representing different political and social interests. Such
leaders of the gentry as Mikotaj Sienicki, Stanistaw Szafraniec and Swietostaw
Orzelski wanted the new king to be elected by an enlarged Seym, whereas
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THE FIRST INTERREGNUM AND THE PERIOD OF ELECTIVE KINGS 163
important success, above all for the Catholic magnates, was the appointment
of the Archbishop—Primate of Poland as interrex in face of the opposition
of the “execution-of-the-law”, movement which put forward the candidature
of the Calvinist Jan Firlej, the Grand Marshal of the Crown. The bishops
were inclined to place the matter of election in the hands of the rank and
file gentry, being fully aware that if the Seym were to be convoked in Warsaw
the dominant position would be held by the Catholic Mazovians who had,
thus far, resisted the encroachments of the Reformation. This view was shared
by some of the magnates who believed that it would be much easier to control
the thousands of poorly educated and politically immature gentry than to
exert influence on experienced parliamentarians.
The legal basis for that mode of holding elections was provided by the
young and still little known Jan Zamoyski. He advanced the principle of an
election viritim, contending that in accordance with the established rules
of the gentry’s democracy all nobles of whatever rank had the right and the
obligation to participate directly in choosing their king. The principle was
accepted by the Convocation Seym held in Warsaw in January 1573. (This
was, since the First Interregnum, the name given to the Seym held before the
election.)
The Seym had to make its choice between three contending candidates—
Hapsburg, French and Russian. All the candidates were members of dynasties
with autocratic aspirations. For that reason the gentry sought appropriate
guarantees against the introduction of such a form of government into Poland.
In their struggle for the Polish throne the candidates bid against each other
with all kinds of promises and concessions which would have been unthinkable
on the part of any of the former Polish monarchs. It should be remembered
that the powers and authority of the last Jagiellons were, in practice, very
considerable ; as Grand Dukes they could count on strong support in Lithuania
which in turn, enhanced their position in Poland. Elective kings were deprived
of that trump card and, being linked by dynastic ties with their own countries
they did not hesitate to regard the new crown as a subject for bargaining.
Most important, however, was the fact that they had to accept two sets of
conditions. The first, called pacta conventa, concerned the persona! obligations
of the elected king towards Poland, for example, of equipping a given number
of troops at his own expense and replenishing the country’s treasury. The
second, which were of much greater importance to the shaping of the political
system of the Commonwealth, were submitted for acceptance to the first of
Poland’s elective kings, Henry of Valois, henceforth called the Henrician
Articles. These were presented to him by a Polish delegation which went to
Paris in the autumn of 1573. The delegation, consisted of Catholics, led by
Bishop Adam Konarski, and of Calvinists headed by Jan Zborowski and
Jan Tomicki who used the opportunity to prevail upon Henry of Valois to
make concessions in favour of their co-religionists in France. These concessions,
called Postulata polonica, considerably eased the situation of the Huguenots.
11*
164 POLAND'S “GOLDEN AGE” (1492-1586)
Under the terms of the Henrician Articles the king recognized free
elections, undertook to convene the Seym at regular intervals (once every two
years for the period of six weeks) and not to call a general levy without the
consent of the deputies. He could not proclaim new taxes and customs tariffs
without the approval of the Seym. During the intervals between the sessions
of the Seym the king was to be advised by a permanent council composed of
16 senators, sitting four at a time and changing every six months. The king
was also required to reaffirm all the privileges gained thus far by the gentry,
including the provisions of the Confederation of Warsaw which Henry of
Valois accepted only very reluctantly. Yet he realized that his election by
the gentry depended upon his agreement to all these conditions. In case of
his failure to carry them out, the Henrician Articles released the gentry from
their oath of allegiance and authorized them to declare against the king. That
legal provision was, indeed, resorted to in the seventeenth century in the form
of two mutinies, against a ruling monarch. In this way the privileges of the
gentry reached their peak in the sixteenth century. Apart from personal
immunity (no imprisonment without a court sentence), freedom of religion
and exclusive jurisdiction over members of their own class, the gentry gained
not only a share in the country’s government, but also control over the king’s
activity.
The Henrician Articles (which, in course of time, were amalgamated with
the pacta conventa into one law) were a classic example of the Seym’s
aspiration to attain supremacy over the king. The Seym controlled henceforth
the actions of the government and of the king, influenced the course of foreign
policy, decided on matters of taxation and the calling of the general levy.
After the Union of Lublin the Seym was composed of some 140 senators and
170 deputies representing the gentry (of which 48 were from Lithuania).
The Senate and the Chamber of Deputies debated jointly or separately though
simultaneously, sending delegates to each other. In the sixteenth century a rule
was established in the Seym, according to which any new law could be passed
only with the unanimous consent of all deputies. At first, the disastrous effects
of such a procedure did not make themselves felt. For a long time, when there
was a difference of opinion among the deputies, attempts were made to
reconcile the oponents of the particular bill and to convince them that if they
did not intend to vote in the affirmative, they should, at least, refrain from
protesting. The opposition’s silence sufficed to recognize the unanimity of the
Chamber. Such a compromise could be reached only thanks to the political
experience and the high level of responsibility of the deputies and the
relatively insignificant influence of the magnates. Already towards the end
of the sixteenth century, however, lack of unanimity prevented a number of
Seyms from operating.
The central offices of State, like those of the Marshal (who presided over
the Senate and supervised affairs of the royal household); the Chancellor (who
was in charge of external affairs and represented the king in the Seym) ;
THE FIRST INTERREGNUM AND THE PERIOD OF ELECTIVE KINGS 165
S. Samostrzelnik, Coat-of-Arms of the Szydlowiecki Family, 1552
THE POLICY AND WARS OF STEPHEN BATORY 167
the Treasurer ; and the Hetman or supreme commander of the army, were
usually appointed by the king during the Seym. Local administration and
judicial powers were exercised chiefly by starostas and, to a lesser extent, by
the ancient regional officials, voivodes and castellans, whose offices were
gradually assuming a purely formal character. Many other regional offices,
held for life, usually unpaid and in most cases only honorary, served as a rule
to satisfy the personal ambitions of the gentry rather than to contribute
towards the efficiency of administration.
The revenues of the treasury were based on taxes granted in each case, by
the Seym. The taxes were collected from the peasants and country squires
(pobér—land tax), from the burghers (szos—property tax) and occasionally
from the clergy (subsidium charitativum). The treasury also drew from the
czopowe (a tax on beverages), customs, revenues from mining (salt, copper,
silver and lead), port dues at Gdansk, Elblag and Riga, poll tax and profits
of the mint. During the sixteenth century there took place a division between
the public treasury, which provided chiefly for the maintenance of the army,
and the court treasury, which furnished funds for the maintenance of the
royal household.
The “army of the quarter” was small in number, not exceeding 3000 and
then mostly cavalry, and was deployed along the southeastern borders defend-
ing the country against the invasions of the Tartars. The size of the army was
increased only during the reign of King Stephen Batory who created a “‘selec-
tive” infantry which was formed by recruiting one soldier from every 20 fan
(about 320 ha) of the royal estates. Thanks to the endeavours of the King and
his chancellor (Zamoyski), the cavalry was also expanded, the infantry was
equipped according to the Hungarian model and the first sapper units were
formed.
THE POLICY AND WARS OF STEPHEN BATORY
The first election proved to be a discreditable affair. Henry, Duke of Valois,
ceremoniously brought to Poland to be proclaimed King, after barely four
months in Cracow learnt about the death of his brother Charles IX and
escaped to Paris under the cover of night in 1574, to become the King of
France. After his flight a double election took place. The senators chose
Emperor Maximilian II, whilst the gentry elected Princess Anne, the sister
of Sigismund Augustus, who was to marry Stephen Batory, Duke of Transyl-
vania. The firm and resolute stand of the gentry prevented the outbreak of an
armed conflict for the Polish throne. The followers of the Emperor who also
had the support of the Papal Curia, finally recognized the legality of Batory’s
election to the Polish throne (1576). His election was resisted the longest by
the city of Gdansk. In order to crush its opposition Batory besieged the city
in 1577. After several battles a compromise treaty was eventually signed ;
Poznan. Town Hall, 1550-1560
168 POLAND'S “GOLDEN AGE” (1492-1586)
the King consented to loosen the links of dependency binding Gdansk to the
Commonwealth and the city paid him a considerable indemnity.
That solution harmful as it was to the interests of the State, was the result
of both the attitude of the gentry, unwilling to sacrifice blood or money for
a war against Gdansk, and of an unfavourable international situation. The
King was preparing for a decisive showdown with Muscovy and sought
alliances and money for the war. The full involvement in the East brought yet
another and not less fatal decision, because the King and the Senate agreed
to place the mentally incompetent Duke Albrecht Frederick of Prussia under
the guardianship of the Margrave of Brandenburg, George Frederick of Hoh-
enzollern (1578). Thus one more opportunity to subordinate Ducal Prussia to
Poland was lost.
In Silesia, also, the situation turned to Poland’s disadvantage. In the
sixteenth century a number of Silesian rulers, descendants of the Piasts died
without issue, which inevitably led to the decline in the number of sovereign
Piast duchies. After the death of dukes without heirs, their lands fell into the
hands of the Hapsburgs. In 1526 Bohemia came under the rule of Hapsburgs
and in due course the centralist and absolutist aspirations of that dynasty were
increasingly felt in Silesia.
Some of the Silesian rulers like the Piast dukes of Brzeg-Legnica did,
however, resist these aspirations. The strong economic and cultural links
between Silesia and the other Polish lands were still maintained. Although the
urban patricians and the majority of higher clergy and gentry yielded to the
growing pressure of germanization, the peasants as well as the plebeian
elements in the Silesian towns, especially in Wroclaw, remained Polish. Much
weaker were the Commonwealth’s ties with Western Pomerania which had
recognized the suzerainty of the Emperor as early as 1521. Since the middle
of the sixteenth century in particular, the economic links of Western Pom-
erania with Poland weakened and the victory of the Reformation brought
that country closer to the German Empire in religion and culture.
The increasing Germanization and the consequent decline of the economic
and cultural ties of Silesia and Western Pomerania with Poland were the
outcome of the Commonwealth’s growing political involvement in the East.
The Union of Lublin drew the Commonwealth to an increasing extent, into
the conflicts between Muscovy and Lithuania. In addition, the class interests
of the gentry and the magnates compelled them to turn their expansion in the
direction where they could obtain, with relatively little effort, the speediest
and greatest advantages. In fact, at this period of history expansion eastwards
was the policy pursued by practically all European States—from France to
Muscovy, which precisely then, under the leadership of Yermak, was engaged
in the conquest of Siberia.
This commitment did not mean that Russia abandoned her territorial
ambitions in the West. In 1577 Ivan the Terrible invaded and occupied
Livonia up to the Dvina river, with the exception of Reval and Riga. In this
BATORY AND THE GENTRY 169
way Muscovy not only hindered the transit of goods along the Dvina but
presented a direct threat to the Byelorussian lands within the borders of the
Polish Commonwealth, and even to Lithuania proper. The reigning “King
of Livonia”, Magnus, turned for assistance to Batory who started military
operations both in Livonia and Muscovy herself. In the first months of
hostilities the Polish armies recovered the central part of Livonia and seized
the town of Dyneburg. After the victories won by Poland in 1579-1580,
when Polock capitulated and Velikye Luki was captured, Russia appeared to
be ready for concessions. In the course of the 1581 campaign the Polish armies
besieged the impregnable fortress of Pskov. The difficulties encountered during
the siege however induced Batory to make certain concessions and to abandon
the idea of further conquests. The King accepted the plea of the Tsar’s envoys
for a truce which was supported by the Holy See’s diplomacy. A ten years’
truce was finally concluded in Yam Zapolsky in January 1582. Under its
terms Muscovy surrendered the area of Polock and withdrew her troops from
the Livonian fortresses. Poland, for her part, returned the territories seized
during the war. Notwithstanding these successes Batory did not abandon his
plans first to subjugate Russia, and, afterwards, to strike, in alliance with
other countries, at Turkey and thus to free the Hungarian lands from the
domination of the Ottoman Empire. The death of the King (1586) interrupted
the preparations for a new war against Muscovy.
BATORY AND THE GENTRY
ad
Batory’s death was met with relief among a large part of the gentry. They
looked with apprehension at the King’s attempts to consolidate his power and
imputed to him absolutist tendencies of which the sign was to be the execution
of a magnate, Samuel Zborowski, accused of high treason. The gentry, very
expertly incited by some magnates, viewed this step as the first attempt to
restrict their own liberties, forgetful that the same monarch granted them the
separate jurisdiction for which they have long fought. The disintegration of
the “execution-of-the-law” party went together with the rise of a new
opposition to whom political trouble and the sowing of discord was the
supreme purpose of activity. This opposition included members of the Catholic
gentry, such as Stanistaw Czarnkowski, as well as dissenters, like Jakub
Niemojewski, a Calvinist, and Mikotaj Kazimirski, an Arian. The latter were
prompted to opposition by the King’s policy towards religion which was
unequivocally pro-Catholic and favoured the Jesuits who were then generally
disliked.
The attacks on the King were at the same time directed against his closest
collaborator, his alterrex, the Grand Chancellor of the Crown, Jan Zamoyski.
Thanks to his own abilities and the support of King Stephen this highly
educated humanist and shrewd politician climbed quickly to the top of the _
170 POLAND'S “GOLDEN AGE" (1492-1586)
ladder of State, not forgetting, in the meantime, his own personal advantage.
Possessing only a few villages at the outset of his remarkable career, he
became the owner of huge estates extending over an area of 6400 sq.km and
the tenant of vast royal estates. Jan Zamoyski was the typical example of the
new nobility which, taking the place of the old impoverished and moribund
aristocracy, was gradually assuming power in the country.
The presence of Hungarian courtiers at the court of King Batory was the
source of irritation to a growing national consciousness. They were accused of
accumulating riches and aspiring to posts of eminence at the expense of the
old Polish families. The King’s cooperation with the Seym also did not run
smoothly, although he somehow managed to induce the Seym to provide him,
however reluctantly, with funds necessary for the conduct of the wars. On
other questions, however, there was a mounting discord between the gentry
and the royal court. Even Batory’s military policy did not escape criticism,
not so much on account of objection to the wars of conquest, because in those
days few people were concerned with such subtleties, but rather because it was
correctly assumed that, prior to any engagement in the East, the Prussian
problem should be finally solved. Already at this stage the gentry’s unwilling-
ness to become involved in a military effort was apparent. That attitude
stemmed not so much from a pacifist frame of mind as from a quietist
reluctance to any armed conflict unless it guaranteed immediate material gains.
The transformation of former knights into opulent gentlemen-farmers thriving
on the grain trade was becoming a fact of life.
The reign of Batory did not bring any radical reforms which could, in the
future, prevent the emergence of an omnipotent oligarchy, whose opposition
to the King was to exert an ever stronger influence on the country’s affairs.
Assuming the posture of defending the nobles whose privileges were threatened
by absolutism, the magnates skilfully exploited the gains of the gentry with
the view to consolidating their own position. The principle of unanimity in
the Seym, the election of the kings by the rank and file of the gentry (viritim)
and the limitation of royal power by the Henrician Articles were all to
become important weapons in the hands of the magnates in their bid for
power.
HUMANISM IN POLAND
The period from the close of the fifteenth century to the end of the reign of
Stephen Batory (1586) was the era of the Renaissance. The death of Casimir
IV (1492) coincided in time with the discovery of America, which is generally
accepted as the beginning of modern times.
Humanism did not emerge in Poland suddenly like a deus ex machina but
was, in a way, a continuation of trends prevailing in Polish intellectual life
and existing independently of foreign influences. It only multiplied and gave
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL CULTURE 171
a powerful boost to the pre-humanistic undercurrents which had already
existed in philosophy and historiography. Although at first humanism left
a foreign, cosmopolitan imprint on many spheres of intellectual activity like
poetry and architecture, it successfully merged with the local ‘material and
spiritual culture to give a highly original and specific mould to the Polish
Renaissance. The refined character of the Italian Renaissance, which was
brought to Poland either indirectly, through Hungary, or directly, was fully
compatible with the aspirations of the royal court, the magnates, the gentry
and even those of the wealthier burghers.
To the court of the Sigismunds, and especially to Queen Bona, the Italian
example acted as a stimulus to centralize the authority of the State and to
consolidate the power of the Crown at the expense of the privileges of the
magnates and the gentry. The latter found in humanism a confirmation and
an approval of their pre-eminent position. The study of the golden period of
the Roman Empire inclined them to make certain comparisons and associations,
so much the pleasanter that they enabled them to trace the origin of their class
to ancient times. The flourishing of the Renaissance moreover coincided with
the political and social advancement of the gentry.
The wealthy burghers, too, although lacking serious political aspirations,
made full use of the achievements of humanistic culture. The more enterprising
members of that estate used their wealth and influence to buy their way into
the ranks of the gentry. Other representatives of the urban patricians saw in
humanism, like many nobles and members of the clergy, a perfect means of
making life more pleasant by acquiring new customs and habits attractive in
form and content, and for displaying a growing interest in literature and
works of art. Only a few of the burghers, such as Biernat of Lublin or
Andrzej Frycz-Modrzewski, linked humanism with social protest and the
striving to improve existing social relations. This reforming trend, however,
was not limited exclusively to secular life ; voices were raised for introducing
changes also in the Church. The advocates of a radical transformation of the
Church often shifted their loyalty to new religious organizations, hostile to
the Holy See. In this way certain links were formed between humanism and
the Reformation despite their opposing views on numerous issues.
Though the fixing of the exact period of Polish humanism could be
a matter of discussion its beginnings, for example, had often been placed too
early. The indisputable fact was that in its wake it brought fresh cultural
values.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL CULTURE
Humanism stimulated a deep interest in ancient history, cultures and
languages, especially Latin, but, at the same time, it greatly enhanced the
development of a Polish national culture. The knowledge of the contemporary
172 POLAND'S “GOLDEN AGE”’ (1492-1586)
man was extended not only by the discoveries of new lands and continents
but was also affected by a mounting interest in the history and geography
of his own country. The growing appreciation of the beauty of classical Latin
was accomp4nied by the simultaneous process of ousting it from usage in
many fields of life and supplanting it increasingly with the Polish language
which was rapidly gaining ground. Polish came to be widely used in connex-
ion with objects of everyday use such as names of tools, implements, and
clothing. This period saw also the first drafts of legal documents, including
constitutional laws adopted by the Seym in Polish. The decisions of the
Cracow Seym of 1543 were the first legal publication in Polish. In that same
year, 1543, the King decreed that documents of the courts of law, summons
and verdicts, could be issued in Polish. Difficulties in introducing the Polish
language were, however, encountered in those fields in which there was no
adequate Polish terminology, which applied particularly to learning, especially
philosophy, as well as to natural sciences and to political and social concepts.
The advent of the Reformation helped to introduce the Polish language to
theological subjects. Despite the opposition of the Catholics, the Polish
language was gradually replacing the formerly predominant Latin, its usage
extending from Psalters to the conduct of highly involved dogmatic disputes.
A new type of religious literature came into being which in a comprehensive
and easily accessible form of writing expounded the position and views of
the author and attacked the set of dogmas presented by the opponent. From
the adherents of the Protestant faith the first Polish translation of the Bible
of 1552 and 1563 came, as well as the first Polish grammar by Piotr Statorius,
the first edition of a Latin-Polish dictionary by Jan Maczynski and, finally,
the prototype of a national anthem written by Andrzej Trzecieski in the form
of an anthem for the King and the Commonwealth. For the first time also,
thanks to Lukasz Gérnicki, the notion of “my country” as understood today
came into usage.
This was one of the features of the developing Polish national conscious-
ness. Though still uncertain and varyingly understood on account of the
differences in comprehending the meaning of gens and natio, the concept of
a Polish nation came to personify not so much a territorial community, as
the common origin and birth, and, in many instances, also the common
language of the people. The Renaissance idea of a nation, as reflected, for
example, in the works of Frycz-Modrzewski, included as an integral part also
the peasants whose sons were at that time admitted even to Cracow
University.
The deepening and increasingly extending feeling of national conscious-
ness, disseminated by literature (historiography and belles-lettres) had an
influence in the Crown itself on that strata of the German patricians who had
hitherto preserved a different language and different customs. Thus the six-
teenth century brought about the final Polonization of the urban population in
the Commonwealth. The second half of that century witnessed the victorious
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL CULTURE 173
march of Polish culture to the vast expanses of Lithuania and Ruthenia. The
granting to the local gentry of rights and privileges identical with those
enjoyed by their counterparts in the Crown and the resulting adoption of
Polish customs and way of life, brought in its wake the growing acceptance
of the Polish language as more cultured and better suited to the requirements
of the current political and intellectual life. The process of Polonization
embraced also, at that time, the gentry of Royal Prussia. The identity of class
interests as well as of social position was bound to lead, sooner or later, to the
creation of a national unity of culture and customs.
The ethnically diverse State, split into supporters of Catholicism, the
Orthodox Church and the Reformation, was to become united on the basis of
the common origin of its people, allegedly descended from the ancient
Sarmatians (inhabitants of the proto-Slavonic lands), according to the new
chroniclers, Macie} Miechowita, Marcin Bielski and Marcin Kromer. The
conception of the Commonwealth for this reason was often identified with that
of Sarmatia whose eastern borders were supposed to have coincided exactly
with those of the united Polish-Lithuanian State. This Sarmatian myth played,
at the time of Sigismund Augustus, a completely different role from that in
later periods when it served to set the gentry in opposition to the rest of the
nation. The flourishing historiography of the Polish Renaissance became
a great school of patriotism disseminating the feeling of love for the country
and respect for the nation’s past history. According to the historians (Bielski,
Kromer and Bernard Wapowski), the past and the present, were linked by the
memory of the life and history of the bygone generations.
A similar process could be observed in literature. The forms of its artistic
expression were becoming ever richer, its horizons broadened and there grew
the feeling of the responsibility of the writer and his involvement in the
country’s affairs. The language, still somewhat clumsy and primitive in the
writings of Biernat of Lublin, was improved and enriched by Mikotaj Rej
to reach perfection in the works of Jan Kochanowski. The popularization in
Poland, during the 1520’s, of the Roman type, which was taking the place of
the Gothic type used before, was of considerable significance for the develop-
ment of literature. This much clearer, easier and readable way of writing
owed its popularity to Italian printers who had spread knowledge of it north
of the Alps.
The period of the Renaissance in Poland witnessed a rapid growth of
printing shops where belles-lettres and learned books were printed in hundreds
of copies. The main printing centre was Cracow where such well known
printing houses existed as those of Florian Ungler, Hieronim Wietor and
Maciej and Marek Szarftenbergs. Printing offices were founded also in smaller
localities, like Lustawice, Pinczéw, BrzeS¢ Litewski, NieSwiez and elsewhere,
playing 4n important part in the current political and religious conflicts. The
printers boldly advanced the cause of the Polish language often drawing
attention in the prefaces to the books they published, as did, for example,
174 POLAND'S ‘GOLDEN AGE” (1492-1586)
F. Ungler, to the importance of the national language and the need to
work on it.
Slowly and timidly the Polish language found its way to the schools also,
though only at secondary level. As in other universities it was not accepted by
Cracow University which, by the second half of the sixteenth century, was
on the decline. On the other hand Polish was introduced into the curricula
of the Protestant schools, above all into the Academy founded by Calvinists
in Pinczéw and the Lutheran schools in Gdansk, Torun and Elblag. Some
Catholic secondary schools soon followed suit like St. Mary’s school in
Cracow.
Education during the Renaissance period was strongly influenced by the
ideas of humanism particularly in the Protestant schools. The followers of
that faith waged a bitter struggle against scholasticism which prevailed,
among others, in Cracow University. The interests of the entire Renaissance
culture centred not only on the country conceived as a community of men,
but also around man himself, his joys and sorrows, his thoughts and aspira-
tions, his days of leisure and days of work. Jan Kochanowski did not hesitate
to devote his Treny (Threnodies) to the sorrow of a father mourning the death
of his child : Mikoltaj Rej praised in his works the pleasures of the life of an
average nobleman : Klemens Janicki wrote about the light and shade in the
life of a poet who sought the favours of a mighty patron. Architecture which
hitherto had been preoccupied with the erection of monumental edifices to the
greater glory of God limited its interest to the building of chapels and
reconstructing existing churches. Instead it showed a growing concern for
decorating and beautifying mansions, castles, town halls and other public
buildings. The reconstruction of the royal Wawel castle, begun by the
Florentine della Lora was continued by Bartolomeo Berrecci. The result was
a mixture of the Italian style with that arising from local requirements and
conditions. In 1516-1517 the Sigismund chapel was completed on the Wawel
hill. Formally a religious shrine, it was in fact a mausoleum extolling the
king’s greatness and power. There, too, the frivolous spirit of the Renaissance
marked its presence in the rather suggestive grotesque decorations placed on
the upper coffers, invisible to the faithful.
The example of the court was followed by the wealthy burghers. In many
towns like Sandomierz, Chetmno, Tarnéw, Biecz, and Poznan the old Gothic
town halls were rebuilt in the Renaissance style or new ones erected. The same
style prevailed in the newly built houses of the urban patricians and the
manors of the wealthier gentry and magnates, like the palaces of the Boners
in Ogrodzieniec, the Szydlowieckis in Szydtowiec and Chmielow, the Te-
czynskis in Teczyn, the Tarnowskis in Tarnéw and the Kmitas in Wisnicz. The
style of Polish Renaissance castle, modelled on the Wawel, was represented
by the stately homes in Pieskowa Skala, Niepotomice and Barandéw. ‘The Sig-
ismund chapel influenced the construction of similar mausoleums enhancing
the prestige of the founder ; e.g. the Bishop Noskowski chapel in the Pultusk
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL CULTURE 175
collegiate church, or the chapel of the Myszkowski family in the Dominican
church in Cracow.
Apart from the Wawel, numerous palaces of the aristocracy became centres
of Renaisance culture. Some of the prelates, too, like the Bishops Lubranski,
Padniewski and Krzycki took their part in patronizing and fostering the arts.
Sculptures and paintings thriving under Italian influence, were used ex-
tensively to decorate the residences. They represented the realistic trend in
which man and the flora and fauna about him were the centre of interest.
The sitter’s attire was carefully reproduced and in much detail ; the gloves
of Jan Kochanowski carved in stone on his tomb in Zwolen were an example
of the case in point. The painters more and often took as the subject of
their works the representation of well known personages of the time rather
than the images of the Saints. The sculptures, even if they were intended
to be placed in a church, were concerned rather with presenting, in marble
or in alabaster, the greatness of the deceased than with praising the glory of
the Creator.
All this expressed the protest which in Poland, too, was beginning to
emerge in the minds of the people of the Renaisance against the stringent
control of their views, opinions and way of life by the Church in the name
of religion. The bitter religious conflicts, during which Catholics and dissenters
insulted and denounced each other, evoked among some representatives of the
Polish intellectual elite, like Jan Zambocki, a courtier of King Sigismund I,
and others, a feeling of despondency and scepticism towards all authority.
They sought support for their views in the various branches of learning.
The first to speak out against theology was astronomy. Copernicus’ discovery
not only destroyed the established belief that the sun revolved around the
earth but also undermined the authority of the commentators on the Holy
Scripture, who from its texts deduced their theory on the immovability of our
planet. The Copernican heliocentric system was of tremendous significance
for the development of the modern natural sciences. Based on a scientific
attitude to the world it maintained that the fundamental criterion of truth
was the compatibility of theory with practice and not with statements of
ancient scholars. The banning, in 1616, of Copernicus’ work De revolutionibus
orbium coelestium, first published in 1543, by the ecclestiastical authorities,
could not stop the triumphant march forward of his great discovery whose
ardent supporters like Jan Brozek held chairs in Cracow University in the
seventeenth century.
Historical writers of the Renaissance, too, endeavoured to establish laws
governing history instead of attributing its course as had been hitherto
maintained, to the direct interference of Providence. Lawyers were questioning
the supremacy of the Church over the State. Polish jurists of the Renaissance
period, like Andrzej Frycz-Modrzewski or Jakub Przytuski, advocated the
full sovereignty of the Commonwealth in its relations with the Holy See.
In geographical writings names appeared of lands and peoples, which Holy
176 POLAND’S “GOLDEN AGE” (1492-1586)
Scripture did not mention at all. Even in literature, in the works of Jan
Kochanowski, Mikolaj Sep-Szarzyntski and Szymon Szymonowic, the names
of ancient gods and goddesses were used instead of those of the Saints which,
in the prevailing climate of opinion, signified something more than mere
classical reminiscences. Equally noteworthy was the lay character of the
foreign policy pursued by the last Jagiellons who maintained friendly relations
with Lutheran Prussia and Mohammedan Turkey and firmly opposed the
Papacy as long as it supported the Teutonic Order. Signs of religious
indifference apparent during the Renaissance should not, of course, be
overestimated. How weak and superficial they actually were, was proved by
the rapid progress of the Counter-Reformation. The beginnings of the process
of secularization of cultural life was to last for many centuries.
RENAISSANCE CULTURE AND LIFE
An essential feature of Renaissance culture was its close concern with everyday
life and its involvement in the contemporary struggle for shaping a new
political, cultural and religious face of the community and the state. Polemical
literature was naturally engaged in that struggle. Any literary work of that
period, beginning with Mikolaj Rej’s Krétka rozprawa miedzy trzema osoba-
mi: panem, wojtem i plebanem (Short Discourse Between Three Persons :
the Nobleman, the Bailiff and the Parson), filled with allusions and innuendos,
and ending with Jan Kochanowski’s Odprawa postow greckich (The Dismissal
of Greek Envoys), the first Polish political drama, show how strongly con-
temporary literature was linked with the developments of the day. The same
applied to the fine arts and to learning. Copernicus was an astronomer
and mathematician but—when the necessity arose—he applied his knowledge
of engineering in the defense of Olsztyn castle against the Teutonic Knights.
Geography served the needs of the country as well as the developing of
trade. An important publication was the first modern geographical outline
of the east European countries, written by Maciej Miechowita (Tractatus
de duabus Sarmatiae, 1517). This was for many long years the chief source
of information for the West about eastern Europe. An important achieve-
ment of Polish cartography was a great map of Poland made in 1526, by
Bernard Wapowski on a scale of 1:1,000,000. Andrzej Frycz-Modrzewski
postulated in his work De Republica Emendanda the rebuilding of the State
in a spirit of greater social justice. He advocated not only religious reforms
and the establishment of a national Church, but took a stand in the defense
of the peasants against the growing burdens of serfdom, spoke for the rights
of the townspeople and for equality before the law of all classes in criminal
cases. He demanded as well the strengthening of the royal powers, the
streamlining of State administration and the improvement of the country’s
defenses. His work was based on a modern conception of the State as a sec-
RENAISSANCE CULTURE AND LIFE 177
Jan Kochanowski. Tombstone at Zwolen, 1584
ular organization, independent of, and superior to social classes and main-
taining the balance between them. The novelty of the ideas propounded by
Frycz-Modrzewski lay in the demand for extending the scope of the State’s
functions among which he also included ecclesiastical and educational affairs.
The fact that Modrzewski’s works were translated into German, Spanish,
Italian and Russian clearly indicated that the ideas which he set forth were
of topical and general importance far beyond the borders of a single country.
Every nation embarking upon the path of modern development could find
there advice and instruction. On the other hand many of his utopian ideas
have not been put to the practical test either in Poland or in any other
country.
12 History of Poland
178 POLAND'S “GOLDEN AGE” (1492-1586)
sala caei ce ean socal Se aaancba cs TT ade st aitvbiae Day bowers banat el uoNs
T. Treterus, Disputation of Cardinal Hozjusz with Protestants, 16th cent.
It would be highly unjust to the Polish Renaissance to limit its achieve-
ments, as is often attempted, to the activities of those three intellectual giants :
Copernicus, Frycz-Modrzewski and Kochanowski. Side by side with them
there existed a galaxy of lesser creative intellects and they themselves often
drew upon the achievements of their direct predecessors. The essential
feature of the Renaissance was the scope and range of this cultural trans-
formation. The number of copies of learned books which were then published
on average in editions of 500-600 was symbolic for those times. Young
RENAISSANCE CULTURE AND LIFE 179
people travelled in great numbers to foreign universities, predominantly
Italian (Padua, Bologna), German (Wittenberg, Leipzig, K6nigsberg) and
Swiss (Basel). The ranks of educated people grew steadily and in the course
of the fifteenth century the number of parish schools more than doubled,
from 253 to 650.
Cultural life was concentrated in the big towns with which the educated
gentry had regular contacts. Small mansions were built by the gentry in the
suburbs of Cracow and Lublin, (among others by Mikolaj Rej), where they
used to spend their leisure time in pleasant company. This cultural life had
not yet succumbed to rustic torpor and even smaller towns flourished under
the rule of dissenting nobles. Printing houses were opened in such remote,
parochial localities as Pinczow, Rakéw, Baranédw and Wegrdow. Writers
and scholars converged on them to hold disputes and polemics on religious
questions and the echo of these debates resounded all over Europe.
Thanks to the general use of Latin as the language of scholars, Polish
thought and ideas spread and penetrated to the West, where the works of
Modrzewski were widely read and commented upon with admiration. The
treatises by Kromer and Hosius, directed against the dissenters were trans-
lated into many languages. The great discovery of Copernicus evoked lively
discussions as well as strong opposition. The books by Miechowita and the
popular sketches by Kromer (Polonia) extended knowledge of Poland among
foreign readers. The arrival of Italians with Bona Sforza, of Frenchmen with
Henry of Valois and of Hungarians with Batory enabled the average squire,
who had never travelled abroad, to acquaint himself with the ways of these
foreign visitors and to compare it with his own mos polonicum.
On the whole, the foreigners did not meet with an enthusiastic reception
from the gentry. Their intellectual acumen and the manner in which they
managed to acquire wealth and rank were a source of irritation to the average
gentry. At the same time, however, there was only little evidence of a feeling
among the gentry that because of their own superiority they had nothing
to learn from other nations. National megalomania and xenophobia, which
in later times were to poison the mind of the average nobleman, were not
prevalent in his thinking though certain manifestations of these feelings
were already apparent. The gentry were still tolerant towards other religious
denominations, their way of life and political opinions. That tolerance stem-
med partly from an attitude of indifference towards everything that had no
direct bearing on the interests of their class, but in the final account never-
theless it was certainly propitious for the further promotion of cultural
development. The scope of Poland’s cultural life in the sixteenth century
compared very favourably with similar developments in France or England
and was undoubtedly much more extensive than in the immediately contigu-
ous territories of eastern Germany and Western Pomerania which, at that
time, were clearly passing through a period of cultural decline.
12*
Chapter VIII
THE COMMONWEALTH
AT THE TURNING POINT
(1586-1648)
THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER
The Commonwealth of this time still drew upon the splendid traditions of
the Renaissance and even seemed to continue them, conducting an expan-
sionist foreign policy and extending the country’s dominions. Thanks to the
conquests in the East, confirmed by the peace treaty of Polanowo in 1643,
it grew from 815,000 sq.km in 1569 to almost a million (990,000 sq.km).
Of this, the area of compact Polish settlement comprised 180,000 sq.km and
the Poles constitued about 40 per cent of the more than 10 million people
who inhabited the Commonwealth in the first half of the seventeenth century.
The dilemma which then faced the kings of the Vasa dynasty at the time
of the Thirty Years’ War could be summarized as follows : either friendship
with the Hapsburgs and the concentration of Polish interests in the East with
a view to consolidating and extending the conquests there, or an alliance with
the French-Protestant grouping and an active policy in the West with the
hope of regaining Silesia and Pomerania. The former line of policy was sup-
ported by Sigismund III ; attempts to pursue the latter were made, though
not very consistently, by his son Wladyslaw IV. They both came from
Sweden and thus both cherished the hope of regaining, through Poland,
the Swedish crown which was due to them in succession to Sigismund’s
father, John III.
The dynastic plans of the Vasas, however, miscalculated. The magnates,
whose influence in Poland’s political life was increasing regarded with ap-
prehension any move in the country’s foreign policy which seemed to involve
excessive risk (and expenditure). In this attitude they had the backing of the
gentry whose distrust of the monarch was coupled with a quietist content-
ment with the prevailing state of affairs. Hence already in the first half of
the seventeenth century the central problem of the country’s internal policy
became the question of constitutional reform to strengthen the executive.
Steps in that direction were taken by Sigismund III and continued by
Wladyslaw IV with the support of the leading circles of the Counter-Refor-
THE POLITICAL CRISIS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 181
mation. But all these attempts met with the unsurmountable opposition of
the gentry who regarded any improvement in the machinery of State as the
beginning of absolute rule.
The King, on the other hand, had hardly anybody to rely upon in his
struggle for a consolidation of his authority. The towns, whose position in
the Commonwealth was still rather weak, could not be counted on, while
the Church in the seventeenth century refused to give support to the throne.
The King sought to rally around him a part of the magnates upon whom he
bestowed favours, but even they eventually found a common language with
the anti-royalist nobles on the basis of common interests. This became clearly
evident during the final stages of Mikotaj Zebrzydowski’s rebellion and also
found expression in the outcome of plans for a war against Turkey.
The reforming aspirations of the Court induced the magnates to seek
a further weakening of the administration. The gradual restriction of the
royal prerogative was coupled with the growth of the privileges of the great
nobles, especially the magnates of the eastern marches, who had at their
disposal their own armed forces, great wealth and numerous clients among
the dependent local gentry. Thus, the individual magnates had everything
that the reigning monarch was refused—abundant financial resources, a strong
army and the support of a political party. They began also to exert a growing
influence on the courts of justice which, at least nominally, were still in the
hands of the gentry. Yet the verdicts of the courts could not be executed
without the requisite force and the State was in no position to supply that
force. The necessity therefore arose for the assistance of the magnates’ own
troops. Already at the beginning of the seventeenth century, individual
magnates’ families were engaged in private wars against one another, devasta-
ting the country and devouring its resources.
THE POLITICAL CRISIS OF THE COMMONWEALTH
After the death of Stephen Batory, the Hapsburgs, for the third time, made
a bid for the Polish crown. Through the efforts of Jan Zamoyski, the throne
was, however, given to Sigismund Vasa, the nephew of Sigismund Augustus,
but the anti-Batory opposition, led by the Zborowski family and hostile to
Zamoyski, proclaimed the Archduke Maximilian King of Poland. The Arch-
duke crossed the Polish frontier at the head of an army. Defeated by Za-
moyski at Byczyna in 1587, Maximilian was taken prisoner. Yet, the new
King did not display the gratitude which Zamoyski had hoped for. The
Swedish prince felt himself dominated by the personality of the Chancellor
who sought to hold power, as during the reign of Batory, at the side of the
young monarch. Their political plans also diverged. Sigismund III was despite
everything, favourably inclined towards the Hapsburg whom Zamoyski, in
Genealogy of the Jagiellons and the Vasas
(The table includes only the most important members of the dynasties)
Giedymin, c. 1275-1341
Olgierd, ?-1377 Kiejstut, 1297-1382
|
1
Wiadyslaw Jagiello, c. 1351-1434; Witold, 1350-1430
first wife Jadwiga d'Anjou,
c. 1374-1399
Wiadyslaw II] of Warna, 1424-1444 Casimir IV, 1427-1492
{
+
Wladyslaw, John I Albert, Mes I, Sigismund I the Old,
King of Bohemia 1459-1501 1461-1506 1467-1548;
and Hungary, second wife Bona
1456-1516 Sforza, 1494-1557
+
. ’ +
Louis II, Isabella, Sigismund II Anne, Catherine,
King of Bohemia 1519-1559; Augustus, 1523-1596; 1526-1583;
and Hungary, husband John 1520-1572; husband husband John
1506-1526 Zapolya, King second wife Stephen Batory, III Vasa,
of Hungary, Barbara King of Poland King of Sweden,
1487-1540 Radziwill, 1533-1586 1537-1592
1520-1551 |
Re ok,
_t L
Sigismund III Anne Vasa,
Vasa, 1566-1632 1568-1625
t
+
Wiadystaw IV, John Casimir,
1595-1648; 1609-1672;
second wife wife
Marie-Louise Marie-Louise
Gonzague Gonzague
de Nevers, de Nevers,
1611~1667 widow
of Wladyslaw IV,
1611-1667
THE POLITICAL CRISIS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 183
turn, hated so much that he was even said to be prepared to enlist the support
of the Turks against them. When the old feud between the Zamoyskis and
the Zborowskis flared up, the Commonwealth, soon after the election of the
new King, became entangled in a serious political crisis.
The crisis was further deepened by the news of the behind-the-scenes
dynastic bargaining between the new King and the Hapsburgs. In return
for renouncing the Polish throne, Archduke Ernest promised Sigismund ITI
substantial material benefits. The political differences were also accompanied
by growing religious conflicts. The new ruler soon came under the influence
of the Jesuits and opposed the strengthening of the provisions of the Con-
federation of Warsaw, by a constitutional law, under which those who vio-
lated religious peace in the towns would be liable to severe punishment. The
dissenters, offended and shocked by this attitude began to draw closer to the
Opposition represented by Zamoyski’s party which advocated religious toler-
ation.
The ranks of the opposition were soon swelled by another religious group,
the Orthodox. So far they had not been discriminated against because of
their creed, nor were they coerced into accepting the Catholic rite. That
situation changed, however, by the end of the sixteenth century when the
Papal Curia in its desire to recover the losses sustained as a result of the
Reformation, renewed its centuries old plans to bring about a union of the
Greek Orthodox and Catholic Churches.
These plans also suited the Polish government which saw in religious
unity the means of ensuring political unity in a vast state where so many
different languages were spoken. This prompted the acceptance by the synods
in Brze$¢ held in 1595 and 1596, of a union which subordinated the Orthodox
Church in the Commonwealth to the jurisdiction of Rome. It soon became
evident, however, that the supporters of a union were in the minority. It was
rejected by the peasants and the burghers for whom the old faith was an
important element of their distinct national identity. Many of the Russian
gentry as well as some of the magnates led by Prince Konstanty Ostrogski,
also rejected the imposed union and joined the ranks of opposition to the
King.
Meanwhile the King’s relations with the gentry were steadily deteriorat-
ing as a result of his increasing involvement in the affairs of Sweden, the
throne of which he formally acceded to after the death of his father John III
(in 1592). His ill-timed military expedition against Sweden in 1598 ended
in defeat. In keeping with the terms of the pacta conventa the King ceded
Estonia, which belonged to Sweden, to the Commonwealth thus involving
Poland in a new war over Livonia. The erisuing hostilities, in the course of
which the Polish army, commanded by Hetman Jan Chodkiewicz, gained
a resounding victory over the Swedes at Kircholm in 1605, had to be
temporarily suspended because of the developments in the East.
The internal weakness of Russia, where Boris Godunov succeeded to the
184 THE COMMONWEALTH AT THE TURNING POINT (1586-1648)
throne of the Tsars despite the resistance of the boyars, invited direct inter-
vention by her neighbours, Poland and Sweden. A pretext for intervention
was conveniently found in the appearance of an adventurer, said to be
Gregory Otrepiev, a Russian monk who escaped to Poland claiming that he
was the son of Ivan the Terrible, miraculously saved from the hands of Boris
Godunov’s henchmen. He enlisted the support of the magnates, in particu-
lar of the Wisniowieckis and Jerzy Mniszech whose daughter he promised to
marry upon his “return” to the throne.
The False Demetrius also found support among the court party including
the King himself. Sigismund III, who was looking everywhere and at any
price for allies in his struggle for the Swedish throne, hoped that he would
find one in Russia under a new ruler. The clergy, particularly the Jesuits,
saw in the person of the new Tsar the expectation of bringing Orthodox
Russia within the fold of the Roman Church. All these hopes and aspirations
were based on the promises which the power hungry Otrepiev lavishly gave
to all and sundry. He adopted the Catholic faith, though, for the time being,
he preferred to conceal this fact. An expedition against Russia met with
the opposition of the local diets, who were critical of a foreign policy pursued
by the unpopular monarch.
In autumn 1604, the False Demetrius with a several thousand strong
army supplied and equipped by the Polish magnates crossed into Russia.
Defeated on the line of march he would probably have perished, had it not
been for the sudden death of Godunov which opened for him the road to
the throne of the Tsars. Supported by the peasantry, the Cossacks and the
boyars who despised the deceased ruler, Demetrius was crowned Tsar of All
the Russias in 1605 and shortly afterwards married Maryna Mniszech, but
his pro-Catholic leanings, his preference for Poles as well as his dissipation
was bound to evoke mistrust towards him.
That mistrust was soon transformed into open hatred which led to the
outbreak of a popular uprising in Muscovy in May 1606. Demetrius was
murdered, the Polish garrison stationed in the Kremlin massacred and those
who survived were thrown into dungeons. The boyars then proclaimed one
of their own members, Vasili Shuiski, Tsar.
THE ZEBRZYDOWSKI REBELLION
In Poland all these events resulted not so much in a wave of Russophobia
as in a growing resentment towards the already despised King who had
involved the country in an unnecessary and bloody adventure in the East.
The gentry’s dislike of Sigismund was caused by all manner of grievances
both great and small. They were irritated by his secret dealings with the
Hapsburgs as well as by the presence of foreigners at the court, by his fond-
THE ZEBRZYDOWSKI REBELLION 185
ness of ball games and by the “incestuous”, as they alleged, second marriage
with the sister of his deceased wife. Yet undoubtedly the King’s attempts
to increase his powers were most feared. He was accused of absolutist tend-
encies in which he was supported by the court camarilla consisting of a group
of loyal magnates led by Zygmunt Myszkowski and Andrzej Bobola, and
some of the bishops. The programme of that party, unambiguously ex-
pounded in the books of Krzysztof Warszewicki and in Father Piotr Skarga’s
sermons, could well arouse anxiety among the gentry. What if the King’s
own preacher openly called for the abolition of most of the gentry’s privi-
leges, above all of neminem captivabimus, and for the reduction of the
Chamber of Deputies to the status of mere advisory body ?
The reasons which led the gentry into opposition were manifold. Though
their avowed leader was Mikolaj Zebrzydowski, a zealous Catholic and
a devoted friend of Jesuits, he succeeded in rallying around him adherents
of the Orthodox Church as well as prominent dissenters. The Zebrzydowski or
Sandomierz rebellion, so called after the town of Sandomierz which was the
main centre of the movement, lasted for almost three years (1606-1609) and
had a considerable influence upon the future course of the Commonwealth’s
history. Many words were then written by both sides, even more were angrily
exchanged at meetings at Lublin, Sandomierz, Jedrzejow and Wislica. Every-
body spoke only of the welfare of the Commonwealth, but that welfare
was conceived quite differently by the two contending parties.
The royalists defended the domestic and foreign policy of the Court.
The opposition demanded further limitation of the royal prerogative. It
wanted to deprive the King of the right to appoint state officials, strove to in-
troduce a system of elective local officials, to pledge the deputies to obey
instructions strictly given them by the local diet and finally to expel foreign
Jesuits, the spokesmen of religious intolerance and ardent advocates of
absolutism..
Eventually an armed clash took place after many attempts to find
a negotiated solution had ended in failure. In July 1607 the royal armies
routed the main forces of the rebellion at Guzéw. The following year, the
rebels, including Zebrzydowski, their leader, submitted to the King at a Gen-
eral Seym. It would, of course, be wrong to regard this act as a triumph
for Sigismund III, because the rebellion destroyed, for years to come, all
chances of enhancing the royal powers. The middle gentry, too, who were
lured into the rebellion by slogans hostile to the magnates gained nothing by
it. For them it was but a sad epilogue to the long years of struggle for the
execution of the laws.
The sole victors to emerge from the rebellion were the magnates. That
applied equally to those who had rallied to the King as well as to those who
conspired with Zebrzydowski against him. The rebellion ended in a com-
promise by which the leaders of the opposition were assured a lenient treat-
ment. The magnates made full use of the fact that changes in the State’s
186 THE COMMONWEALTH AT THE TURNING POINT (1586-1648)
structure were henceforth rendered impossible. Playing upon the slogan of
Golden Freedom they were gradually taking over the control of the govern-
ment. The efforts of the magnates were clearly understood by the Jesuits,
who not only carefully expurgated from the next editions of Piotr Skarga’s
Sermons all praise of a strong royal authority, but even established censor-
ship of all sermons to avoid anything that might offend the feelings of the
increasingly powerful and watchful lords.
ATTEMPTS TO CHECK RUSSIA
The gentry, with their hopes for success frustrated, were left with an op-
portunity to look for partial compensation at least in the form of booty and
military honour, in the vast expanses of Russia. On this occasion the expe-
dition against that country was no longer a private affair of the magnates
but was undertaken directly by the Polish Commonwealth. After the death
of the first False Demetrius, another appeared claiming, as before, that he
was the Tsar and that once again he had miraculously escaped death. The
fraud was even more obvious than before although earlier Zamoyski already
hinted that the affair was a “Plautus’ comedy”. But few cared now for any
appearances of truth. Thousands of gentry rushed to the aid of the second
False Demetrius to look elsewhere for the income satisfying the ambition
and position which were denied to them in Poland. They sought to gain
by the sword great fortunes in that rich and, to all appearances, defenceless
country. The State on its part welcomed this opportunity of ridding the Com-
monwealth of the many fortune-seeking adventurers, a large number of
whom had been former participants in the Zebrzydowski rebellion. When
Tsar Shuiski concluded a defensive alliance with Sweden, Sigismund III
decided that all courses of action were open to him and advanced into Russia
(1610). In this he was prompted by his own dynastic considerations as well
as by the Pope and the Jesuits who nourished the dreams of converting
Russia.and even Persia to Catholicism.
At the beginning the hostilities were concentrated around the fortress of
Smolensk. The Russian army, together with Swedish contingents, which
marched to relieve the siege, suffered a crushing defeat at Ktuszyn (1610), at
the hands of Hetman Stanislaw Zdtkiewski, who boldly attacked the forces
of the enemy four times larger than his own. This victory proved to be the
turning point of the campaign. The road to Muscovy lay open, Shuiski was
deposed and the boyars were ready to negotiate the election of Prince Wla-
dystaw Vasa to the Russian throne. Sigismund III, however, himself wanted
to be Tsar and, moreover, the question of the Prince accepting the Orthodox
faith (which was the conditio sine qua non for ascending the Russian throne)
was absolutely unacceptable to Polish Court. Negotiations thus dragged on
ATTEMPTS TO CHECK RUSSIA 187
without any hope for a successful outcome, the more so because in Poland’s
political plans the idea of annexation was gradually taking precedence over
that of a personal union. This time, too, the Polish garrison in the Kremlin
did not last long.
In 1612 an insurrection broke out in Muscovy, led by the burgher Kuzma
Minin and Prince Dimitrii Pozharski. After gaining control over Muscovy
a new Tsar was elected (1613). He was the boyar, Michael Romanov, the
founder of the dynasty which was to rule Russia until the end of monarchy
in 1917. Poland’s hopes of any easy conquest had vanished. In order to
maintain hold over its possessions, which included Smolensk, the Common-
wealth was now compelled to resort to a protracted war.
This, however, did not restrain Sigismund III from pursuing his dynastic
plans which by that time had become the idée fixe of his foreign policy. With
his eyes set on conquest in the East, the King, just as Batory before him,
made a disastrous move with regard to the future of Prussia. Following the
death of Joachim Frederick of Hohenzollern, he agreed to the taking over
of the Prussian fief by the electors of Brandenburg. Thus the Polish govern-
ment once again entered the road of fatal compromise which was to lay the
foundations for a powerful Prussian State.
In his attempts to win allies, Sigismund III turned again towards the
Hapsburgs with whom he concluded a treaty (1613) which provided for
political cooperation, covering also a campaign against the Emperor’s rebel-
lious subjects in Bohemia, Silesia and Hungary. In this way Poland took
upon herself a kind of obligation to safeguard the interests of the Hapsburgs
in countries once ruled by the Jagiellons.
All this was done with a view to regaining the Russian throne, this time
for Prince Wladystaw. In 1617 he set out on a conquest of Moscov proclaim-
ing himself the rightful Tsar. To his future subjects he solemnly promised
that he would respect their faith, their rights and privileges, but at the same
time he secretly pledged to his father that he would cede considerable parts
of Russian territory to the Commonwealth. The campaign, in which com-
paratively small Polish forces were engaged, did not bring the expected
success. Attempts to take Muscovy by storm ended in failure and the pros-
pective subjects of Wladyslaw did not show excessive eagerness for a change
of ruler. On the contrary, they regarded Michael Romanov and rightly so,
as a more trustworthy guarantor of the State’s territorial integrity and de-
fender of the Orthodox faith.
In that situation the only favourable outcome of the campaign were
considerable territorial gains by the Polish Commonwealth which included
the regions of Siewierz and Czernihow. These were ceded to Poland under
the terms of a truce with Russia for 14 years concluded in 1618 at Deulino.
Both sides adhered strictly to its provisions and only in 1632 did Russia
make an attempt to recover the lost territories. A Russian army commanded
by boyar Shein laid siege to Smolensk which the Poles, however, had trans-
188 THE COMMONWEALTH AT THE TURNING POINT (1586-1648)
formed in the meantime into a strong fortress. The newly elected King,
Wladyslaw IV, hastened to check the Russian advance and to relieve the
besieged stronghold. His military successes induced Russia to sign in 1634
a peace treaty in Polanowo. Poland retained for ever everything that she
had gained under the Deulino Truce and, in exchange Wladyslaw IV renoun-
ced all his claims to the throne of the Tsars. To make sure that his word
would be kept, the Russian envoys even demanded the return of the docu-
ment of 1610 declaring his election to the Russian throne, and were greatly
dismayed when they learnt that the document in question was lost because
of the disorder prevailing in the royal archives.
THE CONFLICT WITH TURKEY
The situation on the southern borders of the Commonwealth was much less
favourable. A basic tenet of Poland’s policy throughout the entire sixteenth
century was to avoid a direct military engagement with the preponderant
military power of the Ottoman Empire. Cossack forays into the Ottoman
dominions and the Tartar incursions into Poland had repeatedly strained
the relations between the two countries. Nevertheless, by “balancing on the
brink of war” an open military conflict had in some way been avoided. This,
of course, did not mean that Poland was not interested in the countries of
the Danube basin, whether in Hungary, or in Moldavia and Valachia. At
the turn of the sixteenth century Zamoyski had made several attempts to put
on the thrones of these countries candidates who were amicably disposed
towards Poland.
The further history of Polish-Turkish relations was shaped by two fac-
tors, the growing expansion of Turkey which reached practically to the
threshold of the Commonwealth, and the continual incursions of Cossack
forays into Turkish dominions. The Cossacks consisted of former serfs who
had fled to freedom, and of the urban poor who settled in south-eastern
Ukraine, colonizing the so-called Wild Plains, which extended along the
Dnieper, between Polish and Tartar possessions. The Cossacks were organized
in a military brotherhood, with their own authorities and their defensive
stronghold of Sicz on the Dnieper island of Chortyca below the famous
porohy or rapids of the river (hence the name of the region: Zaporozhe).
Already Sigismund Augustus and Stephen Batory had attempted to use the
Cossacks for the defense of the Commonwealth. Some of them had been
enlisted into military service, constituting the “registered Cossacks” (enrolled
in a special register). They were born warriors and adventurers who in search
of loot and booty robbed Turkish galleys and invaded the dominions of
the Ottoman Empire on the Black Sea coast.
Relations between Poland and Turkey had also deteriorated as a result
THE CONFLICT WITH TURKEY 189
of the decision taken by the Court and the King to side with the Hapsburg
bloc. The reasons for that decision were manifold including the Common-
wealth expansion eastward, the dynastic interests of Sigismund III (not to
be identified with the interests of the Polish State) as well as the growing
influence of the Counter-Reformation which more and more often abandoned
political realism in favour of the aspirations of the Pope and the Hapsburgs.
The Hapsburgs gained many important benefits from the alliance whilst it
brought none to Poland. The only result for the Commonwealth was that it
hastened the outbreak of a military clash with Turkey.
The Thirty Years’ War was fought between the Catholic camp repre-
sented by the Hapsburgs, the Holy See and the Catholic League of the
princes in the German Empire and the anti-Hapsburg grouping which con-
sisted of France, the Netherlands and the Protestant union of the German
princes. When an uprising against the Hapsburgs broke out in Bohemia,
Sigismund III, who had been prevented by the opposition of the gentry from
dispatching regular troops to relieve the situation, sent in units, which had
been enrolled by Aleksander Lisowski (hence their name: Lisowski’s men)
during the days of the war against Russia.
These units composed of mercenaries typical of those times, inflicted
severe losses on the army of Bethlen Gabor, Duke of Transylvania, who
being at war with the Hapsburgs, laid siege to Vienna. Because Bethlen
Gabor was a vassal of the Turks, the assistance given to his enemies was
bound to affect Poland’s relations with the Ottoman Empire. To add insult to
injury the Cossacks had invaded and plundered the town of Varna. Faced
with this situation Turkey, where the government had just been taken by the
bellicose Sultan Osman II, renounced the “‘eternal peace” which had been
concluded in 1533 and embarked upon war.
The small! Polish force, under the command of the 70 year old Hetman
Stanistaw Zolkiewski, was routed in the battle of Cecora (1620) and the aged
Hetman, who refused to seek his safety in flight, fell on the battlefield. The
Commonwealth had to prepare for defense against an enemy which stood
at its door. In the search for allies attention turned to the Cossacks. Their
Hetman, Piotr Konaszewicz-Sahajdaczny brought an army of forty thousand
men to the Polish camp at Chocim. In return the King had to close his eyes
to the illegal reconstruction of the Orthodox Church’s hierarchy in Poland.
Since the unfortunate Union of Brze§¢ its opponents now found in the Cos-
sacks staunch defenders of the Orthodox faith. The Cossacks themselves,
apart from their social demands for which they fought against the Polish
Commonwealth under Semen Nalevaiko and Krishtof Kosinski (1595-1596)
now found in the defense against the encroachments of Catholicism an ideo-
logical justification of their uprisings.
The Polish camp at Chocim (1621) resisted every assault of the Turkish
army and, eventually, the Ottoman Empire was ready to start negotiations.
The armistice, which was quickly concluded, came just in time for the Polish
190 THE COMMONWEALTH AT THE TURNING POINT (1586-1648)
army which had only one barrel of gun-powder left in the camp. The peace
treaty restored the position which had existed during the times of the
Jagiellons. The frontier was to run along the Dniestr river ; Chocim was to
remain with Turkey and both sides undertoook to restrain their respective
allies from invading one another’s territories. In practice, however, the treaty
prevented neither Tartar depredations in Poland nor the Cossack piratical
raids to the Black Sea.
The preoccupation of the Commonwealth in the South, and above all, its
inopportune interference in the affairs of Bohemia and Transylvania, weak-
ened its position in the North. The opportunity thus created was seized by
Sweden which launched an attack on Poland from that direction. In the years
1617 and 1621-1622 Poland lost in the hostilities a considerable portion of
Livonia. Encouraged by these successes Sweden next attacked Royal Prussia
and blocked the mouth of the Vistula which was vital for Poland’s economic
interests. The occupation of Royal Prussia was designed to check Polish
attempts to recover Livonia and also to provide Sweden with a convenient
base for an attack on the Catholic princes of the Empire and their Hapsburg
allies thus joining the Thirty Years’ War.
The three year long struggle in Pomerania (1626-1629) was waged with
varying fortune. The Poles scored a victory in the naval battle near Oliwa
(1627) while the Swedes emerged the victors at Gdrzno (1629). The terms
of a six years’ truce signed in Altmark (1629) placed Poland in a highly
disadvantageous position. Sweden retained all the Prussian ports, with the
exclusion of Puck, Gdansk and KGnigsberg, as well as the Livonian territories
up to the Dvina river. Poland was compelled to sign this humiliating treaty
for the additional reason that the gentry refused to support the King’s military
effort though by this time the issue was not his dynastic claims, but the danger
of Poland being cut off from the access to the Baltic Sea.
THE AGRARIAN CRISIS
During the closing years of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth
centuries, rural economy based on manorial farms employing serf labour
continued to expand in Poland. The amount of land owned by the gentry
grew not only by putting under cultivation temporarily abandoned areas, but
also at the expense of peasants who were relegated to inferior or even fallow
lands.
These methods inevitably led to the curtailment of the size of peasant
holdings, as well as to a further social differentiation of the countryside
resulting in a growth in the numbers of the village poor. This influenced the
general standard of living of the rural population and was reflected in the
steady decline of livestock and draft animals. The needs of estate manage-
THE AGRARIAN CRISIS 191
ment induced the gentry to increase the amount of labour dues. Where this,
for varying reasons, was not possible, other peasant obligations towards the
landlord were raised, such as extra labour days during harvesting or haymak-
ing as well as payments in kind. The lord of the manor had moreover the use
of numerous and burdensome monopolies which obliged the peasants to
purchase certain commodities like vodka or beer exclusively in the inns run by
the manor.
The possibilities of judicial action against mounting oppression were
gradually being closed to the peasants on the estates of the landed gentry.
Those who lived on the royal or ecclesiastical estates had the opportunity of
appealing to the referendary courts and to higher Church authorities, though,
as a rule, these took the side of the tenants or estate agents against the
peasants. Yet even when the verdict went in favour of the complaining
villager, there was still a long and arduous road before him before he could
see that justice was done. In this situation the peasants, driven to desperation,
resorted to flight to other estates where they were granted, at least in the
initial period, certain reductions in the amount of labour and rent. The safest
sanctuary was for a time the Ukraine, but it was too far away, especially
for fugitives burdened with a family and possessions however meagre.
Thus, what was left to the overwhelming majority of the peasants, was
the reluctant performance of labour dues (many complaint about their decreas-
ing efficiency were then recorded), and the resort to an armed struggle for
their rights. Though peasant uprisings led by the Cossacks, used to break out
quite frequently in rhe Ukraine during the first half of the seventeenth century,
in Poland proper such events occurred only sporadically. They occurred
chiefly on the royal estates, above all in the Podhale region, where the living
memory of former freedom and the mountaineers’ skill in arms created
favourable conditions for such uprisings in the defense of rights abused by
the willfulness and tyranny of the starostas. In the district of Nowy Targ,
for example, peasant disturbances lasted uninterruptedly for almost ten years
(1624-1633). But apart from that region there were no major peasant riots
and the charges levelled at, for instance, the Polish Arians by the followers of
Counter-Reformation that they strove to incite a repetition in the Common-
wealth of the bloody German events of 1525, were pure demagogy.
The possibility of a flight to the Ukraine helped to relieve the pressure of
peasant resistance in other areas of the Commonwealth. There was likewise
no unity among the serfs in the different regions of the country. The varying
degrees of oppression and the lack of experience in the use of arms deterred
the peasants from taking the course of direct armed action. Furthermore, on
the ethnically Polish lands, the increase in labour and other dues towards the
manor was a lengthy process extending over a couple of generations. In the
Ukraine, on the other hand, the situation developed in quite a different
manner. There in a comparatively short time the peasants were forced to
perform serf labour to which formerly they had not been liable. In the
192 THE COMMONWEALTH AT THE TURNING POINT (1586-1648)
Ukraine, too, the insurgents found a common ideology which the Polish
peasants lacked. That common ideology was expressed in slogans of the
defense of freedom, of the Orthodox faith and of the emerging Ruthenian
national consciousness. The insurgents rose in arms not so much against the
medium sized manor farms of the gentry as against the huge estates which in
the eastern regions of the Commonwealth covered most of the land. Thus, for
example, Vasilii Ostrogski owned some 100 towns and castles while, in Vol-
hynia, 60 per cent of the land belonged to the magnates. This rapid expansion
of the great estates occurred after the Union of Lublin. In the Ukrainian areas
there emerged new magnates’ latifundia like those of the Wisniowieckis,
Ostrogskis or Koniecpolskis. On the other hand, many ancient magnate
families had died out. Many Lithuanian and Ruthenian noblemen had moved
to the Kingdom of Poland where they purchased or inherited new fortunes.
As in a melting pot a reshuffle had taken place and new people had come to
the fore within the magnate class. This was coupled with the further, rapid
growth of its social importance.
THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF THE MAGNATES
The aspirations of the magnates to dominate the entire gentry were not
always successful. Symptoms of an antagonism between the gentry and the
magnates had been evident throughout the whole history of the Common-
wealth prior to the partitions, Its outward signs were visible in the struggles
and disputes at the Seyms and in polemical pamphlets. But increasingly often
the gentry were the losers in the conflict. The lesser gentry were employed
in the administration of the magnates’ estates and households: the middle
gentry reduced to obedience by economic means (loans) as well as by the
frequently occurring need to avail themselves of the magnates’ protection.
While the middle gentry could still resist the pressure of the magnates, who
were not seldom unpleasant and troublesome neighbours, the lesser representa-
tives of that class were, to a growing degree, becoming mere tools in the hands
of the magnates. It was through them that the latter gained an increasing
influence in the local diets and from among them that they recruited their
private armies which were ready at any time to cut the throats of their
adversaries.
Very characteristic of the progressing decentralization of the State was
the fact that the armed forces in the service of the individual magnates were
often equal in size to the peace time army of the Crown. Thus, for example,
when in the middle of the seventeenth century this army numbered some four
thousand soldiers, border magnates like Jarema Wisniowiecki or Dominik
Zastawski maintained regiments of two or even three thousand of their own
men. In that situation both the defense of the country and the protection of
THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF THE MAGNATES 193
Portrait of a nobleman, 16th cent.
the interests of its ruling class ceased to be the concern of the central
authorities but, to a growing extent, became the function of the magnates.
Nor were the gentry any more interested in a strong, centralized administra-
tion ; the latifundia of the magnates, their armies and courts provided ample
opportunities for a career and good earnings, and the private forces of the
“kinglets” as they were called, guaranteed adequate protection against revolts
of their serfs and attacks by hostile magnates. Thus, the functions which, for
example, in France or Austria were performed by the increasingly powerful
central authority, in Poland were being gradually taken over by what, in fact,
amounted to small sovereign States ruled by individual magnates. Their
13° History of Poland
THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF THE MAGNATES 195
influence, which grew in the eastern borderlands, penetrated deep into the
Commonwealth, for their huge estates existed all over the country. The
majority of the starostwa were also held by the most powerful families and,
after a magnate’s death, were granted not uncommonly to his son.
Observing the bitter struggles which the magnates waged among them-
selves, for example Stanistaw Stadnicki with Lukasz Opalinski during the
first half of the seventeenth century, and which at times developed into small
civil wars, it was difficult to believe that somewhere there existed a superior
royal authority. The economic power and the resulting political influence of
the magnates permitted them to act in complete disregard of the State.
During the period of the first elective kings the prerogatives of the crown
had been greatly reduced, among other reasons because of the necessity to
reckon with the decisions of the Senate. On the other hand, the influence of
the dignitaries of the Crown (ministers of State), most of whom came from
the magnates’ families and were appointed for life, increased considerably.
The Senate was gradually becoming the chief centre in which the State’s
affairs were decided. The role of the Seym, which during the first half of the
seventeenth century broke up six times without passing any laws, was visibly
declining. The importance of the local diets on the other hand, was increasing
(not without prompting by the magnates) and bound the hands of the
deputies to the Seym thus hindering the possibility of reaching agreement at
the Seym.
From 1613 decisions concerning taxation were, as a rule, transferred to the
local diets. This decentralization of the fiscal system led to a situation in which
some districts had to pay bigger taxes than others. The chaos was further
deepened when the local diets were entrusted with the voting of taxes even for
the defense of the State (1640). All this was bound to result in a decline of the
revenues of the treasury which, in turn, rendered regular payments to the army
virtually impossible.
The soldiers, who wed arrears of pay, organized military leagues or con-
federations which ravaged the country constituting dangerous centres of
political ferment. The numerous wars (in which Poland was almost per-
manently engaged), however, made it imperative to continue the military
reforms initiated by Batory. In addition to the old cavalry, “foreign regi-
ments” composed of mercenaries had been organized. A number of Poles also
served in these regiments. Specially created headquarters took command of the
artillery which could boast of a high technical level raising its efficiency and
fire power considerably. During the first half of the seventeenth century many
new fortified outposts had been erected, especially in the Ukraine, where they
were intended to keep in check the peasants and the Cossacks. Military
operations carried out by Polish commanders were noted for their tactical
brilliance ; with comparatively small forces at their command they successfully
conducted an active defense.
Krasiczyn. Renaissance castle, 1598-1614
13*
196 THE COMMONWEALTH AT THE TURNING POINT (1586-1648)
Factors hampering the expansion of Poland’s military power were, how-
ever, not only difficulties of a fiscal nature. Neither the gentry nor the
magnates, in fact, desired it. The former, never themselves eager to enlist
unless faced by enemy troops within the borders of the country, were against
giving arms to peasants who could, if the need arose, turn those arms not only
against a foreign invader. Both the gentry and the magnates regarded an
efficient and well disciplined army as a potential source of support for the
King’s absolutist aspirations.
THE SITUATION OF TOWNS AND BURGHERS
At the turn of the sixteenth century, the Polish towns began to feel the effects
of the steady development of the manorial farm economy based on serf labour.
This applied, above all, to medium and small urban localities. The impover-
ished peasant was compelled to give up purchasing many goods produced by
the urban craftsmen and to content himself with the products of the
increasingly self-sufficient peasant holdings. Expansion of smaller towns was
hampered also by the military confederations and civil wars. The situation of
larger towns like Gdansk, Lwéw, Warsaw, Poznan and Cracow where the
period of prosperity and expansion continued uninterrupted, was somewhat
different. These towns were important commercial centres which, directly or
indirectly, reaped the benefits of external trade.
Towns like Sandomierz, Kazimierz Dolny, Plock, Torun and Bydgoszcz,
situated along the route of the grain trade to Gdansk also grew in importance.
The export trade was on the increase on account of the expansion of the
estates’ productivity as well as the growth of the external demand for grain
(from 52,000 last in the years 1562-1565, to 116,000 last in 1618. A last = c.
5000 kg). For the Gdansk and Torun merchants the export of grain became
the source from which they accumulated considerable commercial capital. This
process was practically impeded, especially during the reign of Sigismund III,
by a monetary crisis which was reflected in rising prices and a decline in the
value of money. As a result the State gave up its function of controlling the
coinage, thus providing speculators of all kinds with an opportunity of making
easy money out of the influx of foreign currency.
A different kind of towns were those founded at the turn of the sixteenth
century on the lands of the magnates’ latifundia. Among such centres were
Zamoéé, which belonged to the Zamoyski family, Brody and Zdtkiew, the
property of the Zétkiewskis, Zbordw, of the Sobieskis and Bilgoraj, of the
Gorajskis. Their population worked mainly on the land while the local
craftsmen worked for the needs of the surrounding estates. These townships
being the property of the local lords were naturally subjected by them to
increased exploitation. The supremacy of the nobility had also made itself felt
in other urban centres. The royal towns were (since 1565) subordinated to the
THE DOCTRINE OF THE COUNTER-REFORMATION 197
starostas who often, jointly with local authorities, composed of the town
patricians, drew handsome profits from the exploitation of the population.
In towns there were also districts, called jurisdictions which were the property
of the gentry or the Church and as such were independent of the towns’
administration and judiciary. The handicraft workshops in these districts,
working on the commissions of the feudal lords, were often manufacturing
goods which required high skills, for instance textiles, and found there
conditions favourable for development, unrestricted by the prevailing laws
and regulations of the guilds. Outside the guilds there were also the iron
foundries which worked mainly for the needs of the army, and mines (chiefly
salt mines in Wieliczka). The forges in ecclesiastical and royal estates were at
that time leased to the gentry who, as a rule, brought them to a state of ruin.
The adverse effects of the political supremacy of the gentry and of the
expansion of farm economy based on serf labour on Polish towns and hand-
crafts were to become evident only in later years, but the first signs of an
economic crisis had been apparent already in the first half of the seventeenth
century. The economic crisis was accompanied by a critical situation in the
country’s social, political and religious life. The later was closely linked
with the progress of the Counter-Reformation in Poland.
THE DOCTRINE OF THE COUNTER-REFORMATION
The progress of the Reformation in Poland had markedly slowed down
during the 1560’s. The gentry and the magnates, after they had attained their
main aims (exemption from the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts and
ecclesiastical contribution towards the costs of the country’s defense) began to
return to the fold of the Catholic Church. They were impressed by the
coherence of a Church which, despite the pressure of the Reformation move-
ment, managed to preserve its basic privileges and the position of the
dominating religion. The Church consolidated the unity of the gentry in the
Commonwealth (acceptance of the Catholic faith constituted the last stage
of the final Polonization of the Byelorussian and Ruthenian gentry). Cathol-
icism marked Poland off from Protestant Sweden, Orthodox Russia and
Mohammedan Turkey. The great value of the Catholic social doctrine was
continually emphasized and, in a demagogic manner, counterposed to the
“rebellious” teaching of the Reformation, especially of the Arians.
All this prepared for the triumph of the Counter-Reformation. Its influence
was enhanced both by the arrival of Jesuits in Poland (1565) as well as by
the improved intellectual level, though not the moral standards, of the local
clergy thanks to the acceptance by them and partial realization of the decrees
of the Council of Trent (1577). At a time when the activity of the Church
embraced all spheres of life, it was only natural that the Counter-Reformation
198 THE COMMONWEALTH AT THE TURNING POINT (1586-1648)
came out with its own concept of the State, especially of the social and
political relations which, according to its spokesmen, ought to prevail in it.
Following largely the pattern of Hapsburg absolutism this concept in-
cluded demands for granting greater privileges to the burghers and easing the
lot of the peasants. Thinkers of the Counter-Reformation like Marcin Smigle-
cki or Szymon Starowolski were specific in demanding the reduction of serf
labour, maintaining rents and taxes in kind at an unchanged level and giving
the serfs the right to leave the land. These demands resulting, in part, from
the plebeian origin of their advocates aimed, as it was emphatically pointed
out, at safeguarding the interests of the gentry. The excessive exploitation of
the peasants resulted in the flight of peasants from the villages, an increase of
the waste land and even, ultimately, peasants’ revolts. In the political sphere
the leaders of the Counter-Reformation spoke for the introduction of certain
basic reforms. They demanded that the monarch’s authority be strengthened,
elective kings be replaced by hereditary rulers and that the State’s administra-
tive machinery be fully subordinated to the monarch.
It is obvious that these ideas could hardly evoke enthusiasm among the
gentry for whom they heralded the transformation of Poland into another
Spain or Austria, ruled by the same Hapsburgs, who during the successive
interregna were so fervently supported by the Holy See and the Jesuits, as the
prospective candidates to the Polish throne. On the other hand a strong
monarchy, a Catholic one of course, was regared by Rome as a tool to be used
for a speedy and ruthless extermination of heresy. As soon as it was realized,
however, especially after the Zebrzydowski rebellion, that such theories gave
rise only to distrust of the Church’s intention and pushed even Catholic
zealots into an alliance with Protestants, the Jesuits ceased to advocate them.
More and more often, instead, they praised in writing and from the pulpit the
system of Golden Freedom though, in fact, it amounted to approval of the
growing omnipotence of the magnates. |
The gradually developing decentralization of the State was bound to find
reflection in the attitude of the Church, which began to attach a greater
importance to cooperation with the gentry and the magnates than to an
alliance with the king. Even during the reign of Sigismund III, who enjoyed
the strong support of the bishops, the Papacy sought to realize, through
Poland, not only its own political aims but often those of the Hapsburgs.
That was because Poland, by rejecting absolutism, was not in a position to
subordinate the Church to the interests of the State as had been the case in
France in the seventeenth century and, even earlier, in Spain. Thus, religious
considerations began to play an increasingly weighty role in Poland’s foreign
policy which was unheard of in the sixteenth century, an example of which
was the alliance with the Hapsburgs and the military expeditions undertaken
against Muscovy, among other reasons, on missionary grounds. In internal
affairs, also, these considerations were gradually emerging.
THE METHODS OF THE COUNTER-REFORMATION 199
THE METHODS OF THE COUNTER-REFORMATION
The Counter-Reformation had to take into consideration the specific features
of the country in which it was to conduct its campaigns. Religious tolerance
which had prevailed in sixteenth and seventeenth century Poland and
attracted religious exiles from many European countries, did not secure equal
treatment for the different social classes. The peasants, of whom only an
insignificant number adhered to the Reformation, were reconverted to
Catholicism by the crudest of means. Like the Calvinists before them, the
Catholic lords did not now hesitate to apply pressure and to compel their
subjects to attend religious services by fines, flogging or arrest. Similar
procedures were adopted in the royal boroughs and in townships which be-
longed to the more zealous Catholic lords.
In larger urban centres the urban poor were won over to the Church by
small scale philanthropy. This was pursued by the so-called Banks of Piety,
interest-free pawnshops and by various benevolent brotherhoods. The sermons
appealed to the religious ardour of the burghers and incited them to a ruthless
destruction of the homes and the chapels of the “heretics”. The appeals which
invoked in equal measure the religious feelings and animosity of the Catholic
plebeians towards the Protestant patricians, inevitably had their effect. At the
turn of the sixteenth century the religious upheavals which took place in many
towns (Cracow—1591, Poznan—1616, Lublin—1627) brought a total destruc-
tion of Protestant churches. Shops and even the homes of the dissidents were
wrecked by the incited mob. The discriminatory practices applied against
them by the guilds and by town courts also led to the rapid decline of their
memberships. Some agreed to be reconverted, while others emigrated to Royal
Prussia. In the towns of that province the Protestant majority revenged them-
selves on the Catholics by similar persecutions. On the other hand, during the
Thirty Years’ War, Lutherans expelled from Catholic occupied Silesia, and Bo-
hemian Brethren, proscribed by the Hapsburgs in Bohemia, had been arriving
in Poland and finding acceptance in many private estates. The Bohemian
Brethren settled chiefly in Leszno, the property of their co-religionist Lesz-
ezynski. Thanks to the new arrivals the population of Leszno grew from three
hundred families before 1628 to two thousand in 1656. The Counter-Reforma-
tion, victorious in Poznan, Cracow and elsewhere, was in no position to
counteract these developments. Both the magnates and the gentry were joined
together by class solidarity ; actually their privileges lay at the root of the
religious tolerance in Poland. The boundaries of private possessions constituted
at least for a time an impregnable barrier which assured the safety of
Protestant churches, printing offices and schools within them. In these
circumstances the only way of dealing with dissenting magnates was by
suggestion and persuasion backed by financial inducements. For a long time
Papal nuncios had advised the kings to reserve State offices and grants of royal
200 THE COMMONWEALTH AT THE TURNING POINT (1586-1648)
land exclusively for Catholics. Only under Sigismund III was that advice
taken and even then not immediately.
The outlook and opinions of the young gentry were moulded in Jesuit
colleges to which the gentry sent their children in great numbers, wanting to
give their offspring a humanist education. The pupils were also prepared for
public responsibilities. The graduates remained under close surveillance and
those who displayed talents and obedience were promoted to positions of
influence. In this way the Jesuits placed their own supporters in the Seym
where the Catholic party systematically blocked all attempts to supplement
the provisions of the Confederation of Warsaw with additional regulations
which would guarantee its practical implementation. Graduates of Jesuit
colleges were also present in the courts, which disregarding the prevailing laws
of the land began, already in the 1620’s to punish the adherents of Protes-
tantism with heavy fines and imprisonment.
The sentence upon a Calvinist nobleman, Samuel Bolestraszycki, for
translating a book written by his French co-religionist, Pierre de Moulin
(1627) raised a commotion in the Commonwealth, but though the sentence
was rescinded by the Seym, it nevertheless was an ominous sign for the future.
The toleration of earlier years was gradually giving way to the fanaticism of
the “new Catholics”, as the dissenters called those who identified the gentry’s
interest with absolute obedience to the Church. Their first victims were the
Arians. Although they were relatively small in number and although the
social radicalism of the elder Polish Brethren had long since turned into
a simple humanitarianism, their religious doctrines were too rational and toler-
ant even for the Calvinists. They thus continued to be considered a dangerous
bogey.
During the reign of the tolerant King Wiadystaw 1V, who sought to come
to terms even with the Orthodox Church by officially aknowledging the
reconstruction of their Church hierarchy (1632), the main centre of the Polish
Brethren, Rakéw, the renowned seat of their Academy and their printing
office of European fame, was closed. Not satisfied with these successes, the
Counter-Reformation initiated a campaign against anti-Trinitarianism which
had spread to the estates of the Arian gentry in the Ukraine. An edict of 1647
finally forbade the Polish Brethren to maintain schools and printing houses.
It would, of course, be wrong to draw comparisons between all these
developments in Poland with the militant intolerance which reaped its harvest
in western Europe, whether in Protestant England or in Catholic Spain.
It should also be borne in mind that the weakness of the executive authority
of the State made a strict observance and execution of these bans and
sentences difficult if not impossible. The general atmosphere in the country
nevertheless visibly deteriorated. The Protestants for this reason began to
look for assistance to Sweden. Transylvania and even Ducal Prussia. This in
turn allowed Catholic propaganda to charge the Protestants with plotting
high treason. Such propaganda was disseminated in many different forms,
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verbally from the pulpit, by such distinguished preachers as Father Piotr
Skarga, and visually (Jesuits’ school theatres and ecclesiastical art was very
skilfully adapted to the needs of the struggle against heresy), as well as by
the printed word. The latter included serious theological treatises (by Hosius,
Bialobrzeski, Powodowski) and small pamphlets (by Laszcz, Wargocki) which
sharply attacked not only the dogmas, but above all, their habits, way of life
202 THE COMMONWEALTH AT THE TURNING POINT (1586-1648)
and political views. The propaganda of the Counter-Reformation presented
the dissenters almost as atheists, enemies of Church and State, as basically
antisocial elments always ready to conspire with the enemy. There was no
hesitation in charging them with immoral and indecent behaviour.
The ostentatiously austere interiors of the dissenter chapels were pointed
to by the Counter-Reformation and compared with the dazzling Baroque
interiors of the Catholic church with its sculptures, gildings and the scent of
incense. The rationalist Protéstant religion was contrasted with a faith based
on external and emotive manifestations of worship. The Jesuits, in particular,
placed great emphasis on pilgrimages to miraculous shrines and images and on
processions and relics, arguing that the surest way to the souls of the faithful
was through their eyes. The imagination of the people was stirred by theatrical
plays performed at Jesuit colleges and by public spectacles in the towns during
which Protestant books and images of their leaders were burnt. Called to
assist the lay and secular preachers in this campaign were the religious brother-
hoods originating from the Middle Ages and now reactivated.
Though the Counter-Reformation was formally in many respects a return
to the medieval conception of religion, it was in fact a new version of
Catholicism adapted to the requirements of the new times, blended to
a growing extent with local habits and traditions. Images of Saints, church
interiors, cribs at Christmas and holy sepulchres at Easter were endowed with
local decorative elements. Saint Isidore, the Spanish peasant, was depicted in
the garb of a Polish villager. The after-life was represented as another version
of life on earth in seventeenth century Poland. The heavenly court with
Christ as King was described in words taken from the political life of the
contemporary gentry and the Virgin Mary was presented as a good maiden
from the manor pleading with the King of Heaven for her subjects. The
earthly and heavenly hierarchies bore a close resemblance, with the sole
difference that the magnate who had lived in wealth and luxury would have
to beg the despised but virtuous serf to intercede for him.
For the gentry, Catholicism became an important element in their ideology.
Although they respected and revered the clergy as the servants of God, they
nevertheless sought to curtail the economic expansion of the Church by
passing in 1635 a special law restricting bequests of land to monasteries. The
traditional anti-clericalism of the gentry had out-lived the era of Counter-
Reformation and the sharpest attacks on the Jesuits’ insatiable lust for power
and wealth came from the pens of Catholics. Polish antimonastic pamphlets,
like Monita Secreta by Hieronim Zahorowski (1614) gained a European fame
which endured well into the nineteenth century.
These attacks were not affected by the fact that during the first half of
the seventeenth century, the ecclesiastical hierarchy had been infiltrated by
the gentry. If at first the boldest advocates of both Protestantism and the
Counter-Reformation in Poland were of plebeian or foreign origin, dur-
THE ELECTION AND REIGN OF WEADYSELAW IV 203
ing the course of the next generation there was a marked predominance
of priests of gentry origin who brought into the clerical order the vices and
habits of their own class.
THE ELECTION AND REIGN OF WLADYSLAW IV
The lesson of the Swedish war (1626-1629) once more put on the agenda
efforts to strengthen the royal authority. An opportunity was provided by
the prospective election of a new king. The reign of Sigismund III, one of
the longest in the country’s history (1587-1632) was drawing to its close and
the time was coming to think of how to elect his successor. Much attention
was devoted to that question during the last years of the ageing monarch.
Proposals were advanced for taking decisions by a majority vote (which, in
a way, would be a solution for the recurring situation in which more and
more often the Seym broke up without passing any laws). It was proposed
also to exclude foreign candidates and designate a successor before the death
of the reigning monarch. All the heated discussion on this subject yielded,
however, no practical results because both the gentry, increasingly attached
to the watchword of Golden Freedom, and the magnates, not excluding
persons close to the Court, did not really desire to see the king’s prerogatives
strengthened and consolidated.
If the procedure of electing a king was controversial, the person of the
candidate for the throne excited few reservations. Wladystaw Vasa knew well
how to gain sympathy of the gentry. His attitude to his future subjects was
one of frankness, chivalry@and cordiality. In the controversy which raged
between the supporters of a Swedish, short pointed beard and those who
preferred moustaches 2 la Polonaise, Wiadystaw was not referred to, as his
father was, as representing the foreign, Swedish or German fashion, so much
disliked by the gentry. Even the dissenters, whose protests and complaints
during the 1632 interregnum were treated reluctantly and perfunctorily,
regarded the new ruler as the harbinger of better times. It was not without
good reason that the Papal nuncios in their reports to Rome, denounced
a religious indifference bordering almost on heresy in the young monarch.
The entire election was nothing more than an enthusiastic acclamation of
the only candidate for the Polish throne ; which, nevertheless, did not prevent.
the gentry from seeking, at the very beginning of his reign, measures to impose
fresh restrictions on the royal powers. The new king soon put a stop to these
attempts and, within a few years, himself started to campaign for the exten-
sion of his prerogatives. He sought to achieve this aim by an alliance with the
Church and the group of magnates who were close to the royal court. The
task of recruiting new supporters was entrusted to an exclusive organization
204. THE COMMONWEALTH AT THE TURNING POINT (1586-1648)
called “The Cavalry of the Order of the Immaculate Conception of the
Virgin Mary” (1637). Yet all these endeavours were in vain. The plans of the
King were rejected with indignation by the gentry who saw in them an
attempt to copy the Spanish model hated by all as absolutist, and by the
Protestants, moreover, as ultra-Catholic and likely to subject the conscience of
the gentry to the authority of the Inquisition.
It may be added that the King’s aspirations did not really horrify the rank
and file of the gentry. It was generally considered quite understandable that
every monarch should strive for an autocratic form of government, just as
every nobleman should resist the implementation of these sinister plans. But
such an attitude rendered any lasting political cooperation between the Crown
and the gentry virtually impossible.
The gentry complacently enjoying their freedoms, privileges and wealth,
rejoiced at the peace that reigned in the Commonwealth when the Thirty —
Years’ War was just raging beyond its borders. The neutrality which Poland
maintained during the reign of Wladyslaw IV, despite attempts of the
belligerents to draw her into the conflict, prevented the possibility of gaining
any advantages from it, like the recovery of Silesia or, at least, reminding the
world of her rights to that territory. The people of Silesia, especially when it
was the direct theatre of the hostilities, more and more frequently looked
towards Poland. The leader of the Protestant camp in Silesia, the banished
Duke of Brzeg and Legnica John Christian, approached Wiladystaw IV with
the request to assume suzerainty over Silesia. This idea was, however, never
realized, though in 1636 France undertook to support the Polish King’s claims
to Silesia in return for his entry into the war on the Franco-Swedish side.
Wladystaw IV would not agree to that because he had never abandoned
his hopes for the Swedish throne. Following the pweviously mentioned successes
against Russia, crowned by the treaty of Polanowo (1634), the King compelled
the Swedes by force of arms to withdraw their garrisons from the Prussian
ports which they had occupied since 1626, and to stop imposing customs
duties on Polish trade. These conditions accepted by the Swedes in the truce
signed in Sztumska Wies (Stumsdorf, 1636), were considered by Wladyslaw IV
as a temporary armistice, only, but the Seym refused to support his plans for
a new war. The magnates obstructed it and likewise the city of Gdansk, where
the customs duties imposed by the King proved very unpopular. Thus, how-
ever reluctantly, Wladyslaw IV had to give up his Baltic plans for which
preparations had already started with the expansion of the Polish navy at its
base in Wladystawowo. After 1641 all further work was abandoned and what
ships remained were sold.
In 1637 Wladystaw IV established closer relations with the Hapsburgs,
sealing them by his marriage to the Archduchess Cecilia Renata. This new
alliance brought only meagre results. It is true, that the Duke of Prussia and
Elector of Brandenburg Frederick William submitted and, failing to obtain
the support of the Emperor, swore fealty as a vassal of the King of Poland
Kazimierz Dolny. Przybyta House, 1615
206 THE COMMONWEALTH AT THE TURNING POINT (1586-1648)
(1641) at the castle in Warsaw (this was to be the last Prussian homage in
Poland’s history). Wtadystaw IV also received in pawn the Silesian duchies
of Racibérz and Opole (1644) but this was the end of all advantages derived
from the King’s pro-Hapsburg orientation. The gains in the North-West were
also insignificant. After the disappearance in 1637 (together with the death of
Bogustaw XIV, the last Duke of Western Pomerania) of a separate Pomera-
nian State, its territory was seized by Sweden. Poland succeeded in regaining
in 1637 two Pomeranian fiefs, the Bytéw and Lebork districts, which were in-
corporated into Royal Prussia. Atempts to regain the Duchy of Stupsk,
rather inconsistently handled by the King, ended in failure.
THE COSSACK QUESTION
The gentry increasingly quietist in their attitude preferred to keep their
military effort beyond the borders of the country to a minimum, particularly
in view of growing internal difficulties which were not only of an economic
nature. The source of the trouble was the Cossacks, who from being previously
a loosely knit community of individual settlers seeking a better life in the
borderlands of the south-eastern Ukraine, had grown into a military force
presenting a threat not only to the Turks and Tartars. Their ranks were
constantly swelled by the influx of people from other parts of the Ukraine
who in the freshly colonized areas hoped to find freedom from the burdens of
taxation and compulsory labour.
Indeed the lords of the vast Ukrainian estates had granted the newcomers
considerable facilities releasing them for a period of several years from rent
and labour dues. After the lapse of that period and sometimes even earlier the
serfs were required to perform all the feudal obligations. This gave rise to an
understandable opposition on the part of the population not only in the
villages but also in the towns. Feudal oppression did not spare the towns-
people, most of whom derived their livelihood from agricultural occupations.
Discontent grew also among the Cossacks themselves as attempts were
made to put them, too, under strict control by establishing only a small
number of registered Cossacks (in 1625, for instance, the number was fixed
at six thousand whereas in actual fact there were already some 30-40 thous-
and of them). The remainder were to be relegated to the level of serfs and
placed under the control of the gentry and the magnates. This gave rise to
numerous rebellions which, here and there, were joined by the local pop-
ulation, who not only held in high esteem the military valour of the Cos-
sacks, but also regarded them as defenders of the serfs’ freedom and of the
Orthodox faith.
Of the lesser Cosack rebellions three had assumed a greater significance,
in 1630, 1637 and 1638. All of them were crushed. In order to keep the
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Cossacks in submission the fortress of Kudak had been erected on the lower
Dnieper, above Zaporozhe. The number of registered Cossacks was further
; reduced and the Cossack military self-government was abolished. Ten years
of “golden peace” (1638-1648) followed for the Ukrainian landlords who re-
joiced at “the peasantry having been driven to the burrows”, but the pacifica-
tion proved to be transitory. Not only the Cossacks but also the majority of
the remaining population nourished dreams of revenge for the wrongs they
had suffered and of liberation from the growing oppression.
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208 THE COMMONWEALTH AT THE TURNING POINT (1586-1648)
himself. His political and military ambitions were in glaring contrast to the
general trends of the nobility. Being fully aware of this antagonism Wladystaw
IV started preparations for a great anti-Turkish campaign, keeping them
secret from the Seym. The King’s plans were indeed grandiose. It was no
longer a simple question, as suggested by the military (Stanistaw Koniecpolski),
of evicting the Tartars from the Crimea from which they constantly made
incursions into Poland, but a less realistic concept of liberating the Balkans
from the Turkish yoke and even hoisting the Polish flag over the Bosphorus.
These ambitious plans required the assistance of the Cossacks. The King
gave them a secret order to start building a flotilla of small river crafts and
rumours were circulating in the Ukraine about important privileges granted
to the Zaporozhe Cossacks, the essence of which was, in the meantime, being
kept secret. No wonder, therefore, that when nothing came from these plans
the Cossacks felt deeply embittered. They were certain and not without good
grounds that the failure was due to the intrigues of the magnates who were
adamantly opposed to granting privileges to the Cossacks.
In fact, the affair had a wider aspect ; at the Seyms of 1646 and 1647
the gentry and the magnates torpedoed the King’s plans. Neither could see
any advantages deriving to themselves in the planned expedition and both
suspected that the King would emerge as the only winner, because in one way
or another it would result in enhancing the royal power and in new taxes.
As ever, on this occasion too, the foreigners were accused of being the
instigators of these designs, so unpopular in the country. The King was let
down also by his external allies. Muscovy concluded a treaty with the
Tartars ; Rome and Venice did not provide effective assistance, to say nothing
of France to which Wiadystaw IV came closer after his second marriage with
Marie-Louise de Gonzague.
The frustrated Cossacks took up arms to win by force the privileges they
were refused in negotiations. As their leader they chose Bohdan Chmielnicki,
one of the Cossacks chiefs. Chmielnicki also hoped to avenge the personal
wrongs which he suffered at the hands of Daniel Czaplifski (an official of
the magnate Koniecpolski) who confiscated his possessions and carried off his
beloved wife.
Having reached an alliance with the Crimea Tartars, Chmielnicki set out,
in the spring of 1648, from the Sicz advancing in a north-western direction
deep into the Ukraine. He routed the Polish army at Zélte Wody and at
Korsun, thus convincing the people of the Ukraine, who had only waited for
such a moment, that this time they were to witness events of an incomparably
greater scope and power than ever before. The news of the victory rallied
around him most of the local population. The peasants, the townsmen and the
Cossack elders joined his forces, and they were soon followed by lower Ortho-
dox clergy and even by the lesser and middle Ruthenian gentry.
In 1648 the King, who still had a certain moral authority with the
Cossacks, died. The ambitious ruler who dreamt of gaining for Poland a lead-
Powroznik. St. James’ Orthodox Church, c. 1643
210 THE COMMONWEALTH AT THE TURNING POINT (1586-1643)
ing place among the European powers, left the country in an extremely
precarious situation. This situation had been developing for quite some time
and the successes scored by Chmielnicki merely brought forcibly to light all
the basic weakness inherent in the constitutional and social structure of the
multinational Commonwealth. Chmielnicki’s armed uprising at first taken to
be just another Cossack rebellion which would be easy to suppress, turned out
to be the beginning of the military and political disintegration of the Polish
State. This disintegration, however, had been prepared by the anomalies which
had long been inherent in the entire system.
The lack of a strong, central government permitted the magnates to quell
local anti-feudal movements and even sporadic Cossack rebellions. They were
in no position to crush a massive uprising like that led by Chmielnicki. The
reasons for the defeats of 1648 were to be found not only in the magnates’
ruthlessness towards the Cossacks and the Ukrainian peasants, but also in
their long struggle against any attempts to strenghthen the country. The
founding of the Polish Commonwealth’s internal and external security upon
a federation of strong, but small dominions of magnates could not endure the
test of experience.
Chapter IX
THE COMMONWEALTH
IN THE YEARS OF CRISIS
(1648-1696)
THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE PERIOD
The defeats sustained during the years 1648-1655 proved that the establish-
ment based on Golden Freedom did not provide adequate safeguards for the
political interests either of the State or of the ruling class. To some of its
representatives led by the Court the successes scored by the Cossacks and the
Swedes sounded an alarm which forced them to give serious thought to the
need for far-reaching reforms ; to others it was an indication that they should
turn for help to foreign protectors.
That was the origin, on the one hand, of the attempts made during the
reign of John Casimir to improve the constitution and, on the other, of the
plans either to hand over the Polish crown to a foreign monarch, more
powerful than a Polish ruler (the accession to Charles Gustavus of Sweden), or
to carve out from the territory of the weakened Commonwealth a separate
sovereign princely state (for example, the Radziwitls in Lithuania). In fact,
those very same magnates who in their own country revealed themselves as
the worst kind of trouble makers, like Bogustaw Radziwilt, were at the same
time the most zealous followers and executors of the absolutist aspirations
of foreign rulers. Radziwill behaved in this way as the governor of the Bran-
denburg elector in East Prussia.
The feverish endeavours to introduce reforms failed utterly, buried finally
by the Lubomirski rebellion. The independence of the country, however, was
for the time being preserved thanks to the patriotic drive of the people,
including the gentry, during the Swedish invasion, known in Poland as the
“Deluge”. The peasants also rallied to the defense of the Commonwealth
against aggressors of alien tongue, religion and customs. The gentry, too,
fought with valour and bravery, especially when they were faced with the
immediate danger of the invader on their theshold. The self-sacrificing military
effort of all sections of the population contributed to the preservation of the
country’s independence.
Another factor was that Poland’s neighbours could not yet carry out the
partitions planned by Sweden, Brandenburg and Transylvania in 1655-1657.
14
212 THE COMMONWEALTH IN THE YEARS OF CRISIS (1648-1696)
They were then still too weak and too much at odds, and, what was most
important, these plans were not compatible with the interests of the future
partitioning Powers, Austria nad Russia. On the other hand, the states border-
ing on Poland found a common interest in thwarting all attempts undertaken
in the Commonwealth to reform the constitution. Moscow, Berlin, Vienna
and Stockholm joined hands to prevent, by intrigues or bribery, any change
for the better. They did not fail to conclude suitable agreements for joint
action to counter any strengthening of the authority of the Crown.
This heroic feat of arms and a favourable international situation preserved
the country’s integrity, but it could not restore it to its former position. From
1648 Poland suffered continual territorial losses both in the East and in the
South. In the 1670’s the Commonwealth’s foreign policy for a while was
revitalized namely in the Baltic question, but already towards the end of the
century Poland was only an object in international politics. The long wars
combined with effects of the economic crisis, resulted not only in a marked
fall in agricultural production and the beginnings of the decline of the towns,
but also in the decay of the culture which in the first half of the seventeenth
century, during the initial period of the Baroque had produced so many
valuable and original works of art.
The growing class and national megalomania made the gentry turn a deaf
ear to all calls for reforms and made them blind to the contemporary scientific
and technical achievements in the West. In the course of the armed conflicts
with enemies professing alien religions, the feelings of intolerance grew and
religious fanaticism became for the gentry the sole criterion of raison d’état.
The gentry considered that only they constituted the political nation and they
therefore excluded all other social classes.
THE WAR WITH THE COSSACKS
The successes of the Cossacks during the first months of the Chmielnicki
insurrection exicited a twin reaction in the ruling circles. The border magnates,
like Jarema Wisniowiecki, advocated the crushing of the rebellion by force
without entering into any negotiations with the enemy. On the other hand,
the more conciliatory party, represented by Chancellor Jerzy Ossoliiski and
the Voivode Adam Kisiel, sought to draw the Cossacks away from an alliance
with the Tartars and, by granting them minor concessions, to induce them to
come to terms with the Commonwealth.
The disastrous defeat suffered in the battle of Pilawce where the regular
army and the private regiments of the magnates together with their command-
ing officers ignominiously retreated from the battlefield, seemed to give
substance to the opinion of the group which did not believe in the possibility
of a military solution to the Cossack problem. This group scored another
THE WAR WITH THE COSSACKS 213
success by the election to the Polish throne of John Casimir Vasa, whose
candidature was supported by Ossolinski. John Casimir married Marie-Louise,
the widow of his deceased brother, Wladystaw IV. Chmielnicki reacted
favourably to this election, but was not prepared to make concessions. He
sought to liberate the entire Ukraine and not only, as was suggested, on the
Polish side, to obtain agreement to increase the number of registered Cos-
sacks and win the title of Hetman for himself.
Under the terms of the Zborédw agreement in August 1649, however,
Chmielnicki was forced to accept these proposals. The attacks of a combined
Cossack-Tartar force failed to break the heroic resistance of the Polish units
besieged in Zbaraz, while John Casimir for his part succeeded in winning
over to his side the Tartar Khan, who himself did not really desire to see
the emergence of a sovereign Ukrainian State.
The Zboréw agreement raised the number of registered Cossacks to
40,000 but, at the same time, restored the domination of the gentry over
the remaining Cossacks and the peasantry of the Ukraine. The agreement
obviously could not last and was eventually rejected both by the Cossacks
and by the Polish side where, following the death of Ossolifski (1651), the
militant Wisniowiecki party gained the upper hand. In this situation hostilities
were resumed in 1651. The two sides prepared themselves very thoroughly
for the new clash. Chmielnicki even thought of inciting subversion in the rear
of the Polish army.
With that aim in mind he sent emissaries to Poland who aroused the
peasants against the landowning gentry. These emissaries found a partic-
ularly fertile soil for their agitation, as the old social ferment in the Polish
countryside got considerably stronger at the news of the success of the
Ukrainian insurrection. The peasants of Great Poland, under the leadership
of Piotr Grzybowski and Wojciech Kotakowski, and the Podhale moun-
taineers took to arms in 1651. The latter were led by Aleksander Kostka
Napierski who used a forged royal “letter of credence” which allegedly
entitled him to recruit for the army. Both those rebellions were ruthlessly
suppressed. Kostka Napierski was besieged in the castle of Czorsztyn and
impaled after the castle had been seized. Nothing certain is known about
the contacts between Kostka Napierski and Chmielnicki ; more probably
he had links with George II Rakoczy of Transylvania. It is possible that
Kostka Napierski only waited in Czorsztyn for the invasion of the Tran-
sylvanian army in order to attack the Commonwealth, when it was threat-
ened from the east, between two fires. It seemed that this condottiere who
had earlier offered his services to Queen Christina of Sweden, sought to
use the anti-feudal struggle of the Podhale mountaineers to further his own
ambitions.
The Podhale rebellions were suppressed chiefly by the militia of the
Bishop of Cracow because the national army and troops of the general levy
had departed for the Ukraine. Some of them returned hastily after the news
214. THE COMMONWEALTH IN THE YEARS OF CRISIS (1648-1696)
reached them about the peasant rebellions, but in spite of this the forces of
the Commonwealth gained a splendid victory over the Cossack-Tartar
coalition in a three days’ battle at Beresteczko (28-30 June, 1651). Chmiel-
nicki’s defeat was brought about by the military superiority of the Polish
army and the withdrawal of the Tartars from the battlefield.
A new agreement was signed at Biala Cerkiew (Byelaya Tserkov), but
after a short interval the war flared up again. The Tartar allies of Chmiel-
nicki continued to play an ambiguous role and in these circumstances the
Cossacks were unable to win a decisive victory. This compelled them to
look for allies elsewhere. Chmielnicki, who had been aware of this situation
for a long time, sought to establish closer relations with Muscovite Russia.
The gradual rapprochement was eventually crowned by the Perejastaw
compact of 1654.
Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich who sought to make good the losses sustained
in previous Polish-Russian wars, prevailed upon the Zemsky Sobor, the
representative body of the nobility, in Muscovy to decide in favour of
incorporating the Ukraine into Russia. This was approved also by the
Cossacks, with the exception of some of the chiefs, and a section of the
gentry and the higher clergy who saw in Russia a state akin in language
and religion. The compact of Perejastaw, though it did not make the Ukraine
a sovereign state, nevertheless guaranteed her territory against attacks by
Poland and aggresion on the part of Turkey which strove to convert the
Ukraine into a protectorate of its own. It also brought about a complete
reversal of alliances and became the cause of a prolonged war between
Poland and Russia. The Tartars hitherto allied with the Cossacks went over
to the side of the Commonwealth and helped to repel the combined Russo-
Ukrainian attacks. The allied Muscovite and Ukrainian forces occupied
parts of Byelorussia, Lithuania and the Ukraine, and penetrated as far as
Lwow. In 1655 the Cossack army, after taking Lublin, reached the Vistula
river, near Kazimierz Dolny and Putawy.
The situation was saved thanks to the Tartars, and Chmielnicki was even
forced to recognize, though only formally, the suzereinty of John Casimir.
A more decisive factor, however, which compelled Russia to withdraw from
Poland and to make concessions was the military success of the Swedes who,
in the summer of 1655, invaded the Commonwealth. Russia, fearing the rise
of Swedish power, signed an armistice with Poland, the terms of which pro-
vided, among other things, for a joint campaign against Sweden.
THE SWEDISH INVASION OF 1655
From the very outset the new war took a disastrous turn for Poland. King
Charles X Gustavus, under a formal pretext (John Casimir’s persistent
THE SWEDISH INVASION 215
claims to the Swedish crown) broke the truce of Sztumska Wies, hoping to
conquer the Baltic provinces of the Commonwealth. In making his plans he
was encouraged by the military weakness of the Polish State, exposed during
the Cossack wars. He also believed, under the influence of the Polish mag-
nate Hieronim Radziejowski, a traitor who fled to Stockholm after a private
quarrel with King John Casimir, that Poland would be an easy prey.
” Radziejowski’s information turned out to be correct. The treacherous
attitude of the magnates of Great Poland led by Krzysztof Opalinski enabled
the Swedes in July 1655 to oceupy that part of the country practically
without fight. In the course of the following month the Lithuanian magnates,
under the leadership of Bogustaw and Janusz Radziwill, followed the
example of their counterparts in Great Poland and surrendered Lithuania
to the invader. Warsaw fell without a single shot being fired and shortly
afterwards Cracow, defended by Stefan Czarniecki, was forced to surrender.
The majority of the magnates and most of the gentry dependent upon them
submitted to the invader. The gentry agreed to collaborate with the oc-
cupying power and the most eager collaborators were the dissenters embit-
tered by the activities of the Counter-Reformation, but Catholic clergy
also were to be found in the Swedish camp, led by some members of the
episcopate. Barely three months after the beginning of the invasion King
John Casimir had to take refuge in Silesia, while throughout the country
the idea to dethrone him and elect Charles Gustavus the King of Poland
was increasingly gaining ground.
Some gentry, remembering the persistent attempts by the Vasas to win the
Swedish crown, consoled themselves that the proposed change would, in
practice, amount to replacing one elected king by another. In reality much
more important issues seemed to be involved. The gentry imagined that
Sweden would help them in recovering the lost territories in the East because
Poland was by herself in no position to achieve that goal. This defeatist
policy was actually caused by the general state of the Commonwealth,
which was not prepared to resist the forces of an invading army, trained
and hardened in the Thirty Years’ War.
The burghers, the peasants and the lesser gentry had but little to gain
from the protection offered by the Swedes. On the contrary, they could
feel the whole burden of that “protection”. Looting and acts of violence
by the Swedish troops, who had no respect even for the churches, to say
nothing of their contempt for the safe conducts which the gentry so eagerly
acquired, evoked general indignation and a strong desire for revenge. Already
in the autumn of 1655 armed clashes with the invader occurred. They were
waged by those units of the Polish army which did not go over to the enemy
and by partisan groups organized by individual officers from among the
burghers, the peasants and the patriotic gentry. The enemy, though still
too strong to be defeated in an open battle was, at each opportunity, harassed
and attacked by the partisans.
216 THE COMMONWEALTH IN THE YEARS OF CRISIS (1648-1696)
From his exile in Silesia John Casimir issued a summons for resistance.
A general confederation was formed by the gentry in Tyszowce in De-
cember 1655, which declared itself for the legitimate King. The prevailing
feeling of hatred towards the enemy was roused still further when in Novem-
ber and December the Swedes besieged the monastery of the Pauline Monks
in Czestochowa, revered for its miraculous efigy of the Virgin. From the
military point of view the siege was a complete failure and the widespread in-
dignation which it aroused was eventually to bring disastrous consequences
for the invader, the fact which was later skilfully exploited by the Counter-
Reformation.
At the beginning of January 1656 John Casimir returned to the country.
He was welcomed enthusiastically by the gentry who were disillusioned with
Swedish rule and did not wish to be outdistanced by the partisan units of
the people. With the King’s return there began the period of liberation
initiated already in December 1655 with the capture of Nowy Sacz by
a several thousand strong detachment of peasants. In order to induce the
common people to continue the struggle John Casimir solemnly swore in
the Cathedral at Lwdéw, though in very general terms, to improve the
situation of the serfs (1 April, 1656).
Hostilities, however, were to continue for a long time. They were waged
by methods of partisan warfare, especially skilfully employed by Stefan
Czarniecki, one of the most talented military leaders of the period. In June
1656 Warsaw was recovered for a short time but barely a month later it
was retaken by the combined forces of Sweden and Brandenburg after
a three days’ battle on the outskirts of the city.
Realizing that he would not by himself be able to keep his Polish con-
quests, Charles Gustavus proposed to share the spoils with the Elector of
Brandenburg who had joined forces with the Swedish King on the promise
of obtaining Warmia and Great Poland, and of the recognition of his sov-
ereignty over Ducal Prussia. The third partner in these plans of partition
was to be Duke Rakoczy of Transylvania who indeed at the beginning of
1657 crossed the frontiers into the Commonwealth.
Poland, on her part, also thought of securing allies in the struggle against
Sweden. Treaties were concluded with Denmark and Russia. The Elector
of Brandenburg, who was induced to abandon his alliance with Sweden in
return for releasing Ducal Prussia from fealty to Poland, was also granted
the Lebork and Bytéw districts (treaty of Welawa of September 1657).
Reinforcements also came from Austria while Jerzy Lubomirski conducted
a campaign of reprisal in northern Transylvania which .forced Rakoczy
to leave Poland hastily. His expedition thus ended in a complete failure
and he found himself deserted even by Charles Gustavus who in June 1657
withdrew from Poland leaving Swedish garrisons in only a few towns. Hos-
tilities then continued in Denmark and Western Pomerania whither Stefan
Czarniecki set out with a Polish army corps. The eastern part of that prov-
THE PEACE OF OLIVA AND EASTERN QUESTION 217
ince had recently been ceded under the terms of the treaty of Westphalia
to Brandenburg, and the remaining territory, the coastal areas with Szczecin,
had been left in Swedish hands.
THE PEACE OF OLIWA AND THE EASTERN QUESTION
After years of ceaseless struggle consideration was given to negotiations
hastened by the defeats sustained by Sweden and the sudden death of her
king. In the peace of Oliwa (May 1660), in which France acted as mediator,
John Casimir renounced al! claims to the Swedish throne. Sweden for her
part, gave up all her territorial acquisitions in Poland, retaining only part
of Livonia up to the Dvina river. Thus the status quo was restored, but at
the cost of economic ruin for Poland and a political weakening of the State.
The blame for the “Deluge” was laid on the invader, on Fate and, finally
on the Arians. The latter who, as blasphemers, brought the wrath of the
Almighty upon the country, were to be driven out from Poland by a decision
of the Seym in 1658. The gentry failed to find fault with themselves, and
were eager to cast into oblivion their own collective treason which not so long
before had thrown the country wide open to the enemy.
As in the North and the West, in the East, too, attempts were made to
restore, at the price of some concessions, the status quo of 1648. Following
the death of Chmielnicki a compact was signed at Hadziacz in 1658 with
the new Cossack Hetman, Jan Wyhowski. It provided for the creation of
a separate Duchy of Ruthenia, covering the territory of the three voivodships
of Kiev, Braclaw and Czernihdéw, under the rule of the Hetman. The Duchy
was to have its own officers of State and the Cossack leaders were to receive
the same privileges as the Polish gentry. Their representatives were to sit in
the Seym and the Greek Orthodox bishops in the Senate. The compact of
Hadziacz which aimed at transforming the Commonwealth into a free union
of three nations, Polish, Lithuanian and Ruthenian, came at least twenty
years too late. Part of the Cossack leaders only decided to support it, but
the rest no longer had trust in the good will of the Poles. The Ukrainian
peasantry regarded the compact, and not without good reason, as yet another
attempt to restore the rule of the feudal lords in the Ukraine.
A popular uprising against Wyhowski put an end to the Hadziacz com-
pact. The would-be chancellor of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia, the magnate
Jurij Niemirich, was killed by the insurgents. Soon afterwards the Ukraine
became one of the targets in the Russo-Polish hostilities which were resumed
in 1659. The war lasted, with varying success, until 1664 when negotiations
began leading only three years later to the truce of Andruszéw (Andrusovo).
Under the terms of the truce all Ukrainian territories on the left bank of the
Dnieper as well as the provinces of Czernihow, Nowogréd Siewierski and
Smolensk were ceded to Russia, which also received Kiev for the period of
218 THE COMMONWEALTH IN THE YEARS OF CRISIS (1648-1696)
two years, though in practice for ever. The treaty of Andruszéw was
a reflection of Poland’s declining international position, which could have
been resored only by a far-reaching reform of the country’s political system.
ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE REFORM
AND THE LUBOMIRSKI REBELLION
The defeats in the initial stages of the Swedish invasion impressed upon the
royal court the urgent need for reforming the constitution. The conquest
of the Commonwealth, territorially a much larger country with a bigger
population than Sweden, by a relatively small Swedish army demonstrated
the superiority of a centralized monarchy over a Poland, drifting towards
anarchy. That same system of strong central authority was also behind the
rising power of Brandenburg and Russia, both of which greedily looked
towards the lands of their neighbour, the Polish Commonwealth.
On the other hand, the treason of the magnates who surrendered the
country to the enemy, revealed that their class, embolded and encouraged
by the growing chaos in Poland was even prepared to beg assistance from
more powerful states in order to preserve its wealth and privileges. The
omnipotence of the magnates was the outcome not only of the lack of a strong
army and of a well-filled treasury, but also of defects in the parliamentary
system. More and more often a minority opposition broke up the debates
and in 1652 this was done by a single deputy. For the first time the deputy
Wiladystaw Sicinski broke up the session of the Seym by his liberum veto.
In this situation, the Court presented a plan for readjusting the manner of
conducting the Seym debates (decisions were to be reached by a two thirds
majority) linking this proposal with a bill which would enable the levying
of regular taxes on the gentry. At the Seym of 1659 this scheme was, on the
whole, favourably received. There was still a long way to its implementation
and reliable supporters had to be found to carry it through. Those supporters
could not come from the burghers, who were economically weak and not
really interested in the affairs of the State. Nor could they come from the
gentry, who, despite their enduring antagonism towards the magnates, were
so distrustful of change in the existing system of government, that they
could hardly be expected to help in the introduction of important reforms.
As at the time of Sigismund III, there remained only the help of a group
of magnates (Mikolaj Prazmowski, Stefan Czarniecki, Jan Sobieski, Jan
Wielopolski and others) who, in return for high offices and salaries, were
inclined to support the plans of the Court. But that group alone was not
sufficient, aJ] the more that another (led by Jerzy Lubomirski) stood firmly
against the introduction of any change in the political structure of the State.
The advocates of the reforms sought to find allies abroad. Assistance came
from France, which was to be won over by the election to the Polish throne
ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE REFORM. THE LUBOMIRSKI REBELLION 219
of Louis Duke of Condé or his son, during the lifetime of King John Casimir.
The election vivente rege which would inevitably lead to the strengthening
of the royal authority, was regarded by the gentry as an atempt to abolish
free elections, one of the cornerstones of the gentry’s democracy.
Their indignation and fears were readily exploited by the conservative
Opposition among the magnates ; their wrath against the plot intending to in-
fringe the Golden Freedom was generously subsidized by Vienna and Berlin,
two capitals equally concerned to preserve the existing establishment in Po-
land. In those circumstances the opposition (Jerzy Lubomirski, Jan Leszczyn-
ski, Krzysztof Grzymuttowski) easily defeated the reform bills submitted to
the Seyms of 1661-1662. The fire-brand magnates secured a powerful ally in
the “Holy Union”, a confederation of the armed forces. The soldiers con-
federated in the Union not only demanded their arrears of pay but also openly
threatened, that they would cut to pieces all those who would dare to raise
their voice in support of the election vivente rege.
In spite of everything the Court did not abandon its plans. The first step
towards their implementation was to have been the removal of Jerzy Lubo-
mirski, the leader of the opposition, from the political scene. Sentenced by the
tribunal of the Seym to banishment and disgrace for high treason he refused
to submit to the judgement and raised an open rebellion, the second in
seventeenth century Poland.
Fratricidal war has been devastating the country for two years (1665-
1666). Lubomirski defeated the royal troops at Matwy (one of the most blo-
ody battles in the history of seventeenth century Poland), but finally yielded
to the King and left for Silesia. His death which occurred shortly afterwards
(1667) put an end to further plots, which were simply high treason for Lubo-
mirski planned to cede certain Polish territories to the Elector and to the
Emperor both of whom had subsidized his activity. He also conducted
negotiations with Muscovy. Lubomirski’s own programme did not contain
any constructive elements but, on the contrary, aimed at maintaining all the
anomalies of the constitution and in this way prevented for a long period to
come the possibility of introducing political reforms.
The Lubomirski rebellion was also a severe defeat for the King who
therefore abdicated in 1668 and left for France. He died in Paris where
King Louis XIV placed at his disposal the revenues derived from eight ab-
beys (among them Saint-Germain-des-Prés). The election which followed his
abdication was a very turbulent one, because both France and Austria spared
no effort to force through their candidates. Finally, however, a “Piast”,
which means a native Pole, was elected in the person of Michal Korybut
Wisniowiecki (son of Jarema). The new King, married to the Austrian
Archduchess Eleanor ruled for only four years (1668-1673) which in view
of all his deficiencies, was certainly too long. He was completely unable
to cope with the internal difficulties of Poland and with the dangers which
then threatened the country.
220 THE COMMONWEALTH IN THE YEARS OF CRISIS (1648-1696)
WAR WITH TURKEY
The most serious blow was the invasion of the Turks who strove to reduce
the whole of Poland to vassalage. The peace of Poland’s southern frontiers
which had lasted since 1621, was broken after a lapse of more than forty
years. Hetman Pietr Doroshenko, the Cossack leader in the Ukrainian
territories on the right bank of the Dnieper, which remained under Polish
rule submitted to the Sultan and called upon the Tartars for help. A com-
bined Cossack-Tartar army was crushed by Hetman John Sobieski near
Podhajce (1667), but the situation was not favourable for delivering a deci-
sive blow to the invaders. The breaking up of consecutive Seyms, an empty
treasury, the soldiers’ confederations which time and again had shaken the
country, all prevented the organization of a proper defense in the following
years. It was not surprising therefore that in 1672 the army of the Sultan
Mohammed IV, under the command of the Vizier K6priilii, began a triumphal
march penetrating deep into the Commonwealth. Kamieniec Podolski fell
to the Turks who then advanced to Lwow.
The victorious Ottoman Porte dictated ignominious conditions of peace
which were accepted in Buczacz (1672). The Commonwealth lost the
voivodships of Podolia, of Bractaw and part of Kiev and had to pay, hence-
forth, a yearly tribute. This unprecedented humiliation was a healthy shock
to the nation ; all disputes and quarrels were abandoned for the time being,
the Sultan was refused the tribute and taxes were voted for raising an army.
John Sobieski was put in command. In 1673 at the battle of Chocim, a place
already well known in the history of Polish-Turkish wars, Sobieski achieved
a splendid victory over the Ottoman forces. Victory paved him the way to
the Polish throne, vacant on the death of Michal Korybut Wisniowiecki.
After his election (1674) Sobieski resumed the war with Turkey. The
truce signed following his victory at Zurawno left, however, Podolia with
Kamieniec in the hands of the Turks (1676).
The defensive battles fought in the East did not prevent the King from
making attempts to recover Ducal Prussia which had been ceded to Branden-
burg by the treaty of Welawa.
The idea was suggested by France. Even before his election Sobieski
belonged to the French party, owing in part to the influence of his wife
Marie-Casimira, daughter of the Marquis d’Arquien, a woman rather un-
popular in Poland where she was generally known under the pet name of
“Marysienka”. Sobieski’s election was thus a success for Louis XIV. A secret
alliance signed in Jaworéw (1675) provided that Sobieski was to undertake
a campaign against Ducal Prussia, while France, on her part, would prevail
upon Turkey to restore to the Commonwealth the territories she had con-
quered from it. According to the plans of Versailles, the termination of the
conflict with Turkey would enable Poland to invade Brandenburg or Austria,
“with whom France was then at war. These plans were, however, frustrated by
THE ANTI-TURKISH LEAGUE 221
the opposition of a group of magnates, who were bribed by Berlin and
Vienna, with the aim of deposing Sobieski and giving the Polish crown to
a Hapsburg.
Opposition came also from the Holy See and from the Polish clergy at
the instigation of Papal diplomacy. The Papacy and Austria wished to
prolong the Polish-Turkish war which prevented the Sublime Porte from
attacking the Hapsburgs in Hungary, thus making it possible for the Emperor
to wage the war against France. The rank and file of the gentry, too, among
whom the conception of Poland as the “bulwark of Christianity” was by
then firmly established, had no understanding for Poland’s vital interests
on the Baltic. Most important of all, however, was the fact that Turkey was
not disposed to make any territorial concessions. In such circumstances
Sobieski was compelled to abandon his plan to conquer Ducal Prussia. He
set about instead the construction of an anti-Turkish league, though with
scant success. Only at the beginning of 1683 did Austria, when faced with
an imminent danger, conclude an alliance with Poland against Turkey. The
Ottoman army was then standing at the gates of Vienna threatening the
very existence of the Empire.
King John III at the head of an army consisting of 25,000 men hastened
to relieve the city. Taking command over the combined Polish, Austrian and
German forces, in all some 70,000 men, he defeated the Turkish army of
about the same strength, in the battle of Vienna (September 1683). Aside
from the husaria, Polish heavy cavalry, an important part in the victory
was played by the effective cooperation of the other armed services, especially
the infantry and artillery. The entire Turkish encampment fell to the victors.
The reserve and hostility exhibited by the Emperor towards Sobieski and
the Poles were more than compensated by the fame won by Polish arms all
over Europe.
Less impressive results were attained in the pursuit of the retreating
enemy. In Hungary the Polish army suffered a painful reverse in the battle
of Parkany in which the King himself almost met his death. Political realities
showed the expediency of the speediest possible conclusion of a peace with
the now much weakened Turkey.
THE ANTI-TURKISH LEAGUE
In spite of the need for peace largely as a result of the activities of Papal
diplomacy, Poland joined in 1684 the so-called “Holy League”, an alliance
between Poland, Austria, Venice and the Holy See. This step brought as its
consequence new and exhausting conflicts with Turkey and the Tartars,
from which only Austria benefited. The latter, striving to prevent the con-
solidation of Polish influence in the South, abstained from giving Sobieski
222 THE COMMONWEALTH IN THE YEARS OF CRISIS (1648-1696)
effective assistance in his campaigns. Sobieski undertook several armed
expeditions, in the years 1684-1687, 1689 and in 1691, in Podolia, to recover
Kamieniec, and in Moldavia which he wished to conquer for his son Jakub.
In order to obtain armed assistance Sobieski signed a military alliance with
Muscovy in return for which he finally renounced (1686) all territories ceded
to Russia under the truce of Andruszéw.
All endeavours to conclude a separate treaty with Turkey were wrecked
by the intransigent opposition of the magnates who were instigated, even
openly bribed, by Brandenburg and Austria and strongly supported in their
attitude by Rome. On the other hand, the Sublime Porte on its part was wil-
ling to return to Poland only Podolia with Kamieniec and that solely on the
condition that the fortress would be demolished. Peace was eventually signed
in Karlowice in 1699, three years after the death of Sobieski (1696). Under
its terms Poland regained all the lands lost in 1672, not only Podolia (with
Kamieniec), but also the voivodships of Kiev and Bractaw.
It is not easy to make a general assessment of Poland’s position at the
period of her conflicts with Turkey. The wars were certainly an inescapable
necessity because they were waged in defense of her national existence. On
the other hand, the Commonwealth played only a secondary role in them,
pulling Austria’s chestnuts out of the fire. The decline of the country’s
political power, internal chaos and obstruction of the King’s initiatives by
the magnates at foreign instigation, resulted in the Commonwealth’s divert-
ing to herself the impact of a part of the Tartar-Turkish forces without gain-
ing corresponding advantages, but opening the way for Austria to proceed
to the conquest of almost all Hungary.
For the campaigns waged in the rear of the enemy, serving only to en-
hance the forces of Austria, a future partitioning Power, Poland payed with
her military and economic exhaustion. Poland’s situation contrasted sharply
with the growing might of her neighbours. Fully aware of the fact that their
strength lay partly in the weakness of the Commonwealth, the neighbouring
states never relaxed their efforts at obstructing all attempts to consolidate
the royal authority in Poland. Several secret treaties were signed between
Austria and Russia (1675), Sweden and Brandenburg (1686 and 1696) and
Austria and Brandenburg (1686), in which the contracting parties pledged
themselves to work jointly to prevent the introduction of reforms in Poland
and, specifically, the strengthening of the royal authority.
Who would sit on the Polish throne became increasingly a matter for
the decision of foreign powers. The events which accompanied the election
of 1697 were not only evidence of the decline of Poland’s international
position, but also a warning that her very existence as an independent State
was in jeopardy.
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CRISIS 223
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CRISIS
Protracted wars waged on the territory of the Commonwealth brought in
their wake great devastation, not always caused by foreign armies. More-
over, as a result of these unsuccessful wars, the size of the State was reduced
from 990,000 sq.km in 1634 to 730,000 sq.km in 1667 (following the truce
of Andruszéw), not to mention the temporary loss of Podolia and part of
the Ukraine occupied by Turkey from 1672 to 1699. The population also
decreased considerably ; in the middle of the seventeenth century it was
about 10 million, but the Cossack wars, the Swedish invasion and the im-
portant territorial losses reduced that figure by almost a half. Only towards
the end of the seventeenth century did the population begin to increase
again as a result of the period of stabilization attained during the reign of
John Sobieski.
The decline of population and the devastations of wars and natural dis-
asters brought about a marked fall in agricultural production : arable land
reverted to waste, the number of livestock was greatly. reduced and yields
per acre fell considerably. The basic reason for this decline of agriculture,
however, was the prevailing system of the manor farm economy based on
serf labour and the serfs’ consequent lack of interest in increasing production.
Wars only hastened and intensified the process of decline in agriculture, but
they were not themselves the essential cause of it.
The owners of the manor farms sought to improve the situation by im-
posing new dues upon the serfs. The number of days of labour service was
raised and other burdens increased, like the manorial monopolies, rents and
taxes. The peasants replied by mass flight, refusal to work and, in some parts
of the country, even armed resistance. In addition to the peasants’ rebellions
1651 mention should be made of the rising on the royal estates in the south-
western part of the Cracow voivodship (1669-1672), in the Podhale, in the
Kurpie region (on the frontiers of Ducal Prussia) and on the Suraz estate
in the Podlasie. Thus, as before, the main centres of peasant opposition were
primarily on the royal estates.
Simultaneously with the ruthless suppression of the peasant rebellions,
steps were taken by the owners of the manorial farms ruined by war to
reduce the amount of labour dues and also to replace them to some extent,
by rents. These changes were, however, of a transitory character and were
introduced with a view to facilitating post-war reconstruction and to shifting
its cost to the peasants who were also to bear the risk involved in the pro-
duction of grain, the demand for which was steadily falling. Another reason
for the greater use of rents instead of labour dues was the growing resistance
of the peasants. Rents were introduced, above all, in the estates of the
magnates, including Lithuania and Byelorussia, and in the royal estates. But
those measures did not yield the expected results. A consequence of the
224 THE COMMONWEALTH IN THE YEARS OF CRISIS (1648-1696)
prevailing shortage of labour and of the low level of cultivation was the
recourse to extensive agriculture.
In this situation only the large estates of the magnates could be kept in-
tact and only they could expand, mainly at the expense of the middle gentry,
who lacking money for the economic reconstruction were compelled to sell
them or to transform them into leaseholds. The extension of the magnates’
latifundia strengthened their influence in the political life of the country,
The clients of the magnates, the lesser and middle gentry, not only served
loyally in the administration of their estates, at their courts and in their
private armies, but also defended the interests of their protectors in the
Seym and local diets.
It is no wonder, therefore, that out of 44 Seyms convened during the
second half of the seventeenth century, 15 were broken up and two ended
without passing any laws. The most important decisions were taken at local
diets at which the magnates had control of the votes ; their creatures broke
up the sessions of the local diets and of the royal tribunals, questioning the
legal status of the deputies. In the courts of law bribery became the chief
instrument influencing the verdicts and the magnates brought pressure to
bear on the judges to pass sentences favourable to their clients. The efforts of
the middle gentry, who suffered most from these abuses, to restore order
in the tribunals by way of legislative action were in vain. The competence
of the courts of first instance, the castle courts (which examined the cases of
the gentry but had their seats in towns) were extended, But in spite of the
obviously biassed and corrupt administration of justice and the difficulties
systematically encountered in carrying out a sentence the gentry willingly
went to law and spared no effort and expense in protracted litigation.
The decentralization of the Commonwealth was reflected also in the
fiscal system. There was no central supervising fiscal organ. The revenues
of the treasury fell largely as a result of the monetary crisis brought about
by the issue, after the Swedish wars, of almost valueless coins to the amount
of twenty million zlotys, leading to a devaluation. From 1688 on the royal
mints virtually ceased to function.
The treasury sought to find a source of revenue in new taxation. Instead
of maintaining the army in winter quarters on the royal estates, a levy was
imposed, the so-called hiberna, which was to cover the costs involved. Pay-
ment of the armed forces caused increasing difficulties a solution of which
was sought by the introduction of a poll tax. The tax proved very unpopular
with the gentry who in the end managed to get it rescinded.
Lack of money very adversely affected the numbers and the proficiency
of the army. Cavalry continued to play the leading role as in the past, and
only towards the end of the seventeenth century did the scales turn in favour
of infantry and dragoon units. Apart from the busaria, cavalry distinguished
by an armour to which were attached metal wings, which had always been
dreaded by the Swedes and the Turks, light cavalry units, more mobile and
RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS 225
less expensive to maintain were introduced. Sobieski reformed the structure
of the infantry and raised its number considerably. He was the first Polish
ruler who gave up altogether the service of the general levy, being fully
aware of its doubtful military value.
Sobieski knew also how to coordinate the action of infantry and artillery
whose effectiveness and fire power was greatly increased during the Swedish
wars. His efforts to build a strong professional army met, however, with
the resistance of the gentry who feared lest such an army would be used to
increase the power of the Crown. Their fears were further intensified by
the social composition of the army in which many people of plebeian origin
not only served in the ranks but even held commissions. The peasants provid-
ed most of the infantry, while in the dragoon regiments there were many
burghers even among the officers. The fact that the townspeople were eager
to enlist in the armed forces was due not only to their patriotism, which
they proved beyond any doubt during the Swedish invasion, but also to the
economic decline of the towns and the shrinking possibility of finding
employment there. The destruction of war reduced the population of Warsaw,
Poznan and Cracow by half and losses were not made good even after the
end of hostilities,
It was only then that the towns began to feel the impact of a manorial
farm economy based on serf labour. The impoverished peasant bought less
and less and the noblemen engaged in the export of grain made their purchases
abroad or in Gdansk. This inevitably led to the decline of both the urban trade
and crafts. Manorial and rural crafts were serious competition to the crafts-
men. Another reason for the decline of Poland’s foreign trade was that the
centre of international commerce had shifted to the Atlantic which was, the
main route for overseas trade with the colonies, whereas Poland’s main com-
mercial interest lay in the Baltic. The mining of lead, silver, copper and salt
declined considerably, the latter chiefly because of smuggling from abroad.
RELIGIOUS PROBLEMS
The deepening economic and political crisis caused a mounting wave of
intolerance among the gentry. Those responsible for the prevailing ills were
sought not only abroad but also at home, chiefly among the “heretics” who
were continually accused of conspiring with the enemy. After the banish-
ment of Arians (1658) a law was passed which made the abandonment of
the Catholic faith a capital offence (1668). “Disloyalty’ among the Catholics
was enthusiastically hunted down. A Lithuanian nobleman, Kazimierz Lysz-
czynski, was even beheaded for his alleged, or real, atheism (1689). The in-
fluence of the Greek Orthodox Church was consistently pushed back. At the
turn of the seventeenth century, after the loss of the Ukrainian territories
15 History of Poland
226 THE COMMONWEALTH IN THE YEARS OF CRISIS (1648-1696)
east of the Dnieper, inhabited by adherents of the Greek Orthodox Church,
the Catholic Church secured the abolition of the three Ortodox dioceses
of Lwéw, Luck and Przemy$l and forced their bishops to join the Greek-
Catholic Church, in communion with Rome.
The role of the clergy in the public and private life of the gentry had great-
ly increased. Indeed, a priest was the noblemen’s companion from the cradle
to the grave. The episcopate exerted a strong influence on home and foreign
policy guarding, above all, their own interests as well as those of the Haps-
burgs and the Holy See. An example is the confessor of King John III, the
Italian Jesuit Maurizio Carlo Vota. The victory of the Counter-Reformation
also adversely influenced the quality and learning of the clergy.
It is characteristic that Catholic thought in Poland expressed in polemical
works, theological treatises and in preaching, flourished at the time of the
struggles and disputes with the Protestants and as long as these struggles
were not conducted by administrative coercion. As the Catholic Church
gradually gained power and influence, and consequently greater freedom
of action, it ever more frequently resorted to open pressure. Polemics were
replaced by burning the heretical books, arguments gave way to insults and
oral discussions—to massacres of the heretics. The victory of the Counter-
Reformation submerged Catholic thought in inertia and quietism.
The numerous theological treatises, which then appeared, were only
compilations and the contemporary disputes on the subject of divine grace
and free will, which preoccupied Europe, generally did not reach Poland.
Instead vast numbers of prayer books, moral dissertations and lives of the
Saints were printed containing few original thoughts and often drawing
upon medieval writings. The art of preaching could boast of only one pro-
minent representative, the Jesuit Tomasz Miodzianowski, a writer of many
works on theology, philosophy and ascetism.
The remaining preachers were a long way behind the standards of Skarga.
They strove in the pulpit most of all to attain surprising effects by the use
of a very elaborate manner of speech and strange comparisons. Polish words
were intermingled with Latin, examples from Greek mythology were quoted
as often as those from the Holy Scriptures. All this indicated a trend to
achieve the exaggerated and purely theatrical effects, so typical of Baroque
culture.
SARMATIAN BAROQUE
The Baroque which appeared in the West during the second half of the
sixteenth century, came into its own in the Polish Commonwealth only at
the outset of the following century. Its features were on the one hand
a marked similarity with the European Baroque, for example, in its identical
SARMATIAN BAROQUE 227
striving for an effective accumulation of contrasts, colours and decorative
detail, and on the other, a distinctly regional manner of artistic expression
and of customs differentiating it from the Italian or French Baroque. This
separateness, which has led some historians to speak of a Slavonic Baroque,
was expressed among other things in the orientalization of artistic tastes
that became apparent in the decorative arts, in dress and interior decoration.
These oriental influences in Poland were the outcome not only of the many
contacts with Turkey, the Tartars and Muscovy, but also of the partial
shifting of the centre of gravity in the cultural sphere from Little Poland
and Great Poland, the ethnically Polish lands, eastwards to the Ruthenian
and Lithuanian territories, now rapidly becoming Polonized, though this
was restricted to the ruling classes only. From those eastern provinces came
many prominent figures of the Polish Baroque—writers, scholars and artists.
There, arose also the palatial residences of the Radziwitts, Czartoryskis,
Potockis, Sapiehas, Wisniowieckis and Lubomirskis, which constituted the
centres for their patronage of the arts, made possible by the political and
economic power of this class. Whereas in the West the royal courts, the
ducal palaces and the towns were the main centres of Baroque culture, in
Poland the order was reversed—the primary role in this respect was played
by the manors of the gentry and the residences of the magnates and only
afterwards by the royal court and towns. Political decentralization was
accompanied by the decentralization of cultural life. This did not mean that
the townspeople were not affected by the Baroque culture, and did not
contribute to its development. From this point of view the influence of the
Baroque on the community was probably broader than the earlier impact
of the Renaissance.
The Baroque in Poland coincided with the period of gradual disinte-
gration of social and economic life and, from the middle of the seventeenth
century, with the political disasters which befell the Commonwealth. These
events did not have an immediate effect on the Baroque culture and, until
about the time of the Swedish invasion, it would be unjust to speak of a cul-
tural regression in Poland. It was undoubtedly a qualitatively different period,
which, however, did not mean that it was any worse than the preceding one.
It would also be incorrect to identify completely the Baroque with the
Counter-Reformation. Catholicism which triumphed in Poland certainly
did leave its imprint upon it, but Baroque culture also embraced Protestant
circles, influencing their literature and even the way of life of the dissenters.
The cultural contacts with the West endured the longest and thus they be-
came an important intermediary in bringing Baroque culture to Poland.
As a result of their common social level and interests the Catholic magnates,
like Krzysztof Opalinski or Aleksander Koniecpolski, could easily find
a common language with the representatives of the Arian élite.
The Baroque period was, however, marked by certain contradictory
trends. The growing religious irrationalism was intermingled with the ration-
is*
228 THE COMMONWEALTH IN THE YEARS OF CRISIS (1648-1696)
alist attitudes expressed in the doctrine of the Polish Brethren, and the
mounting fanaticism, with demands for tolerance advanced not only by the
dissenters, but also by some Catholics who opposed religious persecution.
The general trend of development was, however, clearly indicative of a grow-
ing cultural isolation displacing an open-minded attitude towards other ide-
ologies, nations and civilizations.
The regressive tendencies in cultural life were enhanced by a reshaping
of the Sarmatian myth. It attained its fullest and most mature form in the
course of the seventeenth century, but had simultaneously a different ideolog-
ical content than previously. It was above all the gentry which at this time
looked for historic links with the ancient Sarmatians who, allegedly by
conquering the local tribes, became the founders of the ruling class. Upon
the gentry lay the historic duty to defend Christianity. The gentry, and
only they were identified with the Polish nation, excluding other social
classes, allegedly of different origin, from the national community. This
concept of a nation of gentry, based on the community of a privileged
estate, merged into a single entity the Polish nobility with the Polonized
Ruthenian and Lithuanian gentry. This usurpation which contradicted the
old Renaissance concept of a nation, proved to be an obstacle also to the
process of the Polonizing the burghers of Royal Prussia.
If in the eastern borderlands even the burghers accepted, in part, the
Polish language and culture, the population of Prussian towns remained,
on the whole, faithful to the German way of life. At the same time, however,
the inhabitants of Gdansk, Torun and Elblag preserved deep loyalty to the
Commonwealth, which was proved during the Swedish invasion. The exist-
ing political and economic ties made them feel closer to the people of
Poland than to their compatriots in Brandenburg or Bavaria. One could
speak, in this connexion, of the beginnings of the formation of a separate
new-Prussian nationality, analogous with Belgian or Dutch. The continuation
of the process was hindered by the Sarmatian myth which admitted to the
Polish nation only the Prussian nobility and rejected those who could not
boast of armorial bearings.
“Sarmatism” was not only a way of life, an original blending of Western
and Eastern cultures. It also became an ideology. Its predominant feature
was intolerance of other cultural, political and religious beliefs, an intolerance
which clearly reflected the megalomania of the gentry who were convinced
of their superiority not only over other social classes in Poland but even
over other nations. The conviction grew among them that nothing could be
learned from foreigners, because the system prevailing in Poland was perfec-
tion itself. This opinion implied that the foreigners for this reason sought
to plot not only against the existence of the Commonwealth, but also against
the freedom, the rights and the incomes of its inhabitants. Hence in the
seventeenth century, a straight path led towards a growing xenophobia.
Among the lower strata of the Polish community, especially among the
LITERATURE AND ARTS 229
peasants and in small townships, belief had spread about a devil dressed in
a foreign, mostly German costume. As the popular tale had it, the devil
ruled over witches who brought pestilence upon animals and death and
illness upon people. Prosecutions for witchcraft which came to Poland from
Protestant Germany, increased in frequency towards the end of the seven-
teenth century. Their victims were, as a rule, women of peasant and urban
origin, but never noblewomen, who were protected by their class privileges.
Royal privileges also guarded the Jews who enjoyed in Poland personal
freedom and commercial rights. The Jews had their self-government exercised
by the Jewish communities (kahals), and, for certain cases, their own courts
of law. During the Renaissance period Polish Jews attained considerable
prosperity, their cultural élite attained high standards of scholarship and
could boast of such writers as Isaac of Troki, polemicist on questions of
religion. During the seventeenth century Jewish communities in Lithuania
sent rabbis to their co-religionists in the Netherlands, where they were highly
esteemed for their piety and expert knowledge of the Talmud. The Cossack
wars decimated the Jewish communities in the eastern areas of the Common-
wealth, and the subsequent economic decline of the country undermined
the prosperity of Jewish merchants and craftsmen.
LITERATURE AND ARTS
The effects of the growing intolerance and susceptibility among the ruling
class found their reflection in the literature of these times. Its most valuable
and boldest works were left unpublished ; for this reason the seventeenth
century is remembered as the century of literature circulated in manuscript.
But the literary output of this period should not be judged by the standard
of the devotional and panegyrical works published in large editions. Though
the latter constituted almost one third of all publications which had been
printed during the seventeenth century, nevertheless side by side with it
there appeared poetical works of great value. Their authors came from among
the Arians and circles close to the Arians (Waclaw Potocki, Zbigniew Mor-
sztyn and Jan Andrzej Morsztyn) as well as from among orthodox Catholics
(Macie) Sarbiewski and Samuel Twardowski) who placed their pens at the
service of the Counter-Reformation. The literature of the middle classes,
especially at the beginning of the seventeenth century, contained many
elements of social criticism (Sebastian Klonowic, Sebastian Petrycy of Pilzno,
Szymon Szymonowic). Though not very well known, there was an anony-
mous literature of plebeian origin which in a sharply realistic manner de-
scribed the exploitation of the peasants, the cruelties of the soldiery and
the growing poverty, in a word, the progressive disintegration of the Com-
monwealth. The constitutional system was praised by Andrzej Maksymilian
230 THE COMMONWEALTH IN THE YEARS OF CRISIS (1648-1696)
Fredro in his Maksymy which were, for that reason, very popular with the
gentry. Another author, Stanislaw Herakliusz Lubomirski, criticized the
system viewing with scepticism any possibility of its improvement. Numerous
journeys, military adventures and experiences of the vicissitudes of life gave
rise to a profusion of memoirs which appeared in the course of the seven-
teenth century. This literary form reached its climax in the memories of Jan
Chryzostom Pasek who eloquently described the turbulent life and the nar-
rowmindedness of an average nobleman of those days.
A realistic picture of contemporary customs and moods was painted by
the theatre. This is evident not so much in the court theatre which mostly
staged adaptations of foreign plays and dramas (in 1662 the Polish premiére
of Corneille’s Cid was held in Warsaw), as the urban theatres patronized
by schools or towns. The truth about the situation in Poland, often a bitter
truth, especially for the gentry, was brought to light on the stage of Jesuit
school theatres which had at their disposal many able dramatists, the most
outstanding of whom was Grzegorz Knapius.
The increasingly important position, of the lords spiritual and temporal
found expression in the erection of new castles and palaces on their latifundia,
as for example in Rytwiany by the Opalinski family, in Leszno by the
Leszczynskis, in Krzyztopér by the Ossolinskis, in Lancut by the Lubo-
mirskis or in Kielce by the Bishop of Cracow. Their construction was
accompanied by a flourishing development of sculpture and painting. Se-
pulchral sculpture, which continued to be under the influence of Dutch art
(its exponents were Wilhelm and Abram van den Blocke and Sebastian Sala),
as well as portrait painting served to depict the wealth and social importance
of the founder. There appeared, too, a type of Sarmatian portrait painting
of the school of M. Kober, Stefanowicz and others in which the graphic
value gave way to a broad, and smooth coloured plane to portray accurately
the magnate’s attire in all its finery.
Yet side by side with the attempt to enhance the splendour of the family,
portrait painting tried to achieve a true likeness of the subject. The burghers
likewise were interested in having their portraits painted and the middle
gentry honoured their ancestors by having their portraits painted on the
coffins.
The triumph of the Counter-Reformation brought about the construction
of many new churches and monasteries whose interiors were richly decorated
with sculptures and Baroque painting. The flowering of ecclesiastic, Baroque
architecture, the foremost examples of which were the St. Peter’s and
St. Pauls’ Church in Cracow and St. Casimir Church in Wilno, owed its
origin mostly to the Jesuits. Often old Gothic churches were reconstructed
and given new external decorative elements. Sometimes they were enlarged
by the building of new aisles (examples of such a reconstruction can be seen
in the churches in Przeworsk, Szczebrzeszyn, Lezajsk and Kazimierz Dolny).
EDUCATION AND LEARNING 231
A notable builder of those times was Tylman of Gameren, who con-
structed the Krasinskis’ Palace in Warsaw. The theory of architecture was
represented by Stanislaw Solski and Adam Freytag. The royal court was an
important centre of the arts, primarily because of its patronage of the theatre
and painting. The Italian Master Tomaso Dolabella worked in Poland during
this period and under the patronage of the Vasas.
EDUCATION AND LEARNING
The high standard of non-conformist education, above all of the Arians
(Rakéw) and the Bohemian Brethren with their Academy in Leszno (where
one of the teachers was the famous Jan Amos Komensky) reached only a
minor part of the dissenting gentry. The majority of the Catholic gentry sent
their children to Jesuit colleges, whose large network covered the country.
The level of these colleges, was tolerably high in the beginning but declined
gradually in the second half of the seventeenth century. The situation in the
Jesuit Academy in Wilno (founded in 1578), and in the Academy of Zamoéé,
established in 1595 by the great Jan Zamoyski, was no better.
In their efforts to gain contro] over university education the Jesuits en-
countered serious opposition from the Cracow Academy. In that school,
too, despite its undoubted achievements during the first years of the seven-
teenth century, scholasticism was gradually gaining the upper hand and
theology began to take precedence over the sciences. In this situation young
noblemen, both Protestant and Catholic, preferred to pursue their studies
at foreign universities, in Italy, France, the Netherlands and, to a lesser
extent, in Germany. Higher education in Poland was provided mainly for
commoners. Visits to foreign countries assumed a different character from
the tours undertaken during the preceding century. The gentry were now
more concerned, as can be seen in numerous diaries of these journeys, with
acquiring a general Polish and a superficial knowledge of the world, its people
and its customs rather than with a systematic education. Yet these voyages,
too, came to an abrupt end with the Swedish Wars.
The “Deluge” was a dividing line in the development of Polish learning.
Up to middle of the seventeenth century Polish learning continued to make
creative contributions to knowledge. To some extent it developed parallel
with the achievements of west European learning which, after the period
of negation and destruction, so characteristic of the Renaissance, turned in
the following century to constructive thoughts and ideas. The numerous
polymaths of the West found a worthy counterpart in Poland in the person
of Szymon Starowolski, author of works on history, politics, geography and
war. Historiography likewise developed. Though its general conclusions and
findings were largely erroneous and its main aim was to embroider the
232 THE COMMONWEALTH IN THE YEARS OF CRISIS (1648-1696)
Sarmatian myth, it nevertheless reveals evidence of a high standard. Apart
from research into Poland’s history (Wespazjan Kochowski and Jan Ru-
dowski), the philosophy of history induced a wider interest in religious ques-
tions (Stanislaw Lubieniecki) and in the study of the development of learn-
ing (Jan Brozek).
Learning, in fact, became the domain of the urban middle class whose
representatives distinguished themselves in philology (Grzegorz Knapius),
mathematical sciences (Jan Brozek, Stanistaw Puditowski), philosophy and
logic (Sebastian Petrycy of Plzen, Adam Burski). Middle class scholars like
Jan Jurkowski and Sebastian Petrycy approved of the Court’s attempts to
strengthen the powers of the monarch and to reform the administration
with the view to limiting decentralization and putting an end to the law-
lessness of the magnates.
The progress of learning and culture was hampered by the economic and
political setbacks experienced by Poland. Attempts to rebuild the country
after the havoc of the “Deluge” yielded only meagre results. In the second
half of the seventeenth century, one can already discern the beginnings of
decay of Polish culture. Yet it would be risky to make any hasty general-
ization. Even such people as Wojciech Tylkowski who wrote nonsensical
tracts of a pseudo-philosophical character had merit in the field of mechanics
and theory of agriculture.
The Counter-Reformation played its part also in the decline of Polish
learning. It regarded every bolder achievement of scientific research almost
as a heresy. The Counter-Reformation hampered the free flow of scholarly
thought, broke all contacts with the Protestant world and forbade even
university professors to read books placed on the Index Librorum Prohibi-
torum.
The universal lack of interest in scholarly research had a decidedly ad-
verse effect. Neither the magnates nor the Court showed any concern for
promoting scientific learning and by providing scholars with means to pursue
their studies at leisure. Men of learning no longer enjoyed the respect of the
community, a phenomenon which had first become apparent towards the
end of the sixteenth century, higher education was held in contempt and
considered unneccessary by the mass of the gentry. They had a purely utili-
tarian approach to learning from which they demanded enough to help
them manage their financial affairs, or show their eloquence during debates
in the Seym or the local diets. Legal education was acquired not at the uni-
versities but solely by working under experienced jurists.
The growing difficulties did not, however, stop the spread of Polish cultur-
al influences eastward and westward. This influence was particularly marked
in Russia and the Ukraine where Polish literature found eager translators,
and Polish painting and music were widely followed and admired. Polish
Culture also reached Rumanian lands (Valachia and Moldavia). Less impres-
sive was the impact of Polish culture in the West. The rapid development
EDUCATION AND LEARNING 233
of education and technology there created 2 gap between Poland and the
West which was to be only partially closed in the period of Enlightenment.
Nevertheless it should be noted that the works of Arian philosophers,
especially the monumental Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum published by the
exiled scholars in Amsterdam (from 1665), met with a considerable response in
England, Germany and France. Ideas propounded by such Arian writers
as Jonasz Schlichting, Samuel Przypkowski, Jan Crell and Andrzej Wiszo-
waty who advocated a rational approach to matters of religion and religious
toleration based on the separation of Church and State had some influence
on the thinkers of the early Enlightenment. John Locke, Isaac Newton and
Pierre Bayle held similar views, though on a number of points they disagreed
with the Arians.
In the seventeenth century, the Silesians constituted a comparatively large
group in the Arian movement. From their ranks came such vigorous leaders
and talented writers as Szymon Pistorius, Joachim Pastorius and Tomasz
Pisecki. Students from Silesia attended dissenter schools in Torun, Rakéw
and Leszno. Works by Polish poets and writers were widely read in the
schools of Byczyna, Kluczbork and Wolczyn, thus maintaining the tradition
of good Polish in these areas. The works of the great poet of the Polish Renais-
sance, Jan Kochanowski, translated by Marian Opitz, were especially popular.
The mainstay of Polonism in Silesia were the burghers and not the
gentry, most of whom were by that time already Germanized. Polish literary
works created in Silesia expressed the thoughts and ideas of the burghers
glorifying productive effort, like Walenty Rozdzienski extolling the toil of
the foundry workers in Officina ferraria, or Adam Gdacius criticizing the
vices of the nobles, their laziness and drunkenness, and preaching attachment
to the land of the fathers from which they were separated by the present
frontiers. Szymon Pistorius thus wrote of his native Opole: “When thou
joineth with Poland, that bounteous and flourishing land, we shall all rejoice
together with thee at the restoration of thy former condition”’.
Strong cultural ties existed also between the Commonwealth and the
Polish element in Ducal Prussia. These ties were maintained above all by
dissenters who went to study in KGnigsberg. On both sides of the border,
identical hymn books were in use and successive generations were educated
on Polish editions of the Holy Scripture. Polish dictionaries, grammars and
readers were published in Konigsberg. In the second half of the seventeenth
century these contacts had slackened, to grow stronger again with the arrival
of Arian exiles (Zbigniew Morsztyn, Samuel Przypkowski and others) and
also as a result of the ceaseless efforts of the Prussian gentry to throw off the
detested yoke of the “Great Elector”—Frederick William.
Chapter X
THE CRISIS OF SOVEREIGNTY
(1697-1763)
GENERAL VIEW OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
Eighteenth century Polish history is usually divided into two contrasting
periods: the “Saxon era” (1697-1763) marked by the decline of the Com-
monwealth, and the reign of Stanistaw Augustus (1764-1795), regarded as
a period of reforms and the age of Enlightenment, but which was also the
period of partitions. There has been a tendency to link the reign of Stanislaw
Augustus with the nineteenth century rather than with the history of the
Polish Commonwealth and to consider the year 1764 as marking the end
of one era and the beginning of another.
The second half of the eighteenth century undoubtedly brought a change
in the rhythm of Polish history; crucial and dramatic events occurred which
resulted in “the revival of the Nation and the downfall of the State”. The
problem of “the Old and the New”, of the end and the beginning in a con-
tinuous historical process, is usually an intricate affair but in this case the end
stands out with exceptional, glaring clarity ; it is the end of the Polish-Lithu-
anian State. The era of Stanislaw Augustus was the last act in a political
drama, in which the relations between Poland and her neighbours, with
Russia in particular, provide the central theme. From the same point of
view the problem of the beginning appears in a clear relief. The inter-depend-
ence of Russian and Polish history points to the early eighteenth century
as the crucial period. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the two
Powers competed for ascendancy in eastern Europe and for domination over
Byelorussia and the Ukraine, with the scales turning now in favour of one
and now in favour of the other neighbour. They were two sovereign Powers
in which the ruling classes had developed two diametrically opposing types
of state: the centralized monarchy of the Tsars and the oligarchic Common-
wealth of Poland. From the middle of the seventeenth century Russia had
gained the upper hand, but Polish-Russian relations had not yet become
the decisive factor in the history of the Polish-Lithuanian State and did not
affect its internal affairs. With the reign of Peter I the situation changed
fundamentally. Russia entered into the period of great-power development,
THE PERSONAL UNION OF SAXONY AND POLAND 235
while Poland sank into anarchy and passed through a period of crisis with
the result, that the Poles could no longer contro] their own internal affairs.
The Commonwealth opened the door wide to foreign political influence.
During the reign of Peter I, Russian influence proved most important and,
although weaker under succeeding rulers, it was to become decisive under
Catherine II.
The uneven development of Poland and of her neighbours with regard to
financial and military potential and the degree of political independence,
left a distinct mark on Poland’s history throughout the whole century, from
the Northern War until the third, and last, partition of 1795. This was the
background to the dramatic struggle for the reform and reconstruction of
the Commonwealth in the era of the Enlightenment. The leaders in the second
half of the eighteenth century had to bear the burden of the Saxon era.
THE PERSONAL UNION OF SAXONY AND POLAND
Sobieski’s persistent efforts to secure the throne for his son ended in failure.
Prince Jakub and the Queen-Dowager Marie-Casimira (“Marysienka”) did
not enjoy popularity. Apart from the dislike of the Sobieskis the concept of
a Polish candidate was undermined by the jealousies among the magnates
of whom more than one were themselves aspiring to the crown. The inter-
regnum of 1696-1697, disturbed by the mutinies in the army demanding
arrears in pay and by an attempt at breaking-up the Convocation Seym, was
dominated by the call to exclude a “Piast” from the throne. Quite a number
of foreign candidates came forward. The odds were in favour of the French
Duke of Conti whom Louis XIV supported with large sums of money. The
seriousness of the French candidature induced the opponents of Versailles
(Austria, Russia, Brandenburg, England and Holland) to a coordination
action on behalf of the strongest opposing candidate, the Elector of Saxony.
Peter I’s position was of particular importance. For the first time Russia
tipped the scale in a Polish election. In spite of the fact that the Frenchman
was elected by a majority vote, the partisans of the Saxon conducted a se-
cond election. Conti had arrived by sea from far-away France to Gdansk,
but the candidate elected by the minority had himself crowned in Cracow
(15 September, 1697). Faced with a fait accompli, the nation eventually
accepted the Saxon King. (The final formalities were settled by the “Pacifica-
tion Seym”of 1699), The Roman Curia played its part also because the head
of the arch-Lutheran Wettin dynasty recognized that “Warsaw was worth a
Mass” and became Roman-Catholic.
The Elector Frederick Augustus I who, as King of Poland, assumed the
name of Augustus II, hoped to create a great power under his sceptre. So-
vereign ruler of Saxony, he expected that the Electorate would provide
236 THE CRISIS OF SOVEREIGNTY (1697-1763)
the means which the elective kings had been hitherto lacking to curb the
Golden Freedom. Industrialized Saxony and agricultural Poland were to com-
plement each other economically to the advantage of the royal treasury.
The territory separating the two countries (Silesia or a part of it) could be
acquired by political and dynastic bargains. To safeguard the succession of
Poland for the Wettins, dynastic sovereignty first had to be secured in the
Danube duchies, Livonia or Courland. Did these ambitious designs present
the Commonwealth with a historic opportunity for restoring the Jagiellonian
splendour?
The union of Saxony and Poland often incurs unfavourable criticism
with the Wettins’ dynastic policies incorrectly interpreted in terms of the
Teutonic “Drang nach Osten”. Undoubtedly, however, Augustus the Strong,
a nickname he owed to his unusual physical strength, attempted a task whicn
surpassed his possibilities. If he was to succeed in creating a monarchy with
great power status out of the union of a small duchy with an efficient gov-
ernment and a huge oligarchic Commonwealth, he had to break not on-
ly the resistance of the Polish gentry and magnates, but also that of the Pow-
ers interested in maintaining the status quo in central Europe. The Gold-
en Freedom had too many powerful patrons. Augustus II remained up to
the end a man of grand designs which he tried to carry out in an adventurous
manner. Enmeshed in complex Polish and international issues, the higher
he aimed the deeper he sank. As a last resort he was ready to propose a par-
tition of Poland to his neighbours, provided he could at that price keep
a part of the country under an sovereign and hereditary monarchy. During
the reign of Augustus II, the idea of the Polish-Saxon union fell into discredit
for this reason.
His successor abandoned these ambitious plans. To Augustus III (1733-
1763) and his Saxon Court, the Polish crown meant a royal title for the
Wettins, exalting them above the princes of the Empire. It enabled them
to exploit the royal estates and the country’s economic resources and to
dispense sinecures. The Commonwealth was otherwise abandoned to its fate.
Augustus III was the incarnation of the ideal shadow king, so dear to many
Sarmatians. Augustus II attempted to rule from Warsaw ; his son ruled only
from Dresden. Up to that time, the monarch, in spite of all the limitations
upon his power, had remained the keystone of the Commonwealth’s political
structure and the royal court had been an important institution in the cultural
life of the country. After the collapse of Augustus II’s ambitions plans, the ~
Polish-Saxon union deprived Poland of that element. Batory could have kept
in mind his native Transylvania, as the Vasa could think of Sweden, but
these were kings residing in Poland, who identified their destinies strictly
with those of the country. The situation which prevailed for 60 years, in
which the Saxon kings remained strangers to Poland and absent from the
country, was an important factor in the crisis of sovereignty.
THE NORTHERN WAR AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CROWN 237
THE NORTHERN WAR AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CROWN
The peace of Karlowice (1699) marked a turning point in Polish-Turkish
relations. The century-long period of wars against the Porte came definitely
to a close.
After the conclusion of the peace with Turkey, a party among the mag-
nates believed that the time had come to abrogate the treaty with Russia
and to recover the territory beyond the Dnieper. Augustus II tended in the
opposite direction. As Elector of Saxony he entered into an alliance with
Denmark and Russia aiming at partitioning Sweden’s overseas possessions.
Livonia was to be the share of the Wettins and not Poland’s. It seemed
an easy prey, but the surprising victories of Charles XII over the Danish and
Russian armies in 1700 brought an unexpected turn to the war. The Swedes
forced Denmark to conclude a peace and, taking the offensive, attacked
Poland. She was to become the base for the decisive showdown with Russia.
Having routed the Saxon army in Livonia (July 1701), Charles XII
entered Courland and demanded that the Commonwealth dethrone Augus-
tus II. Without waiting for an answer, the Swedes occupied Warsaw (May
1702), defeated Augustus in the battle of Kliszow (9 July) and occupied
Cracow. The Commonwealth was dragged into the war with Sweden, but
it was politically divided and militarily passive. The programme put for-
ward by Charles XII and endorsed by French diplomacy, providing for
the deposition of the Saxon, a Polish-Swedish alliance and a joint war against
Russia, found support with some of the magnates, but the looting by Swedish
troops met with resentment and protest. The majority in consequence stood
by Augustus. The Confederation of Sandomierz was formed by the King’s
side (1702) and a Polish-Russian treaty was signed in 1704, giving Russian
forces the right to operate in Commonwealth territory. At the same time,
in the territory occupied by Sweden, the Confederation of Sroda was formed
(1703) and later the General Confederation of Warsaw (1704) which pro-
claimed an interregnum. On 12 July, 1704 eight hundred of the gentry
elected Stanistaw Leszczynski King in a camp surrounded by Swedish sol-
diers. A year later a Polish-Swedish treaty was concluded in Warsaw, giving
to the Swedish army rights similar to those which the Treaty of Narva had
granted to the Russians. Thus there were two Kings in Poland, two Common-
wealths (Leszczynski appointed new ministers and new officers of State) and,
what is most important, two foreign protectors and two “auxiliary” armies
fighting against each other. The Polish adherents of Augustus and Leszczynski
played a secondary role, waging a guerrilla civil war on the fringe of the
war between the Powers.
Before engaging in a final showdown with Russia, Sweden tried to con-
solidate her position in Poland. For this reason Charles XII entered the
Electorate in 1706 and extorted from Augustus his abdication in Poland
and the withdrawal of Saxony from the war. Leszczynski was recognized
238 THE CRISIS OF SOVEREIGNTY (1697-1763)
as King by most of the Powers, but did not gain general recognition within
Poland. The adherents of Augustus deprived of their legal head, remained
united under Russian protectorship. Charles XII and Leszczynski established
contact with Mazepa, Hetman of Cossacks on the left-bank of the Dnieper.
Till now subordinate to Russia, Mazepa aimed at unifying the Ukraine under
the suzerainty of the Commonwealth. Relying upon Polish and Cossack help,
the Swedes attacked Russia in the summer of 1708. The majority of the
Cossacks, however, did not follow Mazepa and remained faithful to the
Orthodox Tsar. The help of the Polish army also proved illusory. After an
initial success, the Swedish army suffered a crushing defeat at Poltawa on
8 July, 1709. Charles XII and Mazepa fled into Turkish territory, Leszczynski
withdrew into Swedish Pomerania and Augustus returned to Poland. The
restoration of his rule took place at the General Assembly in Warsaw in 1710.
Meanwhile, Turkey, incited by Swedish and French diplomacy, but in-
fluenced in fact by her own designs for the annexation of Ukraine, attacked
Russia. Mazepa’s successor, Filip Orlik, recognized the suzerainity of the
Porte. The combined Turkish, Tartar and Cossack expedition against the
Ukraine was repelled by the Russian army, and Tsar Peter I entered Mol-
davia. There, however, he found himself encircled by the Turks and, threa-
tened with captivity, signed a treaty with the Porte at his camp on the river
Prut (23 July, 1711). Russia obtained the peace with Turkey at the price of
her pledge to return Asov and not to interfere in Polish and Cossack affairs.
This treaty was later to acquire the significance of a Turkish guarantee for
Polish “freedom”. Its origin in fact lay in Turkey’s annexationist aspirations
directed against the Ukraine ; it was not until 1714 that the Porte official-
ly renounced those aspirations when it recognized Augustus and renewed
the peace of Karlowice with the Commonwealth. Annexationist plans were
entertained also by the King of Prussia ; (the title was assumed by the Elector
of Brandenburg in 1701) but they met with Peter I’s opposition. From 1710,
Poland remained outside major war operations.
The Northern War, with famine and pestilence following in its wake,
caused fresh devastation of the country. Though the frontiers of Poland were
not affected, the political result of the war was disastrous to the Common-
wealth. In Sobieski’s time the country though weakened internally managed
to accomplish feats of war and enjoyed prestige abroad. At the beginning
of the Northern War Poland was still being treated as an equal partner by
the Powers. Internal divisions, only superficially healed by the “Pacification
Seym”, were nevertheless in evidence since the double election. Trouble
spots existed in both Lithuania and the Ukraine. The powerful Lithuanian
family of the Sapiehas tyrannized the middle gentry to such an extent that
a real civil war broke out in 1700. The Sapiehas, defeated in the struggle,
turned to Charles XII seeking his intervention and taking the field at the
side of the Swedes, while the opposite “republican” party placed itself under
the protection of Tsar Peter. After the peace of Karlowice, the oligarchs of
°
THE CONFEDERATION OF TARNOGROD 239
Little Poland had wanted to eliminate the Cossacks within the borders of
the Commonwealth. This resulted in a Cossack uprising led by Palij and
Samus (1702) with which the Crown forces could not cope. Tartar or Swedish
support was considered but eventually an appeal was made to the Russians,
whose help was rated to be the most effective. In this way the Poles them-
selves were encouraging foreign Powers to interfere in their internal affairs.
At the same time, they proved incapable of independent military and po-
litical action on the side of either Augustus or Leszczynski.
The constitutional system of the Commonwealth was particularly con-
ducive to acts of violence or foreign pressure under the cover of the legal
paraphernalia of a confederation. In territories under the control of the
Swedish, Russian or Saxon armies, pseudo-Polish authorities were established.
Pressure by threat and corruption were sufficient to produce rival shadow
governments with the help of one magnate group or another, and thus io
force upon Poland an apparently legal decision. This was the easy lesson
learnt by the neighbouring Powers from the experiences of the Northern War.
The balance of power among those Powers had changed. Turkey no
longer threatened Poland and went on to the defensive as a result of Austrian
and Russian pressure. Sweden, too, after the dazzling successes of Charles XII
lost her great power status once and for all. Two new Powers expanded their
influence in the Baltic at Sweden’s expense: Russia and Prussia. The War
of the Spanish Succession, waged at the same time as the Northern War,
resulted in pushing away the Hapsburg from the south-west. Thus the aspi-
rations of the dynasty to establish an universal monarchy came to an end. In-
stead the dynasty concentrated upon the consolidation of its dominions in
Europe. As well as the modern Austria, France of Louis XV no longer played
the same part in Europe as she had under the reign of the “Roi-Soleil’’.
From the time of the Northern War onwards, Poland’s international situ-
ation was determined by three countries : Russia, Austria and Prussia.
THE CONFEDERATION OF TARNOGROD
AND THE ARBITRATION OF PETER I
From the beginning of his reign Augustus II had been entertaining the idea
of an royalist coup d’état, but the Northern War frustrated the implemen-
tation of these plans for many years. The Seym was not convened from 1703
to 1710; the decentralization of the administration therefore proceeded
apace and the importance of the local diets, which raised taxes and recruited
soldiers, increased. This lamentable state of affairs shocked the gentry out
of their quietism. Amidst the misfortunes of war, political confusion and
a growing antipathy for the oligarchic ministers, especially for the Hetman
whose licence then had reached its climax, the thought of reforming the
Commonwealth gripped the mind of the gentry. The spectacle of two rival
+.)
240 THE CRISIS OF SOVEREIGNTY (1697-1763)
Kings claiming the crown discredited still more the authority of the ruler.
Let Poland therefore become a true Commonwealth, a republic of the gentry,
orderly, capable of defending her frontiers, but peaceful and living in har-
mony with her neighbours, because Kings, and not the Commonwealth had
dragged the country into wars. In the political writings of the time these
aspirations were most eloquently expressed by Stanislaw Dunin-Karwicki.
His programme advocated a strengthening of the Commonwealth’s institu-
tions and a curtailing of the royal powers.
Reform was being planned also by Augustus and his Saxon entourage,
especially by Field Marshall Jacob Heinrich Flemming, but in the opposite
direction to that of the gentry. The royal party aimed at introducing a he-
reditary monarchy and strengthening the government ; the Saxon army was
to be the main instrument for implementing this programme. At the General
Assembly of Warsaw (1710), the two opposing trends did not, as yet, clash.
In the short run, the chief opponents of both the Crown and the republican
reformers, were the oligarchy of magnates and the power of the Hetmen,
who were the dominating factor in the State.
The oligarchy was interested in maintaining the constitutional status quo.
Its key-position lay in its power of mediating and holding the balance between
royal authority and gentry republicanism. The scale turning one way or
the other would curb their power to mediate and subordinate the magnates to
the authority of the monarch or to that of an orderly Commonwealth. Let the
King therefore keep his prerogatives, in particular his power to dispense
patronage, so profitable to the magnates and let him use these prerogatives
to keep the Golden Freedom in check. Let the liberty of the gentry, with
the help of the magnates as mediators, at the same time prevent the King
from strengthening his authority. If, however, the balance of power were
endangered, and arbitration by the magnates proved insufficient to maintain
that balance, then the help of foreign arbiters should be invited.
The Hetmen’s opposition at the Seym of 1712 frustrated the attempts
of the King to cooperate with the reformist group of the gentry. Augustus II
resorted to drastic measures. The Turkish danger furnished the pretext for
bringing Saxon troops into Poland in 1713. The behaviour of these troops
was provocative. The Saxons sought to provoke a crisis, the pacification of
which would allow them to establish a new order. The first riot of the gentry
broke out in Little Poland in 1714. Within a year fighting had flared up on
a larger scale. In addition to the gentry, peasants also joined the drive against
the Saxons. These movements swept the whole country and a General Con-
federation was formed in Tarnogréd (25 November, 1715) under the presi-
dency of Stanislaw Ledédchowski. The standing army ranged itself with the
Confederation. The gentry movement was directed not only against the
Court and the Saxon troops but against the Hetmen as well. Augustus IT was
again threatened with dethronement. Once again, however, the decisive role
was to be played by a foreign power.
THE CONFEDERATION OF TARNOGROD 241
Augustus IJ, having secured his position on the throne with Peter I’s aid,
now aimed at shaking off the Russian tutelage. Negotiations for an alliance
with France and an attempt to destroy the Russian party, headed by the
Hetmen, were means to this end. Russia, therefore, excited the opposition
against the King and had her share in inspiring the Confederation of Tarno-
gréd. While both the provocations of Saxon troops and the Russian inspira-
tion had played a part in initiating this movement, its momentum exceeded
‘the intentions of those who had provoked or inspired it. It was the last
spurt of gentry democracy, which engaged in fighting on two fronts : against
the anti-Russian King, and against the Hetmen connected with Russia. The
time had come for arbitration. The Hetmen were the first to turn to the Tsar
for mediation. The Confederates followed suit and eventually King Augustus
also accepted Peter I’s mediation.
The Tsar’s envoy, Grigory Dolgoruki, acted as mediator in the negotia-
tions between the Court and the Confederates. The negotiations proceeded
with difficulty until 18,000 Russian troops entered Poland. From then on,
Dolgoruki was the master of the situation and it was through his influence
that the treaty of Warsaw was signed and subsequently approved by an one-
day Assembly called the Dumb Seym, because no one was permitted to speak,
on 1 February, 1717.
Augustus II’s Saxon-Polish policy had suffered a decisive defeat. The
King was henceforth allowed to keep in Poland only 1200 of his Saxon
guards and 6 officers of the Saxon Chancery. The attempt to achieve a closer
union of Saxony and Poland was thereby frustrated. The gentry’s programme
of reforms was partly implemented in fiscal and military matters. Regular
taxes were voted to cover 24,000 soldiers’ “rations”, out of which the officers
were to have a fund for themselves. As a result a standing army of only
12,000 men was established. Hetmen authority and the autonomy of the local
diets were somewhat reduced. A general amnesty was granted to both Con-
federates and Saxon soldiers. The restoration of order in military and fiscal
affairs would have been a positive step, had not the budget and the credits
for military establishment been fixed as if for a secondary state of the German
Empire or of Italy, but not for one of Europe’s largest countries, surrounded
by the greatest military powers of the age. The fiscal and military reform
was connected with a curtailment of provincial self-government which was
not followed, however, either by a reform of the Seym or by the establishment
of a local administration.
The Dumb Seym determined the Commonwealth’s system of government
for nearly 50 years ; as a precedent it was of even greater importance. After
Augustus II’s grandiose plans and the effort of Tarnogrdéd, a balance between
“majesty and freedom” was established for many years, reflected in an
atrophy of the legislature. There was, however, a specific reason resulting
from the signature of Dolgoruki, the mediator. On the basis of that me-
diation Russia claimed the right to guarantee the resolutions of the Seym
16 History of Poland
242 THE CRISIS OF SOVEREIGNTY (1697-1763)
of 1717. The seventeenth century had already seen many agreements by
the Powers with regard to Poland’s internal affairs. The Russian interpreta-
tion of the Warsaw treaty, backed by force, introduced the concept of a for-
eign guarantee approved by the Commonwealth.
The growth of Russia’s power alarmed many European states. Augustus II
wished to take advantage of these fears to throw off Peter I’s tutelage and
regain Livonia. An anti-Russian alliance of England, Austria and Saxony
was concluded in Vienna in January 1719. It was intended to draw the
Commonwealth into the coalition by playing upon the dissatisfaction of
the gentry with the protracted presence of Russian troops in Poland. The
attempts of Augustus II to conduct an “emancipation policy” collapsed at
the Seyms of 1719-1720 and 1720. The evacuation of Russian forces reas-
sured public opinion and Poland refused to join the anti-Russian league.
Not only the opposition of the Hetmen, who were connected for a long time
with Russia, but the overwhelming majority of the gentry as well would not
hear of another war. Augustus, in his disappointment, began to devise plans
for a partition of Poland hoping to strengthen his power in a mutilated
country. Peter I not only rejected these plans, but revealed them to the public
in Poland. Thus the Tsar, as mediator and guarantor, was now defending
the territorial integrity of the Commonwealth and its freedom, that is the
existing system of government, and in particular free election. A vast but
passive country, demilitarized and neutralized, would ensure peace at Russia’s
western frontier. To that end Russia concluded a number of treaties guaran-
teeing Polish liberties and a free election of the king : with Prussia and with
Turkey in 1720, with Sweden in 1724 and with Austria in 1726. All these
treaties were aimed against Augustus II’s plans for the succession.
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE POLISH THRONE
Until the end of his life Augustus II persisted in vast political plans. He
aspired to obtain the throne of Courland for the Wettins, which encountered
Russia’s opposition ; as father-in-law of the Archduchess Marie-Josephine,
he was counting on a share for Saxony in the division of the Habsburg terri-
tories (Silesia) after the death of her uncle, Emperor Charles VI, and he
conducted negotiations with France to that end. His principal concern was
to secure the succession to the Polish throne for his son. He was playing all
the time with the idea of introducing a law making the monarchy hereditary
by a coup d’état. In view of the resistance of the Commonwealth and of
the neighbouring Powers these designs were only day dreams. Augustus also
continued to entertain schemes of partition—his last remarks on that subject
were uttered as late as three weeks before his death. King Frederick William I
of Prussia listened to them with delight, but the collusion of the king-electors
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE POLISH THRONE 23
were not sufficient to change the existing system of the Powers. Augustus’
multifarious negotiations did not inspire the trust of his partners.
The Saxon candidature had no chance of success in a free election in
view of the attitude of both the Poles and the Powers. As in 1697, however,
the odds suddenly turned in the Saxon’s favour because he emerged as the
only real contestant worth supporting against the French competitor.
One relic of the Northern War was Stanistaw Leszczynski’s royal title.
Although Leszczynski conducted secret and protracted negotiations with
Augustus II on renouncing his claims in return for an adequate compensa-
tion, the two parties never reached agreement. Leszczynski was hoping for
a change in the international situation and counted on surviving his rival.
After the conclusion of a peace between Russia and Sweden, and in the pe-
riod of growing antagonism between Augustus and Peter I, Stanistaw placed
his main hopes on Russia. It was elsewhere, however, that he found firm sup-
port. France had not given up the idea of revenge for her defeat in the
election of 1697. The Orleans faction contemplated obtaining the Polish
throne with Russian support. The French Regent, wishing to use Lesz-
czynski’s claims for the purpose of his own Polish policy, granted him
asylum in Alsace (1719). After the Regent’s death, French diplomacy at
once put up, in 1724, the candidature of Stanislaw whose only daughter
Maria was to marry a French royal prince and thereby bring a lateral branch
of the Bourbon family closer to the Polish succession. The candidate to Ma-
ria’s hand was first the Premier Louis Henri de Bourbon, but later it was
decided to marry her to King Louis XV himself (1725). From that moment
until the death of Augustus IJ, French diplomacy worked for eight years for
Leszczynski’s return to the throne.
Never before had a candidature vivente rege been prepared so long and
so carefully. Ambassador Monti achieved much success in Poland. He effec-
tively counteracted the consolidation of the Saxon’s position, chiefly through
a systematic disruption of the Seyms, in which French diplomacy cooperated
with Russia. France won over to Leszczynski’s cause the most influential—
and competing—coteries of magnates, the Potockis and Czartoryskis. Sta-
nistaw as an anti-King who had been imposed by Sweden, was not popular
during the Northern War. As the father-in-law of the King of France and
a “Piast” he now gained general sympathy which France was encouraging
with large sums of money. The task of French diplomacy in the internation-
al field was more difficult. In view of the basic antagonism between France
and Austria, a counter-move by the Emperor was to be envisaged. The sup-
port of Sweden and Turkey was sought, but these countries were weakened
and Turkey was involved in war against Persia. Russia’s position was of
crucial importance. It was believed in France that with the death of Peter I
(1725) the position of Russia as a power would collapse and therefore not too
much importance was attached to the negotiations with her. The attempts
at a rapprochement did not yield results. The main difficulty consisted in the
16*
244 THE CRISIS OF SOVEREIGNTY (1697-1763)
divergence of interests with regard to Turkey. France had traditionally
been a friend of the Porte, while Russia was her principal antagonist, espe-
cially after the Baltic problems had been settled. It was also feared in
Russia that Leszczynski’s return to the throne might contribute to incite an
undercurrent of revenge in Sweden. The result was that Russia remained
faithful to her anti-Turkish alliance with Austria (1726) which proved to
be one of the most durable alliances in the eighteenth century and of par-
ticular importance in Poland’s international situation.
In 1732, a secret treaty between Russia, Austria and Prussia was signed,
the so-called “Treaty of the Three Black Eagles”, which excluded the candi-
dature of both the Saxon and Leszczynski. The Powers declared themselves
in favour of some neutral candidate, either a “Piast” or the Infant of Portu-
gal. After the death of Augustus II on 1 February, 1733, however, Lesz-
ezynski’s chances in the royal! election proved so overwhelming, that the
new Elector of Saxony with a handful of court creatures at his disposal was
the only one who could cause a “conflict”. He was, of course, unable to
achieve anything without the intervention of the Powers. He purchased Rus-
sian intervention by promising the Duchy of Courland to the Tsarina Anna’s
favourite, Biron; with regard to the Emperor, the Elector renounced his
rights to the Hapsburg succession and, abandoning his father’s policy,
guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction.
The Saxon and Russian armies entered Poland forcing Leszczyhski to
withdraw to Gdansk. A handful of nobles under the protection of Russian
troops elected Augustus III King and a confederation was formed at his
side. On Leszczynski’s side the Confederation of Dzikéw was formed, but
Polish military activity was so weak and the superiority of the 30,000
Russians and 10,000 Saxons was so great that hostilities did not assume ma-
jor proportions. Before the capitulation of Gdansk, Leszczynski sought shelter
in Prussia ; Frederick William I broke with the Alliance of the Three Eagles
and, though lending no active support to Leszczynski, he nevertheless ex-
pected territorial rewards from him. The decision was to be brought about
by the European war called the War of the Polish Succession of 1733-1735
and the final peace treaty of 1738.
Under the slogan of defending the freedom of the Polish election, France,
Spain and Sardinia attacked Austria. To Spain and Sardinia Leszczyhski’s
cause was, of course, only a pretext ; for France it was the object of a po-
litical bargain. The victories of French armies on the Rhine and in Italy
could not produce a decision on the Vistula. The scant help sent by sea to
relieve Gdansk was of no practical consequence, while more extensive oper-
ations in the Baltic zone would have provoked England into joining the
war. Under such circumstances the military successes in the West were
used to dictate to Austria conditions profitable to France and honourable for
Leszczynski. He retained the title of King of Poland for life and received
the Duchy of Lorraine which became Queen Maria’s dowry. Augustus III
DEMILITARIZATION AND NEUTRALIZATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH 245
was recognized and the “Pacification Seym” of 1736 brought about a normal-
ization of conditions in Poland. The Saxon and Russian troops left the
country.
The new King, an indolent ruler of mediocre abilities, was the opposite
of his dynamic and adventurous father. The Saxon Minister Brith] governed
on his behalf. During Augustus III’s reign, the idle King did not infringe the
noble liberties and the aspirations of the Court were limited to keeping
the Polish throne for the Saxon dynasty. Yet, during the thirty years of
Augustus III’s reign, the Poles would now and again plan confederations
against the King and the Saxon schemes of succession and would contemplate
his dethronement. Abroad Stanistaw Leszczynski was slow to abandon hopes
for his return to the throne, and Louis XV’s secret diplomacy would be
contriving the secret du Roi, aimed at paving the way to Warsaw for
the Duke of Conti, the grandson of the French candidate of 1697. First Prus-
sia, later Russia were to dazzle the Polish magnates with expectations of the
crown. During the reign of Augustus III the struggle for the throne did not
assume such drastic forms as in his father’s time, but none the less the prece-
dents of double elections, two rival Kings and dethronements caused the po-
sition of the Polish King to be regarded lightly in the opinion of the Com-
monwealth and of Europe. The succession crisis entered a chronic phase.
DEMILITARIZATION AND NEUTRALIZATION
OF THE COMMONWEALTH
The reign of Augustus II saw a series of wars in which the neighbours of
the Commonwealth took part. The war of the Polish Succession had not yet
ended when the war of Russia and Austria against Turkey (1735-1739)
broke out. In 1740-1742 came the First Silesian War which overlapped with
the Russian-Swedish War (1741-1743). In 1744-1745 the Second Silesian
War was fought, as a campaign subsidiary to the general war of the
Austrian Succession (1740-1748). Finally, eight years of peace, were fol-
lowed by the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763). Augustus III, as the Elector of
Saxony, took part in the Silesian Wars and in the Seven Years’ War. Saxo-
ny was twice invaded by Prussia ; the Commonwealth remained neutral, but
its neutrality was not respected by the belligerents. For the Tsar’s army, the
way to Balkan and German battlefields led across Poland. It was during
the Seven Years’ War that Russian troops established themselves in the
Commonwealth, especially in Pomerania, for good. Prussian armies repeated-
ly forced their way into Poland, while Austrian forces did so sporadical-
ly. Upon those infringements of their frontiers, the Poles lodged ineffective
protests and remained neutral.
The gentry society of the eighteenth century professed anti-militarism
and pacifism. It had-no thought of territorial expansion. The magnates of
the borderlands still nourished feelings of nostalgia for the provinces lost
246 THE CRISIS OF SOVEREIGNTY (1697-1763)
in the East, but since the times of Peter IJ all talk of “torn away lands” was
sheer rhetoric. It was not in Poland but in Saxony that plans were being
made for a Silesian “bridge” to connect the Electorate with the Common-
wealth (Briihl revived these Silesian designs during the wars with Frede-
rick II). It was outside Poland, too, that plans were born for incorporating
East Prussia into Poland in return for a compensation in Byelorussia or
the Ukraine for Russia (Bestuzhev’s plans of 1745 and 1756). The Poles did
not think of expanding or shifting their frontiers, but feared foreign an-
nexation. These fears were, however, not particularly strong. From the
experience of the Northern War and the collapse of Augustus II’s “grand
designs”, the conclusion had been drawn that the neighbouring Powers
were watching each other with suspicion and would not let plans of par-
tition be carried out. The threat to the fief of Courland alarmed Poland
as an expression more of the Wettin’s dynastic policy than of Russian
expansion. The Poles wished to maintain the territorial status quo, pro-
tected, as they believed, by Providence, by the Powers and, in the last resort
only by the mass-levy.
According to the republican ideology of the gentry the armed forces
ought to be strictly for defense. Such had always been the concept of the
mass-levy. Contrary to experience, much confidence was still placed in the
effectiveness of this anachronistic instrument (the myth of 200,000 armed
gentry). A numerous regular army, on the other hand, was considered
dangerous as a potential weapon of royal absolutism or despotism of the
Hetmen. The hardships suffered during the Northern War at the hands of
unpaid marauding soldiers were indelibly inscribed on the memory of the
gentry. A large regular army required taxes and recruitment—the gentry
were not eager to bear the costs or to release peasant serfs for the army.
The problem of taxation was moreover rendered more complex by the
abatements granted to the Ukrainian voivodships. These tax reductions, jus-
tified by the havoc which those provinces had suffered at the time of
the wars with Turkey and of the Cossack risings, were anachronistic py
the mid-eighteenth century, but the gentry of the borderlands insisted on
their privileges. The people of Great Poland, on the other hand, would not
hear of increase in taxes until an equalization of burdens took place. This
was the rock on which all plans for an expansion of the army were to
founder. An increase in the army was also dependent on the changing inter-
national situation. It was to strengthen not only the Court or the Hetmen,
but also the Powers with which the Court or the Hetmen wished to enter
into alliance. Every plan to increase the army met with the opposition not
only of the internal political forces, but also of foreign political factors.
Before the outbreak of the Northern War, the Commonwealth had an
army which in principle consisted of 25,000 men, but was only 18,000
strong in reality, a trifle compared to other armies of the time. Even more
important was the fact that in the course of the eighteenth century, the
THE SYSTEM OF ‘‘ANARCHY” 247
strength of armies elsewhere was constantly growing, whereas in Poland
the opposite occurred. The Seym of 1717 carried out a reduction of the
army to just over ten thousand, with the outdated old-style Polish cavalry
amounting to almost a half of it. An attempt to increase the army, made
at the Seym of 1718, was blocked by the opposition of the Hetmen and was
not resumed again until the end of the reign of Augustus II. Under his son the
Seyms witnessed passionate pleas in favour of a stronger army (especially
in the years 1736-1748), connected with efforts to make Poland’s foreign
policy more active. The policy of the Court and of the cliques of magnates
was fluid and equivocal, but it can be said that generally the Court aimed
in principle at an alliance with Russia and Austria while the opposition
(the Potockis) sought connexions with Prussia, Sweden, Turkey and
France. The most serious confrontation took place at the Seym of 1744.
Saxony, Russia and Austria strove to draw Poland into the anti-Prussian
alliance and, for this reason supported not only an increase of the army but
other reforms as well. The Potockis broke up the Seym with the coopera-
tion of French and Prussian diplomacy. The Seyms of 1746, 1748 and 1750
were broken up under similar circumstances. In the course of these clashes
the Potockis’ plans for a confederation failed to be implemented, but the at-
tempts of the Court to achieve reforms also collapsed. The reversal of alli-
ances, preceding the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War, completely upset the
political balance of forces outside Poland. Plans for confederations, alliances
and enlarging the army dissolved completely in the chaos of factional strug-
gle and foreign intrigue.
Throughout all the fluctuations prompted by expediency, the Common-
wealth of Augustus III came to play a stabilizing role in the “European
system”. The demilitarization and neutralization of Poland in fact suited
the interests of all her neighbours. The political game of the Powers was
limited to preventing an inert Commonwealth from being subordinated to
the influence of one side or another. Whereas, under Peter I it appeared
that a Russian protectorate would be established in Poland, in the plans of
the Court of Versailles Poland was to take an active part, with Sweden and
Turkey, in the France’s system of eastern alliances. After the experience of
several decades a system of balance and compromise was firmly established.
This suited the Polish gentry quite well. The mechanism of inertia worked
almost automatically and, if need be, disturbance of the balance could easily
be adjusted by diplomatic pressure and corruption. The breaking-up of
a Seym sufficed to secure this solution.
‘THE SYSTEM OF “ANARCHY”
During the reign of Augustus II, eight Seyms completed their work, but ten
were broken up. Under Augustus III the second “Pacification Seym” (1736)
248 THE CRISIS OF SOVEREIGNTY (1697-1763)
was the only one to be held while the remainder, thirteen in all, were
broken up. In breaking up Seyms Russian, Prussian and French diplomacy
played the major part. France spent most money on that because in view
of the distance involved, money was the chief argument in support of her
policy in Poland, whereas Poland’s neighbours had other means of pres-
sure and persuasion at their disposal. A study of diplomatic correspondence
may give the impression that Polish magnates were puppets pulled by
strings from distant capitals, and that political struggles in Poland were
waged by a Muscovite, a Prussian or a French party, with the outcome of
sessions of the Seym decided by roubles, thalers and louis d’or. This would
be, however, an over-simplified picture. The French, when drawing up the
dismal balance sheet of their expenditure, came to the conclusion that those
Seyms would still have been broken up, even if they had spent more money
on making Seyms workable than in breaking them up.
The Polish nobles became accustomed to accepting foreign money and
to discussing political action with representatives of the Powers, but they
were governed in fact by their own family ambitions and interests. The un-
challenged system of unrestrained licence of the magnates caused anarchy.
Violence at elections and subsequent arbitration between “majesty” and “‘free-
dom”, paved the way for the omnipotence of the oligarchs. The long process
of its growth reaches its peak under Augustus III]. The Saxon Kings were
incapable of creating a Polish centre of government. Henceforth foreign in-
fluence from being a decisive factor changed into being an instrument used
by the Polish nobles in their internal intrigues. The Potockis or Czartorys-
kis involved half of Europe in their affairs. The dividing line between doing
suit and service to foreign reason of State and harnessing foreign forces
in service of one’s own family interests became blurred. The reconstruction
of a centre of Poland’s raison d’état could not come from Dresden but, un-
der the existing conditions, only from one group of magnates gaining ascend-
ancy. In such a situation the task of the Powers, interested in maintaining the
status quo, was not difficult when the family groups themselves watched
each other with suspicion.
The recovery of the south-eastern borderlands under the treaty of Karto-
wice and the cessation of Cossack and Tartar wars brought about a period
of flourishing development for the Ukrainian latifundia. The “Wild Plains”
were brought under cultivation. Skirmishes with the maraudering hajda-
maks, remnants of the Cossacks engaging in brigandage, were but a far cry
from the wars and havoc that had filled the seventeenth century. At the time
of the contest for the eastern borderlands the magnates had certain common
aims demanding a coordinated action with the State. Now, this unifying fac-
tor ceased to operate. All that remained was family policy and the struggle
for riches and honours.
In the middle of the eighteenth century Polish magnates were considered
to be the richest private individuals in Europe, next to the English aristocra-
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The names of the residences (first) and of the families to whom they belonged (second) are given below :
Baranéw—Leszezynski ; Biata—Radziwill ; Biala Cerkiew—Branicki (Korczak) ; Bialaczéw—Matlachowski ;
Bialystok—Branicki (Gryf) ; Biezut—Zamoyski ; Birze—Radziwil! ; Brody—Koniecpolski ; Buczacz—Potocki ;
Dukla—Mniszech ; Goluch6w—Ossolitski ; Jablonna—Poniatowski ; Kiejdany—Radziwill ; Kleck—Radziwilt ;
Koden—Sapieha ; Konskie—Malachowski ; Korsut—Poniatowski ; Korzec—Czartoryski ; Krasiczyn—Krasicki ;
Krystynopol—Potocki ; Krzyztopér—Ossolitski ; Leszno—Leszczyaski, later Sutkhowski ; Ladcut—Lubomirski ;
Lubny—Wisniowiecki ; Niebor6w—Radziwiil ; NieSwiez—Radziwill ; Olyka—Radziwitt ; Opole—Lubomirski ;
' Otwock—Bielifski ; Podhorce—Koniecpolski, later Sobieski, still lacer Rzewuski ; Przeworsk—Lubomirski ;
: Pulawy—Czartoryski ; Rydzyna—Leszezynski, later Suikowski ; Rytwiany—OpaliAski ; RzeszSw—Lubomir-
ski ; Siedlee—Czartoryski, later Oginski ; Sieniawa—Sieniawski, later Czartoryski ; Sierakéw—Opaliaski ;
P Slonim—Oginski ; Stuck—Radziwilt ; Stanistaw6w—Potocki ; Tulezyn—Patocki ; Wisnicz—Lubomirski ; Wi§-
oa niowiec—Wisniowiecki, later Mniszech ; Wotezyn—Czartoryski, later Poniatowski ; Zamosé—Zamoyski ;
Zlocz6w—Sobieski ; Z6!kiew—Sobieski.
cy. The source of their wealth, apart from hereditary fortune, lay in the
acquisition of lucrative sinecures. In the Saxon period competition for va-
cant offices and ecclesiastical benefices was the main driving force in poli-
tical activity. Distribution of vacant offices was the only real prerogative of
250 THE CRISIS OF SOVEREIGNTY (1697-1763)
the Crown, but manoeuvering with this power was insufficient to create a
stable Court party. Appointments were made for life so that a magnate, once
provided for, was not obliged to obey the Court any longer. On the other
hand, too much favour to one clique could intensify the opposition on the part
of other pretenders to the danger of internal peace. The Saxons came finally
to accept the Polish system and were concerned chiefly with the future of
their dynasty. To that end it was necessary not to estrange the influential no-
bles in the various parties. The controller of patronage Briihl, who received
fees from the applicants, was governed by personal interests. As a result,
the patronage policy of the Court, like the influence of foreign Powers, con-
tributed to the maintaining of a balance among the cliques of the magnates.
Towards the end of Augustus II’s reign, three men connected by family
ties occupied an outstanding place because of their particular ability and
a statesmanlike approach to politics. They were the brothers Michat and
August Czartoryski and their brother-in-law Stanislaw Poniatowski. The
Czartoryskis traced their descent to an ancient princely family but, as far as
fortune and honours were concerned, they were newcomers to the oligar-
chy. They owed the start in life to the patronage of the Saxon minister
Flemming. Poniatowski rose from the medium gentry by revealing his mil-
itary and diplomatic talents during the Northern War. The marriage in
1731 of August Czartoryski to Poland’s richest heiress, Zofia Sieniawska,
brought an enormous fortune to the family. As supporters of the Court
they strove to obtain high office, but met with fierce resistance form the old
oligarchy, especially from the Potockis. To prevent Poniatowski from
receiving the vacant Hetman’s baton the Potockis caused the breaking-up of
the last few Seyms under Augustus II. The Czartoryskis lent support to
the King, but not to the Saxon plans of succession because they them-
selves aspired to the crown. During the interregnum they sided with Lesz-
czynski who was no longer young and had no male heir. After the Saxon’s
victory, they regained influence at the Court and until 1748 tried in vain to
push through reforms. The so-called “republicans” or “patriots”, which in
Poland denoted groups opposed to the Court, with the Potockis at their
head, successfully checked these efforts, but “The Family”, the name com-
monly used for the Czartoryskis and Poniatowskis, because for so many
years they had had a share in the State patronage, could promote their
friends and consolidate their position in the country.
The Czartoryski party was notable for its coherence and high intellectu-
al standards, but in the factional struggle they resorted to the same means as
their adversaries. They entered into collusion with foreign Powers, planned
confederations and broke up Seyms. From 1748 the Seym ceased to pro-
vide a platform to be used in the struggle for reform. The idea of achieving
anything by parliamentary action was abandoned and the faction struggle
was concentrated in the Tribunals. Efforts to dominate the administration of
justice in order to settle accounts for the clique resulted in the complete
WESTERN POMERANIA AND SILESIA UNDER PRUSSIAN RULE 251
decay of political life. From 1750 the Court and the Czartoryskis drifted
apart. Briihl grew weary of their unsuccessful attempts at reform, to which
the Saxon court attached no great importance, while “The Family’s” arbi-
trary policy with regard to State appointments was burdensome to him. The
Saxon minister found a more subtle dispenser of patronage in the person of
his own son-in-law, Jerzy Mniszech. Owing to Mniszech’s efforts an under-
standing was reached between the Court and the Potockis ; the Czartorys-
kis passed into opposition. Under the rule of the so-called Mniszech cama-
rilla political life in Poland became a hollow shell. Indeed, it is difficult
to speak about programmes and orientation in foreign affairs even in terms
of parties. The Commonwealth, having in fact neither a King nor a Seym,
became a conglomeration of secular and ecclesiastical latifundia and gentry
estates. The events which aroused public interest, were the scandals of the
Tribunals, big court cases, appointments, grain prices, religious ceremonies,
marriages among the magnates and their even more frequent divorces.
Such was to the satisfaction of Europe the condition of the Common-
wealth. Not only Poland’s neighbours (Russia, Prussia, Austria and Turkey)
but France also arrived at the conclusion that any change in the Common-
wealth would be dangerous. French diplomacy was the first to introduce the
term “Polish anarchy” ; it entered the political vocabulary as the description
of a state of things which was looked upon with favour because it guaranteed
a convenient demilitarization of the Commonwealth. The Poles themselves
coined a brief, and not altogether disapproving definition of their situation :
“Poland stands by anarchy” (Polska nierzqgdem stoi). This maxim was not as
absurd as is commonly believed. While the “anarchic” Poland presented the
sad picture of a political market place, she nevertheless “stood” in the sense
that her defenseless frontiers, though open to the entry of foreign troops,
were not threatened with annexations. The Powers not only watched over Po-
land’s neutrality ; they were also on the alert lest any one of them should
expand at her expense.
WESTERN POMERANIA AND SILESIA
UNDER PRUSSIAN RULE
Though the Commonwealth suffered no territorial loss in the Saxon ti-
mes, momentous and dangerous changes occurred none the less in the we-
stern teritories which had been lost by Poland in the Middle Ages. The deve-
lopment of the Brandenburg-Prussian State reached its climax when Prus-
sia became an European power.
Th> division of Western Pomerania between Sweden and Brandenburg
in 1648 did not satisfy the aspirations of the Hohenzollerns, who made several
attempts in the second half of the seventeenth century to obtain possession
252 THE CRISIS OF SOVEREIGNTY (1697-1763)
of the mouth of the Odra. This goal was reached during the Northern War.
The Prussian army occupied Szczecin in 1713; under the peace treaty of
1720, Sweden was forced to cede part of Western Pomerania including Szcze-
cin to Prussia. The government proceeded with the elimination of Pomerani-
an particularism re-organizing the province, with strongly fortified Szczecin
as its capital (1724). This thinly populated agricultural country of 300-400
thousand inhabitants became a domain of junker estates, with its sandy soil
bearing not only rye and potatoes, but supplying the Prussian army with
cadres of professional officers and with regiments of tough Pomeranian grena-
diers. Gaining the command of the mouth of the Odra, gave Prussia the con-
trol of the Baltic gateway of the Warta basin. Twenty years later the whole
of the Odra was to become a Prussian river.
In the early part of the eighteenth century, Silesia recovered from the
devastation of the Thirty Years’ War. Habsburg rule was consolidated at
the expense of feudal particularism by the action of the Counter-Refor-
mation. The German element was strengthened by an influx of Austrian
nobles, bureaucrats and the Jesuits. Churches were being taken away from
the Protestants, and this was connected with the ousting of the Polish lan-
guage from churches. In the long run the consolidation of Roman-Catholi-
cism in Silesia, a part of which belonged to the diocese of Cracow, with the
diocese of Wroclaw also subordinated to the Warsaw nuncio, was to prove
advantageous to the survival of the Polish and Roman-Catholic conscio-
usness of the Silesian people at the time when the province came under the
rule of Protestant Prussia. Class conflicts of great intensity in the eighteenth
century Silesia set the Polish peasants against the German gentry. For
economic reasons the need to know Polish was felt even among the German
burghers. Polish schools and printing presses continued to exist, and the
enrolment of students at Cracow University in 1720-1780 remained on
a level equal to that of the first half of the seventeenth century. With regard
to language Silesia was largely still predominantly Polish in the middle of
the eighteenth century. From the time of Sobieski, however, the Common-
wealth did not care for the forgotten provinces in the West. Now, with
the Austrian succession in question (after the death of Emperor Charles VI),
Frederick II, with an ingenuity for legal chicanery typical of his family
voiced the claim of Brandenburg to the inheritance of Silesia after the
Silesian Piasts. His decisive argument consisted of an army of 100,000 men.
The annexation of Silesia accomplished’in 1740, sanctioned in 1742
and finally confirmed in 1763 brought to the Hohenzollern monarchy a
country which was vast (36,000 sq.km), populous (1,500,000 inhabitants)
and rich. Frederick II now had not only new areas from which to recruit
his soldiers and levy taxes but an industrious army of Silesian weavers
and a multitude of miners and metal-workers whose number was growing
rapidly. The Silesian metallurgical industry became the armoury of Prussia.
This land, wedged-in between Saxony, Bohemia, Moravia and Poland, was
SARMATIAN AND CATHOLIC CONFORMISM 253
for a quarter of a century the centre of strife in Europe, a stake in Prussia’s
power policy. The loss of Silesia would have ended the dreams of Hohen-
zollern power ; the keeping of that province was the starting point for
the further “rounding off” of their dominion.
For 300 years, the tradition of encroachments inherited from the
Teutonic Order had been looming along the intricate course of the frontier
between the Commonwealth and the Brandenburg-Prussian State. Now,
a pincer arm was closing tight all the way from Wschowa to Pszczyna.
The Electors of Brandenburg had already had under their sceptre the East-
Prussian Mazurians, Lithuanians and the Pomeranian Kashubians, not to
mention the Germanized Slavs. With the annexation of Silesia, Frederick II
took another resolute step towards building a multi-national Hohenzollern
power on Slavonic land. Prussia’s further progress depended on a change
in the European system with regard to Poland; in short, the replacement
of the doctrine of static balance (anarchy) by the doctrine of dynamic
balance (partition). A change of system in turn depended on what was
going to happen within the Commonwealth.
SARMATIAN AND CATHOLIC CONFORMISM
In spite of the paralysis, or even atrophy, of its central government, regional
particularism was not developed in the Commonwealth. A far-reaching dif-
ferentiation among the peasant masses and burghers still prevailed in the
multinational State, but the “gentry nation” was growing more and more
homogeneous in its outlook. The process of Polonizing the Ruthenian no-
bility was completed (in 1697, Ruthenian was abandoned in judicial records).
The Polish, Lithuanian and Ruthenian gentry, interrelated by thousands of
family ties, were assimilated into one big family of brother nobles. The
cultural patterns of Sarmatism, that is of the exclusively Polish Baroque,
shaped in the seventeenth century, did not change in the first half of the
eighteenth century, but were spreading and consolidating. Various factors
worked for this intellectual conformism.
A Polish gentleman was called upon to speak on public matters and
was brought up with this public duty in view. Elector of kings, potentially
a member of Parliament and actual member of local diets, he should hold
or, at least, voice some opinions. Although Seyms were broken up and under
Augustus III there even came to the breaking-up of a Tribunal (1749),
the local diets were held and lenghty instructions were drawn up at their
sessions. Deputies and delegates from all over the country convened, made
speeches and mingled with each other. A knightly estate in name, but in
fact a community of landowners and jurists, settling their disputes under
the land law, which was becoming more and more uniform in the Crown
254 THE CRISIS OF SOVEREIGNTY (1697-1763)
and in Lithuania, the gentry constituted a quarrelsome, but basically harmo-
nious group used to obeying “elder brothers”. The gentlemen-citizens voiced
opinions which could not change anything under the existing conditions of
anarchy but which one was supposed to utter. Patriotic ranting produced
clichés which sounded similar, although spoken with a different accent, in
one provincial town or anothef. In this way, generally accepted and obliga-
tory axioms were inculcated in their minds, maxims on the honour of noble
blood, on Golden Freedom, on despotism, the depravity of foreigners and the
horror of heresy. ,
Besides an uniform judiciary and the declarative nature of political ac-
tivity, another powerful factor in intellectual conformism was Jesuit educa-
tion. Whether his manor was in one corner of the country or another, the
average nobleman wrote and thought in the way he had been taught by
the Jesuit fathers. The fathers proclaimed that all the calamities afflicting
Poland were divine chastisement for indulging in heresy. Meanwhile, new
grievances and new fears accumulated against the dissenters.
During the Northern War, as in the time of “the Deluge”, dissenters
sought Swedish protection. Saxon troops, against which the Confederation
of Tarnogréd was formed, were Lutheran. Saxons, backed by the Court,
sought naturalization as Polish nobles and competed for Polish offices.
Peter I was the protector of the Orthodox Church and an enemy of the
Uniates. The Commonwealth, so submissive to the Powers, still behaved
uncompromisingly in matters of religion. The Dumb Seym of 1717 passed
a number of restrictions for dissenters. In 1724, a violent clash occurred
between students of the Jesuit school and the Protestant burghers in Torun.
Sentenced by the royal (assessorial) court, the Mayor of Torun and 9 burgh-
ers were beheaded. The Torun affair aroused great resentment in Europe
and had a powerful effect in shaping the unfavourable opinion on Poland
which took root in Protestant countries and among the “philosophers”.
This opinion was certainly exaggerated, but it is a fact that Poland ceased
to be the mainstay of religious tolerance, which she had been in the six-
teenth century ; in comparison with the rest of Europe, however, Poland
remained a relatively tolerant country in the eighteenth century. In the West
there has often been some confusion concerning the two concepts of
religious toleration and of equality of rights of the dissenters. The execution
of Torun was a unique event and was exploited against Poland by an ill
disposed propaganda. Poland was at this moment threatened with an inter-
vention by Russia, Prussia and England in defense of the dissenters. Ex-
ceptionally, with regard to this issue an understanding was arrived at
between the King and the Commonwealth. At the Convocation Seym of
1733, ic was resolved to bar dissenters from all offices, from membership
of the Seym and from the function of deputies in the Tribunals. The Protes-
tant gentry against which these resolutions were aimed, was then already
very small in number.
SARMATIAN AND CATHOLIC CONFORMISM 255
The struggle against the Orthodox Church, the faith of Ukrainian and
Byelorussian peasants, was of a different character. The treaty of 1686 placed
the members of the Orthodox Church in Poland under the protection of Rus-
sia, but at the turn of the seventeenth century all the Orthodox hierarchy in
Poland turned Uniate. It was not until 1720 that an Orthodox episcopate was
established in Mohyléw by Peter I. The religious situation in the Ukraine
and Byelorussia was fluid. The offensive of the Union did not cease in spite
of Russian opposition, and the border gentry almost all adopted the Latin
rite. The terms “Pole” and “Roman Catholic” were becoming more and more
synonymous.
In the first half of the eighteenth century, the religious feeling of the peo-
ple manifested itself in their taste for Church ceremonial and in religious
practices which became a part of customs and tradition. Processions, saints’
days, rigorous fasts and sumptuously celebrated sacred festivals were an
annual feature. Home prayers marked weekdays. The need to belong to
a community was met by fraternities and Third Orders. The cult of the
Virgin was widespread and its most spectacular displays were the crownings
of the effigies of the Virgin Mary, with the first coronation taking place in
Czestochowa in 1717. The Polish religious rite had its own distinct pattern,
with much in common with the Italian or Spanish Catholicism but was less
marked by clericalism than in those Latin countries. The clergy were numer-
ous and affluent, but for the most part not particularly scholarly ; differing
in the colour of their robes but not in their theological views, they played
of course an important part as ministers of a cult that permeated the life
of the nation. Yet, the friar with a collecting bag bowed low when entering
the manor and the squire treated the parish priest as his personal chaplain.
The clergy, greatly differentiated from the bishops of the senatorial order
down to the poor plebeians in the rural parishes, occupied an intermediate
social status half-way between the knightly estate and the people.
In spite of the undoubtedly well-grounded Roman-Catholic orthodoxy
and the growth of intolerance and excessive piety in Poland of the Saxon per-
iod, the divergence between gentry and clergy and between the Common-
wealth and the Vatican still smouldered. In the Catholic monarchies of the
eighteenth century, relations between Church and State were often strained,
but these matters took place on a high level between the Most Christian
King or His Catholic Majesty on the one hand and the Hierarchy or Rome
on the other, or else they took the form of doctrinal un-orthodoxy, like
Jansenism in France. In republican Poland the collective opinion of orthodox
and pious gentry prevailed instead. Although the gentry rejected heresy,
the tradition of the sixteenth century disputes over tithes was still alive.
The wealth of the Church, which had grown enormously at the time of:
Counter-Reformation, and its independence irritated the rank-and-file of
the gentry, especially when taxes were considered. A programme of the
gentry’s demands was drawn up at the Seym of 1719 providing for taxes
256 THE CRISIS OF SOVEREIGNTY (1697-1763)
on the clergy for military purposes, a restriction of bequests to the Church,
a lowering of fees for religious services and of the interest rate on the debts
on landed estates owed to the Church, curtailment of the clergy’s right to
produce and sell spirits, a regulation of tithes and limitation of the compe-
tence of ecclesiastical courts. The conflict grew more acute in 1726 when the
Seym went as far as to demand that the Nuncio be recalled. The immediate
origin of the conflict was a dispute over appointments to certain abbacies ;
a compromise concordat was concluded in 1736 and put an end to a 10 years’
crisis. In reality, a number of issues were involved. Apart from the demands
of the gentry, there were also the aspirations of the Polish hierarchy to
abolish the Nuncio’s court in Warsaw ; an inveterate antagonism existed
between the Primates and the Nuncios. It was also desired to limit Church
payments remitted to Rome. Owing to the paralysis of the Seym under
Augustus III it was impossible to settle the relations between the Church
and the laity, but the programme had the strong support of public opinion.
The devout gentry exhibited a peculiar strait of anti-clericalism by condemn-
ing the legacies to the Church, the tithes, the inns belonging to priests, and
the fiscal and judicial immunities of the clergy.
The gentry in the Saxon period still repeated the traditional maxim of
the poorest country squire being equal to the voivode. This notion of equality
did not, however, prevent the gentry cringing and bowing cap-in-hand
to the magnates. While cultivating the “Sarmatian” way of life of their
ancestors, they no longer possessed their martial valour and spirit of adven-
ture. Vexatious litigation in court suited them better than prowess on the
field of battle. The typical diarist of the time was the faction agent and
constant litigant Matuszkiewicz rather than men like Pasek, the soldier.
Over the length and breadth of Poland men engaged in lawsuits, but “the
law is like a cobweb; the breeze will break through, but the fly will get
caught and be blamed”. Yet, in spite of the anarchy and the oppresive dom-
ination of the great nobles, a peculiar legalism became deeply ingrained
in the mentality of the gentry. The gentry had a highly developed sense of
their Sarmatian and Catholic identity and reacted sharply against anything
which endangered those values. Religious issues and slogans rather than politi-
cal ones could rouse them to violent and even desperate action. Accumulated
ideological residues remained idle in the Saxon times, but became an active
force in conservative republicanism in che near future. But the sense of
liberty was so deeply felt and linked to republicanism that it was later to
characterize the Poles in their struggle against oppression.
LATE-BAROQUE CULTURE
The configuration of the Sarmatian and Catholic way of life was accom-
plished amid cultural stagnation and an atrophy of creative intellectual
LATE-BAROQUE CULTURE 257
activity. The absence of change and new cultural contents was conducive
to a consolidation of existing and permanent cultural values. Attempts have
been made to explain that state of cultural ossification and regression in
various ways, by war-weariness, by xenophobia checking outside influences,
by a watering down in the “diluted culture” of the vast eastern territories
and by the peculiar features of Turkish influence. It seems, however, that
the main cause may be found in the preponderance of agrarian economy
and in the fact that the urban element remained culturally unassimilated.
The long decay of the towns reached its lowest point after the calamities
of the Northern War. Gdansk and other Pomeranian towns were still
relatively prosperous, but they were Lutheran and German. The numerous
Jewish communities constituting about 10 per cent of the population lived
in even stricter cultural isolation. In modern Europe new cultural values
were being created by the nobility who had settled in towns, the nobility
in civil service, by the bourgeoisie and skilled craftsmen, whereas the Poles
were a nation of landed gentry and serfs. The decay of the capital was par-
ticularly harmful to cultural life. The Warsaw of the Saxon times hardly
deserved to be called a capital city. The Court residing in Dresden not only
did not fulfil the role of a patron of arts and culture, but could not even be
a centre of social life. Warsaw was neither a royal residence nor a political
and administrative centre. Poland became one large province and cultural
life drifted idly along a parochial course.
Amid the monotony of the countryside there glittered the magnates’
residences and churches. The wealth of the magnates and clergy was dis-
played with grandiose ostentation. Palace and church architecture with
appropriate painting and decorative sculpture produced the impressive
works of the late Baroque period. In palace architecture, the Rococo style
of France and Dresden prevailed and was accompanied by landscape gar-
dening. The magnates built or rebuilt their many palaces in Warsaw, which,
however, were not their homes. Their actual residences, furnished with every
splendour, were constructed in the country. The first half of the eighteenth
century saw the flourishing of church architecture. In addition to the pre-
vailing Roman Baroque, Austrian and Czech styles affected more by the
Rococo than the Italian exerted an increasing influence on this architecture.
In the lively centre of Wilno, a north-Italian, influence may be traced. In
Warsaw and Lwow the classic Palladian elements also appeared. Amidst
the multitude of models and influences entirely original concepts took shape
and many beautiful churches were erected. In palace and ecclesiastical
architecture architects of foreign origin held the lead (Italians, Germans,
and Frenchmen), yet the number of Polish architects was growing. Stone
buildings gradually supplanted wood architecture. “In the most indigenous
wood architecture traditional and Gothic-like forms yielded to imitations
of Baroque stone architecture.
To a greater extent than in architecture, Polish tastes and the work of
17 History of Poland
288 THE CRISIS OF SOVEREIGNTY (1697-1763)
Polish artists found expression in interior decoration. While the fagades of
churches and palaces were often kept simple, condensed luxury prevailed
inside. In church sculpture stone and stucco were supplanted by wood.
Polish carvers (Antoni Fraczkiewicz, Piotr Kornecki and Antoni Osinski)
were outstanding in their mastery of expressive and dynamic figurative
sculpture. In altar painting the traditions of Roman Baroque prevailed
(Szymon Czechowicz, Tadeusz Konicz). In the field of court art the nobles
wished to have their palaces turned into little Versailles, with historical
Paintings patterned on ancient mythology and idealized official portraits.
At the same time, however, the realistic “Sarmatian” portrait was widely
cultivated (A. Misiowski, F. Rojecki, £. Orlowski), and to that we owe
a rich gallery of expressive and lively pictures of moustached gentlemen in
semi-oriental attire. The taste for the oriental found an expression in the
decorative arts, with rugs and carpets manufactured at home appearing
side by side with imported goods. The style of Polish country houses and
manors was established at this time; their walls hung with rugs, ornate
arms and Sarmatian portraits. Often their walls were covered with Baroque
polychromes.
The splendour of religious ceremonies and court functions called for
musical accompaniment along with plastic arts setting. Many magnates kept
Italian orchestras. Church music continued in accord with the Old-Polish
tradition (among the composers of the first half of the eighteenth century,
mention should be made of Grzegorz Gorczycki, music master at Wawel
Cathedral). Foreign visitors liked Polish music and dances. In the residences
of the magnates, court theatre was also cultivated. The activities of Waclaw
Rzewuski at Podhorce and of Urszula Radziwill at NieSwiez were outstand-
ing in this field. Among magnate courts, the most magnificent, it seems,
was Biatystok, the residence of Hetman Jan Klemens Branicki, who main-
tained a princely establishment, which has been called the Versailles of
Podlasie. The courts of the magnates were wide open to clientele among
the gentry. It was there that the youth received their “polishing-off”, like-
wise the churches played their part in fashioning taste. Church and court
art of the late Baroque period influenced the national taste inclined to
sumptuousness and decorativeness, and this not only within the gentry ; it
penetrated into folk art as well. The cross-influences from East and West
were instrumental in shaping a peculiarly and typical Polish style.
In the field of the fine arts, the Saxon times did not constitute a period
of regression, but produced a picturesque expression of the civilization of
the Roman-Catholic landed gentry. On the other hand, the stagnation of
cultural life was marked in literature. The nobles and the clergy might live
in ornate surroundings provided by architects, carvers, painters and masters
of carpet-making, but in the realm of literature, they seemed to be self-sufh-
cient. Much was being written and published but this rich production was
for the most part dilettante scribbling or catering for primitive tastes. With
Bialystok. Palace, 1728-1758
regard to form, the Baroque rhetoric degenerated into extreme mannerisms
in pursuit of a far-fetched complexity of expression. Authors and readers
amused themselves with bizarre versifications and childish diversions like
rebuses, cryptograms with double meanings and symbolism obtained by
means of typographical tricks. The Baroque manner achieved artistic results
when the complex form was combined with intensity of thought. In the
Saxon times this depth of thought was markedly weakened. With regard to
content, literature was dominated by devotional and panegyrical writings in
which the exaggerated cult of “armorial honours” and the glorification of al-
leged merit bordered on the grotesque. In epic poetry medieval and fantastic
romances of adventure prevailed together with biblical motifs, lives of
Saints and a legendary or naively heroicized history of Poland. The fiction
of these years was represented by long-winded and clumsy books, which
nevertheless showed the new demand for novels. The output of plays also
grew, in connexion with the development of the school theatre of Jesuit
and Piarist orders and of the court theatres maintained by the magnates.
First attempts at adapting the works of Moliére are to be noted. Satirical
accents can be found in the plays by Franciszek Bohomolec, but on the
whole the profuse moralism of the literature of this period directed its main
attack against adultery, with drastic pictures of debauchery. Literary acti-
vity was cultivated by many magnates, a multitude of priests and, a feature
which was new, by quite a number of women. Fresh and sincere notes
17%
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THE FORCES OF PROGRESS 261
appeared sometimes in lyrics. Almanacs issued by academicians in Cracow
and Zamos¢ spread astrological practices and gave advice on housekeeping
and medical matters, with snippets of practical knowledge alternating here
and there with superstition. This kind of literature for simple minds was
cultivated all over Europe, but in the Poland of the first half of the
eighteenth @entury it was the mainstream, not a margin, of literature. In
the West even educated minds were then sensitive to the charm of astrologi-
cal and alchemic speculation, but among the Polish gentry, vulgar superstition
was spreading. This literature reflected the mentality of a stabilized and
conformist society. Its trivial mannerism seemed shocking to the refined
taste of a later period. Yet this literature may still interest and entertain
the reader of today: it is not devoid of fantasy, imagery and expression,
of a peculiar, though mostly coarse kind of humour. Some works of this
epoch, like church hymns and proverbs, proved their vitality and became
a component of the national culture. There were other fields of literature
such as political writing and studies in history and law, on which the first
half of the eighteenth century produced works of merit.
In the history of Polish culture the six decades of the Saxon rule can be
roughly divided into two periods. Until about 1740 Poland lives on the
increasingly sterile intellectual legacy of the seventeenth century. In the
forties and fifties, in spite of the deep political degradation, a new trend
appeared to overcome the cultural stagnation.
THE FORCES OF PROGRESS
After the Northern War, the Saxon period was one of a peace of uncomm-
only long duration in Polish history. Sporadic fighting with the Saxons in
1714-1715, peripheral hostilities at the time of the two Kings 1733-1735,
and violation of the frontiers by troops of the neighbouring Powers during
the Silesian Wars and the Seven Years’ War, were the only minor disturb-
ances of a peace of more than 50 years. Not only demilitarized Poland was
not the scene of destructive hostilities, marches and billeting of armies, but
it did not have to bear the burdens of maintaining a large standing army,
either. Under these conditions a slow economic reconstruction took place.
The course of this recovery was determined by the still prevailing system of
a manor-farm and serf labour economy.
The convulsions of the Northern War were followed by a long-lasting
stabilization of the value of money and fixed prices. This phenomenon,
however, revealed not a dynamism of the economy, but its normalization,
free of crisis. The incomes of landowners showed an upward trend. In an
agricultural country, placing greatest emphasis on exports, the export of
grain through Gdansk serves as a reliable index. In 1700-1719 exports
averaged 20,000 lasts a year, in the period of postwar normalization they
Canaletto, Election of Stanislaw Augustus, 1778
262 THE CRISIS OF SOVEREIGNTY (1697-1763)
rose to 30,000, and reached 50,000 a year in the 1760’s. At the same time
exports by land increased, owing to demand for supplies for the armies
engaged in the Seven Years’ War. Both townspeople and peasants were
excluded from this growing prosperity whose major beneficiaries were the
gentry and clergy, and above all the great estates of the magnates and the
Church. The one-sided development of agricultural productior~ while the
decay of towns continued and peasants were confined to a subsistence econ-
omy, dislodged the marketing of crops and hindered the effectiveness of
the economic potential of the manor. In these circumstances, the propinacja
(the Polish term for the manor’s monopoly in producing and selling spirits)
assumed increased importance. However, a wider process of industrial-
ization also began.
It is not surprising that Poland was a country which attracted the par-
ticular interest of the French physiocrats in the second half of the eighteenth
century, because this almost exclusively agricultural country had applied
a peculiar liberalism for a long time. It was not an economic doctrine, but
a practice resulting in a quite exceptional concept in the period of mercan-
tilism, a complete absence of a national tariffs and industrial policy. The
matter assumes a different aspect, however, if we consider the Common:
wealth of the Saxon times as an amalgam of the magnates’ latifundia.
Throughout the period when the predominance of the magnates was at
its peak, the process of land concentration in the hands of great estate
owners continued. The Polish magnate was more a wealthy man than an
aristocrat. Wealth in land, however, was not always accompanied by ready
cash. Money was scarce in Poland, credit was expensive and not easily avail-
able. Therefore magnates in their search for cash became bankers themselves
after a fashion with whom their clientele among the gentry deposited money
at an interest. This concentration of money made it possible for the magnates
to spend huge sums for consumption purposes, for big transactions (purchase
of new estates) and investment. Princely states, as the latifundia could be
described, applied peculiar mercantilist policies, they were virtually closed
economic organisms. A magnate, with his own means of transport and his
own brokers, concentrated the exports and imports of a large agricultural
area in his own hands. Within this area there was no liberalism, but rather
a system of compulsion and monopoly. Owing to the use of serf labour
and the natural resources of the latifundia, it was possible to undertake
large capital investment not involving cash; it was possible at the same
time to divert the currency into the lord’s coffers by means of dues in
money or in kind, and of the monopoly in consumer goods.
Those were the conditions which led to the establishment of manufac-
tories in the latifundia. They produced not only for the manor’s own needs
(luxury goods), thereby reducing the import figures in the balance-sheet of
“foreign trade”, but for the internal market of the great estate as well
(simple textile products, glass and metalware). This increased even more
THE FORCES OF PROGRESS 263
the flow of currency to the lord’s treasury. Industrialized latifundia were
not 2 common feature in the first half of the eighteenth century, except
distilling and timber industries, but their growth revealed a significant trend.
There also appeared factories producing goods for the national market,
like the big manufactories of ornate waistbands worn by the gentry. Along
the slopes of the Swietokrzyskie Mountains, the iron industry was encour-
aged largely by the initiative of the Bishop of Cracow, Stanislaw Andrzej
Zaluski, and of the Matachowski family. In Great Poland a large region
of textile industry was developed, connected with Lower Silesia and the
Lubusz-District. In Warsaw, clearing houses transacting international busi-
ness on a large scale appeared to meet the needs of their customers among
the magnates.
The economic and social agrarianization of Poland had brought about
an acute shortage of trained workmen and specialists in many fields. In this
situation foreigners had to be called in ; they were introduced to the manu-
factories and to nobles’ courts as secretaries, librarians or private tutors.
The newcomers came mostly from Saxony ; among the most distinguished
were Mitzler de Kolof, an economist, journalist and publisher and Jan
Daniel Janisch-Janocki, the librarian of the Zaluski family, a noted biblio-
grapher. Poland also attracted Frenchmen, Italians and Swiss. Foreigners
not only entered the service of the nobility, but settled also in Poland as
businessmen. Warsaw became an active centre of a middle class of foreign
origin, but gravitating towards Polish culture.
The immigrant element joined in the efforts of the Polish intellectual
élite to overcome Sarmatian stagnation. This élite consisted of men who had
the means and opportunity to reach beyond the limited horizon of gentry
provincionalism. They sprang consequently from among the magnates and
clergy. These two groups had always maintained a lively contact with
abroad. The Franco-Polish court of Leszczynski in Lunéville and Nancy had
in the thirty years from 1737 to 1766 been a centre spreading French cul-
ture. The magnates visited Dresden, Paris and Italy and began to take
a livelier interest in Holland, England and Switzerland. These latter coun-
tries, which the Poles rated among republics, furnished examples of “orderly
freedom”. In the 1740’s free-masonry began to spread among the magnates,
enlivening international contact and breaking down conformist attitudes.
The clergy remained in constant and close contact with Rome which under
Benedict XIV saw attempts at the assimilation by the Church of certain
scientific achievements of the age of Enlightenment. New intellectual trends
in these years had a chance of penetrating into Poland only in so far as they
were approved by Church circles (the Holy See and the central authorities
of religious orders).
Persons in a position to make comparisons knew that there was nothing
to be proud of in the political and intellectual state of the Commonwealth.
Conscious aspirations for raising the country out of its sloth were born
264 THE CRISIS OF SOVEREIGNTY (1697-1763)
among these people. We are already acquainted with the political mechanism
which frustrated reform in the field of government. However, their efforts
found an expression in political writing, the only branch of literature to
produce in the time of Augustus III such outstanding works as Glos Wolny
(Free Voice), published by Leszczynski (probably not written by the King
himself, but by the circle of his adherents), List ziemianina (A Landowner’s
Letter) by Stanistaw Poniatowski, Anatomia Rzeczypospolite; (Anatomy
of the Commonwealth) by Stefan Garczynski and, above all, Stanislaw
Konarski’s O skutecznym rad sposobie (A Way to Effective Counsels).
A certain animation in scientific research work found distinguished patrons
in the brothers Zaluski: Andrzej Stanistaw, Bishop of Cracow, and Jdézef
Andrzej, Bishop of Kiev, founders of the magnificent Zatuski Library in
Warsaw. In the field of historical and legal sciences prominent figures were
Gotfryd Lengnich from Gdansk, the Jesuit Kasper Niesiecki, and the Pia-
rists Maciej Dogiel and Konarski. Reforms in the educational system were,
however, of greatest importance.
These reforms are associated with the name of the Piarist Stanislaw
Konarski. The Collegium Nobilium, established by him in Warsaw in 1740,
was not a large school but was a model, an example for others to follow.
The general reform in the Piarist schools carried out by Konarski in 1754
was of wider importance. The Jesuits followed the Piarists. They established
select colleges for young gentlemen modelled on the Collegium Nobilium,
in Lwéw, Wilno, Ostrég, Warsaw, Lublin and Poznan. At about the same
time as the reform of Piarist schools, in the 1750’s a modernization of in-
struction in all Jesuit schools was carried out. Cracow University also began
to emerge from a long period of stagnation. Under the episcopate of Andrzej
Stanistaw Zaluski, who as Bishop of Cracow was Chancellor of the Uni-
versity, its standards rose, especially in the Faculty of Law. The connexion
of the University with its network of secondary schools grew stronger.
These reforms were preceded by a considerable expansion of secondary
education in the number of both schools and pupils. At the end of the
seventeenth century there were 9 Piarist schools but by about 1760 their
number has risen to 29. As for the Jesuit schools, their growth may be shown
in the following table :
| Size of school
Vent large medium small total
No. of | No. of | No. of | No. of | No. of | No. of | No. of | No. of
schools | pupils | schools | pupils | schools | pupils | schools | pupils
1700 | 8 | 4000 16 4000 22 | 2200 i 46 | 10,200
—— - — — -- —_- - — | | a —_-— —--
1770 | 17 | 8500 20 5000 29 | 2900 | 66 | 16,400 |
THE POLITICAL DEADLOCK 265
The number of teachers (equivalent to the number of classes) in the
Jesuit schools grew even faster, from 244 in 1700, to 417 in 1773, which
proves that the standard of schools was rising.
Whatever might be said of the curricula and the standards of instruc-
tion (especially prior to the reforms of the 1750’s), the growth in numbers
of the secondary schools was one of the determinant factors in the coming
cultural revival.
The personalities of Stanislaw Konarski, the great political writer and
educator, or Andrzej Zatuski, Chancellor of the Crown, the political col-
laborator of the Czartoryskis and the reformer of Cracow University, show
how politics and education joined hands to carry out a reform of institutions
and to spread general education.
THE POLITICAL DEADLOCK
The French Resident in Warsaw, Hennin, wrote in 1763 : “One would need
volumes to present all that is being said and planned here. Confusion prevails
in peoples’ minds. No nation has ever been more deserving of sympathy. One
is either a Russian or a Saxon—no one is a Pole. Inherent in the situation
of this Commonwealth is a dilemma equal to the squaring of the circle.
I fear that it will prove equally impossible to assure the happiness of this
people, and then it would only remain to wish them eternal torpidity in
their weakness and laxity”.
Forces of revival were gathering in Poland, but their process of crystal-
lization was extremely difficult. Among the magnates “The Family” of: the
Czartoryskis and Poniatowskis had no monopoly of reform ideas. Bold
ideas and initiative were to come from the Potockis also, especially from
Antoni, voivode of Belz. The wise counsels of Stanistaw Konarski were
listened to in the “republican” circles around Hetman Branicki. The modern
administrative practices of the Saxons gained adherents in court circles.
But the rivalries of the oligarchical cliques held the balance and remained
in deadlock. While individual magnates constituted the most enlightened and
modern element in the Sarmatian Commonwealth, the magnate group as
a whole made any change impossible. The liberum veto in the service of fac-
tional intrigue was an obstacle which could not be surmounted. In the four
volumes of his well-known work O skutecznym rad sposobie Stanistaw
Konarski demonstrated the absurdity of the system of the unanimous vote.
The bishops were discussing the use of religious sanctions against those who
committed the “hideous sin” of breaking up the Seyms. Feelings of bitterness,
shame and moral indignation were rising, but there was no practical solution
unless one chose a coup d’état by forming a confederation, which would
mean civil war. In view of the age-old connexion of the magnates with
266 THE CRISIS OF SOVEREIGNTY (1697-1763)
foreign courts and the interest of those courts in Poland’s internal situation,
a coup d’état was unthinkable without foreign interference and a civil
war was bound to bring about a multilateral foreign intervention. After sixty
years of the union of Poland and Saxony and anarchy nursed from outside,
the Poles lost the ability as well as the power to solve their internal problems
by themselves.
The formula that perpetuated the status quo, was the personal union
of Poland and Saxony. At the time of the Seven: Years’ War, all the Powers
that had an influence in the affairs of the Commonwealth, as well as the
Holy See, which always pinned its hopes on the union for the progress of
Roman-Catholicism in Saxony, favoured this personal union. Even Louis
XV, having connected himself with the Wettins by the marriage of the
Dauphin with the daughter of Augustus III and given up an active policy
in Poland, finally abandoned the policy of the secret du Roi and declared
for the Saxon succession, though with the retention of a free election. Augus-
tus III was old and infirm and the time has come to consider the succession.
The initial step towards the consolidation of the Saxon position in Poland
was made when Prince Charles, Augustus III’s son, took over the Duchy of
Courland in 1758 with Tsarina Elisabeth’s consent.
The Courland investiture became the cause of the final and radical
breach of “The Family” with the Court and dynasty. The Czartoryskis and
Poniatowskis decided to oppose by all means the perpetuation of the union
and of the status quo. They had the support of a considerable section of the
gentry, amongst whom anti-Saxon feelings ran high. During the Seven Years’
War Poland was plunged into an acute financial crisis. In conquered Saxony
Frederick II got hold of the mint which coined Polish money and began to
issue debased coins on a large scale. The inundation of the country with
depreciated money and a sudden and sharp rise of prices caused chaos.
Among those who had their fingers in the pie were the Saxon jobbers as
well as treasurers connected with Briihl. The gentry, accustomed to stable
economic relations, condemned the Saxons for causing all the trouble by
their war with Prussia and by their actual or supposed intrigues. “The
Family” had a strong party at their disposal and the monetary crisis brought
about acute tension in the country ; it was a shock to Sarmatian quietism.
This was not enough, however, to break the political deadlock.
The crisis in Polish affairs was to find its solution, as had happened so
many times before in the eighteenth century, from outside Poland.
Chapter XI
TENTATIVE REFORMS
UNDER RUSSIA’S TUTELAGE
(1763-1788)
THE RUSSO-PRUSSIAN ALLIANCE
The abrupt turn in Russian policy after the death of Tsarina Elisabeth on
5 January, 1762 brought about a fundamental change not only on the field of
battle but also in Poland’s situation. The new ruler, Peter III, abandoned hos-
tilities against Prussia and even began negotiations for an alliance with Fred-
erick II, in which Polish problems played an important part. Russia and Prus-
sia were to take the dissenters and the Polish “liberties” under their protection
and to coordinate their action when the next interregnum occurred. The
Russo-Prussian rapprochement resulted at first in the decisive ascendancy of
Frederick II, because the new Tsar, a man of unstable intellect, caring more
for his dynastic interests in Holstein than for the destinies of the Empire,
was a fanatical admirer of Frederick.
Since the annexation of Silesia the King of Prussia entertained plans of
conquest at the expense of Poland. In his Political Testament of 1752, he
recommended that Royal (that is Polish) Prussia be “eaten like an artichoke,
leaf by leaf”, that one should pluck “now a town, now a district, until
the whole has been eaten up”. It was not only because of the configuration of
her provinces that Prussia was particularly interested in territorial gain at
the expense of Poland. The days of the Commonwealth’s greatness and of
Ducal Prussia’s feudal dependence were not forgotten in Berlin. The thought
that Poland might recover her power was a nightmare for Frederick II
because he fully realized the degree to which the big power status of his
small and disjointed monarchy was strained. The King of Prussia, the most
vigilant guardian of Polish anarchy, dreamt therefore of a partition of
Poland being, however, unable to accomplish it by himself.
The negotiations for a Russo-Prussian alliance were interrupted by
Catherine II’s coup @’état (9 July, 1762). The Tsarina was not as accommo-
dating towards Prussia as Peter IIJ and had her own ambitious plans with
regard to Poland ; yet she intended to carry them out in concert with Fred-
erick II. Russia’s attitude allowed Prussia to emerge safe and sound from
the strain of the Seven Years’ War and to conclude the peace of Hubert-
268 TENTATIVE REFORMS UNDER RUSSIA’S TUTELAGE (1763-1788)
sburg (15 February, 1763), a result of the exhaustion, rather than the recon-
ciliation of the Powers. Negotiations for an alliance henceforth proceeded
between Petersburg and Berlin, to be crowned by a treaty of alliance. Its
final signature (11 April, 1764) was already connected with the struggle for
the succession. to Augustus III. The rapprochement between Russia and
Prussia was the genesis of the so-called “Northern system”. The northern
allies were united by common antagonism towards the participants of the
former anti-Prussian coalition, the “Southern system” of Austria, France and
Spain. Cooperation was needed to get the situation in Poland, a country
on the border of the two “systems”, under control. The position of Prussia
and Russia, however, with regard to the problems of Poland did not coin-
cide.
In Frederick II’s intentions, which came near fruition during his nego-
tiations with Peter III, the alliance with Russia was to contribute to a deep-
ening of anarchy in Poland and to keep open the prospects of realizing
his dreams of conquest which, until then, had met with opposition in Pe-
tersburg. To the Russia of Catherine II the “Northern system” was designed
to maintain a dominant and lasting influence in Poland and to permit
freedom of action against Turkey.
These two goals of Russian policy were closely connected because hegem-
ony in Poland was a challenge to the Porte and, in any future Eastern War,
a Polish auxiliary army and the territory of operations between the Dniester
and the Dnieper could, to some extent, replace Russia’s lost ally Austria. In
the first half of the eighteenth century, Russia had several times given the
Wettins support which had been decisive in maintaining their rule in Po-
land, but she failed to gain lasting ascendancy in the Commonwealth. The
reign of the Saxons, which had its mainstay in the Electorate, beyond
Russia’s reach, and in the Wettins’ family ties with western royal houses,
was good enough to guarantee Poland’s neutrality and anarchy, but some-
thing more was now at stake for Russia: she wanted hegemony not al-
liance. The immediate goal of Catherine II was, therefore, to prevent a pro-
longation of the union of Saxony and Poland. Russian troops expelled
Prince Charles from Courland and reinstated Biron. As for the Polish throne,
Catherine II had long before chosen her candidate to succeed Augustus III.
THE PLANS OF “THE FAMILY”
Everything started in the years 1755-1758, still during the reign of Tsarina
Elisabeth, with a love affair between the Grand-Duchess Catherine and the
23 year old Stolnik (Steward) of Lithuania, Stanislaw Poniatowski, who
was then visiting Petersburg. The heads of “The Family”, the old Princes
Czartoryskis, Michat and August, saw in their nephew’s amorous conquest
THE PLANS OF “THE FAMILY” 269
political capital for their party. The assumption of power by Catherine II
aroused great expectations. With this support “The Family” hoped to obtain
the crown for one of their members (the old Princes would have preferred
to see August’s son, Adam Czartoryski on the throne, rather than Stanislaw
Poniatowski).
At the turn of 1762 and 1763, a council of “The Family” drew up
a draft programme of reform, while Poniatowski laid down for Catheri-
ne II his own constitutional programme in the form of a philosophical
allegory, The plan of the Czartoryskis’ provided for decisions in the Seym
by a simple majortity vote. The Seym was to be in constant readiness to
convene in extraordinary session, while collegiate organs of central admi-
nistration were to be appointed by it. Like the work O skutecznym rad spo-
sobie published at this time by Konarski (who collaborated with “The Fa-
mily’’), the programme was an interesting attempt to combine parliamenta-
rism with the collegiate system of administration then widespread in
Europe. Both the Czartoryskis and Konarski wished to eliminate the antago-
nism resulting from the duality of royal authority and the institutions of the
Commonwealth, an antagonism on which the oligarchs thrived. The King
was to be deprived of his only real prerogatives, namely the appointment
of ministers, senators and officers of State, and the distribution of the
Starostwa. The programme, conceived in the spirit of gentry republicanism,
embodied two cardinal principles : 1) supremacy of parliament over govern-
ment; 2) election of ministers and officials by the Seym and the local
diets. Moreover, the creation of ministerial committees (taking decisions by
majority vote), was to take away the importance of the irremovable and
uncontrolled ministers, appointed for life, who in practice had been the
mainstay of oligarchical anarchy. The office of Hetman, the most exuberant
and arbitrary institution, was to be abolished altogether.
Stanistaw Poniatowski’s constitutional programme was somewhat diffe-
rent. As a candidate for the throne he envisaged a reform of parliament
along the same lines as the Czartoryskis’, but he reserved for the king full
power of appointment and distribution of patronage which made him the
actual head of a strongly centralized government. Moreover, according to
Poniatowski, the throne was to be hereditary. The differences between Po-
niatowski’s constitutional monarchism and the Czartoryskis’ republicanism
were a sign of divergencies that existed within “The Family” which were
to become more acute in the future.
The programme of the Czartoryskis’ could not be carried out by parlia-
mentary methods. “The Family” was opposed by two powerful parties of
magnates, now reconciled in the face of the common danger : the Republicans,
rallied around Hetman Jan Klemens Branicki, Franciszek Salezy Potocki and
Karol Radziwill, and the Saxon party or “Mniszech camarilla”. These parties
could count not only upon most of the magnates and their rank and file gen-
try followers, but also on the army under the Hetman’s command and on the
270 TENTATIVE REFORMS UNDER RUSSIA’S TUTELAGE (1763-1788)
private armies, the largest being the Radziwill’s militia of 4000 men. The
Czartoryskis therefore decided on a coup d’état by an armed confederation.
For financial aid and arms, though not military intervention for the time be-
ing, they turned to Catherine II.
The idea of a coup d’état was conceived in connexion with Augustus III’s
illness. “The Family” intended to seize power while the King was still alive
in order to have the situation under control during the anticipated inter-
regnum. Russia approved the political plans of “The Family”, but not
their plans for government reform and at the Council of State held in
St. Petersburg in February 1763 it was decided to give military and financial
support to the candidature of Stanislaw Poniatowski or Adam Czartoryski
in event of an interregnum. The King’s health, however, improved and the
acute party struggle came near to civil war with the danger of “The Family”
being crushed by the combined forces of the Republicans and the adherents
of Saxony. In the spring, the Czartoryskis already asked for a Russian
armed intervention under protection of which they would form a general
confederation and conclude an alliance with Russia. Catherine II withdrew
at the last moment, recommending delay until the death of Augustus IIL.
The background to the reversal of the decision in St. Petersburg, was
the activity of Prussian diplomacy. Frederick II consented to support a
candidate of the Tsarina’s choice during the interregnum, but he rejected
the idea of any change in the Commonwealth’s institutions which were so
convenient for Prussia. “The Family” found itself in a critical situation and
was saved only by the death of the King (5 October, 1763). The Czartorys-
kis deluded themselves into believing they could make use of the Russian
intervention for their own ends. When the interregnum occurred, they were
not the leaders of a confederation deciding the country’s problems, but
a party striving for power, both threatened by, and dependent on foreign
help.
THE INTERREGNUM (1763-1764)
After the death of Augustus III the Wettins’ chances of keeping the Polish
throne were apparently quite strong. They were backed by the majority of the
magnates and enjoyed the support of the southern Powers. The Elector Fred-
erick Christian, however, survived his father by a few months only, and his
younger brothers, Xavier and Charles, each sought to obtain the Polish crown.
There also existed in Dresden the concept of a compromise with the Republi-
cans by placing upon the throne the elderly and childless Hetman Branickt
during whose presumably short reign the 13-year old Elector Frederick
Augustus would come of age. The discard in the Saxon House and the
desire for a Piast, that is a Polish candidature, tacitly harboured by the
THE INTERREGNUM (1763-1764) 271
Republicans, hampered unity of action. Still more important was the fact
that the southern Powers, exhausted by the Seven Years’ War, while not
sparing in declarations and promises, had no intention of becoming involved
in the struggle for the Polish throne. Austria, being nearest to the scene of
events, was effectively held at bay by Frederick II. Turkey, traditionally ill-
disposed towards the Saxons, was not eager to intervene either. Thus Russia
obtained a free hand in Poland.
Only then Catherine II informed “The Family” of her support for
Stanistaw. His candidature was thus a foregone conclusion. “The Family”
mobilized its private armies and brought into the electoral campaign its
eficient party which, with its enlightened and disciplined following, con-
trasted with the quarrelsome and incompetent Republicans. Most of the
loca! diets ended in success for the Czartoryskis ; the news of an advancing
Russian army was also decisive. Under the protection of these troops
a general confederation was formed in Wilno, The armed Republicans
flocked to Warsaw to attend the Convocation Seym (May 1764) which
they tried to break up. When the followers of “The Family” ignored this
attempt, the opponents marched out of the capital. After an ineffective
demonstration of armed resistance, Branicki withdrew to Hungary and Ka-
rol Radziwill to Moldavia.
At the Convocation Seym, the Czartoryskis only partially carried
out their constitutional plans. This was connected with the attitude of the
Powers. The Czartoryskis’ programme was contrary to the traditional po-
licy of Russia and especially to that of Prussia. If Catherine II wished to
act as protector of Poland through her candidate, then the dualism of
King and Commonwealth had to be maintained. A Seym taking decision
by a majortiy vote, and enjoying a decided supremacy over the king, was
a body more difficult to control than a king raised to the throne by Russia.
For these reasons the efforts of Stanistaw to strengthen the prerogatives of
the Crown found a more favourable acceptance in St. Petersburg than the
plans for a parliamentary reform. A number of Poniatowski’s demands met
with a favourable response (“What use do we have for a king who would
be deprived of everything?”’). On the other hand, the candidate to the
throne was requested to support Russia’s old claims with regard to a set-
tlement of the frontier question, the protection of the Orthodox Church
and the problem of fugitive serfs ; he was also asked to persuade the Com-
monwealth “to request our guarantee for the preservation of its constitu-
tion and laws”. That was tantamount to establishing a limit to attempts at
reforming the constitution.
The Convocation Seym only slightly curtailed the use of the liberum
veto. More was achieved in the way of constraining the oligarchic ministers
and creating a nucleus of corporate administrative bodies by the establish-
ment of a Military Commission and two Fiscal Commissions. Among many
economic reforms, the most important were the abolition of private internal
272 TENTATIVE REFORMS UNDER RUSSIA’S TUTELAGE (1763-1788)
customs and the establishment of general customs at the frontiers of the
country. A number of detailed resolutions contributed to an improvement
in the situation of the towns and to the limitation of the clergy’s economic
expansion. The Seym made the important decision to continue the Confeder-
ation indefinitely (under August Czartoryski’s presidency) which strength-
ened the executive power and opened prospects of further reforms being
pushed through without the hindrance of the liberum veto, because confeder-
ated Seyms took decisions by majority vote.
With hopes of any help from abroad disappointed, most opponents
recognized with varying degrees of sincerity the legality of the confederate
authority. During the election the Russian troops withdrew for a distance
of three miles from the capital and, under the protection of a few thousand
private troops of “The Family”, 5584 electors unanimously acclaimed Sta-
nistaw Poniatowski King on 6 September, 1764.
THE FIRST YEARS OF STANISLAW AUGUSTUS
The new King was thirty-two years of age, of outstanding intelligence and
careful education. In his travels abroad he developed a particular ap-
preciation for England and her constitution. He was also impressed by the
splendour of the absolute monarchy which he saw in Versailles and St.
Petersburg. He was careful to preserve the prerogatives and revenues of the
Crown and he used the income of the royal domain to become a patron
of arts and literature. He established manufactories, built up the royal guard
and chanceries. Flexible in his political tactics, he was consistent, almost
doctrinaire indeed, m his pursuit of reform. An enemy of “sarmatism” and
anarchy, he believed that Poland was in need of what he termed a “revo-
lution”. He had a lofty vision of his own cultural and legislative mission.
Stanislaw Augustus has often been charged with weakness of character, but
it should be borne in mind that the position of a king in Poland was normal-
ly weak and Poniatowski’s in particular. The old oligarchy, scornful of the
“upstart” Poniatowski family, could not swallow the bitter pill of a mere
Steward of Lithuania being so exalted. In his own party, “The Family”, dis-
cord was growing deeper as the Czartoryski uncles lost hope of exercising tu-
telage over their nephew on the throne.
Stanislaw Augustus, who owed his crown to Russia and was dependent
on Russia’s help, took little account of Catherine II’s wishes in pursuing his
own aspirations for independence in domestic and foreign policy. He was
encouraged to bold action by his brothers and by the young men who
flocked to his court. However until the King organized a reliable party of
his own and won over to his side the social forces interested in restricting
the oligarchy, his ambitious plans lacked a firm base.
Warsaw. Lazienki Park. The Water Palace, 1784-1795
The first years of his reign were a period of initiatives for sweeping
reform in the field of finance (especially in the reform of the monetary
system upset by Frederick II’s debasements) and in the military field. In
1765 the King established the “Knights’ School” the first really secular
school in Poland, which aimed not only at training officers but also at
preparing young gentlemen educated in the spirit of reform for public
life. A great educational campaign was launched with the help of periodi-
cals, belles-lettres and the theatre. From 1765, the periodical “Monitor”,
modelled on the English “Spectator”, was published on the King’s initiative.
The “Monitor” criticized ignorance and conservatism, propounded religious
tolerance and advocated the development of industry and improvement of
agriculture. It wished to mould public opinion in favour of further
reforms : the extension of the civil rights of the urban middle class and an
improvement in the situation of the peasants. A close collaborator of the
18 History of Poland
274 THE FIRST YEARS OF STANISLAW AUGUSTUS
Ignacy Krasicki
King, Andrzej Zamoyski (Chancellor from 1764), was vigorously active
in municipal matters and organized commissions “for good city rule”. Za-
moyski, who presented the most extensive programme of reform at the
Convocation Seym, was designated as the chief proposer of legislative
reform at the Seym of 1766 at which there was to be a trial of strength.
The opponents of the King and “The Family”, seeing the expectations
for support from the southern Powers frustrated, turned now to Berlin
and St. Petersburg, denouncing the prospective reform as being inconsistent
with “Polish liberties”. In 1765 Frederick II decided to compel Poland to
abolish the general customs system: he established a customs-house impos-
ing dues on goods shipped down the Vistula, through Polish territory to
Gdansk. Through Russia’s mediation, the conflict was settled (the Kwi-
THE CONFEDERATION OF RADOM 278
dzyn customs-house was abolished but with it the Polish general customs).
The Polish-Prussian conflict was a warning of the lack of cohesion in the
“Northern system”, as friendship with Prussia, moreover, was at this time
the guiding-line of Russia’s foreign policy. Stanistaw Augustus’ desire for an
improvement of relations with Austria and France, was likewise alarming to
St. Petersburg. Moreover, Warsaw delayed its answer to Russia’s urgent de-
mands with regard to frontier questions and dissenters.
This became for Catherine a question of personal prestige. Her first
great and costly essay in foreign affairs ran the risk of being judged in
Russia as a woman’s whim, undertaken because of Poniatowski’s charm, but
with no profit to the Empire. Nikita Panin, who directed imperial foreign
policy, was indeed in favour of bringing Poland into the alliance, streng-
thening her executive power and her armed forces, and carrying-out some
of the Seym reforms ; but he wished first to obtain satisfaction of Russian
demands and to act in concert with Prussia. With that end in view he
sent his close aide Saldern to Warsaw and Berlin in the spring of 1766.
Frederick II rejected all idea of reform, declaring that “Poland ought to
be kept in lethargy”. Russia accepted the Prussian point of view.
When Zamoyski, at the Seym of 1766, put forward his programme
of curtailing further the liberum veto, Russia and Prussia threatened Poland
with war, demanded that the Confederation be dissolved and, assisted by
England, Denmark and Sweden, made categoric demands that the dissenters
be granted equal political rights. The King offered resistance by asking for
concessions in the constitutional field in return. The conservative elements,
to which the Czartoryskis fishing for popularity now looked, took the
contrary position : they were readily willing to abandon reforms, but they
were unyielding in religious matters. August Czartoryski dissolved the
Confederation. The Seym did not settle these controversial issues. Europe
was amazed at seeing a “rupture” between Catherine II and _ her
“creature” Poniatowski only two years after his election. New Russian
troops entered Poland and two dissenter Confederations were formed
under their protection: one for Lithuania, at Stuck, and one for the
Crown, at Torun (20 March, 1767).
THE CONFEDERATION OF RADOM
AND THE SEYM OF 1767-1768
To break the resistance of the King on the issue of reform and that of the
Czartoryskis with regard to the dissenters, Russia decided to take advantage
of the conservative opposition. It was clumsy alliance because the conservative
elements with the Episcopate playing an important role, were the most un-
18°
276 TENTATIVE REFORMS UNDER RUSSIA’S TUTELAGE (1763-1788)
yielding on the question of dissenters. They were allowed, however, to delude
themselves with the hope of the dethronement of Stanislaw Augustus and
for a return of the “Saxon times” (the young Elector of Saxony was growing
up). The malcontent magnates under the direction of the Russian envoy, Rep-
nin, formed local Confederations and approached Catherine II with the re-
quest that the “old government” be reinstated under a Russian guarantee. The
Confederation was popular among the befuddled gentry, roused by propa-
ganda against the “new-fangled ideas” of Warsaw and by religious slogans.
Having humiliated the King and holding him at bay, Russia attained her goal.
Stanislaw Augustus bowed to pressure. The confederates, who had formed a
General Union at Radom on 23 June, 1767 (under the presidency of Karol
Radziwill), also witnessed the shipwreck of their hopes. Feelings of resistance
against Russia began to run high.
In October 1767 the Confederate Seym assembled in Warsaw surrounded
by Russian troops. To prevent discussion in the Seym, Repnin demanded
that a delegation be appointed which would prepare draft resolutions which
afterwards would be presented for approval to a plenary session. A section
of the Confederates, led by Kajetan Soltyk, the Bishop of Cracow, strongly
opposed equal rights for the dissenters and the appointment of the delegation.
Repnin responded with brutal reprisals (the arrest and deportation to Kaluga
of the Bishops Soltyk and J. A. Zatuski, the Hetman Waclaw Rzewuski and
his son Seweryn). Russian troops blockaded Warsaw. The terrorized Seym,
appointed a delegation and adjourned till February 1768.
During the four months of the delegation’s work, the relations be-
tween the King and Repnin gradually improved. The conditions dictated
by Russia with regard to dissenters were modified. The King obtained Rep-
nin’s consent for the establishment of a Permanent Council as a supreme
executive authority, but the plan fell through because of Frederick II’s
unbending opposition. Far-reaching draft reforms with regard to peasants
were not carried either, with the exception of the law depriving land-
owners of the power of life and death over serfs. In a number of secondary
matters the Delegation continued and completed the work of reform.
The principle of unanimity in the Seym was limited to “matters of State”.
Though this covered the most important spheres of legislation, it was no
longer possible to break up a Seym for trivial reasons as happened under
the Saxons. A definite limit was set, however, to reform aspirations. Five
“eternal and invariable” cardinal principles were formulated upon which
the stability of the political and social system reposed : 1) free election of
kings, 2) liberum veto, 3) the right of renouncing allegiance to the King,
4) the gentry’s exclusive right to hold office and to own land, and 5) the
landowners’ dominion over the peasants.
The resolutions of the Seym were placed under the guarantee of Cather-
ine II and thus the Commonwealth was reduced even formally to the level
THE CONFEDERATION OF BAR 277
of a vassal state. The Russian troops were, however, to leave the country,
because Turkey insisted upon this point and Russia did not wish to break
with her for the time being. Poland’s place in the “Northern system” was to
be defined by a Russo-Prussian agreement.
THE CONFEDERATION OF BAR (1768-1772)
The international situation had changed since 1764. Anxiety and the
desire to take revenge against the “Northern system” were growing among
the “southern Powers”. The energetic foreign minister of France, Choiseul,
was an exponent of this trend. He tried to set Turkey against Russia by
pointing to the danger involved in the consolidation of Catherine II’s
influence in Poland. The Commonwealth, shaken by political crises, might
become a seat of anti-Russian diversion. The troubles of Stanistaw Augustus
aroused hopes in Dresden where Elector Frederick Augustus had come of age.
Some Radom Confederates, disappointed in Russia, decided therefore to
take up the fight with the support of the southern Powers.
On 29 February 1768 an armed Confederation was formed in the
Podolian town of Bar, 60 km from the Turkish border, proclaiming the
defense of the faith and freedom to be its aim. The Confederation was
headed by Jézef Pulaski and Michat Krasinski, brother of the Party’s chief
diplomatic agent, Adam Krasinski, Bishop of Kamieniec. The movement
had a markedly religious character, especially in the first period. A great
influence was exerted over the Confederates by the Carmelite Father Marek
Jandolowicz, who enjoyed the reputation of a prophet and worker of mira-
cles. The nucleus of the Confederation’s armed force was “The Order of
the Knights of the Holy Cross”. The Confederation spread quickly in the
Ukraine. It was supported by most of the magnates, had the support of
the rank and file gentry and part of the regular troops which passed over
to the Confederates.
Repnin postponed the departure of Russian troops from Poland and
sent them against the Confederates with royal regiments under the command
of Ksawery Branicki marching with the Russians. A civil war flared up as
a result of this foreign intervention. In addition an uprising by the peasants
broke out.
The peasant discontent had been simmering in the Ukrainian border-
lands for a long time. The pacification of those territories after the suppres-
sion of the Cossacks was followed by colonization. The privileges of the new
settlers were now expiring and they became ordinary serfs. The growth of
serfdom was accompanied by an intense Roman-Catholic missionary activ-
ity. The Ukrainian peasants had pinned some vague hopes on the Orthodox
Empress and on her demands with regard to dissenters. The disappointment
278 TENTATIVE REFORMS UNDER RUSSIA’S TUTELAGE (1763-1788)
of these hopes by the armed intervention of the Catholic gentry was the
immediate reason for the outbreak of an uprising under Ivan Gonta and
Maxim Zhelezniak which spread over wide areas of the Ukraine in the
spring and summer of 1768. The fighting cost many lives on both sides.
Thousands of gentry and Jewish innkeepers perished at the hands of peas-
ants, especially in the town of Human. The pacification carried out jointly
by Russian and royal troops, under Generals Kretchetnikov and Stemp-
kowski, brought about an even greater loss of life. The peasant rising was
a terrible shock to the gentry. The Confederation, in their blind hatred of the
King, went as far as to put on him the blame for unleashing this Ukrainian
whirlwind. For a long time, the terrible vision of the year 1768 was to be
present in all debates on the peasant question and the religious and national
problems of the Ukraine.
The capture of Bar by the Russians on 20 June, 1768 and the peasant
war destroyed the Confederation in the south-eastern territories ; the riots
broke out again, however, in the region of Cracow (June-August), in Lithu-
ania and Byelorussia (August-October). The Confederates were not an army,
but a kind of a mass-levy of the gentry who long ago had become unaccus-
tomed to warfare. The small Russian army (20,000 men) routed the Con-
federate groups easily, but was unable to pacify the country. The military
inefhiciency of the Confederates was compensated for by their anti-royalist
political enthusiasm and by their religious and patriotic fervour. Russia now
sought an understanding with the Czartoryskis, but negotiations came to
standstill upon the news that the Porte had declared war on Russia (8 Oc-
tober, 1768); the “Polish War” as the Turks called it. The King ceased
fighting the Confederates and adopted a wait-and-see attitude. In spite of
the fact that Russia moved a part of her forces from Poland to the Turkish
front the year 1769 failed to bring military success to the Confederation
which had no unified command and supreme political authority. It was not
until the autumn of 1769 that, under the pressure of France and Saxony,
a “Generality” was formed at PreSov (in Slovakia).
Owing to the military reverses of the Turks, France wished to invigorate
the Polish diversion by sending money and instructors with Colonel Charles
Dumouriez to the Confederates. It was Dumouriez who, yielding to Saxon
adherents, encouraged the Generality to proclaim the dethronement of Sta-
nistaw Augustus on 22 October, 1770. This step precluded all chances for
an understanding between the Confederates and Warsaw. At the end of 1770
the military activity of the Confederation grew stronger. It had a strong
foothold in Great Poland, where it was not impeded by the Prussians,
because Russia’s troubles in Poland were grist to the mill of Frederick ITI.
In south-western Poland, an attempt was made with the help of the French
to develop regular operations on the basis of newly formed infantry units
and fortresses (in particular that of Czestochowa). Dumouriez thought of
THE CONFEDERATION OF BAR 279
mopping up a fairly large area near the Austrian border in the spring in
order to be able to carry out the election of a new king there. He was,
however, defeated by Suvorov near Lanckorona in May. The last major
military effort was Hetman Oginski’s rising in Lithuania, routed by the
Russians in the battle of Stolowicze (September 1771). Soon afterwards
(3 November) an atempt was made by the Confederates to kidnap Stanislaw
Augustus, which was condemned as attempted regicide and did much dis-
credit the Confederates in the opinion of monarchist Europe. The Confeder-
ation was dying out when the news of the partition spread in the spring
of 1772. The Confederates held out longest in Czestochowa, until 18 August,
1772.
The war of the Confederation demonstrated the military ineffectiveness
of the gentry mass-levy when confronted with the military skill and organi-
zation of the second half of the eighteenth century. Genuine military talent
was revealed only by Kazimierz Pulaski who scored several minor successes.
These marginal successes as well the traditionalism taking little account of
reality, explain the illusions about the value of improvised warfare by the
gentry (la petite guerre) prevailing in Poland and among foreigners interested
in Poland.
In its constitutional programme, the Confederation of Bar followed in
the path of the Confederation of Radom, as a conservative movement with
eyes fixed entirely on the gentry’s Golden Freedom. On the other hand,
original ideas were expressed by foreigners who devoted their writings to
the cause of the Confederation : Rousseau (Considérations sur le gouverne-
ment de la Pologne) and Mably (Du gouvernement et des lois de la Pologne).
The Confederation thus played an indirect role in the West, stimulating
the formulation of new opinions on civil liberty and national independence.
The official historian of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rulhiére
(Histoire de l’anarchie en Pologne) helped greatly to popularize the legend
of Bar. Kazimierz Pulaski who fought for the independence of the United
States and fell in the battle of Savannah in 1779, carried the memories of
Bar over the Ocean.
The Confederation of Bar was an important experience in the life of
the last generations of independent Poland. The anonymous mass of Con-
federate veterans later to some extent helped to shape the opinion of the
country gentry. During the Confederation war, while the magnate leaders
quarrelled and in many cases preserved their fortunes by sitting on the
fence, the younger members of the gentry took refuge in the forests and
were deported to Siberia by the thousands. Resentment against the magnates
grew among the Confederate soldiers. In spite of the leading part played
by the factions of the magnates, the Confederation of Bar contributed to
a growth of the gentry’s political independence by making them sensitive
to the issue of national freedom.
280 TENTATIVE REFORMS UNDER RUSSIA’S TUTELAGE (1763-1788)
THE FIRST PARTITION
The Russo-Turkish war might have carried the seeds of the European war,
if Austria had opposed Russia’s advance in the Balkans. This would have
set both systems of alliances in motion. It was against this background that
the Prussian plan for a pacification of the Commonwealth was formed. As
early as February 1769 Frederick II sent to St. Petersburg his so-called
“Count Lynar’s Plan”, providing for a reconciliation of Austria with Russia
and Prussia by means of a joint partition of Poland, The Tsarina’s Court
oscillated between Chernishev’s tendency towards partition and Panin’s
policy of a Polish protectorate. Inability to deal with the Confederation
swung opinion in favour of partition. The result of Russian policy in Poland
had so far been somewhat unsuccessful. The Austro-Prussian rapproche-
ment (the meeting of Frederick JI and Joseph II on the battlefields of the
Silesian Wars: at Nysa in the summer of 1769, and at Neustadt [Nowe
Miasto] in the autumn of 1770) caused alarm in St. Petersburg. The petty
greed of Austria (seizure of Spisz in 1769, and of three districts in the Tatra
foothills in 1770) furnished a precedent.
In the spring of 1771, Panin made last attempt at pacifying Poland by
dispatching Saldern to Warsaw. After the failure of this mission, negotia-
tions with Prussia for a partition were started in June. All the circumstances
assisted the Frederick’s game: the unsuccessful rising of Oginski in Lithu-
ania and especially the warlike gestures of Austria. In July 1771 an Austro-
Turkish alliance was signed in Constantinople ; the armies of the Emperor
were concentrated in Hungary. Yet, in Vienna there was no firm resolve
upon war. Since the downfall of Choiseul (December 1770) Austria could
not entirely count on her French ally. France wanted to preserve peace and
Choiseul’s successor, d’Aiguillon, informed Frederick in August 1771 that
he would have nothing against the annexation of Gdansk and a small num-
ber of Polish districts by Prussia. This was not the price to detach Frederick
from his alliance with Russia, the only guarantee of sure and permanent
acquisitions in Poland. The loyal ally put his hand ostentatiously on the hilt
of the sword, fully aware that this gesture would be enough and that he
would not have to draw the sword from its sheath because the Franco-
Austrian alliance was disintegrating. As long as the Austrians maintained
their threatening attitude and restrained Catherine in the Balkans, they
could induce her to seek compensation for herself (and for those who,
though not engaged in war, were anxious to preserve the balance of power
in Europe) in another direction, cherished by Prussia for so long. Russia
eventually decided to give up Moldavia and Valachia and to make her
peace with Austria by drawing her into the partnership in the partition.
Maria Theresa entered into the negotiations for partition very reluctantly,
but once her scruples were overcome and the decision taken in Vienna in
1772, Austria revealed herself to be the most acquisitive of the powers.
THE FIRST PARTITION 281
Thus Panin’s “Northern system” disintegrated ; it failed to play its
role as a safeguard of Russian expansion in the Balkans and on the Black
Sea coast. The “Southern system” also collapsed ; its nucleus, the Franco-
Austrian alliance, did not stand the test of the Eastern and Polish compli-
cations. Upon the ruins of those two “systems”, an alliance of the three
greatest military powers of the time was established. This event, dangerous
for the balance of power in Europe, caused panic in Paris and dissatisfaction
in London. Great Britain, however, did not go beyond defending Gdansk
against Prussia’s annexationist plans, and the efforts of France were chaotic,
belated and ineffective.
The year-long negotiations for partition proceeded in an atmosphere
of hard bargaining and were accompanied by accomplished facts. St. Pe-
tersburg intended to continue her tutelage over a mutilated Commonwealth
and, since the principle of the equality of the treaties had been adopted,
Russia presented her territorial claims in a relatively modest manner thereby
seeking to reduce the acquisitions of Austria and Prussia. They, on the other
hand, vied with one another in their greed. Frederick II strove for Gdansk
with particular eagerness. Meeting with a determined resistance in that
matter from Russia and the maritime powers (England and the United
Provinces), the King of Prussia tried in vain to coerce the people of Gdansk
by all manner of vexations and pressures into a voluntary surrender to
Prussian rule.
Under the treaties of 5 August, 1772, and subsequent delimitations,
Prussia received 36,000 sq.km of territory and 580,000 inhabitants, Austria
83,000 sq.km and 2,650,000 inhabitants, Russia 92,000 sq.km and 1,300,000
inhabitants. Not satisfied with their spoils from the treaty, Prussia and
Austria usurped further acquisitions in the course of frontier delimitations ;
these encroachments were, however, partly checked after a Russian inter-
vention in 1776.
The importance of these annexations cannot be measured by area alone.
In spite of the fact that Prussia’s share in land and population was the small-
est, she received the most valuable spoils on account of the vital economic
importance of the mouth of the Vistula. According to Frederick II the Prus-
sians became after the first partition “the masters of all Poland’s products
and entire transit”. The Austrian annexation tore away from the Common-
wealth rich and densely populated lands with valuable salt mines. Russia took
possession of a comparatively poor and thinly populated area.
The ambassadors of the three Powers demanded that the partition trea-
ties be ratified by the Seym. The Seym was to remain in session under the
form of Confederation (the liberum veto was, in that case, inconvenient for
its foreign protectors) and to appoint a Delegation, following the example
of 1767. The Confederation was formed from teh corrupt circle of former
Saxon and Russian creatures, under the presidency of Adam Poninski.
Although the chamber of deputies had been carefully selected (the local
282 TENTATIVE REFORMS UNDER RUSSIA’S TUTELAGE (1763-1788)
diets had been held in the presence of the forces of the partitioning Powers),
a few deputies headed by Tadeusz Reytan raised a strong protest against
the Confederation. In the Seym, which however remained confederated,
the followers of the King and of the Czartoryskis led a quiet opposition
as a delaying action. Stanistaw Augustus solicited foreign intervention and
inspired in the West, especially in England, a campaign by pamphlets to
show the illegality of the partition. The Powers responded to all resistance
with the threat of extending their annexations further. The treaties were
ratified on 30 September, 1773.
The enforced partition was supplemented by trade treaties, ratified in
March 1775. The treaty with Prussia was disastrous for the Commonwealth
being imposed upon the desperately resisting Delegation in a particularly
brutal manner. With Silesia and, later, Pomerania and the lower reaches of
the Vistula under Prussian rule, the overwhelming part of the Polish foreign
trade had to pass through Prussian dominions. The treaty imposed heavy
custom duties on goods leaving Poland, low duties on Prussian goods, and
downright prohibitive charges on Polish transit trade passing through Prus-
sian territory ; the trade between the Commonwealth and Gdansk was in-
cluded in the latter category. In this way Frederick II, unable to get hold
of Gdansk, decided to ruin the basis of its prosperity by directing the Vis-
tula trade to Elblag which was already Prussian and enjoyed special custom
privileges.
Apart from the immediate aims of exerting pressure on Gdansk and
seeking fiscal advantages, Frederick II was carrying out a long-term econom-
ic policy towards Poland which he had begun as early as 1765, when he
thwarted the Polish customs reform. The Commonwealth, remaining under
the political protectorate of Russia was faced with the danger of becoming
economically a kind of Prussian colony. |
With almost 30 per cent of its territory and 35 per cent of its popula-
tion lost, the Commonwealth still remained one of the largest states in
Europe ; in area (520,000 sq.km) it surpassed Spain and was still equal to
France. Within the boundaries of this multinational state, however, the
ethnically Polish area with its main artery, the Vistula, was particularly
mutilated in the north and south, cut off from the sea and from the natural
boundary of the mountains and enclosed in the pincers of the Prussian fron-
tiers. The first partition, moreover, worsened dramatically the international
position of Poland which, virtually became a potentially “revisionist” country.
The traditional policy of Poland’s neighbours thus acquired a new reason
for restricting her independence ; the first partition constituted a precedent
for future action.
CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS 283
CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS (1773-1780)
The Delegation, appointed by the partition Seym (1773-1775), worked out
new forms of government. The cardinal laws being in principle only a re-
petition of those of 1768 were again passed and the new form of govern-
ment was subject to the guarantee not only of Russia, but also of the other
two partitioning Powers. On the other hand, a rapprochement took place
during the session between Stanistaw Augustus and Russia, represented by
the ambassador Stackelberg, who was responsible for the new course of the
Tsarist policy. This rapprochement made it possible to proceed with the
reforms. The establishment of the Commission of National Education in
1773, was the most momentous achievement. The breve of Clement XIV,
abolishing the Jesuit Order, was used and, in spite of the Nuncio’s resistance,
the Jesuit estates were turned over to the State educational fund. Thus
Europe’s first Ministry of Education was created.
Most disputes centred around the projected Permanent Council. Accord-
ing to the original idea, this collegiate body was to take over all the royal
powers, but according to the final draft (voted in 1775), it was the arbitrary
magnate-ministers who were placed under restraint rather than the King.
The Council was composed of 18 senators and 18 deputies elected by the
Seym for a term of 2 years. The Council was presided over by the King.
It was divided into five departments : foreign affairs, police, military, finance
and justice (the Educational Commission was not subordinated to the Coun-
cil, but remained directly under the King’s authority). The Council submitted
to the King three candidates for each senatorial seat. Every two years the
retiring government gave the Seym an account of its activities. The establish-
ment of the Permanent Council put into practice a plan which had long been
proposed in Polish political literature.
The system of government created by the partition Seym was not free
of ambiguities, particularly the definition of the terms of reference for
the departments of the Permanent Council and those of the Commissions
created in the years 1764-1766 (the Military, Fiscal, Marshal’s and As-
sessorial Commissions) ; these Commissions were at one time directed against
the ministers appointed for life. The ministers now saw them as a lesser
evil than the new departments ; the Military Commission in particular had,
since 1775, become a tool in the Hetmens’ hands. The Hetmen again came
to the fore as the opposition aspiring to overthrow the Permanent Council
and to have Stackelberg recalled from Poland.
A regrouping took place within the oligarchy. The old leaders died out
or withdrew from political life. The long feud between the Potockis and
the Czartoryskis gave way to solidarity in the fight against the royal
authority and against the Permanent Council. Men of the former “Family”
(Stanislaw Lubomirski, Adam Czartoryski) now stood side by side with
Ignacy Potocki, Ksawery Branicki (until recently a confident of the King
284 TENTATIVE REFORMS UNDER RUSSIA’S TUTELAGE (1763-1788)
and a conqueror of the Confederates, now Hetman and champion of the
Golden Freedom), and Seweryn Rzewuski (deported in 1767, now Hetman,
always an arch-conservative). Branicki was stirring the army to disobedience
against the Council. The Seym of 1776, the first Seym not meeting in the
rules of a Confederation since the beginning of Stanistaw Augustus’ reign,
was to become a trial of strength. The opposition sought support in St.
Petersburg (counting upon Potemkin against Panin), but they were disap-
pointed : Stanistaw Augustus obtained the protection of Russian troops for
the Seym and the consent to form a Confederation in the Permanent
Council.
The Seym of 1776 debated in an atmosphere of coup d’état. The op-
position deputies were not admitted to the Confederation and excluded
form the Chamber. The authority of the Permanent Council was extended,
the Military Commission abolished, and the Hetmen deprived of their com-
mand. Besides, the Seym opened up the way to further reform by entrusting
Andrzej Zamoyski, upon the King’s proposal, with preparing a codification
of the law.
Stanistaw Augustus, encouraged by the success of the Seym, tried
to engage in more active foreign policy by a normalization of Polish-
Turkish relations and a rapprochement with France. These too independent
steps were not liked in St. Petersburg. At the Seym of 1778 Stackelberg
gave a free hand to the anti-royalist opposition, bringing Stanistaw Lubo-
mirski, Ksawery Branicki, Ignacy Potocki and Kazimierz Nestor Sapieha
into the Permanent Council. During the term of office of this Council
(1778-1780) the fate of Zamoyski’s Code was decided. The draft Code,
preceded by wide publicity and prepared with the help of a group of col-
laborators invited by Zamoyski (including Jozef Wybicki and Joachim
Chreptowicz) was already completed for the Seym of 1778. The work went
beyond the limits of a mere codification of the law ; it proposed a number of
reforms in the social system and in the relations between Church and State.
The draft Code recommended a considerable limitation of serfdom and an
extension of the townspeople’s rights (among them the right to send
representatives to the Seym), while the landless gentry who constituted the
magnates’ clientele were to be deprived of political rights. In the relations
of Church and State, the draft proposed to introduce the exequatur, making
the consent of the State necessary for the publication of Papal bulls. The
religious orders were to be subject to the jurisdiction of the national
episcopate and age limits for entry into monasteries were fixed.
The Seym of 1778 deferred consideration of the draft for two years.
It was opposed during this period by Nuncio Archetti who canvassed large
numbers of the provincial gentry through the monastic clergy. The gentry
were particulary alarmed by the concessions to the peasants, which the
propaganda greatly exaggerated. Stackelberg likewise opposed the Code.
The Seym of 1780 rejected the draft. The King proposed in vain to defer
GOVERNMENT BY THE PERMANENT COUNCIL 285
once more consideration of it, but a resolution was passed which prohibited
the draft from ever to be conssidered by the Seym again.
The Seym of 1780 revealed the limits of reform under Russian tutelage
when conservative opinions prevailed among the gentry. Henceforth, the
King’s party lost the initiative in introducing reforms; it looked only to
Russia and found no encouragement there. After dramatic upheavals, the
joint government by the King and the Russian ambassador became stable.
In 1780, the Russian army left the Commonwealth after sixteen years.
GOVERNMENT BY THE PERMANENT COUNCIL
Russia’s policy in the years 1776-1778 consisted in maintaining an uneasy
balance between the King and the oligarchical opposition. One spoke at
that time of two “Muscovite parties” in Poland : the Stackelberg (or Royal)
party and the Potemkin party (or the opposition of the magnates). Such
a state of affairs was not a result of differences in St. Petersburg, but of the
tactics already adopted by Russia at the time of the Confederation of
Radom.
The position of Stanistaw Augustus was growing stronger. His renuncia-
tion of further reforms reassured the gentry in the countryside. The King
attracted to himself a group of experienced political leaders like his brother
Michat Poniatowski (Primate of Poland since 1784) and Joachim Chrepto-
wicz, Vice-Chancellor of Lithuania, who skilfully managed the elections
in the local diets. The core of the King’s party was the newly-created
senators, appointed from the middle gentry. The Senate lost its former
character of a chamber of magnates and actually won supremacy over the
Chamber of Deputies. The King commanded a majority in that Chamber,
too. Debates in the Seyms tended to be sterile, because the more important
issues which would have required unanimity as so-called matters of State
were not put to the vote. For this reason the liberum veto had little
significance. The Seyms elected to the Permanent Council candidates agreed
upon by the King and Stackelberg. Stanislaw Augustus organized a number
of private royal chanceries, according to the structure of the departments.
These chanceries being better qualified bodies, took over, actual leadership.
The Department of Foreign Affairs only formally had control of the
foreign service created by the King (under Saxon rule, Poland had no
permanent representatives abroad). The Department of Justice intervened
in the judiciary and in disputes over competences. One of the primary
reasons for the breakdown of the rule of law in the Commonwealth was
the inability to execute sentences of the court. Now the courts resorted
to military assistance which, it is true, brought about conflicts between the
army and the civilian population, and kept the meagre armed force oc-
286 TENTATIVE REFORMS UNDER RUSSIA’S TUTELAGE (1763-1788)
cupied. The King’s endeavours to create a court militia were defeated by
a strong opposition. Neither was the codification of law resumed after 1780,
a matter which Stanistaw Augustus had considered a burning need.
Yet, not a little was done to uphold the laws. The Department of Police
supervised order in the towns, the hospital system and the public health
services. It was an institution with a limited personnel and only vaguely
defined terms of reference. The King’s plans for expanding the activities of
the Department were opposed by Marshal Stanistaw Lubomirski (marshals
had traditionally exercised authority over the police in the capital). In the
field of finance, a dualism between the Commissions of 1764 and the
Department persisted. The supremacy of the Department was purely formal.
The Fiscal Commissions had at their disposal the best trained administrative
organization in the Commonwealth (the country was divided into ten fiscal
provinces under superintendents). The fiscal revenues amounted to about
20,000,000 zlotys annually and increased slightly as the administration be-
came more efficient. In addition to financial affairs, the Commissions’ respon-
sibility included industrial development and transportation.
The Military Department was virtually controlled by the King’s mili-
tary chancellery (General J. Komarzewski). The establishment of 1776 was
now limited to 17,000 men. The tax system, which remained unchanged
till 1788, did not permit raising more men. By taking advantage of budget
surpluses, the army was slightly increased and reached a strength of
18,500 men in 1786. The structure of the Polish army did not correspond to
the practice of the time. The cavalry (8000 strong) was still too large in
relation to the infantry and was moreover unruly and archaic. The army
had no system of conscription and voluntary enlistment was failing. The
practice of sale and purchase of military commissions had an adverse effect
on the quality of the officers. The Military Department and the King’s
military chancellery repeatedly took the initiative in army reform, but their
attempts collapsed against the opposition led by Hetman Branicki. Much was
done, however, to put the small army cadres in order; the artillery in
particular was of a high standard. While the King aimed at bringing the
Polish military system into conformity with the contemporary professional
armies of Europe, the gentry considered that the Commonwealth should
go its own way in those matters. Plans were advanced for basing the armed
forces on civilian reserves, voivodship militias and the mass-levy. In that
way, one expected to increase the armed forces without new taxes and
conscription (which would have weakened the landowners’ control over
the peasants). The moral value of the citizen-soldier was used as argument.
The magnate opposition counted on appropriating the supervision of a de-
centralized, provincial armed force.
Government by the Permanent Council was a step forward in com-
parison with the former anarchy and provided a school of administrative
experience of great importance for the future ; it was, however, a provisional
GOVERNMENT BY THE PERMANENT COUNCIL 287
arrangement, paralysed by the foreign guarantee. The Council and its
Departments lacked authority and resources; nor was it backed by the
sovereign will of the monarch, or by a parliament able to decide on “mat-
ters of state”. It was the target of attack from the magnates’ opposition
which gathered momentum in the years 1784-1787.
The oligarchical opposition so often in the past disunited, now displayed
considerable solidarity, which illustrated the extent to which the position of
the oligarchy was in jeopardy. Yet, the opposition was not homogeneous.
Branicki or Rzewuski represented the worst traditions of hetman anarchy,
which gained in the conflict inter maiestatem ac libertatem. Of a different
character was the group connected with Pulawy, the Czartoryskis’ residence
(Adam Czartoryski, the brothers Ignacy and Stanislaw Potocki) ; Putawy
competed with royal Warsaw as a political and cultural centre. Coupled
with a family pride, the idea of reforming the Commonwealth was current
in Pulawy, as well as the will to serve the country and faith in the ideals of
Enlightenment. Apart from the political struggle another fight went on for
cultural values.
Chapter XII
THE SOCIETY AND CIVILIZATION
OF THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT
THE ECONOMIC REVIVAL
For neutral Poland, the Seven Years’? War provided considerable opportuni-
ties for economic development. This appeared in the increase of grain ex-
ports in Gdansk (in 1762-1769, they reached 56,000 lasts a year which meant
an annual income of about 20 million zlotys). It is true that Frederick II’s
debasement of the coinage had flooded the country with counterfeit money,
but that kind of inflation, while resulting in a rise in prices, creating difh-
culty for the treasury and causing more than one devaluation, to a certain ex-
tent provided an abundance of money. Moreover money, liable to a decline in
its value was correspondingly mobile, and was not worth hoarding at home,
or accepted abroad. This period of a certain boom, an unquestionable growth
of agricultural production and monetary chaos coincided with the accession
of Stanislaw Augustus.
The leaders of “The Family” were interested in economic problems
and tried seriously to undo the effect of the State’s traditional negligence.
In 1764 it was resolved to establish a mint in Warsaw and to carry out
a currency reform. Weights and measures were officially standardized,
the General Post Office was established, control commissions were introduced
in towns and a general custom tariff was introduced (as we already know).
The individual magnates in the party of “The Family”, in their concern to
create conditions indispensable to economic development, showed their own
private initiative. In 1765 Michat Oginski launched the construction of
a canal connecting the Neman with the Pripet’, for which reason it was
resolved to honour him with a monument. Fiscal commissions supervised the
preservation and extension of the network of roads and waterways. The
Lithuanian Commission undertook the construction of the “Royal Canal”,
connecting the Pripet’ with the Bug. According to the original plans, those
two large canals were to connect the country’s eastern regions with the
Baltic. Opened for traffic in 1784, under the changed conditions of the
partition, they connected the basins of the Vistula and Neman ‘with the
Black Sea.
In these first years of hope and aspiration, a number of industrial enter-
prises were begun. These were not the manufactories seen earlier on the lati-
THE ECONOMIC REVIVAL 289
fundia, but projects on a national scale. The first joint-stock company, “The
Wool Manufacture Company” (under the direction of Andrzej Zamoyski)
was formed with the government support in 1767. To meet the requirements
of the army the King established an ordnance factory in Warsaw and a cloth
factory ; for the needs both of the Court and the general market as
well, he established a faience porcelain factory at the Belvedere Palace.
The King’s most ambitious investment was the establishment in the royal
demesne of Grodno, under the direction of Antoni Tyzenhaus, Treasurer of
Lithuania, of a network of over a dozen manufactories with greatly
diversified production. Most of them proved to be short-lived and failed
not only because of the calamities brought by the Confederation of Bar and
the first partition of Poland. The endeavours discussed here suffered from the
dilettantism of the magnates and from lack of experts. In spite of the fact
that they were based on the theory of the unpaid labour of serfs, these
manufactories proved unprofitable. Serf labour was inefficient and difficult to
exact, luxury goods did not withstand foreign competition, while ordinary
products were not easily sold because of the low buying capacity of the
market. The industrialization of an underdeveloped country, bureaucratically
conceived from above, planned at a desk, might have overcome its first dif-
ficulties in the hot-house conditions of an absolute monarchy. Such conditions
did not exist in Poland. Among projects on a national scale, the most durable
achievement of those years was the stabilization of currency (1776) but even
here a mistake was committed in striking silver coins which were too valuable
and leaked out of the country in great quantity. This led to the reduction of
the bank rate in 1786. The law of 1774 on negotiable instruments facilitated
and safeguarded credit transactions.
The first partition introduced a basic change in the economic situation of
the country. The loss of Pomerania and the trade treaty with Prussia resulted
in a more than twofold decrease of grain exports via Gdansk (down to
23,000 last a year). This loss was not compensated for by an increase in
the export of agricultural products through Elblag and Kénigsberg. The
Prussian frontiers, hampering seriously Polish exports (with the exception
of raw-materials sought by Prussian industry, like wool), provided an open
gate for imports from Prussia. According to official Polish data the adverse
balance of trade for the years 1776-1777 amounted to 44 million zlotys.
This situation alarmed public opinion. The call for balancing trade by
savings and the development of home industries was one of the most popular
programmes. Nevertheless, Poland remained an agricultural country, with
her farm production continuing to expand.
With the national territory in the Vistula basin mutilated, and the Baltic
trade hampered, the Ukrainian territories and the prospects for Black Sea
trade (opened up as a result of Russia’s victory over Turkey) began to
acquire economic importance. The network of waterways was re-orientated
in that direction. With support from the Seym, the Company for Black Sea
19 History of Poland
290 THE SOCIETY AND CIVILIZATION OF THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT
Trade was established in 1782, with the magnate-banker Prot Potocki at
its head. Poland concluded a trade treaty with Rusia for this purpose and
opened a consular office in Kherson. The Company’s ships appeared in the
Mediterranean. Trade with Moldavia was also developing and in this con-
nexion work was undertaken to make the Dniester navigable. The Black
Sea trade was halted after the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war (1787),
but army contracts provided a compensation for grain producers.
The increase in grain production and in stock breeding was to some ex-
tent related to the progress in farming techniques. The second half of the
eighteenth century witnessed a great development of agricultural literature.
There even appeared the first books on agriculture designed for the peasants.
We know of estates where new techniques and new crops (clover, alfalfa and
‘potatoes) were introduced, but these were just modest beginnings in the
great agricultural changes which were to take place in the nineteenth cen-
tury. In the reformers’ writings, the demand that labour dues be replaced by
money rents, enjoyed much currency. The social and economic advantages
of such a reform were emphasized because the peasant’s initiative would
be encouraged by making him interested in the results of production. The
commutation of services into rents, carried out in the estates of Andrzej
Zamoyski, Joachim Chreptowicz, Pawet Brzostowski and Stanistaw Ponia-
towski (the King’s nephew) achieved considerable fame and were held up
as an example to others. Some of the great estate owners were attracted to
the rent economy by the prospect of the estate administration being greatly
simplified (compulsory labour in the latifundia required a large personnel for
supervision and coercion). The success of these reforms depended on the
development of the local market (that meant sales facilities for the peasants).
The rent economy and the replacing of serf labour in manor farms by hired
labour took place on a large scale in the economically developed territories
of Great Poland. In the overpopulated territories of Little Poland where
manor farms were not lacking in manpower, the commutation of labour dues
into money rents was applied according to the temporary needs of the
owners. In the Ukraine, in connexion with chances for exports, the changes
went in the opposite direction : from rents towards serf labour. Nationally,
the manor farm and serf economy not only held its dominating position, but
was expanding wherever possibilities of large scale grain transactions ex-
isted, specially on the estates of the middle gentry. On the other hand, the
demand that peasants should pay their dues in money instead of labour was
often caused by difficulties in the sale of manorial produce and was tanta-
mount to burdening the peasant with these difficulties. The question of the
sale of farm products, connected with the balance of trade, presented another
important question. Here we have the two aspects of the main problem,
namely the stimulation of the home market.
In economic literature a simple remedy was repeated over and over
again : the development of the towns and of industrial production would
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1, The Royal Castle, 2. The Palace ‘‘Pod Blacha’*, 3. St. John’s Church, 4. St. Martin’s Church, 5. St. Mary’s
Church, 6. Royal Guards barracks, 7. The Palace of the Republic, 8. Piarists’ College, 9. The Arsenal, 10. The
Zaluski Library, 11. The Branicki Palace, 12, The Primate’s Palace, 13. Black Friar’s Church, 14. The Ra-
dziwit! Palace, 15. The Czartoryski Palace, 16. Sisters of Visitation Church, 17. The Czapski Palace, 18. The
Jobn Casimir Palace, 19. Se. Cross Church, 20. The Protestant Church, 21. The Royal Saxon Palace, 22. The
Brithl Palace, 23. The Blue Palace, 24. The Oginski Palace, 25. The Bielifski Palace, 26. Horse Guards barracks,
27. The Ostrogski Palace, 28. The Ujazdowski Palace, 29. The Royal Palace Lazienki, 30. The Belvedere,
31. The Parish Church of Praga, 32. Black Friars Church in Praga.
19*
292 THE SOCIETY AND CIVILIZATION OF THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT
increase the volume of exchange between town and country. Industrial
activity was presented as the duty of a patriot. This motive as well as the
current fashionable ideas should not be underestimated in the activities of
some of the magnate-industrialists, but economics remained economics. The
latifundia manufactories of the Saxon times continued to exist, new ones
were established, more or less profitable, more or less durable. This was
undoubtedly an element of progress, but it was not adequate to the country’s
needs. Nevertheless, deeper changes in the economic development were also
taking place little by little.
Warsaw, a town of less than 30,000 inhabitants in the first years of
Stanistaw Augustus’: reign, reached a population of 120,000 by 1792. This
large capital became, as a matter of fact, an important centre of domestic
trade, of urban industry, crafts and trade as well as of something new in
Poland, of numerous banking houses. Under the difficult conditions of being
on the Prussian borderland, the important centre of Great Poland’s cloth
and linen industry maintained its position as a producer, while handicraft
production in this region was dominated and organized by commercial capi-
tal to an ever greater extent. In the region of Kielce, on the basis of the old
ironworks, modern blast furnaces replaced the former primitive ones. The
Mines Commission, established by the King in 1782, resumed the exploita-
tion of abandoned mines and conducted geological surveys (after the loss
of the Wieliczka and Bochnia salt-mines, the search for salt deposits became
an urgent problem). The mining of hard coal was started. A characteristic
phenomenon of the 1780’s was the establishment of numerous joint-stock
companies with mixed gentry and urban middle class capital. The most im-
portant among them was the “National Linen Factory Company”, formed by
the Primate Poniatowski in 1787. The enlargement of the army to 60,000
during the Four Years’ Seym was an incentive for the development of a na-
tional industry which met to a large extent the needs of the army. A great
deal of building construction took piace in the country, especially in the ex-
panding city of Warsaw:
When dealing with economic revival, one ought not to overlook the
element of conscious effort. The fascination of the people of the eighteenth
century with economic problems and their faith that the economy could be
consciously shaped, were a striking feature. An abundant economic litera-
ture, a multitude of theoretical projects proposed both by private individuals
and by government departments, specially by the fiscal commissions, and the
continuous search for new ways and solutions were also dynamic elements
of development appearing in this short and difficult period. The difficulties
were indeed great and not only of an external nature. Specific projects were
conditioned by the weakness of investment capital and by dear credit ; the
whole of economic Jife was determined by the division of society into es-
tates. It was against such a background that this unique plan for an “Eco-
nomic Constitution” came to life in 1791.
THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION 293
- THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION
Out of about 12 million inhabitants, (without Courland) Poland lost about
4+5 millions in 1772, Within the next twenty years the population of the
dismembered country grew by natural increase form 7+5 million to about
9 million (in 1791). The approximate social structure of that population (we
have so far at our disposal rather inexact data only) was as follows :
Gentry 700,000 8-0 per cent
Clergy 50,000 0-5 per cent
Burghers 600,000 7-0 per cent
Jews 900,000 10-0 per cent
Peasants 6,500,000 72-0 per cent
Miscellaneous
(Armenians, Tartars,
Orthodox ‘“Old-Believers’’) 250,000 2+5 per cent
In the multinational Commonwealth, the Ukrainians, Byelorussians and-
Lituanians accounted for about one half of all peasants and burghers ex-
cluding the Jews. On the other hand, the process of complete Poloniza-
tion of the gentry in the Commonwealth’s eastern territories was already con-
cluded.
This social structure does not reflect the occupational structure. The
peasants were overwhelmingly farmers, though there were among them
persons engaged in rural crafts (especially the timber and textile industries).
The Jews were mostly tradesmen, middlemen and artisans. Two-thirds of
them lived in towns and thus were actually burghers, though they did not
belong to the burghers’ estate. Besides the 600,000 burghers in the formal
sense, as the citizens of the towns, there lived in the towns as many Jews,
a certain number of clergy and gentry with their servants and the craftsmen
employed by them who did not belong to the municipal community. The
urban population can thus be estimated at about 1,300,000, with the reserva-
tion, however, that most small towns were in practice agricultural settle-
ments. Finally, with regard to the gentry, less than a half owned landed es-
tates (about 300,000). For the most part, they were leaseholders, farmers in-
habiting separate villages (the so-called zascianki) and small holders, tilling
their land themselves. The manorial staff, the court and the militia of the
magnate, were also composed of empoverished gentlemen. In the course of
the eighteenth century, a process of social differentiation occurred within
all the estates.
The factor levelling out the peasants’ financial position was the manor
farm economy which was demanding that those who supplied a determined
quantity of labour (with their own draft animals) should have an adequate
economic potential. The gentry manor farm and the serf village were an
integrated whole. When conversion from labour dues to money rent
®
294 THE SOCIETY AND CIVILIZATION OF THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT
took place, or hired labour was introduced in the manor farm on a larger
scale, the levelling role of the manor decreased, and the social division of
labour and financial differentiation progressed. In the second half of the
eighteenth century, new methods of farming, agricultural literature and
general education sporadically began to reach the peasants. Towards the
end of the century, the peasants reacted quite strongly to such political
events as the Constitution of 3 May, 1791 and the Kosciuszko Insurrection.
The impact of the peasants on the moulding of the “peasant question” took
place above all through acts of resistance against serfdom. The peasants used
their limited possibilities for presenting their claims and bringing complaints
(we have a large number of peasant petitions from this period). They refused
to perform duties and escaped from the “‘bad master’s” village. The Ukrainian
rising of 1768 left an unforgettable impression upon the gentry, and new
peasant disorders in the Ukraine caused serious fears in 1789.
The implementation of peasant reform was much more difficult in the
Commonwealth than in an absolute monarchy ; it had to pass through a Seym
composed exclusively of members of the gentry. The Seyms of 1767-1768,
1773-1775 and 1780 rejected the proposals for reform although they were
not at all radical. They proposed only to mitigate personal serfdom and
to give the peasants the possibility of seeking justice in courts. The struggle
for peasant reform went on outside the Seym in political writings.
The Jewish population, almost one-million strong, underwent an ever
greater differentiation. The Kahals, responsible for Jewish debts, had from
the seventeenth century onwards controlled the granting of credits and for
practical purposes performed the function of banks. These flourishing as-
sociations dominated by a wealthy élite, disposed of considerable capital,
deposited with them at interest by the gentry and clergy. They in turn lent
money, not only to Jews. Owing to the Kahal banks a considerable concen-
tration of usurious and commercial capital occurred of a scope reaching
beyond Poland’s borders. On the other hand, the majority of Polish Jews
lived in extreme poverty.
The south-eastern borderlands of the Commonwealth produced in the
eighteenth century two religious sects which had an important influence
on the transformation within the Jewish community. The popular mystical
Chassidic movement begun by Israel ben Eliezer, generally called Beszt, con-
tributed to.a firm isolation of the Jews from outside influence. The equal-
ly mystical anti-Talmudist sect formed by Jakub Frank developed in an
opposite direction. The Frankists eventually adopted Christianity ; a section
of them was knighted and Polonized. The mass Chassidic movement and
the much narrower Frankist movement made it difficult for the ideas of
the Jewish Enlightenment according to the Berlin Haskala to spread in
Poland ; the disciples of Moses Mendelssohn were active in the Common-
wealth, though under difficult conditions. Among the Maskils (advocates
THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION 295
of the Enlightenment) the most distinguished was Mendel Levin from Sata-
néw (a protégé of Adam Czartoryski).
The Jewish self-government known as “Seym of the Four Provinces”
was abolished in 1764. The right of Jews to settle in towns and to engage
in trade and crafts ‘was restricted. Demands were made for the Jews to
be settled on the land and for the Kahbals to be abolished. The Christian
burghers strove, through fear of competition, for an increasingly greater
legal and economic curtailment of the Jewish population’s rights. The re-
formers among the gentry desired assimilation by administrative pressure.
The Jews felt that religious and national identity was threatened. The
question of a Jewish reform was becomming an urgent problem. The estate
barrier between the burghers and the Jews was an obstacle to the transfor-
mation of Polish towns into truly modern urban centres.
Within the estate of the burghers a slow disintegration of the guild
organization took place. The purpose of the continued existence of guilds
was questioned in many quarters. The differentiation of the burghers was
most noticeable in Warsaw. On the one hand, the germs of a modern big
bourgeoisie came into being. Bankers, rich merchants and industrialists had
political and cultural aspirations. They built palaces for themselves and
became partners of the gentry in more than an economic sense. The desire
to emulate the magnates often had adverse effects because capital was turned
over to consumption. However the desire of the rich burghers to purchase
landed estates was a reflection of a normal tendency to secure a sound invest-
ment. On the other hand, Warsaw experienced a great concentration of
town people which, at critical moments, exerted an important influence on
the country’s political climate. Warsaw, a great and dynamic city, abound-
ing in contrasts, was an entirely novel phenomenon in the Commonwealth.
The prominence achieved by the burghers in intellectual life was likewise
a new feature. The middle class provided not only university professors,
jurists and learned priests as before, but also the leading political thinkers
like Stanistaw Staszic and Jozef Pawlikowski, who demanded and planned
the reform of the Commonwealth. The municipal reforms, undertaken in
the 1760’s and 1770’s, had broadened the control of the State over the
towns. The work of the control commissions and of the Permanent Council’s
Police Department contributed to putting the municipal finances in order
and to the launching of public utility projects. This was, however, interfer-
ence by the gentry authorities and was accepted reluctantly by the muni-
cipal authorities. The burghers aimed at emancipating themselves, supervising
their own affairs and gaining a share in the central government of the
Commonwealth. The people of Warsaw became a potentially revolutionary
element.
The formal equality of “brother-gentlemen” had always been a fiction
which became particularly glaring under the magnates’ oligarchy. The great
296 THE SOCIETY AND CIVILIZATION OF THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT
differentiation of the electoral body did not lead, however, to the formation
of separate parties of the magnates, the middle-gentry and of the lesser
gentry. In the first half of the eighteenth century, a score or so important
families commanded all the votes, the poorest gentry being most dependent
on them. Under the condititions of anarchy, a system of patronage and
clientship had developed ; while it did not have a legal form, it was in
essence similar to the process of feudalization in the medieval meaning of
the term. The social trend of the government reforms in the second half
of the eighteenth century was mainly the struggle against oligarchy. The
strengthening of the central authority and the enforcement of law automati-
cally loosened the bonds of patronage and clientship. Apart from. this,
domestic upheavals, specially the Confederation of Bar, shook many a mag-
nate’s fortune. Private armies were abolished. The now smaller courts of
the magnates did not attract as many courtiers and hangers-on as before. The
independence of the middle gentry was growing encouraged by deliberate
policy of the royal party. The lesser gentry, on the other hand, remained
dependent on the magnates, especially in the eastern borderlands. This was
an ignorant element, in principle obedient to the magnates but turbulent,
quick to grasp for the bottle and the sword. Poverty sometimes made them
prone to radical tendencies. The social stratification and tension within the
gentry were reflected in the problem of reforming electoral law.
The process of stratification or even partial disintegration of the tradi-
tional estates of the Commonwealth resulted in the emergence of new social
classes. There was a category of people which did not fit into the accepted
division : the migratory element, composed of peasants drawn away from the
land, or artisans drawn away from their workshops, who made their living
by hiring themselves as casual labour in various trades or in beggary. The
apperance of itinerants was not novel but it was a particularly noticable fea-
ture of this period and so was the*tendency to employ them as manufac-
turing workshops workers. The problem of the proletariat had begun to pre-
sent itself in Poland.
A process more evolved and characteristic for the Enlightenment was
the formation of professional classes. In a society divided into estates, the
role of the intelligentsia was played primarily by the secular and monastic
clergy. An ecclesiastical career opened up the road to promotion, however
limited, for people from lower estates. That is why so many able and am-
bitious people took holy orders.in the eighteenth century. The novel as-
pect was that their membership of the ecclesiastical estate became in many in-
stances purely formal. The dissolution of the numerous Jesuit order contrib-
uted to this development, but more fundamental causes were at work : the
intellectual laicization of many priests and the fact that new types of secular
careers became open to them. Educational reform secularized the teaching
profession. The growth of periodicals and of all kinds of literary works
made it possible for editors and writers to make a living from their profes-
CONFLICT OF FASHIONS AND IDEALS 297
sional work. A literary and artistic milieu appeared in Warsaw. The ex-
pansion of the civil service and the army drew some landowners away
from the rustic way of life and attracted the lesser gentry. In the law, the
bourgeois barristers began to make their mark. Laicized priests and ex-
priests, teachers and tutors, scholars and artists, young civil servants, officers
and lawyers, made up an element receptive to the ideas of Enlightenment
and free of social prejudice. In this respect Warsaw, as a great city, was
moving ahead of the rest of the country.A growing disparity arose between
the progressive capital and the conservative provinces, a phenomenon which
had not existed in the epoch of oligarchic decentralization.
CONFLICT OF FASHIONS AND IDEALS
Wasy i peruka (The Moustache and the Wig) was the title of a comedy, in
which a nineteenth century playwright expressed the contrasts in the cultural
life, customs and manner in the times of Stanislaw Augustus. On the one
hand there was “sarmatism” ; the old fashioned moustached nobleman, his
head half-shaven, wearing the kontusz, an overcoat with split sleeves,
following a semi-Turkish fashion and perorating in schoolboy Latin. On the
other hand, there was “foreignism” : the dandy in a powdered wig, a snob,
forgetting not only Latin, but even Polish for the sake of French.
“Sarmatism’”, colourful, original with a cultural coherence of its own,
experienced ossification in the eighteenth century. Social and_ political
thought became sterile as a result of the gentry’s self-congratulation ; litera-
ture degenerated into Baroque and macaronic writing. To the contempo-
raries, “sarmatism” was synonymous with conservatism. The Confederation
of Bar with its abundant political and religious poetry and with its anti-
reform lampoons, was a powerful manifestation of “sarmatism”, not only
in the political but also in the cultural field. “Sarmatism”, appealing to the
Polish identity, drew its inspiration from the dislike of the foreigner.
The sixty years of Saxon reign in Poland favoured the spread of foreign
fashions and that way of life in the residences of the great nobles. The neg-
ative aspect, however, had a greater significance: the absence of a natural
centre for the nation’s cultural life which a capital should be. The source
of foreign influence was not so much the court of Dresden as travel in the
West, especially in France, which became an almost obligatory part of the
upbringing of the scions of noble families. In drawing-room conversation,
correspondence, reading and the education of children, French supplanted
the native tongue. The traditional Polish and Catholic customs ceased to
be attractive. Divorce increased in aristocratic circles, as well as ‘‘fashion-
able marriages”, in which both sides agreed to full sexual freedom. Drinking
was less fashionable, but gambling for large sums of money became com-
298 THE SOCIETY AND CIVILIZATION OF THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT
mon. The partition Seym of 1773-1775 was engraved on contemporaries’
memories as a continuous carnival. All that had, in fact, little in common
with the “foreign plague”. The magnate enjoyed himself better wearing
a wig than the kontusz, but it was not the wigs that determined his attitude
to a life of self-indulgence without sense of responsibility.
Much thought has been given to the question of the extent to which the
Enlightenment in Poland was an import from abroad. This dilemma is
unreal. The Enlightenment was an European feature and Poland, for all
its Sarmatist ossification, was a part of Europe. Intellectual currents trav-
ersed the old continent in various directions and reached the Common-
wealth by different ways. If Poland in the second half of the eighteenth
century was more than ever before open to the international exchanges of
ideas, it was not because the country had been conquered by outside in-
fluences, but because the political and cultural stagnation of the Saxon
times had been surmounted within the country.
An important part in removing the barriers of social privilege was
played by the freemasonry. The first lodges had already appeared in Poland
under the Saxons, but freemasonry did not spread widely until the reign
of Stanistaw Augustus, especially after 1767. In 1782 the Polish Grand
Orient lodge was established. The highest masonic offices were held by
prominent persons like Andrzej Mokronowski, Ignacy Potocki, Szczesny
Potocki and K. N. Sapieha. Besides the magnates, foreigners settled in
Poland were particularly active members of the lodges (the statutes of the
Grand Orient were drawn up by the King’s secretary, Maurice Glayre,
a Swiss). Stanistaw Augustus himself was a freemason. By the late 1780's
the majority of progressive politicians among the gentry had found their
way into the lodges. The ties of masonic brotherhood, linking magnates
with people not belonging to the gentry, for there were even valets among
them, contributed to spread the ideas of humanism and the natural equality
of men. In the eyes of Sarmatians, those were “foreign fads”.
New ideas from the West reached Poland by various channels. Sta-
nistaw Augustus employed many foreigners in his chanceries and as confi-
dential agents abroad. Some of those mea played a prominent political role,
in particular Father Scipione Piattoli. The Italian Enlightenment found
followers among some of the priests travelling to Rome (Stanislaw Konarski,
Hugo Kolfataj). Some representatives of the Confederation of Bar, which
in principle was conservative (Michal Wielhorski, Ignacy Massalski), estab-
lished close contacts with Rousseau, Mably and with French physiocrats.
The well-known physiocrat, Dupont de Nemours, was engaged by Bishop
Massalski as secretary of the Commission of National Education. A number
of Frenchmen became engaged in Polish political literature by writing trea-
tises and memoranda intended for the Poles. The works by French, English
and Italian philosophers, economists and legal theorists (not to mention
novels), were translated into Polish in great numbers. Erudite German works
CONFLICT OF FASHIONS AND IDEALS 299
furnished material for Polish periodicals. The spate of theatrical production
consisted mainly of adaptation of French and Italian works.
Yet, while the Polish economists took much from the physiocrats or
from Condillac and the Polish playwrights based their plots on foreign
models, it was not merely passive imitation. In the social sciences, foreign
inspiration was adapted to Polish conditions, in literature to Polish customs
and local colour. As years went by, original creative work grew up in all
fields of writing. The same, though to a lesser extent, was true of the fine
arts. In architecture, painting and sculpture, the leading artists were French-
men and Italians, permanently settled in Poland and, for the most part,
enjoying royal patronage: like Merlini, Fontana, Bacciarelli, Canaletto,
Le Brun, and Norblin. To foreigners goes the credit for the reconstruction
and redecoration of the Royal Castle in Warsaw ; its decoration was do-
minated by national themes, both historical and allegorical. The King’s
summer residence, the Lazienki, was the highest achievement of the “Stani-
slavian style’. In later years, Polish artists made their mark: Stanislaw
Zawadzki, Piotr Aigner, and Jakub Kubicki in architecture, Aleksander
Kucharski, Franciszek Smuglewicz and Kazimierz Wojniakowski in paint-
ing. In music Polish opera appeared beside the Italian. The rhythm of the
national dance, the Polonaise, had earlier already made an European career.
Now, alongside of the Polonaise (cultivated by Michal Oginski, Hetman,
constructor of the canal, and himself a composer), folk tunes (mazurkas)
appeared in the works of Polish composers. Various ingredients were thrown
into the melting-pot of Polish culture to produce the alloy of new conven-
tions and attitudes, a new style replacing the sterile “sarmatism” and the
superficial imitation of foreign way of life.
The age of Enlightenment waged a struggle against the errors, vices,
weaknesses and eccentricities which had multiplied during the period of
the oligarchic anarchy. Sarmatian complacency was replaced by the spirit
of criticism, though with an optimistic background. The people of the
eighteenth century believed in the better future for which men should fight.
They liked, at the same time, to look back to the nation’s glorious past and
drew upon the cultural legacy of the Polish Renaissance. National conscious-
ness increased considerably during this time. This can be seen in the conscious
care for, and in the modernization of the language, which was cleansed of
degenerate accretions and a macaronic style and thus entered a period of
splendid development. The old national institutions were permeated with a
new ideological and social content. The traditional Polish freedom of the gen-
try was translated into the language of European Enlightenment and moder-
nized, without breaking with the parliamentary and republican heritage.
The development of satirical literature was a characteristic mirror of
the awakening criticism. The satire on customs and manners had two targets.
The gallery of types ridiculed in poetry and comedy included on the one
hand the ignorant, superstitious and brutal Sarmatians, on the other hand
300 THE SOCIETY AND CIVILIZATION OF THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT
the ladies and dandies, indulging in “fashionable” dissipation, posing as
foreigners and scorning national customs. In the dispute between “the
moustache and the wig”, the men of the Enlightenment declared for the
head, whatever adornment it possessed. From about 1788, however, a change
occurred in fashions, indicative of the rising national consciousness, of the
attachment, and to a certain extent, return to national customs. Among the
progressives, the Polish costume (the kontusz) came into fashion again.
The first man to create a sensation in the Warsaw society in 1788, by
changing ostentiously from French frock into a kontusz, was Jan Potocki,
a young aristocrat educated abroad and the author of distinguished jour-
nalistic, scholarly and literary works, written exclusively in French. Such
gestures should not be underestimated. The problem epitomized in the con-
flict of “moustache or wig”, the problem of a civilization full of contrasts,
arising from temporary backwardness, had been surmounted.
THE INTELLECTUAL UPHEAVAL
For services in the field of education during the Saxon times, Stanistaw
Augustus honoured Konarski with a medal bearing the following inscription :
“To him who dared to be wise”. The greatest poet of the next generation,
Ignacy Krasicki, wrote: “Learn we must, for the golden age is over”, by
which he meant the age of the Saxon kings. Indeed, thought which had once
been an act of courage, now became a duty. Striking indeed was the
country’s general situation first in the restriction, then in the release of tal-
ents. A stimulating role was now played by royal patronage and by some
of the magnate’s courts (Pulawy of the Czartoryskis, Lancut of the Lubo-
mirskis, Sonim of the Oginskis). Warsaw was a magnet attracting the intel-
lectuals. Men of great ability appeared simultaneously in different fields
of creative activity.
A great upheaval took place in literature. Franciszek Bohomolec’s
comedies still moralized more than they amused. Adam Naruszewicz still
wrote turgid panegyrics and conventional bucolics, but in satire he achieved
a pungent sarcasm and racy humour. A great master of satire, fable and he-
roicomic poem was to appear in the person of Ignacy Krasicki- The distin-
guished stylist, Stanislaw Trembecki, raised topical poetry and descriptive
poems to a high level of artistry. Akin to Trembecki in libertinism was the
young Voltairian, Kajetan Wegierski, author of numerous satires and lam-
poons. Franciszek Zablocki displayed considerable skill in the writing of com-
edy. Julian Ursyn Niemcewicz brought to political journalism the effective
form of fable and comedy. A master of the stage was Wojciech Bogustawski,
an actor, theatrical director and producer of many plays. In sentimental
lyrics, Franciszek Karpinski and Franciszek Kniaznin set new tones which
foreshadowed the coming of Romanticism.
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The writers of the Stanislavian era achieved artistic perfection in minor
forms and in traditional literary fashions. Novels or historical dramas were still
experiments. Krasicki’s didactic novels of manners were not equal artisti-
cally to his fables or satires, but they were an important literary and social
phenomenon which found imitators. This rich literary output was strongly
engaged in the great educational campaign. Much of it was declamatory
and declaratory, abounding in stereotyped characters meant to represent
positive values, but satire and comedy pulsated with life and realism in
the presentation of negative or ridiculous types. Laughter indeed became
a formidable weapon.
Learning saw important achievements such as the critical history of
302 THE SOCIETY AND CIVILIZATION OF THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT
Poland in the Middle Ages written by Naruszewicz, a Polish grammar by
Onufry Kopcezynski, the mathematical and astronomical works by Jan
Sniadecki, and Krzysztof Kluk’s writings on botany and agriculture. The
pace of intellectual development was set, however, by talented popularizers
and compilers and by men who put their knowledge to the direct service
of daily life. These were, on the one hand, economists and jurists like An-
toni Popltawski, Hieronim Strojnowski, Ferdynand Nax, Wincenty Skrze-
tuski and Teodor Ostrowski, on the other chemists and geologists, connected
with industry and mining like Jézef Osinski or Jan Jaskiewicz. On the
frontier of the social sciences and current politics there developed a rich
political literature which was to produce its greatest work during the time
of the Four Years’ Seym. During the period of the Permanent Council, this
practical and didactic approach left a mark common to belles-lettres, jour-
nalism and learned writings.
It has been mentioned above, that the alliance of politics and education
was a characteristic feature of the Polish Enlightenment. Statesmen like
the King, the Primate Poniatowski, the Vice-Chancellor Joachim Chrep-
towicz, Andrzej Zamoyski, Andrzej Mokronowski, Adam Czartoryski or
Ignacy Potocki were educational leaders. Educationalists like Hugo Kotta-
taj, Franciszek Jezierski and Franciszek Dmochowski, came upon the politi-
cal stage from their work at school. The presence of the highest dignitaries
in the Educational Commission added to its prestige. The “Society for Ele-
mentary Books” was a more specialized body, presided over by Ignacy Po-
tocki but with Grzegorz Piramowicz as its moving spirit, the most outstand-
ing Polish educationalist after Stanistaw Konarski. The Commission had
recourse to the country’s finest traditions, established in Konarski’s Colle-
gium Nobilium (Ignacy and Stanislaw Potocki were its pupils) and of the
“Knights’ School” (under the command of Adam Czartoryski). Foreign mod-
els were found in the Austrian Studien-Hofkommission and in the French
plans for a reorganization of the educational system, likewise connected
with the abolition of the Jesuit Order.
All schools throughout the country (with the exception of the “Knights”
School”) were subordinated to the Educational Commission. The country
was divided into two school provinces (the Crown and Lithuania) at the
head of which stood the Principal Schools, the reformed universities of
Cracow and Wilno. Directly subordinated to the Principal schools were the
divisional schools (higher secondary schools), beneath which were the sub-
divisional schools (lower secondary schools). The latter had parish and
private schools for girls under their supervision and care. The Principal
schools were the chief element in this organization. The reform of the
Cracow Academy, accomplished by Hugo Koltataj, was a major achieve-
ment ; this moribund school, sunk in medievalism, was transformed into
a modern university. A rather superficial reform of the Wilno Academy
was carried out by the ex-Jesuit astronomer, Marcin Poczobut. The Principal
THE INTELLECTUAL UPHEAVAL 303
Schools performed the combined functions of universities, learned societies,
teachers colleges and education offices. The great amount of administrative
and supervisory work they were burdened with adversely affected their
purely academic activity. Yet, the main goal of the “educational revolution”
was the reform of secondary school system and in that domain the school
system fulfilled its task quite well.
Polish became the medium of instruction in secondary schools (Latin
was taught from a modern Polish textbook). Mathematics and natural
sciences were introduced on a wide scale, with particular emphasis on their
practical application, including instruction in farming and surveying. Young
people were to be prepared for public life by instruction in Polish history,
the laws of the land and “moral science” by which ethics was understood.
Paramilitary training was also introduced. In 1781-1790 about 17,000 pu-
pils annually attended 74 secondary schools. In many schools young people
from other classes than the gentry made up more than one half of the pu-
pils. Compared with the Jesuit and Piarist schools, however, the total num-
ber of pupils fell as a result of difficulties of organization and finance caused
by the re-organization. Among the sons of the well-to-do gentry many
studied at home and not a few abroad.
In the first years of the Commission’s work much attention was devoted
to the problem of the parish schools. This concern was an aspect of the
popularity of physiocratic doctrines. Elementary education was designed
to increase the peasants’ productive capacity. The Commission drew up
curricula and a model primer, but the plans for the creation of a wide net-
work of parish schools fell through for lack of funds. The maintenance of
elementary schools continued to depend on the initiative of the parish
clergy, but the Commission exercised supervision over those already in
existence. The number of these schools was nevertheless growing. During
the Four Years’ Seym the government began to make greater efforts to
make the parsons manage the schools in the parishes.
The Educational Commission met many difficulties, such as the partial
dissipation of post-Jesuit property, the lack of textbooks and competent
teachers and opposition on the part of former monastic teachers and the
conservative gentry. The “Society for Elementary Books” supplied textbooks
of a high standard, for instance the handbook of logic was written for the
Commission by Condillac and the excellent mathematical textbooks by the
Swiss Simon L’Huillier. The number of young secular teachers, already
trained in the Commission’s colleges, increased gradually. With the new
curricula, the introduction of new textbooks and new teachers taking up
their work, internal conflicts within the teaching profession and the outside
Opposition against the Commission however gathered momentum. Among
the provincial gentry ideological differences between the old and the young
generation became more and more clearcut. The opposition to the Perma-
nent Council had many currents. The opposition to the Educational Com-
304 THE SOCIETY AND CIVILIZATION OF THE .AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT
mission was uniformly and unmistakably conservative. In practical mat-
ters of education, on the other hand, the cooperation between the Commis-
sion’s “patron”, the King, its President, the Primate Poniatowski, and such
people as Ignacy Potocki, Adam Czartoryski and Hugo Kollataj, developed
harmoniously. It was a promise of the consolidation of the party of reform
which came to fruition with the Constitution of the Third of May.
Chapter XIII
THE STRUGGLE
FOR THE INDEPENDENCE
AND FOR THE REFORM
OF THE COMMONWEALTH
(1788-1794)
THE END OF THE GUARANTEE
In the quiet years of the Permanent Council’s rule, the alliance of Russia,
Austria and Prussia was gradually disintegrating. With regard to the prob-
lem of the Bavarian succession a rupture between Austria and Prussia took
place in 1778-1779, The relations between Russia and Prussia also cooled
which soon found expression in Russia’s attitude towards a correction of
the Polish-Prussian frontier (1776) and in the constant pressure exerted by
Prussia upon Gdansk. During the life-time of Frederick II (until 1786),
appearances were maintained. From 1780, however, Austro-Russian cooper-
ation was imminent against Turkey and, partly, against Prussia as well.
In St. Petersburg the Austrophile trend represented by Potemkin prevailed
over the old policy of the Prussophile Panin who fell into disfavour in 1781.
Stanistaw Augustus had always considered that Prussia and the Prus-
sian influence upon Russia was the greatest danger to Poland. He now ex-
pected that the anticipated Russo-Turkish conflict would allow the Common-
wealth to play an active part at the side of Russia and Austria. The King
hoped that Poland’s participation in a military alliance would carry Russian
consent to further constitutional reforms and to an increase in the army,
that it would assure a containment of the magnate opposition and open broad-
er prospects for economic expansion in the direction of the Black Sea. The
possibility of territorial expansion at the expense of Turkey was also taken
into account in Warsaw. Counting on Potemkin’s support, the leaders of the
magnate opposition made offers of alliance to Russia, competing with those
of the King. According to their plan, Poland’s participation in the war
against Turkey was to be achieved through an anti-royal Confederation
which would overthrow the rule of the Permanent Council. With Russia’s
help the Confederation would set up its own armed force, intended partly for
the creation of an auxiliary corps to be used at the side of the Tsarist army.
On the occasion of the meeting of Catherine II and Joseph II, in the
20 History of Poland
306 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND FOR THE REFORM (1788-1794)
spring of 1787, the magnates hastened to Kiev and Stanislaw Augustus
to Kaniéw. Both sides were disappointed. Russia had no intention of al-
lowing further changes in the Commonwealth’s guaranteed system of gov-
ernment. The only proposal contemplated was the possibility of using a
Polish auxiliary corps, but without consent to reforms. The offers of the
magnate opposition were also declined for fear lest the Commonwealth
should again become the scene of disturbances and foreign intervention. The
maintenance of the status quo in Poland suited Russia. In the event of a war
with Turkey it assured peace on the western frontier anda supply base on
the right flank of the Ukraine. Under these circumstances an alliance with
the imperial courts did not open the road towards the Commonwealth’s
further reform. On the other hand, Russia and Austria, unlike Prussia, re-
cognized the inviolability of the frontiers of 1772. On 16 August, 1787
the Russo-Turkish war began. It was soon joined by Austria. This was
a turning point in Poland’s history.
The disappointment of Kiev resulted in a split on foreign policy in the
ranks of the formerly united magnate opposition. Szczesny Potocki, Branicki
and Rzewuski stuck to their plans of a Confederation by Russia’s side.
Ignacy and Stanistaw Potocki and Adam Czartoryski gave up solliciting
Russian support and turned to Prussia, as did the Lithuanian magnates,
Karol Radziwill and Michat Oginski. Prussia’s interest in Poland was
motivated by highly ambiguous designs. Since the war of the Bavarian
Succession Hertzberg’s exchange plan had been played with in Berlin. With
Prussian assistance Poland was to recover Galicia and, in return, she would
cede Gdansk, Torun and a part of Great Poland to Prussia. The thought was
also nurtured in Berlin of provoking an anti-royalist Confederation which
would throw the country into civil war, clear the way for an armed
intervention and, eventually, lead to a partition as the Confederation of Bar
had done. For the time being the most important thing was to prevent
a Polish-Russian alliance. The broader background of these schemes was the
great power policy of Frederick William II of Prussia who, having entered
into alliance with England and Holland, and having encouraged Sweden
to declare war on Russia, threatened Austria and Russia. The prospect was
presented to Poland of becoming a part of a powerful alliance of Prussia,
Britain, the United Provinces, Sweden and Turkey. The broad prospect of
alliance and wars obscured to the Poles the annexationist schemes of Prus-
sia. Those opposed to the King and the Permanent Council found external
support and the patriotic elements perceived the chance of emancipating
Poland from Russia’s tutelage and throwing off her guarantee. Very quickly
a wide movement sprang up, deceptively called the Patriotic Party or the
Prussian Party.
The political upheaval of 1788 arose because of mounting discontent
with the humiliating “proconsulate” of Stackelberg. Vigour and self-
confidence were growing among the gentry. The men of the Enlightenment
THE SEYM CONTROL 307
were calling more and more impatiently for social and constitutional reforms,
while the conservatives were counting on the return of “good old times”. In
the King’s words a “ferment of ideas” affected the whole country. A great
variety of elements allied against the system of guarantee and the Council.
This loose coalition, inappropriately called a “party” was ta gain a decisive
majority in the Seym.
Russia did not consent to Stanislaw Augustus’ plan for forming a Con-
federation within the Permanent Council, which would have assured
ascendancy to the royal party from the very beginning. A Confederation
Seym was formed on 7 October under the presidency of S. Malachowski and
K. N. Sapieha ; its task, according to Stackelberg’s original idea, was to push
through a resolution for the increase of taxes and the army, and to conclude
an alliance with Russia. From then on the events followed with lightning
speed. On 13 October the Prusian envoy read a note in which he protested
against an alliance with Russia and proposed a Polish-Prussian alliance. It
created a sensation in Warsaw and in St. Petersburg. Russia withdrew the plan
of alliance. On 20 October the Seym voted amidst general enthusiasm for an
army increased to 100,000. Who was to exercise command over it? On 3 No-
vember, after a hard struggle, the War Department was abolished and a War
Commission was constituted, elected from among the Seym. Stackelberg
protested against such a breach of the guarantee. Prussia responded with
a declaration that she considered herself bound only to guarantee the Com-
monwealth’s independence, but had no intention of restricting Poland’s free-
dom to legislate. On 9 December the Department of Foreign Affairs was
abolished and replaced by the Seym Deputation for Foreign Affairs. On 19
January, 1789 the Permanent Council itself was abolished. The Seym pro-
longed its powers for an indefinite period and decided to govern by itself.
THE SEYM CONTROL
The Poles made up for the long paralysis of the parliament by making it
all-powerful for a few years. It was a provisional arrangement, to be sure,
but in keeping with the republican trends, so important in Polish constitution-
al thought. By the overthrow of the Permanent Council not only the central
organ of government was abolished, but also the Police and Justice Depart-
ments, which were not replaced. The Educational Commission survived be-
cause of its autonomous position, but found itself under very heavy fire. The
conservatism of the gentry found fuel in the financial problem. Increasingly
numerous demands were made for educational funds to be allotted to the
army and for the schools to be turned over to the religious orders again. The
Confederated Seym, taking decisions on all questions by a simple majority
vote, took into its own hands, through the Commissions and Deputations, mil-
itary affairs, the Treasury and foreign policy.
20*
308 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND FOR THE REFORM (1788-1794)
The implementation of the resolution calling for an army of 100,000
proved impossible, because it was not followed by adequate resolutions on
taxes and conscription. The strength of the army was reduced to 65,000. As
a result of the efforts of the Hetmen’s party the dragoon regiments were
turned into gentry cavalry of the Polish type, and its number was so
unproportionally increased that it amounted to a half of the whole army. By
filling the ranks with petty gentry Branicki counted on winning popularity,
but he did not manage to regain the command over the army. This big
increase in the national cavalry led the Polish army away from the line of
development laid down by the King and the War Department.
The introduction, in March 1789, of the tax of incomes from land (10 per
cent) and the corresponding taxation of clerical estates (20 per cent)
was of greatest importance among the tax laws. This was the first tax
imposed directly upon the gentry. It was estimated that it would yield 16
million zloty annually, but the sytem of assessment (based on the taxpayer’s
own declaration) and the method of collection failed to produce more than
9 million, Fiscal revenues from all sources reached a total of 40 million
which was double the figure of 1788, but still not enough for the needs of
the military increases. New sources of income, outside of taxes, were
therefore anxiously sought. In 1789 the latifundia of the bishopric of Cracow
were taken over by the Treasury. It was intended to do the same with other
episcopal estates, with a system of salaries for the bishops, and to carry out
the sale of privately held state domains (starostwa). Thus the problem of
“national domains” promised to become acute in Poland.
In connexion with the increase of the army and treasury, the matters
calling for government intervention grew more numerous. The Seym, while
abolishing the administration from above, began to reconstruct it from
below. Organs of local administration, previously non-existent in the Com-
monwealth, were called into being towards the end of 1789. Mixed civilian
and military commissions for public order were elected by the gentry in
local diets. It was a first step, and a very important one though not systemati-
cally carried out, towards the building of a new form of government.
The Seym’s foreign policy was influenced by public opinion to an extent
previously unknown. There occurred an explosion of anti-Russian feelings
with men from Branicki’s circle unexpectedly playing the leading part in
abusing Russia and this from a group including former Confederates of Bar.
Peasant disorders in Ukraine in the spring of 1789 were attributed to Rus-
sian intrigues. The Marshal of the Partition Seym, Adam Poninski, was
banished by a court of the Seym as a traitor. Public opinion, however, also
thwarted the aspirations of the Prussophiles by opposing any territorial
concessions, in particular, the cession of Gdansk and Torun.
In 1790 the question of an Austro-Prussian war and the plans for
regaining Galicia were hanging in the balance. In Warsaw, the skilful Prus-
sia envoy, Lucchesini, gained considerable influence upon the leaders of the
THE SEYM CONTROL 309
Seym, but the negotiations for a Polish-Prussian alliance were being dragged
out. Although Stanislaw Augustus was no longer the controller of foreign
policy because the Seym had created a new diplomatic service, subordinated
to itself, he made difficulties demanding in particular that the trade treaty
of 1775 be revised. It was eventually decided in Warsaw and Berlin to
postpone the controversial matter of tariffs and cessions to a later date,
and the Polish-Prussian defensive alliance was signed on 29 March, 1790.
The treaty was in point of fact aimed at Austria’s ally, Russia, whose access
to the eventual theatre of war lay through Polish territory ; the entrance
of the Russia army into Poland would constitute the casus foederis.
The Prussian influence in Poland was of an entirely different character
from the Russian tutelage in the years 1764-1788. It is true that the Prus-
sians did not favour a strengthening of the Commonwealth and were covertly
working against it, but Berlin’s policy towards Poland had a variety of
cross-currents. Events might take various turns and the Polish cavalry could
prove useful. Finally, it was by exploiting the theme of independence that
the Prussians had effectively supplanted Russian influence in Poland and
they were netiher willing nor able to establish their own proconsulate in the
Commonwealth. For the first time for many years the country’s political life
developed under the conditions of full sovereignty. This is why the history
of the Four Years’ Seym has particular significance. It shows what could be
achieved by the Commonwealth of the gentry, imbued with the spirit of
Enlightenment.
The fall of the joint rule of King and ambassador allowed various
tendencies and social forces unhampered expression. In the local diets the
provincial gentry expressed quite freely their opinions which were sometimes
strange and old fashioned. Debates in the Seym were far from systematic and
orderly, a display of traditional Polish oratory and quarrelsomeness. As we
already know, for those opposed to the Permanent Council, the overthrow of
the system of guarantee was a common point of departure from which,
however the roads led in different directions. The extreme conservatives ral-
lied around the Hetmen of whom one (Branicki) was performing strange
political acrobatics in Warsaw, between anti-Russian bombast and toadying
to Potemkin, while the other (Rzewuski), having left the country, was ped-
dling a story of lament over the fall of ancient Polish liberties in the capitals
of Europe. Many of the gentry who stayed at home, however, combined
conservatism in constitutional and especially social questions with sincere
patriotism and dislike for the leadership of the magnates. The young
republicans, enthusiasts for the supremacy of the Seym, took up the ideas of
Konarski and of the old “Family”. The latter’s traditions were revived by
Adam Czartoryski and Ignacy Potocki, who gained a decisive influence over
the Speaker of the Seym, Malachowski. The houses of Malachowski and
Czartoryski became meeting places for members of the Seym; there draft
resolutions were elaborated and strategy and tactics in the Seym outlined.
310 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND FOR THE REFORM (1788-1794)
The analogy with the old “Family” cannot, of course, be drawn too closely.
During 25 years much had changed in Europe and in Poland where ever-
louder echoes of the French Revolution were heard. The patient and flexible
Stanislaw Augustus consistently held to the line of reform planned long
before. Having suffered many humiliations at the beginning of the Seym, he
was slowly regaining importance, while the former allies were drifting
farther and farther apart, and the majority in the Seym of 1788 was splitting
into the Hetmen’s “zealots” and the “true patriots” (with Malachowski and
Ignacy Potocki at their head). Their positions were clarified in connexion
with the drafting of a new constitution, undertaken at the end of 1789. This
process took place in Warsaw with its concentration of middle class and
intelligentsia who however did not remain passive spectators of events on
the stage of the Seym.
POLITICAL LITERATURE
Side by side with the debates in the Seym, a discussion led by the political
writers took place, no less verbose than in the Seym, but covering a wider
social range and a greater variety of problems. It is hard to describe briefly,
without falling into schematism, the enormous quantity of pamphlets,
brochures and extensive tracts. It may safely be stated that in political
journalism, the adherents of reform prevailed over conservatives, not only in
the quality, but also in the quantity of their writings.
The most distinguished and most widely read political writers were Sta-
nistaw Staszic, Hugo Kollataj and Jozef Pawlikowski. Staszic, a burgher’s
son from the little town of Pita, who had chosen the priesthood to devote
himself to study (which he pursued in Germany and in Paris) and later became
a tutor to the children in the household of Andrzej Zamoyski. Another priest
was Kollataj, descending from a gentry family of moderate wealth, the
renowned reformer of the Cracow University and an outstanding political
tactician. Jézef Pawlikowski was educated in schools reformed by the
Educational Commission ; a poor townsman from Piotrkéw, he published his
principal works anonymously at a remarkably young age and was later
known as a leader of the radical Left, described as the Polish Jacobins. The
works of these three writers gave the most comprehensive presentation of
the problems with which the Polish political literature was preoccupied ; its
character was one not so much of abstract deliberation as of practical counsel.
Until the outbreak of the French Revolution the Commonwealth was the
largest parliamentary state on the continent. Western estimates of the Polish
parliamentarism and gentry republicanism led to misunderstandings. Rou-
sseau was too susceptible to the charms of the idealized Golden Freedom, ac-
cepting even the liberum veto. The French Jacobins fell into the other extreme
POLITICAL LITERATURE 311
by seeing in the Commonwealth of the gentry with a king at its head only
another form of aristocracy. Under Polish conditions, there existed no pos-
sibility either of monarchical absolutism or of plebeian revolution. Social
reforms could be achieved only through a modification of the principle of
representation. In pre-reform Poland, the gentry, which, incidentally, consti-
tuted a very’ numerous and greatly diverse community, was considered to be
equivalent to the nation. The Seym represented that “nation” within which
there existed formal equality and a general franchise. Now, however, the con-
viction grew that the nation comprised not only the gentry, but all the in-
habitants of the Commonwealth.
Recognizing all the people as full citizens was a utopia under the then
existing conditions, but this utopia created an ideological perspective. That is
why the political writings, especially those of Staszic, reveal a dualism of
maximalist egalitarian theories and of what was attainable at the moment.
Pawlikowski spoke of “eternal truths” and of “truths for the time being”.,
Koliataj appealed for the forbearance of future generations in order to justify
the limited scope of reforms which were considered possible in the eighteenth
century. It was Kolfataj, too, who defined most clearly the new principles of
representation. The nation should be divided into three estates: 1) owners
of landed property, 2) owners of urban property, 3) persons owning no
property. Full electoral rights should be granted only to landowners and the
urban owners of property. The Seym should consist of a landowners’ chamber
and a chamber of the towns. The interest of the plebs should “for the time
being” be defended by three tribunes of the people, elected from among the
gentry by the landowners’ chamber. Staszic demanded that an equal number
of landowner and burgher deputies be sent to a common chamber. Pawlikow-
ski called for parliamentary representation of the burghers and clergy, as tax-
payers. Gentry who owned no landed property were to be eliminated from
the local diets. Thus the general franchise within the gentry nation was to
be replaced by the principle of representation based on property.
Alongside the principle of property qualifications, typical of bourgeois
parliamentarism in its early phase, there appeared a specifically Polish concept
of modifying the notion of the gentleman-citizen. Kollataj, a political leader
with practical common sense, realizing the difficulties in introducing a wide
burghers’ representation into the Seym, proposed an automatic ennoblement
of men of wealth and persons achieving distinction in the army, in civil
service and education. Ignacy Potocki argued that all men (hommes) who
become gentle (getils) should be recognized as gentlemen (les gentilshommes).
A minor political writer made the suggestion that the whole nation should
be ennobled gradually. Ir may be admitted that Kollgtaj’s concept of the
gentry as an open civic estate, with a constant influx of new fortunes and
new talents and with a departure of the gentry without property, was
a variant of the principle of representing property, realistic enough under
the then prevailing Polish conditions. The Commonwealth of the gentry
312, THE STRUGGLE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND FOR THE REFORM (1788-1794)
was to become a commonwealth of men of property in which the landed
gentry would retain a political predominance, but not a monopoly of political
rights.
In social matters Staszic, Kollataj and Pawlikowski agreed in principle.
To all three of them the magnate oligarchy and serfdom were Poland’s
main calamities. Peasants should be personally free, but they should make
contracts with the landowners, convert from labour services to money rents
as far as possible, and be placed under the protection of public law and of
the State. There was no question yet of granting land to the peasants.
Differences appeared in the approach to the Jewish problem. The burghers’
dislike for Jews is noticeable in Staszic’s writings. Kollqtaj called for the
assimilation of Jews by radical administrative measures. The most liberal
programme of making the Jews citizens and re-educating them, while
respecting their religion and customs, was formulated by Pawlikowski. In
the writings of this plebeian, one senses a deep solidarity with the common
people of Polish villages and small towns. It is no mere accident that Pawli-
kowski’s views on the government of the State differed markedly from those
of other authors.
Koltataj and Staszic were republicans in the Polish sense of the term in as
far as they recognized the king as the titular head of the Republic. In order
to avoid the disorders of interregna they even proposed to make the throne
hereditary, the king being, however, deprived of power. All officials and
dignitaries as well as corporate administrative bodies were to be elected by
the local diets and the Seym. The Seym, always ready to be convened in the
view of Staszic, or permanently in session according to the proposal of
Koliataj, would become the government. The deputies and senators should
comply strictly with the wishes of the constituents as expressed in instructions
of the local diets. Kotlataj developed most consistently the theory that the
dualism of king and Commonwealth caused a conflict of powers which ought
to be eliminated by “making the Seym a monarchy”. The king, according to
Staszic, was always the “natural” enemy of freedom and would strive to
found a despotism, if only the means at his disposal permitted it.
Pawlikowski took a different attitude. He maintained that Poland would
not for a long time be mature enough to achieve a “really free government
and legislation”. He had no confidence in the Seym composed of gentry
whose authority he sought to limit. Poland should “mature” under the
paternalist rule of an enlightened monarch, the crown being hereditary in
the Poniatowski family. The royal power of appointment was to be extended
to include all offices in the administration and judiciary. The king was to have
the advantage of legislative initiative in the Seym. Collegiate governmental
organs were to carry out his will. It was not an absolutist programme, but
one for a constitutional and parliamentary monarchy with a strong central
executive. Pawlikowski often referred to Montesquieu, keeping to the spirit
rather than the letter of Montesquieu’s teaching. The king’s share in legisla-
Hugo Koltlataj
tive and judicial power was an infringement on the principle of the separation
of powers but, under Polish conditions, it was to answer Montesquieu’s idea
of balance by compensating for the enormous social ascendancy of the gentry.
Pawlikowski gave philosophical form to the popular tendency to appeal to
the “good king” against the “bad masters”. This young monarchist and later
Jacobin professed advanced liberal views in social and economic matters.
The ideas proclaimed by Kollataj, Staszic and Pawlikowski are to be
found, in a more or less diluted form, in the profuse journalistic production
representing reforming and progressive trends. In the group of writers ral-
lied around Koltataj and called “Koltataj’s Forge” (Franciszek Dmochowski,
Antoni Trebicki), an outstanding personality was Father Franciszek Jezierski,
a passionate enemy of the magnates and a tribune of the people. The munici-
1
deck
Jan Snia
THE CONSTITUTION OF 3 MAY, 1791 315
pality of Warsaw inspired and financed an extensive journalistic campaign in
favour of a municipal reform (Swiniarski, Medrzecki, Barss, Baudouin de
Courtenay). For the first time, Jewish journalists appeared writing in Polish
(Herszel Jézefowicz, Salomon Polonus and Szymel Wolfowicz). Zabtocki
abandoned the writing of comedy to become a master of rhymed lampoons in
which he in particular derided and disparaged the Hetman Branicki.
The conservatives in literature adopted a defensive role, repeating
hackneyed clichés about Golden Freedom, seasoned with the phrases of
J. J. Rousseau. They could, however, count on a response from the gentry by
raising the sceptre of an absolute monarchy which allegedly was waiting to
destroy the gentry’s freedom with the aid of the lower orders. An especially
fierce opponent of hereditary succession and defender of the hetmen’s authori-
ty, the shield of traditional Polish freedom, was Seweryn Rzewuski. Demago-
gy found a chance to show whaf it could achieve in the defense of the
political rights of the impoverished gentry which the magnates used to
dominate the local diets. Some of the ideologists of the conservative party
refreshed their vocabulary by appeal to the federalist ideas fashionable in the
West (under the Polish conditions, the autonomy of provinces would have
benefitted the magnates who controlled the voivodships), and to Montesquieu’s
separation of powers (arbitrary ministers as a “mediating” link between the
king and the gentry). Szczesny Potocki and Jan Suchorzewski were the first
in Poland to advocate the abolition of monarchy. In their plans of a federal
republic without a king they invoked the example of the United States. Those
were, however, isolated voices. The conservative ideal was the Common-
wealth with a king, as it had existed prior to 1764.
‘THE CONSTITUTION OF 3 MAY, 1791
‘On 7 September, 1789 the Seym appointed a Deputation to prepare a draft
Constitution ; the principal role within this body was played by Ignacy
Potocki. Soon afterwards, in the middle of November, delegates from 141
towns assembled in the capital upon the initiative of Jan Dekert, Mayor of
Warsaw, and formed a kind of a bourgeois confederation. They submitted
A petition, composed for them by Kollataj, demanding admission to the Seym
and to official posts and the right to purchase landed estates. The uproar made
by the conservatives about a revolution on the French pattern being allegedly
in the making in Poland was greatly exaggerated. Direct political action by
the bourgeoisie was nevertheless an unusual event in the Commonwealth. The
Seym appointed a special Deputation to work out a draft law for the towns
and thereafter the two Deputations : The Constitutional Deputation and the
Deputation for Towns were working at the same time.
Work progressed slowly for various reasons. In the period of a war scare
316 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND FOR THE REFORM (1788-1794)
in 1790, controversial constitutional disputes were deferred, but, the Austro-
Prussian convention signed at Reichenbach and Sweden’s withdrawal from the
war with Russia (August 1790), foreshadowed the end of the favourable
international situation to which Poland owed its temporary liberty. The
tension between Russia and Prussia still existed but at the end of 1790 and in
the beginning of 1791 the international situation spurred the Poles into
achieving a constitutional fait accompli before the question of war or peace
was finally settled. There existed, however, serious differences between Sta-
nistaw Augustus and the Constitutional Deputation.
The draft prepared by Ignacy Potocki followed the republican line
subordinating the Seym to the local diets and the executive to the Seym. The
king was to be hereditary but without power. These plans were opposed by
Stanistaw Augustus who was gradually recovering importance in the country
and in the Seym. As for the leaders of the patriotic party (one can already
speak of such a party at this time), they encountered ever greater difficulties
on the part of the Hetmen’s “‘zealots” and were unable to achieve their ends
in the Seym without the support of the King. The shift in the balance of
forces was strongly marked towards the end of 1790. The Seym resolved
to extend its term for two more years while at the same time including a new
body of deputies. The elections of 16 December strengthened the position of
the King (the new deputies included many of his followers) ; on the other
hand, the instructions voted ih the local diets during these elections revealed
the conservative attitude and often frank hostility to the reform of the
provincial gentry. The programme of the Deputation was, however, based on
confidence in the “sovereign legislative will” of the local diets. The result was
a crisis of confidence. In consequence, Ignacy Potocki decided to enter into a
closer cooperation with the King. Scipione Piattoli, an Italian, whom both
the King and Potocki employed in preparing constitutional drafts, was very
instrumental in reconciling their views.
Stanistaw Augustus worked out his programme at the beginning of 1791.
The throne in his view ought to be hereditary in the Poniatowski family. The
King was to retain his former prerogatives, in particular the power to appoint
senators, ministers and officials. He was to preside over the council of
ministers, or the “Guardians of the Law”, as they were called, who made their
decisions by a majority vote and were responsible to the Seym, unlike the
King, who was not responsible. Ministers were not appointed for life, but ap-
pointed by the King to the body of Guardians for two years. The ministers,
sitting as Guardians, were at the same time the presidents of the collegiate
governing bodies, elected by the Seym; the Commissions of War, Foreign
Affairs, Justice, Finance and Education. The King presided over the Senate
which had almost equal legislative power with the Chamber of Deputies. The
deputies were not bound by the mandates of the local diets. Sixteen deputies
of the towns sat in the Chamber, and 2 burghers sat in each of the govern-
ment Commissions. The contracts between peasants and landowners were
THE CONSTITUTION OF 3 MAY, 1791 317
placed under the protection of the government. The peasants were per-
mitted to leave the village, while a peasant who had served his term of years
in the army gained his freedom.
The King’s draft became the basis for secret discussions, at first within
a very narrow circle (Ignacy Potocki, Piattoli, Kotlataj and Malachowski),
but afterwards in a wider group of deputies of the patriotic party brought into
the secret. The passing of the Constitution was to be accomplished in the
Seym by a procedural trick which amounted to a4 coup d’état. It was decided
first to satisfy the aspirations of the burghers, and thus secure their support.
On 18 April the Seym passed the law on municipal reform, based on a draft
prepared by the King and Joachim Chreptowicz. The law met in principle
the demands in the petition of 1789 except that it limited the number of town
plenipotentiaries to 22 members who were entitled to vote only on matters
relating to the towns and commerce. On the other hand, the law of 18 April
gave the bourgeoisie the opportunity of achieving the status of nobles. The
law on local diets, passed at the same time, excluded the landless gentry from
them.
In the course of these secret consultations, the King’s draft Constitution
underwent considerable alteration aimed at weakening its monarchical
tendencies. Potocki wished to secure the succession to the throne for the
Hohenzollerns, while Matachowski, following in this respect the more gen-
eral public opinion, preferred the Saxon dynasty. In view of the uncertain
international situation, the Elector of Saxony did not wish to commit him-
self and it was eventually decided that the Seym on its own would proclaim
his daughter, Augusta, heir apparent to the Polish throne, in the expectation
that she would found a dynasty. The: King anticipated that she would
marry one of his nephews. The King’s power of appointment was reserved
to Stanislaw Augustus only for life. After prolonged disputes, it was agreed,
in accordance with the King’s proposal that the Guardians of Law should
be composed of the primate and four ministers only ; the King’s choice was
limited, however, to 16 ministers (4 chancellors, 4 hetmen, 4 marshals and
4 treasurers), previously appointed for life (now they could be recalled
by a vote of the Seym). The centralization of government was weakened
by the stipulation that the same ministers could not sit on the board of the
Guardians and preside over the Commissions. The government Commis-
sion of Justice was rejected as incompatible with the principle of the
separation of powers. The Speaker of the Seym was appointed by the
Guardians in order to give him an insight into the actions of the government
and to enable him, in case of need, to convene the Seym in extraordinary
session even in opposition to the King. The Guardians thus conceived did
not take their decisions by majority vote; the King’s position “prevailed”.
The King® resolution was binding as soon as it was countersigned by one
of the ministers sitting on the board of the Guardians and responsible to
the Seym in virtue of his signature.
318 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND FOR THE REFORM (1788-1794)
In the field of legislation the range of matters to be decided by quali-
fied majority was increased, and the role of the Senate was diminished by
comparison with Stanislaw Augustus’ draft. Confederations and confeder-
ated Seyms were abolished. With regard to the peasant problem, all detailed
provisions were passed over and the Constitution limited itself to a general
declaration of the “protection of the law and the government” to all the
peasants and to assuring freedom to immigrants from abroad.
The final text, worked out mainly by Kollataj, was thus a compromise
between the monarchical and constitutional programme of Stanislaw Augus-
tus, and the republican scheme of Ignacy Potocki. In one matter Stanislaw
Augustus obtained more than he had proposed, when he was granted a deci-
sive voice in the council of Guardians. With ministerial posts filled as they
were at the time, the “patriots” were not sure of a majority ; they placed
more trust in the King than the ministers, because he was bound to them
by having engaged in the plot.
The events of 3 May, 1791 were carefully staged. Advantage was taken
of the fact that the number of deputies present in Warsaw was small (182)
and, being assured in advance of the support of about one hundred of them,
they acted by surprise. Troops were paraded in force, the burghers turned
out in crowds, the galleries in the Chambers were filled by people in favour
of the Constitution. The opposition was confused and intimidated. By
circumventing normal procedure the draft law was read and voted at the
same session.
A compact patriotic and royal party was formed around the Constitu-
tion under the slogan of : “The King with the People, the People with the
King”. Koltataj, who was appointed vice-chancellor, was playing an in-
creasingly important part in the Constitutional party. He organized a po-
litical club, called “‘The Assembly of Friends of the Constitution”, which
enrolled both deputies and political leaders from outside the Seym. At the
meetings of the Club, laws were drafted and parliamentary tactics worked
out. Members of the Club serving.as Seym deputies were bound to solidarity.
The “Assembly” had a press organ of its own entitled “Gazeta Narodowa
i Obca” (The National and Foreign Gazette). It was Poland’s first political
party to be organized on modern lines. The burghers all over the country
were enthusiastic about the Constitution. The reservations of the provincial
gentry were gradually overcome, as can be seen from the resolutions of the
local diets. Agents from Warsaw were active in the provinces and propa-
ganda in favour of the Constitution was also carried out by the army. The
Constitution party purchased the broad support of the gentry by refraining
from a bolder measure of peasant reform. In many places the peasants
interpreted the Constitution as a release from serfdom and renounced obe-
dience to their masters. The Guardians issued proclamations against such
“misinterpretation of the government protection” and called upon local
authorities (mixed military and civilian commissions) to use troops against
THE CONSTITUTION OF 3 MAY, 1791 319
recalcitrant peasants in the event of need. Peasant reform in the long run
was not, however, given up.
The basic law of 3 May as well as laws on towns, local diets and on the
mixed military and civilian commissions, were the first stages of a thorough
constitutional reform which was to be completed by detailed laws. The
Guardians, the main commissions and the local commissions were Poland’s
first extensive and hierarchically centralized government machinery. Koltataj
announced that after the completion of the “political constitution”, steps
would be taken to introduce an “economic constitution” and a “moral con-
stitution”. The latter plan was connected with the work undertaken on the
codification of law, under the name of the Code of Stanistaw Augustus.
Within a few months, the work of the Deputation of Codification was
greatly advanced. It was there that the legal status of the peasants was to
be more closely defined. The peasant problem also played an important part’
in the plan for an “economic constitution”.
Koltataj worked on this project jointly with Michat Ossowski, manag-
er of Prot Potocki’s commercial and banking ~enterprises. The ‘economic
constitution” was to cover: 1) property relationships, 2) the protection
of labour, 3) investments. Polish economists always had a predilection for
liberal theories. In the 1770’s physiocratic doctrines were spreading and
now Adam Smith gained wide popularity. It was realized, however, that
Poland’s feudal economy was not ripe for a free flow of wealth and labour
and the “economic constitution” was to create proper conditions by means
of administrative measures and government intervention. A reform of the
ecclesiastical estates and the starostwa was designed to secure uniformity in
property relations. Peasant reform was to stimulate the economic activity
of primary producers and bring about a clear social division of labour and
create a labour market (a strict separation of agriculture and rural industry,
even by means of compulsory transfers of population). Investments were
to be stimulated by reducing the rate of interest (5 per cent) and by the
establishment of a National Bank granting long-term loans at a low rate
of interest (under 4 per cent) for industrial investment. Only the two closely
related matters of the Bank and the starostwa were submitted to the Seym
in the form of a bill. According to Ossowski the Bank was to issue a paper
currency covered by the income from selling the starostwa (they accounted
for about 10 per cent of all landed estates). In view of international develop-
ments, the resolution of the Seym was tardy. The National Bank was not
established. The starostwa were to serve as security for a loan contracted
abroad.
The question of reforming the law relating to the Jews was closely con-
nected with economic problems. The Seym Deputation had been consi-
dering it since 1790, but it was not until the beginning of 1792 that the
matter took a more concrete form. The initiative was mainly in the hands
of the King, Kollataj and Piattoli who had direct contact with the Jewish
320 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND FOR THE REFORM (1788-1794)
elders. The Seym voted the abolition of Kahal debts and some minor laws
securing a measure of emancipation. The course of political events, however,
interrupted work on broader reforms.
From the passing of the Constitution of 3 May to the outbreak of the
Polish-Russian war, there elapsed barely one year. In order to estimate prop-
erly the importance of the “political constitution”, it should be reviewed
in conjunction with all the steps taken during that year to give effect to
the reforms. It had been instituted on this occasion under conditions of
full sovereignty and on a broad political and social basis. The conservative
opposition sought to block reform by obstruction in the Seym, but was
unable to undertake “‘counter-revolution” (as it was called at the time) on their
own. Time worked for the government which was getting stronger and for
the ruling party. Kollataj’s unwearying activity made its mark in all fields.
“It is impossible to extrapolate the broken line of development and reflect
upon what Poland might have achieved. The dynamism of this line was,
however, indisputable.
THE RUSSIAN INTERVENTION
AND THE SECOND PARTITION (1792-1793)
Having learned of the Constitution of 3 May, the Prussian Minister Hertz-
berg wrote: “The Poles have given the coup de grace to the Prussian mo-
narchy by voting a Constitution much better than the English. I think that
Poland will regain sooner or later West Prussia, and perhaps East Prussia
also. How can we defend our State, open from Memel to Cieszyn against
a numerous and well governed nation”. The old minister from the school
of Frederick II, who had always seen in Poland not only a victim, but also
a potential danger as well, was too pessimistic.
The peace of Jassy (9 January, 1792) brought the Russo-Turkish war to
an end. Prussia, having abandoned her anti-Russian policy, was returning
to the traditional plans of partition and found a pretext in claiming that the
alliance of 1790 was no longer valid in view of the change in the form of
government in Poland. Russia for her part regained a free hand. Although
Austria advised acceptance of the situation, Catherine II and her favourites
were determined to stamp out the “French plague” in Warsaw and demanded
the restoration of the system of guarantee. The victorious army of the Black
Sea was ready to hand. A pretext for the intervention was furnished by
Poles : the Hetman Seweryn Rzewuski, a fanatic of the idea of the “sacred
baton”, Szczesny Potocki, the Ukrainian magnate consumed by personal
ambition and Russia’s henchman Ksawery Branicki. These magnates with
a handful of their clients and followers signed in St. Petersburg on 27 April,
1792 the act of Confederation which was later promulgated under the false
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date of 14 May in the border town of Targowica. On behalf of the “Com-
monwealth” they condemned “the monarchical and democratic revolution
of 3 May” and, under the terms of the guarantee, called for the help of Rus-
sian troops. Those crossed the frontier on 18 May, 1792, two weeks after
celebration in Warsaw of the first anniversary of the Constitution.
At the last moment, on 22 May, 1792, the Seym agreed to increase the
army to 100,000 men. The Poles had deluded themselves too long with the
Prussian aliance (at present Prussia made it impossible even to purchase arms
abroad). Poland had at her actual disposal an army of less than 60,000, with
a disproportionate number of cavalry. Against 97,000 Russians, Poland put
into the field 37,000 men (the rest of the army constituted a reserve). Prince
Jézef Poniatowski, the King’s nephew, took command on the Ukrainian
front. The defensive battles of Zielence (17 June) and Dubienka (18 July)
could not halt the continued retreat. Stanislaw Augustus, Kollataj and
Ignacy Potocki tried to open negotiations with Russia, by offering, in return
for the acceptance of the Constitution, the succession to the Polish throne
to Grand Duke Constantine (the grandson of Catherine II). The Empress
refused to enter into any negotiations and demanded the King’s uncondition-
al accession to the Confederation of Targowica. While the war was not
yet lost, its continuation did not hold out hope of victory and seemed likely
to bring with it the danger of partition. At the session of the Guardians on
24 July, the majority (including Koligtaj) declared for the accession of the
King to the rebel Confederation. Stanistaw Augustus joined the Confeder-
ation and ordered that hostilities be stopped. Some scores of officers (among
them Prince Jézef Poniatowski and Tadeusz Koéciuszko) submitted their
resignations. The parliamentary leaders led by Kottataj, Matachowski and
Ignacy Potocki left the country.
As the Russian forces advanced, the number of Confederates in the
occupied territories grew. There were among them some sincere admirers
of Golden Freedom, a greater number were corrupt opportunists and the
majority was merely intimidated. It was not a spontaneous movement as
the Confederation of Radom had been. Szczesny Potocki was under no
illusion on that account. In December 1792 he warned Rzewuski that the
makers of the Constitution “have no need to win over opinion, because it
is already on their side; if only they waited for the occasion and proper
time, they would have the nation behind them. What I am saying here, is
the incontrovertible truth”. The leaders of Targowica reluctantly yielded
to Catherine II’s demands concerning the King’s accession to the Confedera-
tion. They feared, not without good grounds, that Stanislaw Augustus
might resume his earlier role in the “Russian system”. The leaders of the
Confederation, having wrecked the administration, added to the chaos and
economic depression caused by the cost of a lost war and Russian occupa-
tion. When, in the early spring, the Prussians occupied Great Poland, Torun
and Gdansk (with the people of Gdansk offering armed resistance to the
21. History of Poland
322 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND FOR THE REFORM (1788-1794)
Prussian army), the men of Targowica found themselves in a position of
political bankruptcy. They had not anticipated a fresh partition of Poland
(Catherine II had given them assurances in this respect). Their protests
against the Prussian invasion were unavailing. The Confederation, discred-
ited in Polish eyes as treason and in the eyes of the partitioning powers by
its inefliciency and attempts at resistance, no longer justified its existence.
Szezesny Potocki, Branicki and Rzewuski laid down their offices and left
the country.
The negotiations for partition which led to the Russo-Prussian conven-
tion, signed in St. Petersburg on 23 January, 1793, were conducted against
the background of the war of Austria and Prussia with revolutionary
France. Austria, dependent on the help of her Prussian ally and seeking
consent for her plans to annex Bavaria, declared her désinteressement in
Polish problems. Prussia demanded from Catherine II, the instigator of
the anti-French action undertaken by monarchical Europe, a reward for
her difficult efforts on the Rhine: the reward was to be accretions of
territory on the Vistula and the Warta. The robbery of Polish territory
was to cement the coalition and the partition, according to the intentions
of the Powers, was to extinguish the potential fire of revolution in the East
more effectively than the Confederation of Targowica. Prussia obtained
58,000 sq.km and Russia 250,000 sq.km. The ratification was to be made
by the Seym, convened to Grodno for 17 June, 1793.
In spite of the fact that the deputies were carefully selected, the Seym
put up a much more stubborn resistance than it did in 1773. Arrests,
sequestration of estates, threats, the surrounding of the Chamber by troops
and bribery played their part. The treaty with Russia was ratified on
17 August and that with Prussia on 23 September (the resistance of the
Seym in this matter was particularly strong and the pressure particularly
drastic). During the Grodno Seym, it was not the men of Targowica who
came to the fore, but Stanistaw Augustus and some earlier adherents
of Russia. The new form of government reestablished the Permanent Council,
the fundamental laws and the guarantee, though some of the reforms of the
Four Years’ Seym were retained. This was not a constitution compatible
with the aspirations of the men of Targowica. According to Russia’s
intentions, Poland (with an area of 212,000 sq.km and a population of
about 4 million) was to remain a buffer state, “a barrier between the
Powers”, with the executive power centralized to an extent sufficient to
allow the Russian ambassador to be the actual ruler of the country.
THE EMIGRATION AND THE SITUATION AT HOME
The political emigration, concentrated in Saxony, adopted at first an attitude
of wait-and-see. They wished to discover whether the King could succeed
THE EMIGRATION AND THE SITUATION AT HOME 323
in reaching an understanding with Russia over the heads of the authors of
the Confederation of Targowica and in achieving a tolerable modus vivendi.
The Second Partition clearly upset calculations of a peaceful development
in the country. The political leaders of the emigration not only refused to
reconcile themselves with the loss of three-fifths of the territory, but feared
lest the partition should foreshadow the final elimination of the Polish
State. It was decided to resort to a last fling: to mobilize the maximum
military effort which had not been called up in 1792 for fear of partition
and in the hope of negotiations with Russia.
As early as the spring of 1792 Kollataj and Ignacy Potocki were con-
sidering for a time the idea of an alliance with France, in view of the fact
that the outbreak of the war of France against the first Coalition coincided
with the outbreak of the Russo-Polish war and with the treason of the
Prussian ally. This idea now became the guiding line of the foreign policy of
the emigration. It sought to take advantage of the great authority enjoyed
by the famous “soldier of liberty” Tadeusz Kosciuszko. Born in 1746,
cadet of the Warsaw “Knights’ School”, he studied military engineering in
Paris, later took part in the American War of Independence, distinguished
himself in the construction of fortifications and was promoted to the rank of
general. Appointed to serve with the Polish army by the Four Years’ Seym,
he won fame in the battle of Dubienka in 1792 and had been made honorary
citizen of the French Republic. Kosciuszko went to Paris in the beginning
of 1793 with a memorandum announcing that Poland would establish
a bourgeois republic with abolition of monarchy, equal civil rights for all
citizens and a limited franchise based on property qualifications and that
the republic would declare war on all three partitioning Powers (of whom
Austria and Prussia were then at war with France). While words of encour-
agement came from the French government, interested in a diversion in Po-
land, KoSciuszko obtained no specific promises from either the Girondists
or Jacobins. The Poles could not count on help either from France or from
Turkey, from whom, after France, most was expected. The hopes of Prus-
sian, or at least Austrian, neutrality were illusory. In their struggle against
the three partitioning Powers the Poles were left to their own resources.
An alliance with revolutionary France failed. What remained was
France’s example. The victories of the French greatly impressed the Poles
both at home and abroad. Hugo Koltataj was fascinated by the effectiveness
of revolutionary methods in mobilizing the nation for a tremendous effort ;
the vision of a general “war of the peoples against tyrants” had a magnetic
spell. The pamphlet O ustanowieniu i upadku Konstytucji 3 Maja (On the
Passing and the Overthrow of the Constitution of 3 May), written jointly
by Kollataj, Franciszek Dmochowski and Stanislaw and Ignacy Potocki, was
a vehement indictment of Stanislaw Augustus and reveals the growth of
radical opinions. After Kosciuszko’s return from France it was decided that
he should assume dictatorial powers as the leader of the insurrection. Koé-
21*
324 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND FOR THE REFORM (1788-1794)
ciuszko counted upon the cooperation with the regular army of the armed
masses of the people throughout the country. This idea was suggested by the
American experience, but it had also been very much alive in Polish political
thought. The peasant armies of the absolutist monarchies were kept in the
tight grip of military discipline. In the improvised armies of citizens fighting
for freedom, morale was a factor of major importance. The fundamental
social problem in an insurrection lay in the question : in the name of what
freedom should the serf fight?
The political direction of the preparations for an insurrection was with
the émigrés, but the situation at home was decisive in determining the
outbreak. The country went through a grave economic crisis. The six
largest banks of Warsaw declared their insolvency in 1793. The maintenance
of an occupation army of 40,000 and the billeting of troops were a heavy
burden. During the winter of 1793/1794 there came to Warsaw crowds of
vagrants. Social conflicts were increasing in the guilds and manufactories.
Death and poverty were growing. Against such a background, the luxury
displayed by the notables of Targowica and the Seym of Grodno, despoiling
national property, was particularly shocking. Revolutionary songs, pam-
phlets and posters were multiplying, and in them the hated “traitors” increas-
ingly .were called “aristocrats”. As early as February 1793 the mass of the peo-
ple of Warsaw appeared as a political force, making it impossible for the
Russians to seize the Arsenal.
The situation in the army was most explosive. The new Hetmen ap-
pointed by Russia were the most despised. In accordance with the decision
of the Grodno Seym, the army, about 50,000 strong (a part of the soldiers
was in areas cut off by the new Russian frontier) was to be reduced to
15,000. The soldiers were threatened with unemployment or enlistment into
foreign armies. The army, the importance of which had increased consider-
ably during the time of the Four Years’ Seym, and, which had been toughened
in the campaign of 1792, represented an ardently patriotic and organized
section of the community.
The situation in Warsaw and other urban centres (Cracow, Wilno),
and in the army, was the basis upon which conspiratorial organizations
developed after May 1793. In the ranks of the conspirators, beside army
officers, there were many representatives of the radical intelligentsia from
the old ‘“Kollataj’s Forge”, sympathizers with the French Revolution.
Equally active were men of moderate opinions, whose programme advocated
a return to the consitutional system of 3 May. This trend could count on
the support of the greater part of the gentry and of the wealthire bourgeoisie.
Among the moderate conspirators, some maintained tacit contact with the
King. The conspirators at home exerted pressure on the leadership of the
emigration to launch an insurrection. Kosciuszko hesitated, reviewed the
development of the international situation, and urged a more careful prep-
THE INSURRECTION OF 1794 325
aration of the general mobilization, postponing the call to arms. Mean-
while, the Permanent Council resolved on 21 February, 1794 to proceed with
the reduction of the army. A few days later arrests were made among the
conspirators. Under these circumstances the decision was taken in the coun-
try. On 12 March, General Madalinski’s brigade set out for Cracow, where
Kosciuszko was awaited.
THE INSURRECTION OF 1794
On 24 March Koéciuszko proclaimed in Cracow the act of insurrection
which, with its subsequent decrees (especially the Manifesto concerning
peasants, issued at Potaniec on 6 May) served in its way as a provisional
constitution. Dictatorial power was assumed by the Commander-in-chief
of the armed forces who established an insurgent government, called the
Supreme National Council. The Council was to appoint criminal courts
with the power to inflict the death penalty upon the opponents of the
insurrection. Regional authority was vested in the commissions for public
order. The gentry and bourgeoisie were to sit in the courts and commis-
sions in equal numbers. The lowest organs of administration were controlled
by the superintendents (dozorcy) over an area comprising 1000 peasant
farms each. They were to supervise the execution of government decrees in
the countryside and to intervene in the relations of the peasants and the
gentry. Conscription was designed to exact one infantry man from every
five households and one cavalry man with full equipment from every fifty
(the conscription was.to furnish 100,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, in
order to counteract the predominance of cavalry in the previous structure of
the army). All men between 18 and 40 years of age were to be enlisted into
the mass-levy to undergo military training and to cooperate with the army
in local operations. Peasants were to obtain personal freedom (the right to
leave the village) and to enjoy security of tenure. The labour dues were
limited to 25-50 per cent of te previous assessment. All these decrees were
binding until the end of the insurrection, upon which the government would
surrender its power to the Seym and render an account of its activities. The
Seym was left to decide upon the future form of government.
Thus the act of insurrection did not stabilize revolutionary authority,
but gave it emergency powers. This decision reflected not only respect for
legality, but also the basic political tactics of the insurrectionist authorities.
They counted upon the support of the gentry, the bourgeoisie and the
peasants. Advanced radicalism might deter the gentry from participation in
the insurrection, excessive conservatism could hurt the mass of the people.
The provisional decrees issued by the dictatorial authority made it possible
to adopt a flexible social policy depending on the military needs. Political
326 THE STRUGGLE FOR THF INDEPENDENCYI AND FOR THE REFORM (1788-1794,
Tadeusz Kosciuszko
THE INSURRECTION OF 1794 327
and social accomplished facts created in the course of war would, however,
determine the character of the future constituent assembly.
KoSciuszko at the head of 4100 regular soldiers and 2000 auxiliary
peasant troops achieved a success in the battle of Ractawice on 4 April. The
road to the capital was, however, barred by the Russians and the Com-
mander-in-chief would have found himself in a,difficult situation, if an
insurrection had not broken out in Warsaw on 17 April. A major part in the
street fighting was played by the populace, led by conspirators among whom
the shoemaker, Jan Kilinski, became a legendary figure. The Russian garrison
was routed and the embassy captured. Soon afterwards, on 22 April, an
insurrection broke out in Wilno. Towards the end of the month, the whole
Polish army came into action with the units cut off by the frontier forcing
their way through to the Polish side. Thus the insurrection swept over
almost all Polish territory within the frontiers of 1793. Political differences at
this point made their appearance. In Wilno power was assumed by the
Jacobins (Colonel Jakub Jasinski) who adopted a strong attitude against
the Confederates of Targowica (the hanging of Hetman Szymon Kossakow-
ski). In Warsaw the radical conspirators did not try to seize the power
which was assumed by moderate elements, connected with the King ; they
formed the Provisional Substitutional Council. The Council was reluctant
to satisfy the demands of the populace, which called for revolutionary
justice against the men of Targowica. On 24 April the so-called Jacobin
Club was formed in Warsaw ; it was opposed to the Council. Under the
pressure of the Club and the townspeople, the criminal court sentenced, on
9 May, several leaders of the Confederation of Targowica (the Hetmen Oza-
rowski and Zabiello, the Chairman of the Permanent Council Ankwicz,
Bishop Kossakowski) to death by hanging. Kosciuszko disowned both the
Provisional Substitutional Council and the Supreme Council of Wilno.
In the Supreme National Council created by the Commander-in-chief there
were “Moderates” as well as men connected with the Jacobins.
The social and military objectives of the insurrection were not entirely
realized. The municipal militia of Warsaw did not fail, it is true ; it reached
a strength of 18,000. The gallant part played by peasants armed with scythes
in the first battle of the insurrection at Ractawice was an important fact in
Polish morale which has given rise to a lasting legend ; its hero was the
peasant Bartosz Gtowacki, who was promoted to the rank of officer ; its
symbol was the peasant russet-coat assumed by KoSciuszko. In fact, however,
the peasant mass-levy did not play its expected role. There was no time
to give the peasants military training, there were not enough arms for them
and no successs was achieved in exciting a lasting enthusiasm for the cause
of the insurrection. The decrees aimed at alleviating the lot of the peasants
were frustrated by the gentry ; besides, these concessions were of provisional
nature and did not eliminate the forced labour system. On the other hand,
a radical agrarian reform during the war was impossible, both for political
328 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND FOR THE REFORM (1788-1794)
considerations and for economic reasons. Under the system of compulsory
labour, the village and the manor farm were a unit and its breaking up was
bound to have an immediate effect upon the food supply, a problem the
insurrection was confronted with in the last weeks before the new harvest.
That is why the insurrectionist authorities were instructed not only to defend
the peasant’s rights, but to watch lest the peasants should refuse work on the
manor farm. The command over the peasant levies was to be entrusted to
landowners and their agents. Under such circumstances, the prospect of
a massive transformation of serfs into “soldiers of liberty” had to remain an
utopian illusion. On the other hand, the peasant recruits swelled the ranks
of the regular army of the insurrection. They could feel themselves citizens
in the insurgent army more than in the backwaters of a village.
The strength of the army changed. At the height of the insurrection
it reached 70,000. During the insurrection (April-October), some 140,000
men passed through its ranks. The supply of munitions and arms for an
army larger than that established by the Four Years’ Seym, in the small and
constantly shrinking area under insurgent control, was a major achievement.
The production of gunpowder, guns and ammunition was satisfactorily
organized. A rifle factory was lacking. For this reason an important part was
played by arming soldiers with pikes and adapted scythes and in tactics by
interesting attempts to combine artillery fire with a mass attack, to get
to close quarters with the enemy.
In the insurgent government, the mobilization of resources for the needs
of the army was energetically supervised by the Departments of Treasury,
Food Supply and War Needs. The Department of the Treasury under Kolia-
taj introduced a system of progressive taxation, carried out requisitioning on
a large scale (especially with regard to Church silver for the minting of coin),
printed Poland’s first banknotes (60 million were issued, 8 million went into
circulation). The government took over industrial plants, exacting compulso-
ry deliveries and organizing food supplies not only for the army, but for
the civilian population of Warsaw as well. These activities included certain
elements close to what has been termed “war socialism” in the historiography
of the French Revolution. The Department of Instruction (under Franciszek
Dmochowski, a close collaborator of Hugo Koltataj) managed propaganda
and the press. In the educational and agitational work among the peasants,
the administrative machinery and the Church were employed. The attitude
of the insurgent authorities towards the Episcopate was critical (two bishops
discredited by their collaboration with the Confederation of Targowica had
been hanged), but they could count on the support of the lower clergy,
within whose ranks there were some ardent Jacobins. The scenes most
reminiscent of revolutionary Paris were the public executions in the town
squares. The gallows surrounded by armed crowds were the counterpart of
the guillotine. The activities of the criminal courts and the problem of
Ozaré6w. Manor House, second half of the 18th cent.
terrorism were the two questions in which the differences between the
“Moderates” and the Jacobins were most conspicuous.
The Jacobins were so called by their opponents, though they were not,
of course, affliated to the Parisian clubs. They were mostly groups of young
enthusiasts aged between twenty and thirty who wished to combine the
struggle for independence with permanent political and social change. They
were working directly among the people, especially among the townsfolk,
but were not themselves sans-culottes. They came for the most part from the
impoverished lesser gentry who had settled in the towns. We find them
among the army officers (Jasinski, Zajaczek, Chomentowski), lawyers and
jurists (Orchowski, Maruszewski, Taszycki), journalists and writers (Paw-
likowski, Dmochowski, Szaniawski), and finally among the lower clergy
(Mejer, Jelski, Loga). Their activity exerted a material influence upon the
democratization of the insurrection and of its various bodies. They spread
a revolutionary atmosphere by their agitation and writings (especially
numerous poems and songs). Their goal was to establish accomplished facts,
to build a republic with equal rights for townspeople and gentry and
freedom for the peasants. With the slogan “The Country in Danger!”, they
called for a radical mobilization of all forces, and a revolutionary seizure of
the resources of rich individuals and institutions. Terrorism was to drive
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the insurrection onto the path of ruthless determination and block the way of
retreat. The Jacobins were also called “Hugonists” after Hugo Koltataj, who
enjoyed a great authority among them. In radicalism, however, the disciples
went beyond the master. To the “Moderates” (the majority of generals, the
political leaders of the Four Years’ Seym, like Ignacy Potocki, and the
wealthy bourgeoisie), the republican dictatorship of the insurrection was
only a means of regaining independence when the constitutional system of
3 May could be restored. The King declared his adherence to the insur-
rection. While not allowed to share in power, he had his men among the
“Moderates”. His nephew, Prince Jézef Poniatowski, fought in the insur-
gent army. Kogciuszko attempted to preserve the “unity of action in the gener-
al movement”. The attitude of the Commander-in-chief towards the various
political groups changed according to the development of the military
situation.
In May the Prussian army entered Poland. On 6 June Koéciuszko lost
the battle of Szczekociny (12,000 Poles against 24,000 combined Prussian
THE INSURRECTION OF 1794 338
and Russian troops). On 15 June the Prussians seized Cracow. The Polish
forces retreated towards Warsaw. Military reverses increased the revolu-
tionary ferment among the people of Warsaw and excited the activity of the
Jacobins. On 28 June the mob broke into the prison and a number of people
accused of treason were hanged without trial. Koéciuszko took severe
measures against the terrorists (sentences of death, mass arrests, drafting
suspects into the army) and brought the national cavalry, composed of
gentry, into the capital. Jasinski was removed from command of the
Lithuanian army. In July Russian and Prussian troops encircled Warsaw.
The Commander-in-chief wished to maintain political unity. He declared that
“the revolution would not turn against the King” but at the same time
made a concession to the Jacobins by handing over to them the Army Crimi-
nal Court. Reprisals against the participants in the June riots ceased. The
government appealed to the generosity of the people of Warsaw who
responded by creating enormous earth works around the capital. The bat-
tles before Warsaw (20,000 Poles against 40,000 Russians and Prussians)
and the fortification and defense of the city were the greatest military
achievements in the history of the insurrection. KoSciuszko exhibited
outstanding talents as an engineer. For the second time (since April), an
important part was played by the people on the ramparts and their work.
The siege of Warsaw lasted for two months ; in the meantime an insurrection
broke out in Great Poland ; between 20 and 23 August it spread over the
whole territory annexed by Prussia in the Second Partition and even farther
into Pomerania. This forced the Prussians to withdraw from Warsaw (on
6 September). The Russians likewise raised the siege. To aid the insur-
rection in Great Poland a division was dispatched under General Jan
Dabrowski who reached far to the north, captured Bydgoszcz (on 2 October)
and entered Royal Prussia (on 6 October). The Prussians were driven out
from the main theatre of the war. From the south, however, the country
was occupied by the Austrians, and in Lithuania the territory controlled by
the insurrection was shrinking with the fall of Wilno on 11 August.
Immediately after the siege of Warsaw was raised, political struggles
flared up again. Kosciuszko restricted the work of the Army Criminal Court,
which resigned as a mark of protest. The Jacobins began to criticize the
Commander-in-chief severely. Meanwhile, the war entered into its decisive
phase. Russia, having obtained Turkey’s pledge to keep the peace on
8 August), decided to throw new forces aginst Poland. A strong corps
under the outstanding military commander, Suvorov, set out by forced
marches from the Ukraine in the direction of Warsaw. Kosciuszko gave up
the idea of a peasant mass-levy, ordered a draft of recruits on 18 September
(it was expected to raise about 20,000 men), and prepared an extensive
operation to prevent Suvorov from establishing contact with the army
of occupation. Upon leaving the capital, the Commander-in-chief gave
temporary authority to the Jacobins. The rapidity of Russian movements
332 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND FOR THE REFORM (1788-1794)
defeated the plans of concentrating Polish forces. In the battle of Macie-
jowice on 10 October KoSciuszko’s corps of 7000 men was destroyed after
a heroic struggle ; the Commander-in-chief himself was wounded and taken
prisoner. The defeat at Maciejowice was a moral shock out of all pro-
portion to the loss of one army corps. The Jacobins could not make up
their minds whether to seize power. On 12 October the National Council
elected a new Commander Tomasz Wawrzecki as a compromise candidate
“able to unite the minds”. Kottataj formed a new club in which Jasinski
called for a radical uprising which would make capitulation impossible
(among other things by putting the King to death). On 4 November
Suvorov took Praga, the suburb of Warsaw on the right bank of the Vistula,
by storm. Out of the 14,000 defenders only 4000 escaped to Warsaw.
General Jasifski, poet and revolutionist, fell on the ramparts, fighting till
the last. Suvorov’s troops carried out a massacre of the civilian population.
Praga was to be a terrifying example. Koltataj and Zajaczek left Warsaw.
The surrender of the capital was signed by the Municipality. Wawrzecki
withdrew to the south with the army. Under the pressure of the Russian
pursuit, the remains of the army were dispersed. On 16 November Wawrzecki
was taken prisoner.
THE EXTINCTION OF THE POLISH STATE
It is not clear whether prior to the outbreak of the insurrection, it was
Russia’s intention to preserve permanently a rump-Poland, or whether
further partition was merely a matter of time. With regard to that problem,
there were different tendencies at the Tsarist court. Stanislaw Augustus
received assurances that Russia would check the annexationist aims of
Prussia and Austria, provided the Poles kept quiet. It is, however, hard
to guess what turn events would have taken, because only six months
elapsed between the ratification of the partition and the signing of the
Polish-Russian treaty in Grodno and the outbreak of the insurrection. The
final liquidation of the Polish State was now a foregone conclusion. In
September 1794 Seweryn Rzewuski promised Catherine II to pacify Poland
for good, if he was given dictatorial powers. He promised not to repeat
the “mistakes” of Targowica which “gave rise to the present revolt by
giving strength to the party of the King and the Constitutionalists”. After
the fall of Praga, Ignacy Potocki renewed the proposal of 1792 of giving
the throne to Grand Duke Constantine. No attention was paid to those
offers in St. Petersburg. The only essential problem needing solution was
the determination of the new frontiers.
Negotiations between the partitioning Powers were going on during the
hostilities. As in 1772, the occupation forces tried to create accomplished
facts. Never was bargaining for the division of spoils so determined. Austria
THE EXTINCTION OF THE POLISH STATE 333
and Russia attempted to limit Prussian claims. The conferences on the
partition of Poland ended in a deadlock. On 3 January, 1795 Austria and
Russia concluded an aliance against Prussia. The embroiled Powers were
making war preparations. France took advantage of this situation because
Austria was compelled to reduce her forces in the West and Prussia had
concluded peace in Basel (on 5 April, 1795). Prussia, as a result of her
exhaustion, gave up her resistance in August. The final agreement was signed
on 24 October, 1795. The Prussians occupied Warsaw, captured by Russia,
and in return they ceded Cracow, taken in the course of the final campaign,
to Austria. The new frontier line between the three partitioning Powers
ran along the Pilica, middle Vistula and Bug. This frontier passed through
the immediate vicinity of the tollgates of Warsaw. No ratification from
Poland was needed on this occasion. Stanistaw Augustus abdicated on
25 November, 1795. In an atmosphere of friction, the work of frontier
delimitation was completed on 2 July, 1796. The final settlement of problems
connected with the new territorial changes like the liquidation of the Com-
monwealth’s debts and of those of the King, was determined by the Conven-
tion of 26 January, 1797. In a secret additional clause, the three Powers
undertook that the very name of Poland would be erased forever from the
vocabulary of international law. A year later, on 12 February, 1798, the
last King of Poland died in St. Petersburg. .
For 150 years research on the reasons for Poland’s disappearance from
the map of Europe centred upon two concepts : Poland’s own guilt and the
guilt of others. Poland’s guilt consisted in making insufficient efforts to defend
the country, the egocentricity of the gentry which resulted in the cause of
the Commonwealth failing to become a cause of the whole nation, political
mistakes and treason: guilt of the others consisted in the political crime of
the partitioning Powers and the indifference of the West. The soul searching
examination of Polish and foreign consciences played an important part in
shaping the political, social and emotional attitudes of the post-partition
generations. Closest to a scholarly approach to the problem, however, were
these historians and thinkers who reached back into the remote past in
tracking the internal causes of the fall of Poland. While rejecting the concept
of guilt, we shall follow their arguments.
In the seventeenth century, a basic disparity appeared between the
development of Poland and that of her neighbours in those fields which
were decisive for a country’s strength. There is no reason to believe that in
the eighteenth century some fate necessarily doomed the weaker State to be
devoured by the strong one. A weak country was often a convenient neigh-
bour for the great Powers. Poland, however, found herself in an extremely
difficult, one might say, dramatic situation, marked by two great mutually
incompatible aims: the armed struggle for independence and the desire to
improve the country under peaceful conditions. To govern herself in ac-
cordance with her own will, the Commonwealth, surrounded by great
334 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND FOR THE REFORM (1788-1794)
Powers, would have to be a greater power herself. Poland’s situation
compelled her either to have a great power status, equal to her neighbours, or
to an inertia convenient to them. Transition from weakness to strength is
not achieved by good intentions alone. Stanistaw Augustus was not lacking
good intentions in the ambitious years of 1764-1766, nor were the leaders
of the Four Years’ Seym or the chiefs of the 1794 Insurrection. What they
lacked were means. And means had to be powerful, if forces capable of
resisting the neighbours were to be mobilized from a multinational country,
with society divided into estates, with oligarchic decentralization, an admin-
istration in a state of atrophy and an almost entirely agricultural economy.
As for Poland’s neighbours, if they were not “natural” partitioners, with the
exception of Prussia, they certainly were “naturally” opposed to a power
growing at their frontiers.
It was no accident that the partitions took place not at the moment
of Poland’s greatest weakness, but when she began to grow stronger. There
exists a dramatic rhythm between the reforms of 1764-1766 (and the Con-
federation of Bar which was their result) and the First Partition, the work
of the Four Years’ Seym and the Second Partition, the Insurrection of 1794
and the final disappearance of Poland as a State. Poland was slipping from
Russia’s grasp, Prussia lay in wait upon her frontiers, while the principle of
the balance of power automatically drew Austria in. Closer analysis of
events permits reflection upon merits, errors and guilt of individuals and
social groups, upon the intellectual and moral character of the principal
actors of the drama, like Catherine II, Frederick II, Stanistaw Augustus or
Kosciuszko. When surveying the events in their broad perspective, however,
the conclusion arises that in the seventeenth and at the beginning of the
eighteenth centuries, there occurred in central and eastern Europe historical
processes which brought the Commonwealth to the point of humiliating
inertia. Great risks attended Stanislaw Augustus trying to walk the political
tight-rope without having enough power to lead the parliamentary Com-
monwealth consistently along with him. In fact, both the King and all the
men of Enlightenment took a mutual risk in their efforts to achieve the
political, cultural and economic advancement of their country. Their re-
forming zeal and patriotism cannot be denied; they cannot be accused
of a particular class egoism (they were what they could be, in the social
sense) or inclination to treason (under the conditions of half-sovereignty the
dividing line was flexible). They lost an uneven struggle.
It was not the old system of oligarchical anarchy which destroyed
Poland. Polish society in fact demonstrated its fundamental vitality at a time
when the Polish State was struggling to maintain its existence against the
old order of Europe. This experience infused into the Polish nation the desire
to resurrect the Polish State by internal reform, in alliance with the European
revolutionary movement, in defiance of the defenders of the old order, the
very powers which had partitioned Poland.
POLAND
UNDER FOREIGN RULE
1795-1918
CHAPTERS XIV-XVII
by Stefan Kieniewicz
CHAPTERS XVIJI-XXI
by Henryk Wereszycki
Chapter XIV
THE NAPOLEONIC ERA
(1795-1815)
THE ENFRANCHISEMENT OF THE PEASANTS
AND THE NATIONAL UPRISINGS
The downfall of the Polish Commonwealth was by no means an unprecedent-
ed event in the political practices carried on by the big powers in the
eighteenth century. The unique feature, however, was that Poland deprived
forcibly of her statehood was a nation of 10 million people and fully capable
of independent existence. The partitions interrupted brutally Poland’s
vigorous economic, social and cultural development. Even though the disaster
was a consequence of Polish errors in the past, even though the Targowica
group had played its part, the Polish people regarded the partitions to be
an act of violence perpetrated by perfidious neighbours.
The patriotic majority of the Polish people could never reconcile them-
selves to this outrage. Attempts undertaken by the three partitioning Pow-
ers to denationalize or to assimilate Poles remained unsuccessful, especially
when in the nineteenth century national consciousness and patriotic feeling
ran high in Europe. Moreover, Poland’s struggle for independence found a
ready response in all European countries under foreign rule whether in the
Hapsburg monarchy, Turkey or in Tsarist Russia. Poland’s resistance to the
three “Northern Courts” remained for a period of 120 years a steady ferment
disturbing the balance of power in Europe and was favourable to revolution-
ary upheavals.
The nineteenth century, the era of the industrial revolution and of the
victory of capitalism, was for Poland an age of oppression. While other
European nations were accumulating wealth and power in their bid to
conquer the world, Poland was subject to foreign exploitation. Economically
as backward as the rest of eastern Europe, she had experienced in the first
quarter of the nineteenth century the same process of the abolition of feudal
conditions : serfdom, labour dues, and the guild system, the same process of
building up her factory industry and capitalist landed estates. But in Poland
this process of economic and social evolution took a course different from
that of either Germany or Russia because it developed in the context of
national subjection. Polish patriots from Koégciuszko onwards saw in the
22 History of Poland
338 THE NAPOLEONIC ERA (1795-1815)
class struggle the means of liberating the nation, and appealed to the people,
proclaiming that a reborn Poland would offer freedom and equality. The
agrarian question became, therefore, the key problem in all Polish upris-
ings ; it determined the attitude of all social groups and political factions
and hastened the introduction of reforms by the propertied classes and by
the governments of the partitioning Powers.
The turning point in this dual process was to be the enfranchisement of
the peasants which made it possible for a peasant to become owner of the
land. This reform, started in the part of Poland under Prussian domination
early in the nineteenth century, was completed in Prussian and Austrian
Poland by 1848-1850 ; in the Russian dominions it was carried out only in
1861-1864. The reform was spurred on and accompanied by revolutionary
upheavals and national uprisings. With her peasants enfranchised, Poland
entered the era of modern capitalism. Simultaneously, the agrarian question
ceased to provide the motive power of revolutionary movements. Very soon
labour problems became the main source of social unrest.
Thus the years 1795-1864 were in Poland’s history a period marked by
the introduction of capitalism, by a gradual emancipation of the peasants,
and by large-scales national risings. This period of seventy years may be
divided into two almost equal phases :
(a) 1795-1831. During these years, the crisis of feudalism was only
beginning to take shape. Remnants of a Polish State still existed in the
Duchy of Warsaw and the Congress Kingdom. Independence movements
and the struggle for social justice were still led by the gentry. The period
reached its climax with the November Insurrection (1830-1831).
(b) 1832-1864. The agrarian crisis entered then an acute stage, with
a simultaneous intensification of national oppression. This gave rise to more
radical ideologies and political programmes: plebeian voices now made
themselves heard among the leadership. The culminating point of the crisis
coincided in the parts under Prussian and Austrian rule with the revolution-
ary movements of 1846-1848 and in the Russian part with the January
Insurrection (1863-1864).
POLAND AFTER THE THIRD PARTITION
The three States, which had carved up the Polish Commonwealth, presented
in the late eighteenth century different shades of enlightened absolutism. All
three tried to assimilate the newly acquired Polish territories as quickly as
possible and to exploit their resources to the full. The large landowners, who
had been the masters in Poland, were now excluded from power. The
traditional voivodships were replaced in the Prussian portions by the
provinces of West Prussia, South Prussia, and New East Prussia; in the
POLAND AFTER THE THIRD PARTITION 339
Austrian dominions by the provinces of Old and New Galicia ; and in the
Russian dominated part by a number of gubernias or provincial governments.
The new administrations were manned by freshly arrived foreigners, and
Polish was banned as the official language from government offices and
courts of justice. The Prussian government was more drastic than the
Austrian government in its efforts to Germanize the population. Settlers
were brought from the West, and German was imposed as the compulsory
medium of instruction in all schools. With the same end in view the
partitioning Powers took over the starostwa as well as a considerable part
of lands of the Church. The Russian and Prussian governments sequestrated
or confiscated the large estates of persons who had taken part in the last
insurrection.
The political disaster had a far reaching effect on the economic develop-
ment of the country. A large number of manufactories (particularly in
Warsaw) went bankrupt, and rent reform was checked. In addition, Polish
territories were subject to intensive fiscal exploitation and to conscription.
Greatly increased taxes were collected far more efficiently than they had
been under Polish rule. As for conscription, the toll of lives taken from
Polish peasants was most heavy under the Austrians, who were then waging
a bitter and unsuccessful war in the West.
After 1795 conditions in Russian Poland differed essentially from those
in the two other areas : it covered in effect regions inhabited preponderantly
by Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Lithuanians, where only the gentry and
a part of the urban middle class were Poles. The Russian government did not
take this into account in its political dealings at that time. Russia, like Prus-
sia and Austria, was a State with a feudal, conservative system. All three
imprisoned and persecuted Polish patriots in order to repress irredentism ;
yet, at the same time, they sought to combat Jacobinism born of the French
Revolution, which equally threatened them. For this reason, they maintained
class privileges in Poland and sought support among the country’s aristocracy
and wealthy gentry. Progressive social reforms introduced by the Four
Years’ Seym and during the Kosciuszko Insurrection were abolished ; the
lord remained the master of the peasant; discrimination against the urban
middle class continued and with it oppression of the Jews ; the magnates
were cultivated but the petty gentry were harassed. Ecclesiastical privileges
were curtailed and attempts were made to bring the Church under State
control ; however, Orthodox Russia as well as Protestant Prussia looked
upon the Catholic hierarchy as a desirable ally from the angle of social
conservatism.
More pronounced was the difference in policy adopted by the three
partitioning Powers with respect to the peasantry. Austria began by
introducing progressive reforms. A series of letters patent granted by the
Emperor Joseph II (1780-1790) assured the peasant security of tenure and
laid down that his burden might not be increased ; the maximum labour
22°
340 THE NAPOLEONIC ERA (1795-1815)
service he had to render to the lord was fixed at 3 days a week and the
manorial administration was to be supervised by the district commissioner.
These reforms were, however, carried out only in part: the intended general
change over from labour dues to rent never took place: and the right
granted the peasant to complain about his master at a district office proved
ineffective in practice.
The Prussian government proceeded to introduce rents of the State lands ;
with regard to private estates it confined itself to appointing justices
authorized to settle disputes between peasants under government control
though acting in the name of the squire.
Under Russian rule, the peasant was worse off, because he was as-
similated to conditions prevailing in Russia. Serfdom there had all the
attributes of personal slavery and labour dues were calculated not ac-
cording to the size of the plot of land, but to the number of male “souls” in
the village.
These divergences in the agrarian policy of the three Powers were due,
in part, to the different levels of their economic development. Prussia, who
had withdrawn from the war in the West and was carrying on a vigorous
trade with both belligerents, could afford to offer benefits to agriculture.
High grain prices were an incentive to enterprising landowners to modernize
their estates, expand their manors at the expense of the peasants and employ
more hired labour. Equally profitable conditions existed after the partitions
in the Ukraine owing to the opening of the waterway enabling grain to be
carried on rafts down to the Black Sea port of Odessa. In the conditions
which prevailed in Russia this could only encourage the large wheat pro-
ducers to increase the exploitation of the Ukrainian peasant and to demand
more serf labour. Galicia’s economic situation was far worse : ruined by the
continuing war and cut off by tariff boundaries from the natural outlets for
her exports she had to stick to old methods much longer. The decrees of
Joseph II, which were binding in theory but ineffective in practice, did not
encourage social and economic progress.
ATTITUDE OF THE POPULATION
AND THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT
The downfall of the Commonwealth was beyond doubt a serious blow to
the aristocrats and the wealthy gentry, because it took the reins of power out
of their hands. For the moment, however, they accepted the new state of
affairs, especially when the partitioning Powers averted potential revolution
by maintaining the system of serfdom and labour services. The loyalty of the
gentry was particularly evident in the Russian dominated territories where
the new Tsar Paul I, who succeeded Catherine II in 1796, had released
THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT 34]
numerous Polish prisoners, including Kosciuszko and had restored to the
gentry the privilege of appointing minor administrative and judical officers.
The magnates, who had not lost hope of Poland’s resurrection, counted
mainly on conflicts that might arise among the partitioning Powers, and on
one of the latter restoring Poland to full sovereignty. Actually, a conflict of
the sort was looming ahead in 1795-1796 in connexion with the frontier
delimitation. Tension between Prussia, on the one hand, and Austria and
Russia on the other, continued even after a compromise had been reached.
While hoping for a conflict between the partitioning Powers, a number of
magnates, engaged in political activities took good care to maintain a loyal
attitude towards “their own” partitioning government. A considerable part
of the middle gentry retired into private life. In the Prussian zone, the post-
partition period was referred to as the “golden years”, because the price of
grain rose and credit was cheap. Prussian State institutions invested large
sums of money in mortgages on landed estates. The Polish gentry spent
money lightheartedly with littl | ght of using it to raise their property’s
economic level; the governr ‘ed to recuperate the investment
eventually by chasing the Pol “seir land.
Resistance to the partitic from those groups of the
population which were mc the loss of independence.
This section of the comr sser gentry and the petty
bourgeoisie, but mainly t entsia and the officer corps.
Immediately after the i clandestine connexions were
established between all ied Poland, quite often under
the cover of masonic f restoring a free Poland. The
movement was join ong the gentry and even the
aristocracy ; the latr to suggest diplomatic methods in
preference to arme Galician conspirators sent Stani-
staw Soltyk to P- contact the Directory. In January
1796, a group of w drew up an act of Confederation
which container up arms at the call of the French
government. A founded with its seat in Lwow under
the name of th dependent branches in the Russian and
Prussian prot and of the soldiers who had served under
Kosciuszko, m Denisko, assembled in Moldavia, then
under Tur! zntion of marching into Poland.
It was 2’s brilliant campaigns in Italy. The Polish
people e: of the Austrians, Russia’s entry into the war
and the in the Balkans. Bonaparte, however, signed
an armistice . ), the attempt of Denisko’s forces failed, the
Lwo6w conspiracy w. vered and Austrian and Russian prisons were
filled with Polish patriots.
The first conspiracy had no definite social programme, but it had been
joined by radical elements from the former Jacobins. One of them was
342, THE NAPOLEONIC ERA (1795-1815)
Franciszek Gorzkowski, an impoverished noble and a land surveyor by
profession, who acting in agreement with the Warsaw conspiracy, started
a campaign among the peasants in Podlasie which was then under Austrian
rule. According to him, all peasants in Poland ought to take to arms on the
same day, remove the lords from the land, march on to meet the expected
French forces and jointly with them liberate Poland. In his campaign among
the illiterate population Gorzkowski used lithographed pictures which
showed the difference in numbers of peasants and the gentry, or illustrated
the peasant’s misery of today and compared it with his prosperity of tomor-
row in a free Poland. The first country squire who came across this pro-
paganda, surrendered Gorzkowski to the Austrians (1797); thus ended
an immature, but nevertheless important attempt at revolutionary pro-
paganda among the peasantry.
After the arrests in Galicia and in Lithuania, the conspiracy continued
in the Prussian-dominated areas. In 1798 a new secret centre was founded,
namely, the Society of Polish Republicans. Its membership included former
officers, writers, lawyers, small merchants and even some landed gentry.
The Society’s “Supervisory Body” drew up the directives for Poland’s
future government. It was modelled on the French Constitution of Year III,
which meant that it advocated the abolition of privileges and rejected
cooperation with any of the partitioning Powers. It promised the peasants
personal freedom in general terms, without declaring that they would obtain
their freeholds. The Republicans recognized Kosciuszko as their leader :
he was then in France, having been released from captivity. They also kept
in touch with Koltataj who was detained in an Austrian prison. While
awaiting new French victories, the members of the society restricted their
activity to ideological propaganda, military intelligence for France, and to
helping volunteers who were joining the Polish Legions in France, and
Italy.. The conspirators had no strong backing in Poland; they counted
mainly on the arrival of the French. The group was never discovered, but
it dissolved gradually and ceased all activity after 1800, when peace in
Europe was restored. The Polish revolutionary forces were neither numerous
nor strong enough to take up the fight alone.
THE LEGIONS
When the Kosciuszko Insurrection collapsed a few thousand officers and
politicians emigrated. The majority of them soon assembled in Paris, where
a semi-ofhcial Agency of the Insurrection government was active under the
leadership of a Warsaw lawyer, Franciszek Barss. The Agency was suppor-
ted by the more moderate elements among the émigrés, while the Jacobin
wing, headed by the writers Franciszek Dmochowski and Kalasanty Sza-
THE LEGIONS 343
niawski, set up its own Deputation, and tried to enlist the help of the
French government. The Deputation considered the idea of provoking an
uprising in Poland, whereas the members of the Agency were opposed to
this course and tried mainly to organize Polish military units to serve under
the French. Neither of these attempts had, at the beginning, any chance
of success. Most of Poland’s territories were at that time in Prussian hands
and therefore any action undertaken to secure Poland’s independence was
considered as anti-Prussian. France had meanwhile made peace with Prussia
at Basel and was in no mood to annoy her by raising the Polish question
seriously. The Directory was at war with Austria, but it was a war waged
for France’s “natural frontiers” and not for spreading revolution. The lea-
ders in Paris used the Polish body without the slightest scruple to put pres-
sure on Austria, but they did not intend to tie their hands by creating Polish
units in French service.
Bonaparte’s victories in Italy, however, offered opportunities for raising
such units. There were many recruits from Galicia among the Austrian pris-
oners of war and many able officers could easily be found among the Polish
émigrés. The suggestion was made to the Directory by General Henryk
Dabrowski, who had arrived from Warsaw. The Directory sent him to
Milan, where Bonaparte gave the matter serious consideration. The hero
of Arcole was presenting his government with accomplished facts. He was
already attempting to establish his independence of Paris. One of his plans
was to create an Italian army, but as yet he could not discover where the
required number of volunteers might come from. The idea of a Polish
Legion as an auxiliary unit in his army in Lombardy appealed to him. In
this spirit Bonaparte drafted the agreement which was signed in Milan by
General Dabrowski and the Lombard government on 9 January, 1797, and
formally approved by himself as Commander-in-chief. The legionaries were
to obtain Polish uniforms, Italian epaulets and a French cockade. They
were assured that they would return to Poland if the national cause should
demand it.
Dabrowski issued an appeal inviting his compatriots to join the ranks
of the reborn army and himself engaged in recruiting men in the prisoner-
of-war camps. By the time the armistice of Leoben was signed, he already
had 3600 men under arms. Within a year, their number reached 10,000.
In spite of the peace negotiations, the legionaries longed for an armed return
“from Italy to Poland”. This idea found its expression in a song composed
by Jozef Wybicki, Dabrowski’s friend, in 1797, Jeszcze Polska nie zgineta,
poki my zyjemy (Poland is not yet lost, so long as we are alive). This
song, which all the soldiers adopted, was in time to become Poland’s nation-
al anthem.
Meanwhile France had signed the peace treaty of Campo Formio. The
legions were transferred to serve the new Cisalpine Republic. One of the
legions was garrisoned in Rome and distinguished itself in 1798 during the
campaign in Naples. The Poles were also employed to put down popular
revolts against the French. This revealed the dual character of their duties.
On the one hand, these Polish legionaries were the soldiers of revolutionary
France, adopting the example of her democratic army, pledged to fight for
the rights of man ; with Poland in their mind they accepted instruction in
the art of war under the leadership of the greatest commander of the time.
On the other hand, they were used in Italy as the tool of fresh oppression
and there was nothing to guarantee that they would one day have a chance
to serve their own people. The Deputation group opposed the Legions, both
on principle and because they were the creation of a rival party. This,
however, did not prevent many radicals from joining the ranks of the
Legion. The most gifted among them, Jozef Sutkowski, became Bonaparte’s
aide-de-camp and tried to win his sympathy for the Polish question (he
died in street fighting during the Egyptian Expedition).
In the ill-starred campaign of 1799 the Polish legions suffered great
losses. One of them was handed over to the Austrians after the capitulation
of Mantua, while the other was bled white in the battle of Trebbia. A new
Legion was then formed on the northern front, the “Danube Legion” under
the command of General Karol Kniaziewicz which played a decisive role
in bringing about the victory of Hohenlinden (1800).
There came another brief spell of peace in Europe, during the period of
the Consulate. The treaty of Lunéville left Poland still subject and even
specified that neither France nor Austria would give assistance to the in-
ternal enemies of the other. Many Polish officers and soldiers resigned while
others revolted against the despotism of the First Consul and made contacts
with the Republican conspirators in France and Italy. Bonaparte, in turn,
considered the Polish units superfluous and undesirable. The greater part
of the Legions (about 6000 men) were therefore despatched to San Domingo
(the modern Haiti) to put down the Negro rebellion (1802-1803). Nearly
all of them perished there killed either by the climate or in battle, fighting
for the ignoble cause of a colonial war. This episode brought the idea of
the Legions into disrepute.
Yet in spite of this sorry ending, Dabrowski’s Legions had been of some
use to the Polish cause. During the five years of their existence some 20,000
men had received training and this nucleus made possible the resurrection
of a national army in the Duchy of Warsaw. The Legionaires were imbued
with the democratic and civic spirit of the French Army ; they were the
hard-core radiating hope and confidence in Poland’s liberation even though
they placed their hope on help from abroad.
When this hope failed to materialize and Bonaparte betrayed the cause
of liberty after the 18th Brumaire, the Polish Jacobins began to seek new
means of salvation. One of them, Jézef Pawlikowski, who was then secre-
tary to Koéciuszko, published an anonymous pamphlet with the striking
title Czy Polacy mogq sie wybic na niepodlegtos¢ ? (Can the Poles achieve
ADAM CZARTORYSKI AND THE PULAWY PLAN 345
their own liberation ?) (1800). His answer was, of course, in the affirmative
but on condition that the mass of the Polish people would rise and fight
for national liberation and for improving their lot. The booklet was con-
fiscated by Fouché’s police and made no deep impression at the time ; but
in the succeeding generation it became the credo of Polish patriots.
ADAM CZARTORYSK]I AND THE PULAWY PLAN
After 1800 conspiracies had lost their raison d’étre in Poland. Many poli-
ticians and officers of the former legions were returning from their exile and
seeking other kinds of public activity. This they could find in the field of
science and culture. A nation threatened with disappearance was bound
to salvage at least the relics of its past, to promote education and to pre-
serve its cultural treasures. Many enlightened magnates like J. M. Ossolinski
and S. Potocki established scientific libraries in those years. Many collections
of books owned by monasteries which were closed, were thus preserved to
serve future generations of research workers. Princess Isabella Czartoryska
established in her residence in Putawy the first Polish museum of historical
relics ; she called it “The Temple of Sybil”. In 1800, thanks mainly to the
efforts of Staszic, the Warsaw Society of the Friends of Science was found-
ed. Here a small number of aristocratic patrons assisted a group of distin-
guished scholars who set themselves the task of drafting a comprehensive
programme for the study of the various branches of science and learning.
The most important work published under the aegis of the Society was the
Dictionary of the Polish Language, compiled by Samuel Linde ; its first vol-
ume appeared in 1806.
The most favourable conditions for educational work at this time existed
in the Russian-occupied part of Poland. The new Tsar Alexander I had
made friends with the young Prince Adam Czartoryski, who became his
confident and was appointed Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs ; together,
they drew up projects to liberalize Russia. Czartoryski also became the
curator of the Wilno Educational District and in 1802 he opened a Polish
University in Wilno which soon reached a very high academic standard.
At the head of the University stood the Sniadecki brothers, one of them
a mathematician, the other a natural scientist. Sponsored by this institution,
a network of secondary and primary schools was established in the Educa-
tional District of Wilno which embraced Lithuania, Byelorussia and the
Ukraine. The organization of this educational system followed closely the
model drawn up by the pre-partition Commission of Education. An excep-
tionally high level was attained by the Lyceum (secondary school) of Krze-
mieniec in Volhynia which owed its foundation to the efforts of a magnate
and distinguished historian of law, Tadeusz Czacki. Czacki’s main aide
346 THE NAPOLEONIC ERA (1795-1815)
was Hugo Kollgtaj, who had gone back to educational work after his re-
lease from prison.
Tsar Alexander’s friendship with Czartoryski and his generosity towards
Poland had a deeper political reason. Russia indirectly took advantage of
the weakening of Austria as well as Prussia after the revolutionary wars to
reassert her expansionist policy in central Europe. The liberalism of the
new Tsar was intended to attract not only the Poles, but also the Slavs in
Austria and the Balkans. Czartoryski worked wholeheartedly for the res-
toration of a united Poland in union with Russia under Tsar Alexander.
He saw in the approaching decisive showdown with revolutionary France
prospects for the success of his schemes. When Napoleon Bonaparte pro-
claimed himself Emperor and Great Britain was organizing the Third Coa-
lition, Czartoryski conceived an intricate scheme for joint action by Austria
and Russia to attack neutral Prussia and recover all the Polish lands in her
possession ; the war with France was to be the second stage. In 1805 Alexan-
der I arrived in Pulawy (then under Austrian domination), and was wel-
comed enthusiastically by the Polish aristocrats there as their future ruler.
But the “Pulawy Plan” proved to be a will-o’-the-wisp. Russia was simply
blackmailing Prussia to force her to join the coalition. Straight from Pulawy
Alexander went to Potsdam to conclude an alliance with Frederick Wil-
liam III. Notwithstanding this unexpected disillusionment, the majority of
Poland’s aristocracy was still attracted by the pro-Russian orientation. In
the coming great showdown, Tsarist Russia was to prove the mainstay of
the old feudal order.
JENA AND TILSIT
The 1805 campaign ended in a brilliant French victory at Austerlitz. The
Grande Armée then halted on Poland’s threshold, keeping in mind the ambigu-
ous attitude of armed, though neutral, Prussia. Only a year later war with
Prussia was to compel Napoleon to deal with the Polish question. After
Jena and Auerstadt and after the lightning occupation of the Prussian for-
tresses the road into Poland was open to the French.
Napoleon residing in Berlin, negotiated with the King of Prussia and,
at the same time, encouraged the Poles to rise in arms. On 3 November, 1806
Dabrowski and Wybicki issued a revolutionary appeal to the population
dictated by Napoleon. In it they quoted the Emperor’s words: “I want
to see whether the Poles deserve to be a nation”. Napoleon was not prom-
ising the Poles anything ; he was even ready to strike a bargain with the
King of Prussia at their expense. But the Russian army was drawing near
on its way to reinforce the Prussian forces and hard fighting lay ahead of
the French on the Vistula. Under these circumstances they were compelled
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General Jan Henryk Dabrowski entering Poznan on November 6, 1806
to enlist the support of the Polish people. They entered Warsaw and Poznan
without a shot being fired. Dabrowski organized a provisional Polish ad-
ministration, calling upon the gentry to rise and join the army, and demand-
ing that the landlords provide the recruits from among their peasants. The
common people, the petty bourgeoisie and the petty gentry were full of
enthusiasm. The magnates sent delegations to pay homage to Napoleon, but
in general they were rather reserved. Many of them possessed properties
in the neighbouring areas under Russian or Austrian rule and disapproved
of the “usurper”. On the other hand, there were Jacobin politicians, headed
by General Jézef Zajaczek, who offered their services to Napoleon and
appealed to him to bring about radical reforms in Poland. The Emperor,
however, calculated that the left-wingers would be loyal to him anyway
and that it was much more important to win over the Polish aristocrats
348 THE NAPOLEONIC ERA (1795-1815)
who supported Russia. Prince Jozef Poniatowski hesitated for a long time
before accepting the post of director (or minister) of war offered to him
by the French. He finally had to agree under the pressure of public opinion ;
the alternative might have been the appointment of either Dabrowski or
Zajaczek as Commander-in-chief. In January 1807 Napoleon transferred
the temporary administration of Poland’s occupied territories to a Govern-
ment Committee of seven. Most of its members were aristocrats, former
leaders in the Four Years’ Seym, heated by Malachowski and Stanislaw
Potocki. The Committee’s principal task was to ensure that the Grande
Armée received its supplies during the winter campaign ahead.
Nearly twenty thousand Polish soldiers under Dabrowski were engaged
in this campaign: they had pushed the Prussians down the left bank of
the lower Vistula and later played a major role in the siege of Gdansk.
The Polish people in general were convinced that service under Napoleon
was bound to result in their country being reinstated within its former
frontiers, but the Polish question was left in abeyance. The fierce battle of
Eylau had brought no decision, and Napoleon was careful not to create
any accomplished facts so far as Poland was concerned. After the battle
of Friedland the Polish question became a bargaining point in the Franco-
Russian negotiations.
In the course of secret parleys that took place in Tilsit in 1807, Na-
poleon declared himself ready to hand the Poles over to the Tsar, whereas
Alexander in turn suggested that Jerome Bonaparte should be put in charge
in Warsaw. Both Emperors dreamt of a division of the world, but none of
them was ready to sponsor the troublesome Polish question. A compromise
was finally struck and the new King of Saxony, Frederick Augustus, was
appointed to rule in Warsaw. Russia received, as 2 meagre compensation,
the district of Bialystok. The choice of a Saxon prince as “duke of Warsaw”
was proof of the temporary character of the Franco-Russian agreement.
For the time being, the Duchy of Warsaw was to remain a French outpost
in eastern Europe. Later, depending on the march of events, the territory
might serve another purpose. It might, for example, be either ceded to
Russia in exchange for other advantages, or used in rebuilding all of Poland
as a bulwark against Russia.
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE DUCHY OF WARSAW
The small new State was artificially carved out of the Prussian part of Po-
land ; it covered an area of 104,000 sq.km with a population of 2.6 million ;
ran in a narrow strip from the Warta basin to the lower course of the
Neman. It was so pitifully small a part of the former Commonwealth
that the great general disappointment caused by the Tilsit decision need
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cause no surprise. Yet this small strip of land produced a Polish govern-
ment and raised and trained Polish armies. To the people it meant the
first promising step towards restoring the independence of the entire country.
In July 1807 Napoleon summoned the members of the Governing
Committee to Dresden and there dictated to them the main principles of
the new Constitution, taking little account of their opinion in the matter.
380 THE NAPOLEONIC ERA (1795-1815)
These principles were an adaptation of the Constitution of the French
Empire (of the year VIII) and similar to those granted by the Emperor to
other vassal states in Germany and Italy, but with allowance for conditions
prevailing in Poland. The whole power was put into the hands of the king ;
the Seym had, however, the right to vote on bills relating to taxation and
law. The administration followed the French pattern (6 prefects heading
the departments of Poznan, Bydgoszcz, Plock, Lomza, Kalisz and Warsaw).
Each department was divided into districts under a subprefect. The Con-
stitution made no mention of civil rights but declared the abolition of
“slavery” (which meant the serfdom of the peasants) and proclaimed the
equality of all citizens before the law. Moreover, it introduced the Code
Napoléon. The composition of the Seym followed more or less the same
lines as in the past. The members of the Senate were by appointment, bish-
ops, voivods and castellans. In the Chamber of Deputies the majority
were to be representatives elected in the local diets from among the gentry ;
in addition, however, 40 per cent of the deputies were to be elected in com-
munal assemblies in which landowners, merchants, master craftsmen, ofh-
cers and a part of the intelligentsia had voting rights. All offices were
reserved for the citizens of the country and the “national” language was
introduced into the administration. These provisions gave a Polish character
to this new minute State.
Those were the legal provisions. Matters turned out differently in prac-
tice: King Frederick Augustus resided permanently in Dresden and the
country was ruled by a State Council closely supervised by the French
Resident. The Polish army provided by the Constitution was under the
orders of Marshal Davout, commander of the French occupation corps.
The bourgeois legislation imposed upon the Duchy did not abolish the rule
of the gentry in spite of appearances. The economic weakness of the Polish
bourgeoisie made it possible for the great landowners to retain their po-
litical supremacy even under the new form of government.
This became most obvious in the manner in which the Constitution was
applied with regard to the peasant question. The provision contained in
article 4: “slavery shall be abolished”, did not settle the basic question,
namely, the recognition of the peasants’ right to own land. Left-wing writ-
ers advocated a gradual enfranchisement of the peasants. Some ministers
agreed that the payment of rent was to be accepted at least in the case of
“national” that is State landed estates. But the selfish point of view of the
landowners again prevailed. Their main spokesman was Feliks Lubienski,
Minister of Justice. Under his influence the royal decree of 21 December,
1807 did indeed confirm the right of the peasant to leave his land freely,
but reserved the right of the squire to keep the land with its buildings and
inventory as his property. Moreover, the decree by implication empowered
the squire to remove the peasant from the land at will. Thus the rural pop-
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGES WITHIN THE DUCHY OF WARSAW 351
ulation, though it was freed theoretically, remained in reality dependent
on the goodwill of the squire, and was forced to render labour service under
threat of eviction.
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGES WITHIN
THE DUCHY OF WARSAW
Right from the beginning, the new little State was confronted with econom-
ic difficulties. It was unable to exist independently, it had no real sover-
eignty and in addition, it was systematically exploited by the French oc-
cupation forces. Napoleon levied contributions from the liberated Polish
territories, he took over all Prussian State assets and claims and debited the
Duchy’s treasury for the armaments furnished to the Polish army. In its
balance of payments the Duchy was always in debt to France, compelled
to ask for extension of dates for payment, or to borrow the required amounts
from French banks at usurous rates. About a dozen French generals were
granted awards from Polish State properties.
A typical example of the methods used in this financial exploitation was
the case of the mortgages held by Prussian government institutions on the
majority of Polish estates. Napoleon transferred all claims to his own ac-
count as spoils of war, assesssed their value at 49 million francs and ceded
them to the treasury of the Duchy by the treaty of Bayonne (1808) for
a sum of 21 million francs payable within four years. In practice these
claims were irrecoverable owing to the general decline in the income of
the gentry. The continental blockade had brought in its wake a sharp re-
duction in the price of grain. The years of carefree living were now over
and the ruling circles were faced with the threat of losing their estates.
Because the government did not wish to put them under the hammer and
thus could not raise the instalments (known in Poland as “Bayonne sums”)
it repaid the debt in “cannon fodder”, by supplying recruits to the Army.
The petty Duchy maintained at first 30,000 and later 60,000 men under
arms. In addition to this compulsory contingent, Napoleon organized out
of Polish recruits other units which he incorporated into the French forces.
Over ten thousand Polish soldiers were employed for four years in the cruel
and bloody war against the Spanish people.
The agricultural crisis made it impossible to take proper advantage of
the new conditions arising from the abolition of serfdom. Hardly any land-
owner could afford to make investments and pay for hired labour. Most
of the estates retained the old system of labour dues which cost nothing
but the peasants expected that the arrival of the French would bring them
complete liberation. There were areas where they refused to render services
352, THE NAPOLEONIC ERA (1795-1815)
and regions devastated by the war, which they simply deserted making use
of their new freedom. The government tried to check migration and, on the
whole, defended the interests of the gentry. The contributions imposed upon
the country, in the form of taxes, compulsory deliveries, levies of troops
and construction of fortifications were borne, predominantly, by the poor
rural population.
Three military campaigns within six years were not conducive to a ra-
tional economy. Memoirs recorded that the gentry remembered the Duchy
of Warsaw as a period of hardship caused by falling incomes, wartime
requisitioning and difficulties in obtaining credit. It can hardly be said,
however, that there was general ruin in the country; it was rather the
question of some fortunes tottering and others growing up. Big landowners
experienced difficulties but the weaving industry of Great Poland and other
trades prospered. Warsaw came to life again; army contractors amassed
fortunes, and the peasants found life easier at least for a while. The tempo-
rary currency difficulties were overcome by devaluing the worthless coins
left behind by the Prussians and issuing a national currency. The trade
balance of the Duchy was favourable, at least while peace reigned. The
very fact that the tiny country was able, in spite of the turmoil of war to
cope with its considerable difficulties, find the means to raise an army and
to set up a new administration, was proof enough of its capacity to survive.
The fact remains, however, that the treasury of the Duchy had to strug-
gle hard to overcome its difficulties. In its search for new sources of income
the government increased indirect taxes and issued banknotes, an operation
which proved unsuccessful. Tax collection was slow and the military budget
devoured 2/3 of the income. By 1811 treasury arrears exceeded 90 million
Polish zlotys. Civil servants did not receive their salaries and even the
payments in the army were delayed. In despair, the ministers appealed in
vain to Paris for financial assistance. .
The hard times brought with them a series of important fundamental
changes. The new Constitution did not help the peasants much, but it did
raise the social standing of the petty bourgeoisie. The aristocracy was still
in control, and the Seym was preponderantly gentry in character, but in
the officer corps and in the administration the number of commoners in-
creased and many of them took advantage of the right to acquire land.
From the Warsaw money lenders emerged, during those years, a close-knit
group of financiers and bankers who were soon to become a very powerful
factor.
The Jewish population was excluded by special royal decree from the
privileges granted to the bourgeoisie. The “temporary” suspension of the
civil rights of the Jews denied them the right to hold office, and was the
starting point for further restrictions including the concentration of urban
Jews in segregated districts. Jews were also excluded from military service
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGES WITHIN THE DUCHY OF WARSAW 353
and compelled to pay a special tax instead. This discriminatory legislation
was motivated, as usual, by the view that the Jews belonged to an alien
civilization. This in turn retarded their assimilation. Very few groups of
progressive Jews were favourably disposed towards the new régime and
gave their support to the Polish cause. Special fame was won by Berek
Joselewicz, leader of a Jewish regiment during the Insurrection of 1794 and
later squadron commander in the army of the Duchy, who fell in battle
during the 1809 campaign.
Two new social groups came to the fore during the Napoleonic era, the
bureaucracy and the army. The constitution established a new administra-
tive machinery, until then unknown in Poland. Towards the end of the
Duchy’s existence the number of civil servants and local-government officials
had reached the figure of 9000. A Law and Civil Service School was es-
tablished in Warsaw to train them. The wealthy gentry were unanimous
in grumbling about the expense and incompetence of this new machinery.
The fact remained that the civil service opened a new career for both the
bourgeoisie and the impoverished gentry, and that it helped to emancipate
the emergent Polish intelligentsia.
In the general view, the Army was the chief raison d’étre and support of
the Duchy and thus enjoyed great popularity. Recruits were levied by
drawing lots and they had the right to provide a substitute. Wealthier peovle
took advantage of this privilege, so that in practice the rural poor joined the
ranks. Conditions in the army were tough but training was good, morale
usually high, and military efficiency of quite a high standard. To the soldier
military service was a school where he learned his civic duties; military
service was considered a form of social advancement. The most valuable cadre
within the officer corps were the officers of the legions ; many young volunteers
came from the landed gentry and frequently they rose from the ranks. Service
under the national banner, with its prestige and prospect of speedy promotion,
had general approval. Also, the troops had faith in Napoleon and believed
that he would revive their motherland.
The Church hierarchy looked upon the new régime with disfavour. The
State ignored the privileges of the Church, which it tried to make serve
its needs. The feud between Napoleon and the Pope had repercussions in
Poland. Time and again disputes with the bishops flared up concerning
divorces and civil marriage provided for in the Napoleonic Code. The
compensation due to the Church for expropriated Church estates was not
paid, while clergymen were recruited into the army. Some religious orders
campaigned among the people against the French. The bishops branded some
ministers as freemasons. The clergy declined to perform the duties of
registrars as instructed. An open conflict between Church and State never
arose, but secret animosity was widespread and a large number of patriotic,
englightened citizens looked upon the Roman Catholic Church with disfavour.
23 History of Poland
354 THE NAPOLEONIC ERA (1795-1815)
THE YEAR 1809
Early in 1809 the first Seym was convened in Warsaw, an event which
brought life to the political scene. The government headed by Stanistaw
Potocki and Feliks Lubienski was faced by a twin opposition. The con-
servative party among the landowners complained publicly of exorbitant
taxes and of the costly bureaucracy ; privately they worked to undermine
the system in order to get back the former privileges of the gentry. On
the other side stood the ex-Jacobin leftists almost completely excluded from
power, who sharply criticized the new rulers of the Duchy and, in support
of the progressive principles in the Constitution, advocated their expansion.
The two most outstanding writers of the Enlightenment, Staszic and Kottataj,
expounded their point of view in pamphlets which enjoyed a large circula-
tion. They were in favour of the Napoleonic system and expressed their
belief that it would bring about Poland’s liberation, social progress and
economic prosperity. Staszic sat in the State Council, where he played
a useful part ; the ambitious Koltataj, however, who had been described to
Napoleon as a dangerous Jacobin, was not entrusted with office.
The first elections revealed a majority for the gentry ; none of the radical
politicians entered the Chamber of Deputies. In accordance with the rules
of the constitution, the session of the Seym was limited to two weeks and only
fifteen members elected by the Chamber to the three Seym Committees had
the right to deliver speeches. Under these conditions, the Seym meekly
adopted the government’s proposals for new taxes ; the opposition could air
its views only at informal meetings of the deputies. The international situation
was tense and nobody in Poland wished to risk an anternal conflict.
In the spring of 1809 Austria made an attempt to retaliate against France
by taking advantage of the fact that the greater part of Napoleon’s forces
were tied up in Spain. Napoleon treated Poland as a territory of no import-
ance to the military operations which were to take place on the Danube. The
Duchy was therefore stripped of troops. Quite unexpectedly Archduke Fer-
dinand d’Este’s army corps, 30 thousand strong, crossed the Duchy’s frontier.
This move was political rather than strategic, because Austria wanted to hold
Polish territory as a counter when bargaining for an alliance with Russia or
Prussia. Meanwhile, Prince Jézef Poniatowski barred the way to the
invader at the approaches of Warsaw. The battle of Raszyn on 19 April,
where 12,000 Poles fought against 25,000 Austrians, was a day of glory
for the Polish infantry which stubbornly defended every inch of ground.
The Poles were masters of the battlefield, but had to withdraw to Warsaw on
the following night on account of the heavy losses.
After this honourable encounter Poniatowski negotiated with the
Austrians, surrendering Warsaw to them and withdrawing his army to the
right bank of the Vistula. This stratagem proved most effective : the Austrian
army corps was compelled to*station part of its forces in the turbulent Polish
THE YEAR 1809 355
capital. This weakened them considerably, and the Polish army thus regained
freedom of action. While the Archduke on the left bank of the Vistula sought
in vain to subdue the western districts of Poland, Poniatowski, on the right
bank, boldly launched an offensive into friendly and undefended Galicia.
The Polish cavalry, enthusiastically welcomed by the population, occupied the
districts of Lublin and Sandomierz almost without a shot. They at once set
about raising new Polish regiments in these territories.
Poland’s successes caused uneasiness in St. Petersburg. In 1809 Russia,
though formally allied with Napoleon, wished Austria success. A Russian
army corps entered Galicia, not with a view of fighting Austrians, but simply
to prevent further Polish conquests. Prince Poniatowski’s forces were now
placed in a difficult position. Archduke Ferdinand’s army corps left Warsaw
to defend the Austrian dominions and the Polish commanders could hardly
depend on the Russian “ally”. The outcome of the campaign was decided on
the Danube, by Napoleon’s victory at Wagram. The Austrian army corps
retreated towards the Moravian Gate, pursued by the Poles who took Cracow
before the Russians could get there.
It took three long months of nervous diplomatic manoeuvres by France,
Austria and Russia before the peace treaty of Schénbrunn was signed. As far
as Poland was concerned, this meant another compromise ; the Duchy of
Warsaw was enlarged by 4 new departments (Cracow, Radom, Lublin and
Siedlce) because they could not be denied to the Poles who had conquered
them by force of arms. But they obtained only a part of Galicia, to avoid
provoking Russia, to whom Napoleon assigned the Tarnopol district as
compensation.
The fact that the territories of the Duchy were thus nearly doubled again
kindled the hope that all Poland would sooner or later be liberated. But the
merger of the “old” and the “new” departments did not proceed without
political friction. The Lublin and Sandomierz regions were poorer and
economically less developed than Great Poland and their gentry was even
less ready to accept the new reforms. Here also were the residences and the
spheres of influence of some of the great Polish aristocratic families :
Pulawy—the property of the Czartoryskis’ and the Zamoyski estates. In
1809 Count Stanislaw Zamoyski declared himself firmly for Napoleon and
assumed the presidency of the provisional Lublin government. He hoped to
be able to maintain a separate administration for the four departments at
least until the time when the Constitution of 1807 would be revised and
rendered more conservative. His hopes were disappointed. Under a royal
decree the new departments were incorporated in the Duchy without
reservations. The provisions included the Napoleonic Code, the abolition of
serfdom and the December decree depriving the peasant of the right to own
land. The incorporation of the new territories strengthened the hands of
the right-wing elements in the Duchy. On the eve of the war against Russia
Napoleon himself attached ever more importance to securing the support
23°
356 THE NAPOLEONIC ERA (1795-1815)
of the Polish aristocracy. Ideas of reforming the administration and the
judicial system and the revival of the ancient rights and privileges of the
gentry were frequently discussed in 1810-1811, but were usually shelved
for financial reasons. This accelerated the rivalry between the two most
influential ministers, Lubienski and Matuszewicz. The former, the Minister of
Justice, represented the progressive minority of the gentry favouring
a gradual evolution toward the capitalist system. The latter, the Minister of
the Treasury and a client of Pulawy, represented a conservative tendency.
During the same period changes were taking place within the ranks of
the left-wing opposition. Out of touch with the masses and with no prospect
of obtaining Napoleon’s support, many ex-Jacobins, though capable, am-
bitious, and eager for action, became disillusioned. The most outstanding
of them, Koligtaj, died in 1812 in complete isolation. Many of his former
supporters sought personal promotion. At all cost they wished to become
influential and to take revenge on their right-wing opponents. Looking for
allies to combat the party in power, they tried to join forces with the
conservative opposition, and in 1809 even supported the Lublin provisional
government against the centralist policies of Warsaw. Some of them, like
General Zajaczek and Szaniawski, went still further. They espoused the
Russian point of view and renounced the ideals of their youth. Others, like
Gorzkowski, withdrew altogether from political life. A few, particularly
among the officers, conspired against Napoleon and renewed their former
underground ties with the Republican opposition in France, and with the
German Tugendbund. These were dangerous steps : in the prevailing balance
of power in Europe, a struggle against Napoleon could benefit only the
reactionary coalition. In Poland herself, all progressive and patriotic
elements, fascinated by the Emperor’s genius, followed him faithfully,
believing that they would regain Poland. The epigones of Jacobinism could
not make up their mind to swim against the prevailing current of opinion.
Incapable of practical action, all they could do was to transmit the tradition
of their revolutionary youth to the succeeding generation.
THE DOWNFALL OF THE DUCHY OF WARSAW
From 1807 international conditions were favourable for Poland, due not so
much to the Tilsit compromise as to the antagonism latent between the two
leading continental Powers. The compromise between France and Russia had
relegated the Polish question to the rank of an object of local: bargaining.
A decisive victory of France or Russia for this matter would destroy the
hope of any country in Europe becoming independent. But so long as the
struggle for power between France and Russia continued, Poland held the
balance and this compelled both Napoleon and Alexander to make far
reaching promises to the Poles.
THE DOWNFALL OF THE DUCHY OF WARSAW 357
The beginning of 1810 saw the last attempt to save the Tilsit system,
and to prevent war. The French ambassador, Caulaincourt, was discussing in
St. Petersburg the possibility of a marriage between Napoleon and Grand
Duchess Anna ; in return France was to pledge that “the Kingdom of Poland
would never be restored”. The negotiations were broken off at the last
moment and from that time an armaments race began on both sides of the
frontier. The Tsar now tried to win over Poland, and especially the Polish
army, to his side. He approached Prince Poniatowski through Czartoryski,
promising to revive Poland under his own sceptre in her frontiers of before
1772. Poniatowski resisted the temptation and informed Paris accordingly.
He had two good reasons for his refusal. First he knew that neither the army
nor the people would agree to give up the French connexion and secondly,
he felt rightly that Russia was insincere in her promises. Having failed in his
efforts to win over the authorities in Warsaw, Alexander tried to get a foot-
hold in Lithuania. He offered to restore the Great Duchy of Lithuania, and
to revive the Constitution of 3 May. But even Czartoryski declined this
ambiguous offer, because he did not wish—as he put it “to set one altar
against another”. Only a small group of Lithuanian aristocrats remained on
Alexander’s side.
In 1812 Napoleon hesitated to embark on the difficult campaign. To
the very last moment he counted on being able to force the Tsar to yield,
and this is why he avoided provoking him by raising the Polish problem
openly. On his march to the East, he by-passed Warsaw ; he issued orders
that the Seym be convened in an extraordinary session, and that a Confeder-
ation and the renewal of the union with Lithuania be proclaimed, but this was
a pure facade. The delegates of Confederation who were sent to mect
Napoleon at Wilno, obtained only vague statements. The Emperor carefully
restrained the enthusiasm of the Poles and avoided committing himself with
regard to the future of their country.
For this “Second Polish War” the Poles raised the largest contingent of
all allies of France, nearly 100,000, of whom 40,000 served in a separate
army corps under the command of Poniatowski. It was believed in Poland
that this tremendous effort would bring liberation. There was something
ambiguous in this famous expedition against Moscow. The victory expected
in Poland would restore the old frontiers on the Dnieper and the Dvina
and the domination of the Polish gentry over the Lithuanian, Byelorussiaa
and Ukrainian peasants. In Byelorussia, the peasants greeted the French as
liberators ; they began to refuse Jabour services and in some instances they
even rose against their landlords. The Provisional Government of Wilno
ordered them to continue performing their services and said nothing about
improving their lot. Peasants, who rose against the manors, were severely
punished by the gendarmerie under Polish command. On its march the
Grande Armée lived off the land and devastated the country. Lithuania’s
enthusiasm quickly disappeared and yielded few recruits to the army.
358 THE NAPOLEONIC ERA (1795-1815)
The Poles paid a heavy price for their participation in the war. At
Smolensk and Borodino the 5th army corps fought in the front line and
suffered tremendous losses. In the disastrous retreat the Poles often covered
the disintegrating columns of their allies. At the Berezina they helped to
rescue Napoleon from imminent disaster. They rescued all their guns and
banners in the general debacle, but their losses reached 70 per cent of their
effective strength in dead, wounded, and prisoners.
The rout of the Grande Armée was not equivalent to a total defeat for
Napoleon, but it was obvious that he could not hold the line on the Vistula.
With the approach of the Russians, the Polish aristocracy immediately
changed its attitude. Already in the autumn of 1812 the Warsaw ministers
began negotiations with Alexander using Czartoryski as an intermediary.
Now that the situation had changed, Czartoryski reminded his friend,
the Tsar, of his promise to restore Poland.
Early in 1813 the Russian armies entered Warsaw. The Polish forces
under Prince Poniatowski were then concentrated round Cracow. Once
again his aristocratic relatives tried to persuade the Commander-in-chiet
to join the Russians with his army and thus to earn Alexander’s favour.
Poniatowski, however, stood firmly by his soldier’s oath. There was a time
when his army corps, pinned down at the Austrian border, seemed doomed.
Napoleon’s offensive in Saxony averted this. After the battle of Liitzen the
Austrians agreed to allow the Polish army corps pass through Austrian ter-
ritory. The Polish troops went westwards and fought shoulder to shoulder
with the French until the battle of Leipzig, where Poniatowski, now
a Marshal of France, died a hero’s death when retreating across the Elster
river.
This heroic finale marked the end of Poland’s Napoleonic epic. For
a brief period the best part of the Polish nation had pinned its hopes on
a man of genius, a foreign conqueror. These hopes were in vain, because
Napoleon could never have reunited the Polish territories without domi-
nating Europe. Even if he had succeeded in establishing a world monarchy,
he would have subjected Poland equally with the rest of Europe. The
tremendous effort, however, which went into Poland’s struggle at Napoleon’s
side was not without value. It drew tens of thousands of people from all
walks of life into the struggle for independence, and redeemed, at least in
part, the shame of partition. It reminded Europe that the Polish nation did
not accept its loss of independence. A short lived Polish State and its
national army were to survive the general catastrophe.
Yet, this period in which Poland underwent momentous internal changes
had a still deeper significance. The French régime marked the beginning of
the end of feudalism in Poland and the rise of a new bourgeois society.
During those years serfdom was abolished, the Code Napoléon was intro-
duced together with a modern administration, the bourgeoisie achieved so-
cial advancement and the privileges of the Church were curtailed. All these
THE DOWNFALL OF THE DUCHY OF WARSAW 359
reforms were received from the top and did not arrive from the country’s
own efforts, or own revolutionary endeavours. Success was only partial.
Under the Code Napoléon, the landed gentry remained the ruling class, and
forced labour was still the mainstay of the rural economy. Nevertheless, new
initiatives gripped the countryside and paved the way for later development.
Succeeding generations. for whom every decade brought new disap-
pointments were fascinated by the Napoleonic era, with its glorious victories.
Mickiewicz felt this strongly and expressed it in his masterpiece Pan Ta-
deusz. The memory of these few years, pregnant with hope, for a long time
to come, inspired young people to embark upon new ventures with faith in
ultimate success. Such was the positive side of the Napoleonic legend. It had
its negative aspect also, which only later became apparent, in the form of
confidence that help for Poland would come from the West like a miracle,
the belief that liberty could be attained without a social upheaval. Such
misconceptions weighed heavily upon the national risings in the succeeding
epoch.
Chapter XV
THE KINGDOM OF POLAND
AND THE NOVEMBER
INSURRECTION (1815-1831)
PEASANT REFORM IN PRUSSIAN POLAND
‘The process of abolishing the feudal system of peasant exploitation had its
origin in the development of the productive forces and in the necessity and
possibility of improving rural economy. But it demanded the breaking down
of the age-old privileges of the gentry. This was accelerated by the resistance
of the oppressed peasant masses. In some cases the impetus came from
outside.
By the end of the eighteenth century, Poland’s western territories
were ripe for the abolition of labour service which had become less and
Jess efficient. Their incorporation into the Prussian monarchy had retarded
the trend towards the introduction of a system of rents. The administration
of the junker State in practice vigorously defended the property rights of
both the German and the Polish landowners. While pretending to watch
over the peasants’ interests, the Prussian administration, recruited mainly
from the landed gentry, ruled with an iron hand and exacted from the
country people the bulk of the taxes and the provision of recruits for the
army. The offences against the manor were severely punished.
The junker régime met with the strongest opposition in Silesia. This
province conquered by Frederick II in 1740-1742, was never reconciled to
its new master. For half a century—from the Seven Years’ War to the
Napoleonic era, ferment was brewing in Silesian villages, erupting time and
again in local disturbances among both Polish and German peasants. The
linguistic border in Silesia ran towards the end of the eigtheenth
century more or less along the meridian of Wroclaw. Tension
was particularly acute in 1766-1768, 1784-1786, 1793-1795, and
1798-1799. Here and there the peasants would abandon their work and
march on the manor or town with scythes and pitchforks. They resisted
military coercion and in the 1790’s opposition was particularly marked
in the Sudeten foot-hille with the insurgents openly admitting that they
PEASANT REFORM IN PRUSSIAN POLAND SI
took their example from the French Revolution. All these risings were
local revolts extending, at most, to a few districts, and lacking skilled leader-
ship ; it was relatively easy for the troops to deal with them. But the very
persistence with which revolts occurred made the Prussian bureaucracy
realize that it was high time to introduce agrarian reform.
The necessity for such reform became urgent with Prussia’s collapse in
1806. Silesia was temporarily occupied by the French, and there was even
calk of annexing it to Poland. When serfdom was abolished in the Duchy
of Warsaw in 1807, Prussia had to follow suit. Stein’s programme of reform,
which was evolved with an eye to modernizing the State and preparing it
for a military revival, clearly had to include the emancipation of the
peasants.
In 1807 personal serfdom was abolished in the Prussian State; a year
later the peasants were enfranchized in the State lands. Labour dues con-
tinued for the time being on private estates, and the landowners prevented
any further plans of reform. This caused a fresh wave of revolt in Silesia
in 1811, which was more violent than ever before. Now disturbances broke
out in the southern Polish part of Silesia. The peasants burned down maa-
ors, they demanded publication of a decree which was supposed to have abol-
ished labour service. Again the movement was suppressed by the army,
but reform could no longer be postponed. In the course of the year, the
“Settlement Decree” was issued for the entire State.
The Settlement was to be a voluntary agreement between the landlord
and the peasant. If no agreement were reached, State authorities were to
impose the conditions. The peasant was to become the owner of the land
but in return had to surrender one third of it, or even one half if his rights
were less explicit, to the landlord as compensation. Thus the reform was
onerous to the peasant, the more so because it was carried out in stages
extending over a long period of time, during which the peasant remained
dependent upon his master.
During the new wars of liberation waged in 1813-1815 little was done
in Prussia to emancipate the people. And when the war came to an end the
monarchy no longer needed to curry favour with the peasants with the
consequence that the old Junker methods once more prevailed. A new royal
Declaration of 1816 limited the scope of the Settlement with regard to
a number of essential provisions. It was to apply only to larger holdings of
peasants who performed labour service with animals and who had held
the land for more than twenty years. Certain provinces enforced local
decisions which restricted the peasant’s rights even further. Upper Silesia,
inhabited by a poor Polish population, was treated most severely.
An indispensable supplement to these provisions was the law of 1821
concerning the redemption of still outstanding peasant dues. It applied to
“settled” holdings as well as to former tenants, but in practice only the more
wealthy peasants could afford the expense.
362 THE KINGDOM OF POLAND AND THE NOVEMBER INSURRECTION (1815-1831)
This legislation was applied in two Polish areas under Prussian rule, in
Silesia and Pomerania. After the Vienna Congress of 1815, the Grand
Duchy of Poznan, forming the western part of the Duchy of Warsaw, also
came under Prussian rule. The new agrarian legislation was extended to this
area after a delay of some years. As a first step, in 1819, peasant evictions
were prohibited and in 1823 the Settlement law was promulgated in the
Poznan area. Some of the paragraphs appeared to be more favourable for
the peasants; later, however, in 1836, the landlords of the Duchy of
Poznan obtained a royal declaration which restricted the scope of the
Settlement to bring the law in conformity with that in other provinces.
Thus the Prussian reform which did away with archaic rural con-
ditions, was imposed by the State ; the state, however, acted above all in the
interests of the larger estates. In practice it was left to the landowner to decide
if, when, and at what speed new settlement was to be carried out ; he also
fixed the period during which labour services were to continue. This meant
that a landowner wishing to modernize his estate received encouragement
from the State to convert to a system of hired labour, while less enterprising
landowners could spread the evolution over decades. A key to the Prus-
sian reform lay in the fact that it embraced only a minority of the peasantry.
The poor peasants who were excluded from the settlement, were to remain
as the labour force necessary to enable the manorial farm to carry on. In
Upper Silesia the Junkers evicted nearly the entire rural population ; the
proletariat created by this means was to serve as the manpower in the
Silesian mines and foundries. In the Poznan area evolution was slower ;
the gentry did not dispense with all the small tenant farmers quite as
quickly ; on the contrary, they used them to get a certain amount of free
or cheap labour during the difficult period of adaptation to the new
conditions.
From the point of view of the village, the Prussian reform split the
uniform rural population into two strata. The “settled” peasant, if he
was not required to pay exorbitant redemption instalments, could gradually
achieve independence and even become a well-to-do small producer. The
poor peasant left out of the settlement was doomed to lose his land sooner
or later, leave his village, or be reduced to the status of a farmhand. It was
precisely this split in the village community which made peasant resistance
to the new laws so ineffective. We do know from the documents that many
peasants raised claims against the new settlement and that there were acts
of resistance to certain provisions in Pomerania, Silesia, and the Poznan area.
But nowhere was there mass protest and even in troublesome Silesia the
rural areas remained quiet for a period of more than thirty years.
When the reform was promulgated, it met with the protest of the
conservative part of the landowners who deprecated state interference as an
encroachment upon their property rights. But when they saw-the manner in
which it was enforced, even the conservatives realized that the settlement
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONGRESS KINGDOM OF POLAND 363
really served the interests of the landed gentry. As a result, the more
enterprising landowners in other Polish provinces themselves tried to adopt
the Prussian pattern. In fact, Prussia was the first country in central
Europe to effect the abolition of feudalism and the transition to capitalism
by a reform enforced by the government without experiencing revolutionary
disorders. Lenin called this, at the end of the nineteenth century, “the Prus-
sian road towards the advancement of capitalism in agriculture”. This path
was taken at different times and in different conditions, by all European
countries east of the Elbe, including Poland.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONGRESS KINGDOM
OF POLAND
In 1813 almost the whole of Poland, including Warsaw, Gdansk, Poznan
and Cracow was under Russian occupation. It seemed that Alexander I
would carry out the promise he had made earlier to the Poles. But Napoleon
had not been finally defeated. The coalition needed the aid of Austria and
Prussia to win the final victory and these Powers demanded that Russia
return to them their share in the dismembered Poland. Alexander tried to
evade the issue and played for time avoiding taking .a clear stand in the
Polish question for fear of offending his allies.
It was not until 1814, when the allies entered Paris and Napoleon was
exiled to Elba, that Russia regained her freedom of action. Alexander,
ostentatiously accepted remnants of the Polish forces who had been fighting
to the bitter end on France’s side, under his wing and allowed them to return
to Poland with their arms. He, also declared publicly that he was ready to
“work for the happiness” of the Poles and looked to them for support in the
expected diplomatic conflict. His guidance was enthusiastically followed
not only by the Polish aristocracy under Czartoryskis’ leadership, but also by
a large number of Napoleon’s generals. They imagined that it would be pos-
sible, with Russia’s backing, to re-establish Poland within her pre-partition
frontiers under a conservative régime.
The Powers were opposed to too great an expansion of Russia and re-
sisted these plans at the Vienna Congress. The Tsar succeeded in getting
Prussia’s support in exchange for backing her claim against Saxony. As for
England, Austria and France, they even threatened to resort to military
action, in order to prevent Russia from establishing herself on the Vistula.
The attitude of the Powers towards Poland reflected their relationship with
Russia. In public, the ‘ministers Metternich, Castlereagh and Talleyrand,
afhrmed their readiness to see the former Poland re-established ; in private
they intrigued actively to revert to the 1795 post-partition frontiers. Having
agreed eventually to the proposal that the Kingdom of Poland was to be
364 THE KINGDOM OF POLAND AND THE NOVEMBER INSURRECTION (1815-1831)
united with Russia, they tried to reduce its frontiers in the west ; simultane-
ously they advocated that Poland be granted wider freedoms, with an eye
to possible Russo-Polish conflicts in the future. Alexander resisted these
intrigues backed by the unanimous support of Polish public opinion. Czarto-
ryski himself played an important role at the Congress as a member of the
Russian delegation.
A compromise was reached in February 1815. Russia ceded to Prussia
the western part of the conquered Duchy of Warsaw, including the towns
of Poznan and Torun. A tiny neutral state was formed out of Cracow and
its surrounding district. The rest of the former Duchy was left to Russia
as the “Kingdom of Poland” commonly called ‘Congress Poland” or
“Congress Kingdom”. The definite creation of this last province was strongly
influenced by Napoleon’s sudden return from Elba. On the eve of another
struggle with the “Corsican”, the Congress dared not provoke the Poles.
The peace treaties concluded by Russia with Austria and Prussia on 3 May,
1815, and later incorporated in the Final Act of the Congress, declared
that the Kingdom of Poland was forever united with Russia “in virtue of
its constitution” and that Tsar Alexander reserved to himself the right to
undertake any “internal expansion” of its boundaries. Other provinces of
former Poland would also obtain “national institutions”, the scope of which
was left to the discretion of the monarchs. In this manner another partition
of Poland was carried out in Vienna, which provisionally guaranteed a more
extensive autonomy to only one Polish area. The main decision was the
entrusting of Poland’s central areas to Russia which had, until then, an-
nexed only some eastern and mostly non-Polish territories of the Common-
wealth. Because Warsaw, notwithstanding the new frontiers, remained
a centre of attraction for the whole country, Poland’s fate was, after 1815,
indirectly linked for a century with the destiny of Russia and with the
outcome of the struggle which was to take place in Russia between the
Tsarist régime and the revolutionary forces.
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Poland had been mentioned in the
Final Act of the Vienna Congress and was thus guaranteed by the Powers, but
the text of the Constitution was worded as determined by Alexander him-
self ; the draft prepared by Czartoryski was changed by the Tsar in a more
autocratic spirit and was solemnly proclaimed in Warsaw in November 1815.
There were a number of provisions in it adopted from the Constitution of
the Duchy of Warsaw, namely, the authority of the Crown, the composition
of the State Council, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, together
with the provisions abolishing serfdom and establishing equal rights for all
before the law. “General guarantees” were extended to civil rights which
included freedom of the press and personal freedom, but they largely re-
mained a dead letter. The rights of the Seym were slightly extended. On
the other hand, there was a clear return to collegiate government ; com-
missions were established in preference to ministries and voivodship com-
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THE AGRARIAN QUESTION IN THE KINGDOM OF POLAND 367
mittees instead of individual prefects. A number of the most important
offices was reserved specifically for landowners.
The manner in which the law was to be applied depended in a great
measure on the persons appointed to key positions. The highest office, for-
mally, was that of Viceroy or Lord Lieutenant (namiestnik) who presided
over the Administrative Council (or government) and in whom an important
part of the King’s rights was vested. It was generally thought that Czarto-
ryski would be chosen for that post. Alexander, however, preferred to
entrust the function to a more obedient person. General Zajaczek was ap-
pointed, a former Jacobin, but now a martinet devoid of political ambition.
The Grand Duke Constantine, brother of the Tsar, was placed in command
of the Polish army ; in practice, he was more important than the govern-
ment. In addition, the Russian senator Nikolai Novosiltzow became a mem-
ber of the Administrative Council in his capacity of “imperial commissioner”
and acted as the unofficial supervisor of the Polish government. Thus, con-
trary to the letter of the law, the destiny of the Kingdom lay in the hands
of two men each of whom were either unfavourably disposed or opposed
to the freedoms which had been promised to the Polish people.
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION IN THE KINGDOM
OF POLAND
The Napoleonic years had depopulated and devastated large tracts of land
and had disturbed the balance of social relationships. More and more peas-
ants deserted the land. In 1813-1815 entire hamlets would cease to per-
form labour service and approach the authorities with demands that they
be allowed to pay rent instead of labour dues and even be allowed to rent
demesne.
The “Reform Committee” which was set up during this period of tran-
sition under Czartoryski’s chairmanship issued a questionnaire asking the
local authorities and courts together with private persons for their opinion
regarding rural conditions. The result of the enquiry was negative. The
majority of landowners stated they were in favour of a continuation of
labour dues and opposed to State intervention in agrarian matters. The
Constitution therefore did not alter the status quo ; the decree of December
of 1807, which had made the peasant a free tenant without any right to
the land, remained in force.
The continuation of labour service made the peasant’s formal freedom
an open question ; attempts were made repeatedly to restrict this freedom
even further. In 1818 a royal decree entrusted to the landowners the duties
of mayor of the village (w0jt), thus giving them administrative powers over
the population in their estates. A further decree of 1821 concerning journey-
368 THE KINGDOM OF POLAND AND THE NOVEMBER INSURRECTION (1815-1831)
men made it difficult for an agricultural worker to leave his employment
of his own free will. The new provisions could not again bind the peasant
to the soil but in general they consolidated the practice of the State refusing
to examine the complaints of peasants working on private estates and tak-
ing the gentry’s side in any case of insubordination by the village.
The general economic situation did not favour progressive agriculture.
Grain prices fell because the Kingdom was cut off from its natural com-
mercial outlet at the mouth of the Vistula and growth was courtailed by
the prohibitive corn laws in Great Britain. A considerable number of estates
were burdened with heavy debts and could only carry on because the mora-
torium was extended year after year. The owners of demesnes, especially
those in the western part of the country, were turning from the unprofitable
production of grain to growing potatoes and to sheep breeding. New meth-
ods of distilling allowed them to make easy money by inducing the local
population to consume alcohol, and the growing textile industry was a cus-
tomer for their wool. Cultivation of the potato imposed more work on
the peasants ; sometimes in the form of “additional” days of labour service
but more often through imposing a system of compulsory cheap labour.
A system of loans to the peasants, mostly in grain, pasture or firewood, to
be paid for later in the form of labour, secured for the demesnes a sufficient
amount of cheap manpower.
By the middle 1820’s the big landowners were emerging ffom the crisis.
Prices ceased to fall, and the State established the Land Credit Society (1825)
which enabled landed gentry to pay their earlier debts. Nevertheless, rural
conditions were still unfavourable to technical progress and consequently
to the abandonment of the labour services. After 1815 the government, as
a result of developments on the State land, began to “settle” these estates
and to convert the peasants from labour services to money rents, payable
directly to the State. This attempt at reform was soon abandoned because
it only offended the opinion of the gentry. Ksawery Lubecki, Minister of
the Treasury, who was trying to find the money to launch his big invest-
ment schemes, succeeded in forcing through a decree, in 1828, by virtue of
which all State lands were to be sold to private individuals. The inhabitants
of these domains were to be deprived both of the right to own land and
of the right to State protection which they had enjoyed hitherto.
The State lands were at that time the chief centre of peasant resistance
to oppression. This resistance took the form of petitions demanding con-
version to rents or legal action against the more oppressive tenants. The
moving spirits of those demonstrations and lawsuits were agitators who
were mostly déclassé intelligentsia from outside the village, and sometimes
educated peasants who led the legal opposition of the community. Among
the better known agitators was one, Kazimierz Deczynski, a man of peasant
stock and the village teacher in Brodnia, in the Kalisz region. As a punish-
THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN INDUSTRY IN THE KINGDOM OF POLAND 369
ment he was enrolled in the army. Deczynski left an interesting diary
dealing with his activities and with the contemporary situation of the
peasantry.
THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN INDUSTRY
IN THE KINGDOM OF POLAND
While agriculture made only slight progress owing to the unfavourable
conditions, developments in industry were quite remarkable. These years
gave birth to Lédz as a textile centre.
Earlier attempts to attract skilled workers from abroad had failed. Now
that conditions in Europe became stable after the Congress of Vienna, they
were crowned with success. Spinners and weavers from the Duchy of Poz-
nan, Silesia and Saxony, whose livelihood was threatened by the competi-
tion of factories in western Europe, willingly moved to the east where they
were protected by new custom barriers and where they could maintain con-
tact with the markets of the East. Many of these textile workers were intro-
duced by enterprising landowners into voivodships of Mazovia and Kalisz.
It was in this way thac small industrial centres were established at Aleksan-
dréw, Konstantynéw, Tomaszéw and Zdunska Wola. Each immigrant was
given a plot of land and building material and was granted several years’
tax exemption, while the squire reserved for himself the profits yielded
by the fulling of cloth and more especially by the sale of liquor. The State
adopted a similar line about 1820 when it created industrial settlements like
Zgierz, L£4dz, Pabianice, on its own domains. At first there was only hand-
woven cloths and linen in single workshops, but soon, capitalist entrepreneurs
arrived after the workers, and began to organize manufactories. The govern-
ment gave them assistance by offering loans on easy terms. Industrial enter-
prises were established not only in the new manufacturing centres, but also
in the towns of Kalisz, Sieradz and Warsaw. They adopted various forms
of organization, like the cottage industry, the putting-out system or central-
ized production. The fulling and finishing of cloth generally required water-
driven machinery. At the close of the 1820’s the first steam-driven mechani-
cal spinning machines began to operate in Przedbérz, Lédz, Warsaw, and
in other centres.
The first place among textiles was held, at that time, by cloth woven
from wool, the quality of which was steadily improved by breeders in
Poland’s western districts. At first the chief customer of cloth was the Polish
army, but very soon, markets opened up in the East, thanks to the advan-
tageous customs agreement with Russia which had been arranged by Lu-
becki in 1822. Polish cloth was then going freely to Russia and to China,
24 History of Poland
370 THE KINGDOM OF POLAND AND THE NOVEMBER INSURRECTION (1815-1831)
but by 1830, woollens encountered a competitor in the cotton industry.
The cheaper foreign raw material enabled manufactures to reach the vast
and less exacting market within the country. In 1829, Poland produced
6.9 million ells of wollen cloth and 3.7 million ells of cotton cloth.
The textile industry based mainly on a line running through Eddz and
Warsaw, benefited greatly from the influx of immigrants including Ger-
mans, but also Poles from the Prussian zone. Basically, however, it was
a native creation backed by local capital and using the rapidly expanding
local labour force, home produced wool, and in the case of cotton was sold
to the local customer. The textile industry contributed to the establishment
of several new urban settlements, among them Ldédz, which grew to be
a large city.
Heavy industry, encouraged mainly by the State, developed along some-
what different lines. Staszic, head of the Department of Industry and the
Arts in the Commission of Internal Affairs, elaborated the first plan for
the expansion of State mines in the “Old Poland Basin”, situated between
Kielce and the Kamienna river. The basis for mining was State-owned prop-
erty. “Mining estates” were allocated to the particular establishments and
were required to furnish the necessary serf labour. A “miners’ corps” organ-
ized on military lines, was established to provide skilled labour. The miners
joining it were “sworn in” and enjoyed a number of privileges and social
security benefits, like old-age pensions and sick-benefits, but they were not
allowed to leave the service.
In 1824 the mining administration was transferred to the Commission
of Incomes and Finances, under the control of Lubecki, who accelerated the
pace of its development. A temporary boom on the European market indi-
cated the need to boost zinc production. Iron production, however, was
more important to the economy. Lubecki started the construction of a large
combine on the Kamienna river, consisting of four blast furnaces and six-
teen puddling process furnaces with casting and rolling mills. The technique
employed was old-fashioned, being based on charcoal as fuel and water power.
Water transportation was to solve the problem of carrying raw materials
and semi-manufactured products. Meanwhile, zinc production, concentrated
more to the west, in the Dabrowa Basin, brought with it an expansion of
the State’s coal mines. Coal mining, which had begun before the partitions,
now made progress and it was possible later, after 1830, to take a further
step toward metallurgical techniques.
The development of the pig iron and steel production furnished the
basis for the national metal and machinery industry. The most important
plants of this type were situated in Warsaw, the works of Evans Brothers,
English industrialists, founded in 1822, and the State “Machine Construction
Works”. They produced mostly agricultural implements and distillery ap-
pliances. In addition to these metallurgical plants, there were a number of
smaller workshops in Warsaw which engaged silver-plating and the produc-
THE BEGINNINGS OF MODERN INDUSTRY IN THE KINGDOM OF POLAND 37]
Stanislaw Staszic
tion of precision instruments. There were also some textile mills in the city,
but they never played an important part.
The speedy development of industrial enterprises created conditions for
the growth of a working class, consisting of townspeople, craftsmen from
the guilds and country people attracted to the urban centres. In the mining
industry compulsory labour provided by the miners’ corps and labour
service contributed by mining estates still played an important role, whereas
the textile industry had already adopted a system of wage labour. It is
difficult to speak of a homogeneous working class at this time, if one considers
the differences in background and religion which kept the Polish-German
and Jewish workers apart in any factory. Also, the borderline between the
cottage weaver still theoretically free and the real proletarian was fluid.
24°
Warsaw. Polish Bank, 1825
Statistical data from various contemporary sources permit us to arrive at
the hypothesis of a working class of 30-40 thousand persons.
There was no legislation governing hours and conditions of work, and
no restriction as regards the work of women and children. Old-age pen-
sions an sick-benefits which were financed out of the dues contributed by
the workers, existed on a modest scale only for the miners’ corps. There was
no limit to the exploitation of workers; this was particularly true with
regard to cottage workers, whose workshops were busy round the clock
without interruption, the entire family labouring hard to eke out a miser-
able existence.
The working class showed no signs of organization. There were some
disputes in the textile industry and sharp attacks were made on the factory
owners by weavers who were threatened with ruin; but those were only
sporadic clashes. To our knowledge only two strikes took place in Warsaw,
in 1824 and 1830 but they were of a purely incidental character.
OPPOSITION AND CONSPIRACY 373
OPPOSITION AND CONSPIRACY
The decisions of the Congress of Vienna were received with satisfaction by
the propertied classes of the Kingdom of Poland. The Constitution gave
the landed gentry political power and enabled them to exploit the peasant
at their will; Tsar Alexander kept up the hope that the annexed provinces
of Lithuania, Byelorussia and the Ukraine would be reunited with Poland.
Yet the Constitution of the Kingdom proved rather unstable. The very
concept of a personal union between a huge Russia, ruled autocratically,
and a small constitutional Kingdom seemed indeed unnatural. At first, it
was expected that Alexander would continue on the road to liberal reforms
within Russia, but already in 1820, reactionary tendencies got the upper
hand in the system of the Holy Alliance. Perceiving the danger of a possible
revolution in Europe and the situation in Russia herself, Alexander began
to curtail the liberties he had granted to the Poles. Being himself the author
of the Polish Constitution, he did not feel bound to respect its provisions.
The first source of disagreement was the Polish army, which Grand Duke
Constantine ruled with caprice and brutality. The ordeal of day-long pa-
rades, the steady browbeating of the men and the complete disregard for
human dignity had led a dozen or so officers to commit suicide. Then fol-
lowed the restriction of civil liberties : the secret police was increased con-
siderably and special commissions of investigation were used to supplement
the ordinary process of enquiry. In 1819 censorship was introduced and
the opposition press was suppressed. Novosiltzov ruthlessly tracked down
any secret organization, above all students’ organization. He did his best
to make the Tsar distrust the Poles and was intent on securing the abolition
of all constitutional I:berties.
In this reactionary mood, the Tsarist government made use largely of
newly created aristocrats, the Sobolewskis, Gutakowskis, Grabowskis who
were appointed to the highest posts. The Tsar also secured the support of
the episcopacy in exchange for some concessions in the law of marriage.
At the request of the bishops, Stanislaw Potocki, Minister of Education, was
dismissed in 1820. He was the last of the prominent men of the Enlighten-
ment period, a follower of Voltaire and an advocate of subordinating the
Church to the State. During his term of office, he was instrumental in ex-
panding the network of elementary schools. Stanistaw Grabowski, who
succeeded him, deliberately discouraged the growth of these schools and
thus deserved his nickname of “Minister of Public Obscurantism”.
Ksawery Lubecki, the Minister of Finance, from 1821 acquired an inde-
pendent position. When he assumed office he found the treasury in a desper-
ate state on account of excessive military expenditure and speculation by
corrupt officials. The very independence of the Kingdom seemed threatened.
Lubecki won the confidence of the local bankers and obtained the necessary
credits. He collected ruthlessly all arrears of taxes and succeeded in bal-
374 THE KINGDOM OF POLAND AND THE NOVEMBER INSURRECTION (1815-1831)
ancing the budget. By exploiting the State monopolies of the sale of salt and
tobacco he collected ever higher taxes from the peasants. Lubecki assisted
the big estate owners to pay back their debts and launched a policy of
large-scale investment. Backed by the Tsar, he secured a favourable customs
tariff for Polish textiles. As mentioned above he increased the number of
State-owned foundries. In 1828 he founded the Bank Polski. In short, he
succeeded within a very short time in turning a poor and backward country
into an exporter of industrial goods and a producer of machinery. Thanks
to this achievement, Lubecki’s prestige was very high in Petersburg, which
circumstance enable him to defend the Kingdoms’ independence successfully
against Novosiltzov’s intrigues. On the other hand, Lubecki had no respect
at all for constitutional freedoms and was unpopular in progressive and
in liberal circles among the gentry. The only groups who backed Lubecki
wholeheartedly were the big bourgeoisie, making fortunes on loans and
government orders, and some aristocrats with capital invested in industrial
enterprises.
There were two trends of opposition in the Kingdom of Poland, the one
legal and the other clandestine. Both of them at first set themselves the aim
of defending the Constitution against the encroachments of the Tsar. The
wealthy gentry in western Poland interested in policies of capital invest-
ment, were hard hit by the agrarian crisis. At the same time, they failed to
understand the government’s policy of investing capital in the industry.
With no influerice on the government in Warsaw, they attacked the policy
of the ministers, declaring at the same time their loyalty to the constitutional
monarch.
A group of Kalisz deputies, led by the brothers Wincenty and Bonawen-
tura Niemojowski, voiced their criticism of the government already at the
first session of the Seym in 1818. In the following session in 1820, criticism
grew much stronger and Wincenty Niemojowski demanded that two of
the government ministers be indicted for having endorsed the decree on
censorship. Under his influence the Seym rejected most of the government’s
bills. On closing the session, Alexander gave vent publicly to his annoyance.
The next Seym was convened only after another 5 years had elapsed.
Meetings of the chamber were no longer open to the public and the leaders
of the opposition were excluded from it. The Kalisz deputies were reduced
to silence; at the same time the economic situation of the landowners
improved and the unrest among the gentry subsided.
During the 1820’s the liberalism of the gentry was openly modelled on
the ideas of the French parliamentary system. The Kalisz deputies refused
to cooperate with subversive forces, the obvious ineffectiveness of legal
Opposition in the Seym inclined even some of the Kalisz group to make
contact with the underground conspirators.
Secret associations flourished in Poland after 1815 as they did in other
parts of Europe, among the intelligentsia which had no influence on the
OPPOSITION AND CONSPIRACY 375
affairs of the State. University students and the officer corps wished to see
the tiny Kingdom’s frontiers widened to encompass a united Poland but
they disliked the propertied classes and showed a marked sympathy with
the common people. It must be borne in mind, however, that the conspira-
tors were themselves of noble origin, impoverished and déclassé gentry, yet
traditionally attached to their class. The movement which we today call
“revolution of the gentry”, gradually evolved its aims in the period 1815-
1830. These aims were as follows: full national independence, the improve-
ment of the standard of living of the common people and the need for an
armed rising. To the very end, however, the movement remained confined
to an élite, having no contacts whatever with the peasantry or even with
the urban poor. And for a long time the leaders of the movement rejected
the idea of direct preparations for a revolution. On the other hand, they
quite early on were in touch with similar organizations in other countries—
with the German Burschenschaften, French Carbonarism, and later with
the Russian Decembrist movement.
The first secret society called Panta Kojna (“Everything in Common”)
was created at Warsaw University in 1817 by a small group of students at
whose head stood Ludwik Mauersberger. The group confined their activity
to theoretical discussion and was not discovered until several years later,
when it had already discontinued its meetings in Warsaw. Of far greater
importance was the succeeding students’ organization, The Union of Free
Poles, which was founded in 1820. Some of its members later became well-
known revolutionaries, like Tadeusz Krepowiecki, Wiktor Heltman and
Maurycy Mochnacki. The Union skilfully extended its influence among the
students, preparing them for the struggle for liberation and, among other
things, for rousing the masses of the population. The Union published
a legal monthly magazine, “Dekada Polska”. After several months of exist-
ence the Union was discovered by the police and its members placed under
arrest.
Student’s unions at Wilno University had a longer career. In 1817
a small group of friends, including among others Tomasz Zan, Jozef Je-
zowski and Adam Mickiewicz, established the Society of Philomaths with
self-education as its prim aim but with the broader vision of eventually
transforming the nation and society by means of education. These high-
minded gifted young men matured beyond their years, in their idealism
believed in the efficacy of a systematic long-term activity which would,
some day, make them the leaders of the country and enable them to take
up the fight for independence. This was, of course, a dream. As time went
by and the Philomaths completed their studies and entered the world, their
activity clearly began to evolve in the direction of a political conspiracy.
In 1823 the authorities by accident found traces of their organization. Wilno
became the scene of arrests and investigations conducted by Novosiltzov.
Not all branches of the Philomath organization were discovered, but the
376 THE KINGDOM OF POLAND AND THE NOVEMBER INSURRECTION (1815-1831)
most important of its members, among them Mickiewicz, were exiled to the
interior of Russia, which brought about the collapse of the organization.
Quite independently of the student conspiracies, the officers had estab-
lished an important underground movement. The moving spirit was Major
Walerian Lukasinski of the 4th Infantry Regiment. Taking advantage of
the government tolerance of semi-legal freemasonry, he founded in 1819 an
independent organization called “National Freemasonry”. The humanitarian
phraseology and symbolism were replaced in his lodge by patriotic slogans.
Lukasinski’s aim was the reunification and liberation of Poland. There was
no statement on how these ends were to be achieved. One of his associates
the lawyer Jakub Szreder, stressed the importance of considering the peasant
question. The secret organization was very soon joined by some representa-
tives of the gentry, who sympathized with the Kalisz group and were op-
posed to any radical policies.
Threatened with discovery by the secret police, Lukasinski dissolved
the National Freemasonry and founded in 1821 the “Patriotic Society”.
The members of this secret organization were divided into three grades. In
theory, the Society embraced all the Polish areas, but the officers were
grouped in a separate “military province’. The aims of the organization
were not revealed : members thought that they should meet a possible attack
by the Tsar upon the Kingdom’s independence. A number of the gentry
joined the society in Lithuania and in the Ukraine, prompted mainly by
their desire to see those provinces united with the Congress Kingdom, if
possible, without any armed conflict. In 1822 Lukasinski was arrested and
eventually sentenced to 9 years imprisonment: he never regained his free-
dom and died behind bars in the Schliisselburg prison in Russia, after 38
years of captivity. The leadership was then assumed by Lieutenant Colonel
Seweryn Krzyzanowski, who was far more compliant with the views of
the landowners in the conspiracy. There followed a marked decline in the
society’s activity.
Meanwhile, Russian secret organizations, especially the “Southern So-
ciety”, approached the Poles with a proposal of collaboration. In 1824
Krzyzanowski and, a year later, Prince Antoni Jablonowski discussed the
matter with the Russian conspirators in Kiev. The object was to reach an
agreement on a joint revolutionary action, the form of the future political
structure of Poland and the mutual relationship of the two liberated nations.
Both parties realized the need for common action against a common foe,
but they also sensed the differences inherent in their respective programme
and aims. The Patriotic Society placed the national question before the
social one, and their republican and democratic views appeared to be
considerably weaker than was the case with the Decembrist Left. The Rus-
sians, moreover, did not wish to recognize the Polish claim to the 1772
frontiers. Thus the Kiev agreement was couched in rather general terms.
The more radically inclined individuals among the Poles made closer con-
NEO-CLASSICISM AND ROMANTICISM 377
tact with the Russian conspirators. The friendly relationship between Mic-
kiewicz and the Petersburg and Odessa Decembrists is well known. Julian
Lublifski, a young Polish revolutionary, was co-founder of the republican
United Slavs Society in the Ukraine.
The events of December 1825 took the Polish conspirators by surprise.
After the death of Alexander I, the Decembrists attempted a coup d’état,
but it ended in complete failure, as they were neither sufficiently prepared,
nor backed by the mass of the population. The Patriotic Society was only
a passive witness, but investigations in Russia led to the discovery of the
Polish conspiracy. Krzyzanowski and many of his comrades were arrested
and the famous prison within the walls of Warsaw’s Carmelite convent
became once more the scene of the criminal investigation police’s brutality.
Novosiltzovy endeavoured to apply the Russian criminal procedure to the
Polish offenders, but Lubecki successfuly opposed this and the constitutional
procedure was adopted. Offenders accused of high treason were to be tried
by a Seym Tribunal composed of members of the Senate. The new Tsar,
Nicholas I, agreed to this solution after long hesitation. He reckoned that
after passing sentence on the conspirators the Polish senators would be
forever committed to remaining on the Tsar’s side. The Seym Tribunal,
however, which met in Warsaw among a population seething with
excitement, cleared all the accused of the charge of high treason, chiefly at
the instance of Czartoryski; it passed lenient sentence on them, merely for
their participation in clandestine organizations (1828). The representatives of
the Polish aristocracy dared not condemn publicly revolutionaries of gentry
origin.
Tsar Nicholas took this sentence as a personal defeat. For the following
two years he had to take into account Russia’s difficult international position
and continued therefore to treat the Poles with consideration. In 1829 he
even came to Warsaw for his coronation as King of Poland. He was
determined, however, to curtail the Kingdom’s liberties at the first op-
portunity which presented itself. The Poles were aware of this and although
underground activity subsided to a certain extent after 1825, Polish
patriotic opinion realized the danger looming ahead.
NEO-CLASSICISM AND ROMANTICISM
The fifteen years of calm after the Congress of Vienna created conditions
favourable for the development of Polish cultural life, which had been
halted during the time of the partitions and the Napoleonic wars. Polish
science and education, together with Polish journalism, were in many
respects a continuation of the traditions of the Enlightenment and were
carried on to some extent by the same people. They took up once more the
struggle against “Sarmatic” obscurantism and the class prejudices of the past,
378 THE KINGDOM OF POLAND AND THE NOVEMBER INSURRECTION (1815-1831)
on behalf of reason, liberty and tolerance. At the same time, they were op-
posed to extremist tendencies in the realm of both ideology and artistic
principles.
Side by side with the old universities of Cracow and Wilno, Warsaw
University, founded in 1818, was growing in importance. It had set itself
the aim of training for professions, lawyers, teachers and physicians. The
country’s industrial advancement demanded the immediate establishment of
a mining college followed by the opening in Warsaw of the first Polish
Technical University. The Society of the Friends of Sciences, continued to
carry on valuable research work, specializing in humanities, history, econom-
ics, and philology. Slavonic studies were a subject of particular interest,
because they investigated the cultural heritage common to all Slav nations.
The most noteworthy results in this field were achieved by Zorian Dotega-
Chodakowski, a self-educated research worker in the field of the folk cul-
ture of the Ukraine and of Byelorussia. Next to Wilno, Warsaw became the
main centre of intellectual life. The press developed considerably, and even
though political publications with liberal tendencies declined because of
press censorship, the number of general newspapers increased. The literary
and social journal “Pamietnik Warszawski” (Warsaw Record) stood on a very
high level. Other periodicals specialized in jurisprudence, natural sciences and
industrial techniques.
Attracted by Warsaw life, young intellectuals from all corners of Poland
now flocked to the capital to work in the civil service and private offices
and enterprises, or for newspapers. Coming mostly from impoverished
manors and provincial backwaters, these young people disliked the way of
life and the artistic tastes of the propertied classes. Thus, while the aristocrats
in their drawing rooms still adhered to the literary traditions of the eighteenth
century, the younger generation would gather to debate in coffee houses and
in editorial offices seeking new content, new themes and forms in literature.
The Classical School in Warsaw was patronized by a cultivated
aesthete, Stanistaw.Potocki. It really achieved something, when, for example,
it printed in Wilno paper an article featuring a squire cynically offering
for sale a new invention, a machine for beating peasants, or when a pamphlet
written by Potocki himself, Podrdz do Ciemnogrodu (The Journey to
Darktown) made fun of the backwardness of the Polish clergy. When it
came to literary criticism and the creative arts, the works produced by clas-
sicists were artificial and lifeless; examples are the descriptive poem
Ziemianstwo (The Landed Gentry) by Kajetan Kozmian or Alojzy Felinski’s
tragedy, Barbara Radziwitt. The novels written by Julian Niemcewicz and
Fryderyk Skarbek followed more or less the foreign models of W. Scott or
Sterne. In the field of comedy in these years the great individual talent was
the playwright Aleksander Fredro, closely connected in his sympathies with
conservative circles, but rejecting conventional standards whether classical or
romantic. The best of Fredro’s works, moreover, appeared after 1830.
NEO-CLASSICISM AND ROMANTICISM 379
- Though an older school in literature, the neoclassical, still dominated the
fine arts. Among the artists, Antoni Brodowski, whose great compositions
dealt with mythological and religious topics, was also the painter of ex-
pressive and subtle portraits. Architecture was allowed to develop neoclas-
sical forms of building. Many manors and palaces in the countryside with
their columns and porticos, the new government buildings in Warsaw like
the Bank Polski, the Society of the Friends of Science, built by Corazzi, the
buildings of the voivodship offices at Kalisz, Radom, Suwatki and elsewhere,
bore witness to the impetus in town planning and to the highly developed
aesthetic taste of this period. Bent upon straightening out crooked Janes and
sweeping away unnecessary slums, the planners of the period felt so superior
that they contemptuously destroyed numerous Gothic and to their mind
barbarian monuments of the past. Many ancient city halls and churches
were demolished in this period, including the fortifications round the cities
of Cracow, Warsaw and elsewhere. The romanticists were too late in their
defence of these treasures of medieval art.
The appearance of the first works of Romantic literature gave a death
blow to the concepts of the Classical School. The first volume of Adam
Mickiewicz’s poems was printed in 1822 and Antoni Malczewski’s poem
Maria in 1825. Romanticism broke with the rigid forms, and opposed
sentiment to the cold reasoning of the Classical School. The culture of the
salons was challenged with popular motifs and interest in the fate of the
common people. Contrary to what was happening in western Europe, Polish
Romanticism did not cultivate the worship of the medieval knight errand,
but adopted a tone of animosity against the magnates and struck a note
of freedom. This is not surprising, because the leading Romantics were at
the same time members of secret organizations. Mickiewicz’s Oda do mlo-
dosci (Ode to Youth) reflects the programme of the Philomaths, and his
Konrad Wallenrod describes in the form of an allegory the life of a nation
in captivity. Zamek Kaniowski (The Castle of Kanidw), a poem by Seweryn
Goszczynski written in 1823 reminded the deeply shaken reader of the 1768
rising of the Ukrainian peasantry against the Polish gentry. The Romantic
poets transformed the language, the tastes and the manner of expression of
their whole generation. They imposed their own aesthetic outlook even on the
political circles of their opponents. Their leading theorist, Maurycy Moch-
nacki, made it quite clear in his work O literaturze polskie; XIX w. (On
Polish Literature of the 19th century) in 1830 that one of Romanticism’s
main tasks was the awakening of national consciousness.
Two men of great talent opened the way for Romanticism in their respec-
tive fields. One of them, Joachim Lelewel, a professor in the University of
Wilno, modernized the methods of historical research in Poland. He also
pointed out the importance of studying the history of the entire nation, not
only that of monarchs and ruling upper classes. Although Lelewel steered
clear of politics for many years, he was the idol of the younger generation
380 THE KINGDOM OF POLAND AND THE NOVEMBER INSURRECTION (1815-1831)
and had a powerful influence in a patriotic and progressive sense. The other
was Fryderyk Chopin, favourite of Warsaw’s salons, a child prodigy and
composer, who introduced the extraordinary wealth of Polish folk music in-
to his works and elevated Polish music to the level of the world’s masterpieces.
Romanticism was the artistic outlet for the ideolgical ferment which was
stirring the whole nation. The feeling of insecurity and injustice caused by
the decisions of the Congress of Vienna and the presentiment of the coming
struggle for independencé and social justice inspired both Mickiewicz and
Chopin. Although only a very few groups among the young intelligentsia
readily accepted the revolutionary ideology, romantic poetry made an im-
mediate conquest of the hearts and minds of the educated population.
THE ORIGINS AND THE OUTBREAK
OF THE NOVEMBER INSURRECTION, 1830
The news of the French July Revolution of 1830 electrified the Polish
population, but neither the ruling aristocrates and landowners nor the
wealthy bourgeoisie connected with them had the least intention of breaking
with Russia. No disappointments they had suffered under the Tsars could
alter the fact that a popular uprising would involve enormous risks.
Discontent was, however, growing among the population. The interna-
tional tension had a direct impact on trade and industry. Wages were tumb-
ling, unemployment was widespread, and the cost of living rose sharply. The
poor people of Warsaw bitterly complained against the existing conditions.
For over a year a new secret society had been active in Warsaw ; its
members were mainly cadets of the Infantry Officers School. These young
people, who saw no prospect of being commissioned and were tired of the
senseless parades and drill round Warsaw’s Saxon Square, were eager for
revolt. Piotr Wysocki, their leader, kept in touch with Warsaw literary
circles and university students. He had no political ambitions and was far
from formulating radical programmes of any kind, but he was ready to
give the signal for battle, if the. necessity arose, and he was convinced that
the nation would follow him.
The upheaval in France and Belgium made a European war seem quite
probable. Nicholas I was trying to get Prussia and Austria to join in an
intervention against the revolution in the West. However, the patriotic
circles and secret societies in Germany, Italy and Poland, some afhliated to
the Carbonari organization, sided with France and Belgium and were ready
to go to their assistance. The Polish army was to take part in the proposed
intervention of the Holy Alliance ; if that army marched towards the west,
the Kingdom would be placed under Russian occupation, and that- meant
that the Tsar Nicholas would have a free hand to carry out his plan and
Attack on the Belvedere Palace, November 29, 1830
abolish the Constitution. The Polish conspirators reasoned therefore that
they must start their struggle before the army was sent abroad. Thus, when
the first mobilization order appeared in the Warsaw press on November 19
and 20, it was decided to begin the struggle within the next few days.
The leaders of the conspiracy were not agreed on immediate political
aims. Mochnacki was the only one among them who pointed out the necessity
of setting up a revolutionary government of their own. His comrades looked
towards prominent personalities, popular generals who were known to the
patriots, and members of the opposition in the Seym. They approached
Lelewel in person, who remainded aloof, but gave them some encouragement.
Only during the very last few days before the outbreak did the conspirators
begin canvassing support directly in the districts on the banks of the Vistula
among the craftsmen and the poorer population and in the Old Town in
Warsaw.
On the evening of 29 November, a group of civilian conspirators attacked
the Belvedere Palace, intending to kill Grand Duke Constantine. Simulta-
neously, the Officer Cadets made their assault on the Russian cavalry bar-
racks near the Lazienki Park, while the officers called upon the Polish
regiments to rise. The synchronization of these movements failed. The Grand
Duke hid and was saved. The Cadets were pushed back from Lazienki and
had to fight their way through the centre of the city amid the general
382 THE KINGDOM OF POLAND AND THE NOVEMBER INSURRECTION (1815-1831)
indifference of the bourgeois districts. Most Polish generals categorically
refused to take part in the insurrection and several of them were killed by
the conspirators as a reprisal. The tide turned that night when the populace
spontaneously stormed the Arsenal, armed themselves and engaged the Rus-
sian detachments. By the dawn of 30 November the Old Town of Warsaw
was in the hands of the revolutionaries. The Grand Duke Constantine held
the southern part of the city with Russian cavalry and the Polish de-
tachments, which had not deserted him. He dared not, however, fight in
the narrow streets of the centre of the town, but rather expected the Polish
conservatives to quash the revolution.
Even after this victory the insurgents did not manage to set up a revolu-
tionary government. The power they could have had for the acting was
taken in a swift move by the adversaries of the revolution.
THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE TO CONTROL
THE INSURRECTION
Before the night of 29 November was over, Lubecki, the most prominent
member of the government, and Czartoryski, the most influential of Poland’s
magnates, had joined hands to oppose the revolt. When they learned that
Grand Duke Constantine did not want to act single handed, they called in
the Administrative Council and on their own authority appointed several
popular conservatives to join it. The Administrative Council issued an ap-
peal which was posted on all the street corners, deploring the “regrettable
incidents” of the night before and calling upon the population to restore
peace and order.
Only then did the rebels take action in defence of their aims and turn
to the armed population for support. Mochnacki organized a revolutionary
club. At a stormy meeting he demanded vigorous action including the
disarming of the Grand Duke’s troops and the establishment of a new
government. The people staged a demonstration and compelled the
government to dismiss all members, who openly sided with Russia and coopt
several members of the revolutionary club. The conservatives mastered the
situation by making some concessions to patriotic feeling. A Provisional
Government was set up and the newly coopted members of the revolutionary
club were discarded. The Grand Duke was prevailed upon to send the
Polish regiments which were still with him back to Warsaw. Finally the
convocation of the Seym was announced and simultaneously the club was
broken up by a gang of armed students.
The counter-revolutionaries found a convenient tool in the person of
General Jézef Chlopicki. The General, a Napoleonic officer known for his
valour and popular because of his personal disagreement with the Grand
THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE TO CONTROL THE INSURRECTION 383
Duke Constantine, was generally considered the best man to head the
uprising. In fact, he did not believe that war with Russia was possible and
he was vehemently opposed to any revolutionary action. On 5 December,
backed by the army, he proclaimed himself dictator, seized the arms which
the population had captured from the Arsenal, and re-established law and
order in the city. Some fine appeals to patriotism cloaked his real intention,
which was to find a way to an agreement with Tsar Nicholas. He let
Constantine leave Poland with his Russian troops unmolested and sent
Lubecki with conciliatory proposals to Petersburg.
The conservatives did not succeed, however, in restraining the popular
movement. The provincial towns followed Warsaw’s example and enthu-
siastically declared their solidarity with the rising. Groups of volunteers ar-
rived from Galicia and Poznan. The middle gentry, swayed by the wave
of patriotism, declared their readiness to fight for independence, and the
Kalisz faction linked up with Warsaw radicals to oppose the dictatorship.
On 18 December the Seym unanimously adopted a Manifesto recognizing the
national character of the insurrection. Chiopicki protested and offered to
resign, but finally he came to terms with the Kalisz group. The dictatorship
continued, though under the control of a delegation of the Seym. The Kalisz
faction obtained some ministerial posts and Chiopicki pledged that he would
hasten the country’s rearmament.
The factor which secured an understanding between the patriotic
majority of the gentry and the counter-revolutionary group, was the com-
mon fear of revolutionary tendencies in the country. News of the November
Rising prompted the peasants to refuse labour service and troops were used
to coerce them. Anxiety and fear of the masses induced the Kalisz faction
to rally to the support of a strong government. The former left-wing
conspirators and members of the disbanded revolutionary club counfered by
demanding that the broad mass of the population be made to join a national
war. Their organ, “Nowa Polska”, sharply criticized the activities of the
dictatorship.
In about mid-January 1831 the results of the Petersburg negotiations
were revealed. Nicholas I refused categorically to make any concessions to
the “rebels” and demanded their unconditional surrender. The disheartened
Chlopicki yielded his authority to the Seym without reservation. Warsaw was
in a ferment. The Left wing founded the Patriotic Society and brought pres-
sure to bear on the chamber by means of the press, street demonstrations
and the aid of friendly deputies. Patriotism did not permit the Seym to
capitulate disgracefully. This meant that preparations must be made for
a war with Russia. In spite of the passive opposition of the conservative
wing, the Seym resolved on 25 January to dethrone Nicholas I and thus
close the door to further negotiations. The monarch’s rights and privileges
were vested in the Seym, which elected the members of the government and
the commander-in-chief. A coalition government under Czartoryski was
384. THE KINGDOM OF POLAND AND THE NOVEMBER INSURRECTION (1815-1831)
formed. It consisted of two conservatives, two members of the Kalisz group,
and the representative of the Left, Lelewel. Thus they could count upon
public support. There was, however, no agreement on the course of ac-
tion to be adopted. The commander-in-chief appointed by the Seym was
to become independent and more powerful than the government. Under the
circumstances, the generals, who disliked the war and were opposed to all
revolutionary activities, were to exert a decisive influence on the political
course of the revolution. Because Chtopicki refused to accept the ap-
pointment, Prince Michal Radziwilt was to be the nominal commander-in-
chief, with Chiopicki as his private adviser.
THE POLISH-RUSSIAN WAR
Early in February 1831, a Russian army 115,000 strong under the com-
mand of Field Marshal Diebitsch marched into Poland. The Polish army had
a peace time strength of 40,000 well-trained soldiers. Chtopicki had in-
tentionally neglected to enlarge this force because he had intended to fight
the Russians with a regular army, to suffer an “honourable” defeat, and thus
have a pretext to capitulate. The Polish General Staff had a number of
prominent military experts, among them the highly capable General Ignacy
Pradzynski, but they were short of commanders able to command larger
units and to take major decisions.
The Poles failed to take advantage of the winter to launch their offensive
in the direction of Lithuania and thus steal a march on the enemy. After
a few minor delaying actions, came the pitched battle of Grochéw near
Warsaw on 25 February. The Russian forces outnumbered the Poles and
the fighting was fierce and bloody. Chtopicki was in command, substituting
for the incompetent Radziwill. When he was severely wounded, the Poles
withdrew behind the river. Diebitsch did not dare cross the Vistula near
Warsaw, and waited for the ice to flow downstream with che intention of
attacking the city from the south.
By the end of March, however, an offensive launched by the new Polish
commander Jan Skrzynecki forstalled Diebitsch’s plan. Swift attacks under-
taken from Warsaw in an easterly direction, smashed the Russian right wing
in a series of battles, at Wawer, Debe Wielkie and Iganie,- but Skrzynecki
dared not take advantage of the victory to defeat Diebitsch in a decisive
battle and withdrew to Warsaw.
In the spring the insurrection spread throughout Lithuania and Byelorus-
sia and part of the Ukraine. The Russian armies had difficulty in keeping
open their lines of communication in the rear; this allowed the Poles to
manoeuvre successfully. Diebitsch was still in the area of Lublin. Pradzyn-
ski therefore outlined a plan for a bold attack of the total Polish forces
against the élite corps of Russian guards marching down from Bialystok.
THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT AND THE PEASANT QUESTION 385
There was a real chance to deal the opponent a decisive blow. Skrzynecki,
however, a temporizer by nature, was opposed to any definite decisions as
a matter of principle. He did not believe in victory and pinned his hopes
exclusively on help that was to come from abroad. Another reason was that
he did not wish to expose the army to any risk, because it might eventually
prove a good weapon against the Left. He was reluctant to accept the plan
of attacking the guards and carried it out half-heartedly. At the crucial
moment he cut short the pursuit and thus let victory slip through his fingers.
As a result he now found himself in a critical position. When Diebitsch
caught up with him on 26 May on the retreat from Ostroleka, he defended
himself clumsily and suffered heavy losses. His troops were almost routed
and he had to fall back on Warsaw.
He then redoubled his efforts to remain in power and to bar the road to
the Left. For two months Skrzynecki concealed the extent of his defeat from
the public and pretended to be extremely busy engaging in minor operations.
In reality, he displayed an irresponsible and almost criminal inactivity. The
Lithuanian rising was in the meantime crushed and the Polish troops
despatched to its rescue had surrendered their arms at the Prussian frontier.
Paskevich, the new Russian Commander-in-chief appointed after Diebitsch’s
death, boldly crossed the Vistula on his march from Pultusk through Nie-
szawa and threatened the western districts which had, until then, remained
untouched by war. The Polish High Command did not even try to stop
the enemy’s pincer movement. Not until August, when the main Russian
forces were threatening Warsaw from the west, did the Seym finally decide to
dismiss Skrzynecki. By then, however, the situation had become altogether
hopeless.
THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT
AND THE PEASANT QUESTION
The only possibility of victory in the uneven struggle against the
overwhelming Russian forces seemed to lie in the mobilization of the peasant
masses, but the peasants, who were burdened with contributions in kind and
conscription for guard duties, and who were still forced to render labour
services, remained quite indifferent, sometimes even hostile to the war being
carried on around them.
The question of enlisting the support of the peasants was under discus-
sion in Warsaw. The Kalisz group tabled a bill in the Seym which provided
for the introduction of rents for the peasants in the national estates. This
step accorded with the general idea of evolution towards capitalism and it
did not directly affect the interests of the landowners. Nevertheless, the bill
was opposed by the die-hard conservatives in the Chamber, who obstructed
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THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT AND THE PEASANT QUESTION 387
its passage by dragging out discussion and finally had it taken off the agenda.
One of the few radical deputies, Jan Olrych Szaniecki, submitted a motion
that went even further and provided that all peasants be granted their free-
holds with compensation for the landlords ; he received no backing from the
majority of the deputies. Thus, the leaders of the insurrection did nothing to
improve the lot of the peasants, and this fact was reflected in the attitude of
the country people. As summer came, desertions from the army multiplied in
the villages, and there were cases of peasants rising against the manors.
The agrarian question was also discussed in left-wing circles. Excluded
from power, they created a campaign platform in the Patriotic Society and
had for their use several newspapers including “Nowa Polska” and
“Gazeta Polska”. Membership of the Patriotic Society consisted mostly of
the radical intelligentsia and, to a lesser extent, of the lower middle-class.
Its nominal chairman was Lelewel, who thus combined in a strange way his
functions as a member of the government with those of the patron of the
opposition. In fact, he expected with the help of the Left Wing to bring pres-
sure to bear upon the government in matters of policy and war strategy. The
members of the Society agreed that vigorous military action was imperative.
They demanded the dismissal of ineffective commanders and of any officers
suspected of treason. They advocated a mass-levy and consequently they
were in favour of alleviating the burdens of the peasants and abolishing
feudal labour services. Members of the Society were not unanimous with
regard to social questions. Mochnacki, one of their most prominent
spokesmen at the begining, had become more moderate in his views, whereas
the extreme Left produced a group of more radical speakers and journalists
including men like Krepowiecki, Gurowski, Czynski and Father Pulaski.
Their demands were clear and unambiguous : they pressed for the establish-
ment of a republic, the emancipation of the peasants and capital punishment
for traitors and spies. Yet even this radical minority in the Society had no
direct contact with the populace of Warsaw, and wielded no real power.
The political struggle grew more tense after the defeat at Ostroteka. The
conservatives tabled a bill in the Seym demanding that the government be
reformed. Their aim was to set up a dictatorship capable of resuming negotia-
tions with the Tsar. Alarmed by this turn of affairs, the Kalisz faction, sup-
ported by the Left Wing, rejected the bill of reform. Military reverses
increased tension among the population and, when Skrzynecki in his search
for scapegoats arrested a few senior officers, the infuriated mob demanded
their trial by court martial and punishment. Only with great effort was
the populace pacified.
In August the Seym had at last to bow to public opinion and dismiss
Skrzynecki. His successor, General Dembinski, had distinguished himself
during the uprising in Lithuania and wished to continue the war, but, for
the same reasons as Skrzynecki, he did not want to expose the army to any
risks, and when the moment came to fight the long expected battle, he re-
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25°
388 THE KINGDOM OF POLAND AND THE NOVEMBER INSURRECTION (1815-1831)
treated with his troops to Warsaw. A storm of excitement broke loose in
the city on 15 August. The Patriotic Society held a violent meeting and
despatched a large delegation to the government demanding a drastic
change of policy. The mob took the prison by assault, summarily tried and
lynched the arrested generals for treason, and hanged several agents of
Grand Duke Constantine’s former secret police, who also were under arrest.
The left-wing leaders were utterly perplexed in the face of this spontaneous
outburst. They never thought of taking advantage of the situation to
overthrow the government and take power into their own hands.
The events of 15 August caused surprise and alarm among the propertied
classes. In thier anxiety to restore order, the conservatives, the liberal
Kalisz group, and even the Right Wing of the Patriotic Society, joined hands
once more. The Seym nominated General Krukowiecki to head the govern-
ment and vested him with quasi-dictatorial power. Krukowiecki ordered the
army to occupy the city ; he had a few second-rate participants in the riots
executed by firing squad as a warning to the population. He loudly pro-
claimed his readiness to continue the war; but secretly, he was preparing
to capitulate.
THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE RISING
The November Insurrection was obviously instrumental in preserving
Belgium and even France from the intervention of the Holy Alliance. Rus-
sia had her hands tied on the banks of the Vistula for almost a year. During
that time, the French July monarchy was able to stabilize its position and
Belgium to establish her independence. In view of these circumstances, the
progressive elements throughout Europe developed a warm sentiment for
the Polish “knights of liberty”. French and German democrats were en-
thusiastic about Poland, Hungarian and Czech patriots were influenced by
the Polish movement when formulating their own more progressive political
programmes. Volunteers of many different nationalities joined the Polish
ranks. The Polish insurgents turned to the Russians with the appeal :
“for our freedom and for yours” and paid homage publicly to the memory
of executed Decembrists. This attitude received a favourable response from
many Russian revolutionaries.
The European courts in Paris, London and Vienna, took advantage of the
Polish-Russian war to further their respective interests, but did not think of
assisting Poland. On the contrary, the Powers tried to localize the conflict
lest it spread to the rest of Europe. Polish diplomacy failed to understand
this. Its head, Czartoryski tried in vain to enlist the help or mediation of the
Powers ; nor did he succeed in convincing their cabinets of the legal and non-
THE COLLAPSE OF THE RISING 389
revolutionary character of the Polish movement. He was particularly eager
to obtain Austria’s ear, and ready, to Lelewel’s dismay, to offer the Polish
crown to an Austrian archduke, even at the cost of giving up the Con-
stitution. His efforts were in vain because although Austria was pleased
with the difficulties confronting her Russian neighbour, she considered the
insurrection a dangerous revolutionary movement and wanted it to fail.
Prussia kept an army corps at the frontier of the Kingdom and rendered the
Russian every assistance posible without violating her neutrality. The British
Whig government declined to take a stand in Poland’s affairs. The July
Monarchy in France was mindful of public opinion, but confined itself to
a rather general expression of sympathy with the Polish plight. The Holy See
treated the insurrection as a rebellion against the legitimate power and
condemned it solemnly, after it had collapsed.
With nothing to fall back upon except its own resources, the Polish
insurrection took the brunt of the whole Tsarist might for eight months, but
neither patriotism nor the valour of officers and soldiers could overcome
the enormous difference in means and arms. The leaders of the rising could
not decide upon arming the peasants, nor did they do anything to win the
peasants’ support for the cause of independence. When dissatisfaction with
the ineffective leadership led to the savage riots of 15 August, the conserva-
tive camp, which feared the possibility of a revolution deliberately hastened
the collapse of the insurrection.
Towards the end of August Paskevich’s army reached the capital’s
outer defenses in the west. Krukowiecki had just despatched an army corps
under General Ramorino towards the east, thus reducing the Warsaw de-
fenses by 20,000 men. The most discredited leaders of the uprising, with
Czartoryski at their head, had left Warsaw with that corps. The Russian
army attacked the city on 6 September. Between 35,000 and 40,000 Poles
had to man the vast ramparts and face 77,000 Russian troops whose artil-
lery was more than double that of the Poles. The battle lasted two days.
In spite of the heroic resistance offered in various sectors, the enemy broke
through to the toll bars. General Jozef Sowinski, veteran, who defended
the suburb of Wola, fell in battle. The Polish commanders were above all
concerned with preventing any arms reaching the civilian population and
fighting on the barricades. Krukowiecki started negotiations for total sur-
render. It is true that the Seym rejected it at the Kalisz group’s suggestion
and deposed Krukowiecki. Only Warsaw was abandoned to the enemy,
while the army retreated to Modlin.
The Left Wing in the Seym and many officers demanded that the war
be carried on, but the generals pressed for surrender and forced through
the election of General Maciej Rybinski as Commander-in-chief. Ramorino’s
corps marched south and crossed the frontier into Austria without trying
to join Rybinski. Rybinski started negotiating with Paskevich, but pressure
from his subordinates prevented him from surrendering to the enemy. On
390 THE KINGDOM OF POLAND AND THE NOVEMBER INSURRECTION (1815-1831)
5 October the remainders of the Polish armies still numbering some 20,000,
crossed the frontier near Brodnica and were disarmed by the Prussians.
The November Insurrection had collapsed in an unequal fight without
having been able to muster all the forces available to the nation. Fundamen-
tally, this was due to the fact that the rising was dominated by the gentry.
The signal for the outbreak had been given on 29 November by revolution-
aries from the gentry, men ready to fight for freedom and independence,
but incapable of imposing their will on their own social class. Their vacil-
lation and their lack of any programme, which stood out so glaringly in
the attitude of the most prominent members of their group, like Lelewel or
Mochnacki, were the reason why leadership of the national movement was
taken over by the propertied classes. The government and the army were
thus led by men who did not desire the insurrection, who did not believe
in victory and who were, above all, frightened by any revolutionary ac-
tivities. For these very reasons they wasted the finest assets they possessed,
an excellent army and the enthusiasm of the people.
Engels later referred pointedly to the November Insurrection as a “‘con-
servative revolution”. This definition, which was interpreted in various
ways, did bring out the dual character of the rising ; its weakness as well
as its positive meaning. The rising was led and brought to the point of
collapse by the conservatives, but it was essentially a revolutionary act
which, though it failed, left a lasting imprint on the future of the nation.
The war fanned the patriotism of tens of thousands of soldiers, it shook to
the roots not only the Kingdom but also the neighbouring sectors of the
partitioned country which provided many volunteers. Last but not least, it
accelerated the formation of new progressive and far-reaching programmes.
At the same time the November Insurrection played a large part in
European history by enhancing the chances of revolutionary movements
in other countries. The close link between the fate of Poland’s cause and the
fate of the revolution in Europe was a characteristic feature of the decades
that followed.
Chapter XVI
ON THE EVE
OF AN AGRARIAN REVOLUTION
(1832-1849)
REPRISALS AFTER THE INSURRECTION
The defeat of the November Insurrection brought the revenge of Tsar
Nicholas upon Poland. The Tsar declared the Constitution null and void.
He abolished the Seym, as well as the Polish army. For appearances’ sake,
in 1832 he promulgated an Organic Statute for the Kingdom guaranteeing
the country its separate administration and civil rights. The Statute, how-
ever, was never enforced and the country was kept in a state of emergency.
Paskevich, the conqueror of Warsaw, was named Viceroy (namiestnik) and
became the autocratic ruler of the Kingdom. The Administrative Council
was relegated to the position of a passive instrument executing his orders.
Similarly, the civil authorities in the provinces were placed under Russian
military commanders. The country had to pay the cost of Russian occupa-
tion forces and the cost of building fortresses. A Citadel was erected in
Warsaw as a means of intimidating the rebellious capital.
The Tsar announced an amnesty for all participants in the insurrection
except the principal leaders who had to face trial and exile to Siberia. All
property belonging to persons who had been sentenced or who had escaped
abroad, was confiscated. Many state domains were granted in right of
primogeniture to Russian generals and dignitaries, who had shown their zeal in
crushing the insurrection. Reprisals extended to the cultural field as well.
The Society of the Friends of Science was closed down as were the universi-
ties of Warsaw and Wilno, while precious scientific collections were taken
out of Poland. Tsar Nicholas’ régime clamped down on learning and educa-
tion throughout the State, but particularly ruthless methods were applied
with regard to Polish culture.
The process of Russification was now greatly intensified in the western
provinces of the Empire. In 1839 the separate Uniate Church was abolished
and several million Byelorussians and Ukrainians were forcibly converted
to the Russian Orthodox faith. The Kingdom kept its separate administra-
tion with Polish as the official language, but the highest posts in the govern-
ment were held by Russians. The adaptation of local conditions to Russian
standards was undertaken by stages. In the course of a decade or so, the
392 ON THE EVE OF AN AGRARIAN REVOLUTION (1832-1849)
voivodships were gradually converted into Russian-type provinces (guber-
nia). The Russian currency was introduced and so likewise was the Russian
Criminal Code. The Government Commission for Religious Denominations
and Education was abolished and all educational matters were placed di-
rectly under the Ministry of Education in St. Petersburg. The ultimate aim
envisaged was the complete incorporation of the Kingdom into Russia.
Russian reprisals were reflected in the remaining parts of partitioned
Poland. During the preceding fifteen years the Prussian and Austrian govern-
ments had been paying attention to the liberties granted to the Poles by
Alexander I. Thus the King of Prussia promised to respect Polish nationality
in the Grand Duchy of Poznan and appointed Prince Antoni Radziwitt
as namiestnik. In Lwéw a Seym was established on the lines of the old
system of estates, though without real authority. Permission was granted
to open the Ossolineum, a Polish scientific institute founded by a generous
magnate, J. M. Ossolinski. After 1831, however, the tendency towards
Germanization was more pronounced and the three signatories of the Holy
Alliance collaborated more closely to counteract European revolutionary
movements and particularly the Polish cause. In 1833 a Russo-Austrian
agreement was signed at Miinchengratz, to which Prussia adhered later.
It provided, among other things for the cooperation between the police of
the three partitioning Powers in combatting Polish conspiracies, and for
the reciprocal extradition of political refugees.
The new anti-Polish trend had its impact on the Cracow Republic.
This miniature State of 1164 sq. km, and 88,000 inhabitants had been
granted a constitution in accordance with the decision of the Congress of
Vienna, with the right to elect its Senate and a representative assembly,
and received a guarantee that it might develop on national lines. The Sen-
ate was in the hands of the local aristocrats who refused to allow the
wealthy liberal bourgeoisie a share of power. In general, however, Cracow
and its district fared well enough and enjoyed the advantages of free trade.
In the Cracow district the labour dues had been replaced almost completely
by rents. After the November Insurrection, however, the liberties of the
city were curtailed. Power was taken over by the Conference of Residents,
composed of the representatives of the three “protecting” Powers, and the
Senate was relegated to the role of their passive tool. A secret Austro-Rus-
sian understanding envisaged the abolition of this last vestige of Polish
statehood at the first opportunity.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN THE THREE PARTITION ZONES
Years which for Poland were particularly hard in the political and cultural
sense were marked, however, by economic expansion. This progress was not
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE THREE PARTITION ZONES 393
uniform in all Polish territories and did not affect all branches of the econ-
omy equally.
Agriculrure began to flourish, because the price of grain rose and west
European urban centres were a good market. This induced landowners to
intensify production and invest capital in farming ; crop rotation gradually
replaced the three-field system and steel ploughs and scythes were used ;
manorial farm buildings were improved, greater care was taken in animal
husbandry and horse breeding, while forestry was rationalized. This pro-
gressive trend was particularly noticeable in the Prussian zone, where the
agrarian reform created favourable conditions. In the Congress Kingdom
economic progress was more evident in the northern and western parts, in
the voivodships of Plock and Kalisz, than in the voivodships of Kielce,
Lublin and Podlasie ; it occurred as a rule on the larger and more advanced’
estates. In Galicia, which was rather backward, farming continued in gen-
eral along traditional lines.
The demesne farm, which had every political and economic advantage
over the villages, introduced progressive techniques mostly at the expense
of the peasants. The landlord reorganized his estates either with the help
of the government as in the Poznan region or from his own resources as in
the Congress Kingdom, which meant that he transferred the peasants to
poorer plots and reduced the size of their holdings. He now used his own
teams of animals to work the Jand, needing mostly manual labour to culti-
vate potatoes and sugar beet. He therefore transferred richer farmers from
labour duties to rent, he evicted most of the others, or let them stay on
diminished holdings as cottagers. He limited the peasants’ traditional right
to collect fire wood and graze their animals in the manorial woods. Evictions
assumed disastrous proportions in some parts of the Kingdom, where barely
one fourth of the arable land was left to the peasants. Peasants who paid
rent enjoyed more favourable conditions. They were more numerous on
state-owned land as well as in some of the large latifundia (especially in
the Zamoyski estates) and in many middle-sized private properties in the
western part of the country. On the whole, however, the welfare of the
tenants depended on the amount of rent they had to pay, and was some-
times exorbitant. Moreover, no contract of tenancy made the peasant a land-
owner, nor did it provide him with security for the future.
Industrial development was more and more uneven in the various pro-
vinces of Poland. There was stagnation in some parts of the country ;
Galicia, for example, still had its primitive handlooms, and a few iron or
glass works, operating under the old labour service system. In the Grand
Duchy of Poznan, the weaving industry collapsed completely on account
of the far more efficient competition of western Europe. The peasant weav-
ers in the Silesian Sudeten foothills were also experiencing a crisis. Yet the
Wroclaw textile mills were prospering and heavy industry—ironworks and
collieries—in the Upper Silesian district made spectacular advances.
394 ON THE EVE OF AN AGRARIAN REVOLUTION (1832-1849)
In Congress Poland, the Tsarist government retaliated after the Novem-
ber Insurrection by obstructing the export of Polish cloth to Russia. This
caused a crisis in the textile industry and a number of producers moved
east from Congress Poland across the new customs frontier ; this marked
the development of the textile industry in the Bialystok region. The crisis
did not affect the cotton industry which supplied only the local market.
Its production increased from 3.8 to 22.6 million ells during the period
1830-1844. In the mid-1830’s the first large-size mechanized spinning fac-
tory of Ludwik Geyer was commissioned in Ldédz ; several hundred weavers
working on handlooms also found employment there.
In heavy industry Lubecki’s investment policy was taken over by the
Bank Polski which completed the building of the combine on Kamienna
river and constructed a big modern metallurgical works in the Dabrowa
Basin, the Huta Bankowa. The Huta consisted of six large coke furnaces,
an iron foundry, a puddling furnace, a rolling mill and mechanical work-
shops. This important plant was out of proportion to the actual needs of
the home market and was therefore not exploited to capacity for many
years. However, the construction itself which was financed by the Treasury,
accelerated the accumulation of capital in the hands of entrepreneurs and
financiers with close links with the government. The 1830’s and 1840’s were
a golden age for many speculators who used the credit extended by the
Bank Polski to found or operate a variety of enterprises and to amass
fortunes amounting to millions of zlotys. The most famous of them, Piotr
Steinkeller, whose career ended in a spectacular bankruptcy, had the repu-
tation of being a distinguished pioneer of Poland’s industry. Others, more
adroit, survived the crisis and formed the nucleus of the Warsaw and Lédz
big bourgeoisie. This bourgeoisie was completely loyal to Paskevich and
established close relations with that section of the big gentry which was
itself engaged, like the Lubienski brothers, in financial speculation.
It was during the 1840’s that the first railroads were built in Poland.
Tracks leading towards the foundries and collieries of Upper Silesia were
mapped out almost simultaneously from Vienna, Berlin and Warsaw. The
Warsaw-Vienna line was a project of Steinkeller; after his financial dis-
aster the Russian government extended it up to the Austrian frontier (1848).
About the same time the Berlin-Wroctaw-Cracow line began operation.
Poland thus established comparatively early rail connections with western
Europe.
THE LIBERAL CAMP AND “ORGANIC WORK”
Capitalism developed in Poland under conditions of political subjugation.
The Polish propertied classes were acutely conscious of their dependence on
foreign rulers, who took no account of the interests of the conquered pro-
THE LIBERAL CAMP AND “ORGANIC WORK” 395
vinces and often retarded their development. Paskevich’s régime left no
room for an accommodation with the partitioning power or for open po-
litical action. The Polish landowners, however, did not hide their dislike of
illegal political activity, conspiracies or preparation for uprisings. They
considered them too risky steps which might unleash the revolutionary
forces which were liable to woo the peasants with promises. and create
difficulties for the gentry. Many landowners sought a middle-of-the-road
solution between an unpopular accommodation with foreign rule and a so-
cially dangerous conspiracy. They thought to find it in legal, but non-politi-
cal activity, namely, in the effort of raising the social, economic and cul-
tural level of the country. It was customary at the time to call this compli-
cated concept of activity “organic work” as opposed to plotting revolutions
and insurrections. “Organic work” was to promote the development of the
country and its evolution towards capitalism. It was to safeguard the inter-
ests of the landed gentry in these new conditions and at the same time show
their readiness to serve the public interests. Finally, it was designed to
neutralize the revolutionary movement and oppose it by suggesting more
positive and effective means of reform.
The birthplace of “organic work” (the term came into use in the middle
of the nineteenth century) was the Grand Duchy of Poznan. There the
liberal gentry changed over faster to a capitalist economy and had relative
freedom of action. The Prussian monarchy, harbouring the ambition of
uniting Germany, was beginning to pay attention to German liberal opin-
ions. This fact brought about a marked coolness in its relations with Russia
after 1840 and a more lenient attitude towards the Poles. In Poznan the
censorship was relaxed and the authorities interfered much less with the
establishment of Polish associations.
The leadership of the “organic work” in Poznan was assumed by
Dr. Karol Marcinkowski, a prominent physician and philanthropist who
had gained the confidence of the leading landowners of the province. Thanks
to Marcinkowski’s efforts Poznan built its “Bazar”, a hotel building which
was also to serve as a centre for Polish commerce and to house Polish social
organizations. In the same spirit, the Society for the Promotion of Educa-
tion was founded, a vast organization which awarded scholarships and
trained Polish intellectuals and artisans. Moreover, local- agricultural asso-
ciations began to be set up. The advocates of “organic work” claimed that
their aim was to strengthen the Polish middle classes, bourgeoisie, intelli-
gentsia, and later on the wealthier peasants, but in reality, they were trying
to place the middle class under the thumb of the landed gentry.
The possibilities of carrying on “organic work” were more modest in
the other parts of Poland. In the Congress Kingdom Andrzej Zamoyski, an
aristocrat and civic leader who had introduced the system of rents for many
peasants in his family estates, tried to rally round himself a group of active
landowners. He arranged annual gatherings in his residence at Klemenséw
396 ON THE EVE OF AN AGRARIAN REVOLUTION (1832-1849)
to discuss economic and social questions and inspect a farm where crop ro-
tation was applied. The publication “Roczniki Gospodarstwa Krajowego”
(Yearbook of National Husbandry) became the mouthpiece of the Kle-
menséw group. The influence of this group was narrow, even among the
gentry. In Galicia, another magnate, Prince Leon Sapieha, was trying to
bring life into the old-fashioned and moribund institution of the Seym,
based on the old estates. After many years of effort Vienna granted per-
mission to open a saving bank in Galicia, the Land Credit Association and
the Agricultural Society. There also were some timid attempts made in the
Seym to introduce some agrarian reforms without, of course, trespassing
on the interests of the big landowners. These attempts have to be viewed
against the background of the growing menace of a peasant rising and the
democratic propaganda spreading in the country. Almost at their inception
all attempts were interrupted by the outbreak of the 1846 uprising.
A specific variety of “organic work” were the temperance brotherhoods
which enjoyed tremendous publicity in the villages in the 1840’s. Technical
progress in distilling brought in its wake an enormous increase in vodka
production, lower liquor prices, and a disastrous spread of drunkenness. The
Roman Catholic clergy began to organize mass teetotal meetings patterned
on the Irish temperance movement where people pledged themselves to stop
drinking alcohol. The movement began in Upper Silesia and spread to other
districts where it attracted millions of followers. In fighting the social evil of
drunkenness, the priests were at the same time increasing their influence
among the people and expected to divert attention from revolutionary ideas.
Yet, the mass participation of peasants in the temperance brotherhoods was,
on the contrary, their way of showing their animosity to the gentry who
produced and sold the spirits. The closing down of inns run by the manors
caused anxiety among the gentry. The Tsarist government looked upon the
brotherhoods as a politically dangerous element and prohibited them in its
zone, at the same time increasing taxes on the manufacture of alcohol in
order to reduce consumption. The mass temperance movement subsided
during the years of the 1846-1848 revolution.
The example of the temperance brotherhoods shows the two main difh-
culties which confronted “organic work”. On one hand, the foreign govern-
ment was obstructing their development, on the other hand, the institutions
founded by the organic group were becoming tools of revolution. The golden
mean between armed resistance and losing one’s national identity was
combatted among the gentry itself on the one hand by the ultraconserva-
tives, on the other hand by ardent patriots. As the revolutionary situation
grew more tense, even the most zealous advocates of “organic work” joined
the revolutionary movement, some for tactical reasons, others under pres-
sure of public opinion. Polish liberalism which was artificially limited to
non-political and social activities, broke down whenever it was put to the
test.
THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN SILESIA AND POMERANIA 397
THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN SILESIA
AND POMERANIA
The two areas of the Prussian zone, which had come under foreign domi-
nation earlier than the rest of Poland, developed along different lines. Some
parts of these provinces, Lower Silesia and Western Pomerania were almost
completely Germanized ; wherever the Polish language had survived, it was
used by the common people. In Upper Silesia, Warmia and along the lower
course of the Vistula, the remaining Polish gentry were either Germanized
or had sold their properties at the beginning of the nineteenth century. .
Thus in the regions of Opole, Warmia and Mazuria, and partly in
Gdansk-Pomerania, national and class divisions began to coincide. The
Polish peasant and worker had their opponent in the German junker, mer-
chant and official, When the Upper Silesian industrial region suddenly
expanded at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Polish miners and
foundry workers became once more objects of exploitation by the German
lord of the manor who had become an industrialist. The Polish intelligentsia
was represented in Silesia and Pomerania solely by a small group of priests
and village teachers of peasant stock. This peasant community had no links
with the other Polish districts and their culture was shaped by the gentry
and the landowners. Attached to their native tongue and local custom,
these communities had no distinctly national consciousness. There were
a few scholars and writers in Warsaw or Cracow who did take an interest
in the Polish national character of Silesians and Mazurians. The generation
of the gentry revolutionaries failed to see that this community, though it
did not belong to the gentry class, was an integral part of the Polish nation.
This feeling of mutual strangeness began to change in the 1830’s. The
development of capitalism, progress in town planning, the expansion of
education—all of these processes served as incentives to the hitherto passive
rural population. The November Insurrection found a warm response in
Silesia and Pomerania. Volunteers from both regions took part in the war.
A fact like the internment of the Rybinski corps in Pomerania for a period
of several months after they had laid down their arms contributed to
establish close ties between Polish soldiers and the local population. The
civic leaders in the Poznan district also began to draw closer to the neigh-
bouring provinces under Prussian rule.
National consciousness in those territories crystallized still faster when
measures were taken directed against the Polish language. Up to the nine-
teenth century, the Prussian government undertook no systematic action to
Germanize the common people and did not care what language they spoke.
In Silesia, the official theory claimed that the dialect which was scornfully
dubbed as “‘wasserpolnisch” had nothing whatever in common with Polish.
After 1815, however, the requirements of an expanding industry, of the
capitalist manorial farm, and military service, compelled the administra-
398 ON THE EVE OF AN AGRARIAN REVOLUTION (1832-1849)
tion to pay more attention to the language of the local population. Repeat-
edly orders were issued introducing the German language in Catholic and
Protestant churches and in the primary schools. After 1830, German
became the medium of instruction in all schools of the villages and small!
towns, irrespective of the nationality of the children.
This attack upon the Polish language was bitterly resented by the pop-
ulation of Pomerania and Silesia. Any peasant and worker realized that
the banning of the Polish language in administrative offices, courts and
places of work made it difficult for him to defend himself against the ex-
ploitation by the German ruling classes. The more stubbornly did he hold
on to his native tongue and fight for its equal rights. From the 1820’s on-
ward, entire rural parishes in Silesia and Pomerania—both Catholic and
Protestant—frequently came forward demanding that Polish remain the
language in which church services and teaching be conducted.
Popular resistance was sometimes taken up in intellectual circles. Gustaw
Gizewiusz, a pastor at Ostrdda in the district of Mazuria, defended the
native language of his people. In his well-known work Die polnische Sprach-
frage in Preussen (The Polish Language Question in Prussia) of 1843 he
underlined the Polish features of large areas of Pomerania and Silesia, and
condemned the government’s attempts at Germanization. He secured the
minister’s consent (nominally, at least) to the continuation of some partial
use of the Polish language in the Mazurian schools.
In Upper Silesia, Jézef Lompa, a modest primary school teacher of
peasant stock, was the first propagator of national culture and consciousness.
Lompa was a prolific writer and published popular pamphlets on many
subjects, including economics, folk custom, religion, topography, and his-
tory. Presenting his material in a way accessible to peasants and workers,
he taught them to read Polish and inculcated in their minds respect for
their own national tradition. Like Gizewiusz, Lompa kept in close contact
with the educational centres of Warsaw, Cracow and Poznan and was
consciously working for a union between Silesia and the motherland, though
he steered clear of political activity. It is hardly possible to assume that,
prior to 1848, either Silesia or Pomerania had a broader understanding of
the question of Poland’s independence. But there was that awakening among
the masses, the feeling of being nationally different, which later found its
expression in the revolutionary movements of 1848.
THE GREAT EMIGRATION
After the debacle of 1831 came the exile of those participants in the insur-
rection to whom the Tsarist amnesty did not apply and also of those who
refused to live under alien oppression. The French government, taking
THE GREAT EMIGRATION 399
account of its own public opinion, received the exiles, granting them a
modest allowance and placing them under police surveillance. The Polish
“knights of liberty” wandered westwards, welcomed and cheered on their
way by progressive circles in Germany and France. They numbered about
eight thousand, and among them were prominent political and cultural
leaders, statesmen, generals, journalists, poets and artists. Most exiles were
junior officers, because the regular soldiers had been forced for the most
part to accept the amnesty. Seventy five per cent of the refugees were of
gentry stock, though very few of them possessed substantial means.
This emigration was given the adjective “great” in later years to distin-
guish it from other waves of political refugees. From the very beginning
this group of exiles was to play an exceptional role in the life of the country.
Suddenly, they found themselves in an atmosphere, where political freedom
reigned and where they could keep in close contact with the progressive
currents of the West; they experienced a rapid ideological evolution and,
their eyes lifted toward the homeland, they shared their new experiences
with their mother country.
During the first few months the exiles imagined that they would soon
return home arms in hand, taking part either in the expected war or in
a world revolution. In this mood Adam Czartoryski pleaded with the west-
ern governments to create armed Polish military units as a nucleus for new
legions. The Left Wing made contacts with French progressive thought and
above all, with the secret Carbonari organization, the “Supreme Vente of
the World”, and its leader Buonarroti.
By the end of 1831 the group of newcomers to Paris, composed mostly
of intellectuals, elected a Polish National Committee with Lelewel as its
leader. The most active among the former members of the Patriotic Society
had joined it. The Committee prophesied a fresh uprising in the near future
and emphasized the unity between Poland’s cause and the cause of all op-
pressed peoples. Lelewel, however, who feared internal dissention, was
opposed to outlining of the programmes relating to social and constitutional
matters. This state of affairs led to violent discussion among the Poles in
Paris. In March 1832 several left-wing members including T. Krepowiecki,
K. Pulaski, J. Czynski and J. N. Janowski, refused to obey the Committee
claiming for themselves the freedom to associate with people of the same
opinions. The dissidents founded the Polish Democratic Society.
The followers of Lelewel as well as the conservative group among the
émigrés made every effort to attract the most numerous group of the exiled
officers who had been placed in provincial “dépots” by the French govern-
ment. Proposals were advanced to elect a new committee or “council of
generals“ and to recognize the leadership either of Czartoryski, former
president of the National Government, or of Rybinski, the last Commander-
in-chief. Attempts were also made to revive in exile the former Seym of
the Kingdom of Poland. One after another these attempts failed. The exiles
400 ON THE EVE OF AN AGRARIAN REVOLUTION (1832-1849)
as a whole were against submitting to the former authorities and formed
political groups instead, according to their political beliefs.
Lelewel’s Committee tried for a whole year to arouse world opinion to
take an interest in Poland’s cause. They issued many appeals, organized
campaigns to raise funds and other demonstrations. At the end of 1832 the
Committee was disbanded by the French police. Lelewel had already in-
itiated an underground movement which was to prepare the ground for a
revival in the following year of partisan activities in Poland under Jdézef
Zaliwski. He reckoned that Carbonarist revolutions would break out almost
simultaneously in France, Germany and Italy.
Lelewel, however, was outdistanced in the Carbonari underground move-
ment by his main rival Krepowiecki, who was appointed head of the “Polish
National Venta”. The Carbonarists failed to provide assistance in 1833,
the expected revolutions in Germany and Italy proved a flash in the pan
and Zaliwski’s partisan movement collapsed. Several hundred exiles started
out too early from their base at Besancon to take part in the German revo-
lution and eventually found refuge in Switzerland.
These adventures were accompanied by violent ideological quarrels in
which the causes of the failure of the November Insurrection were discussed,
its conservative leadership was condemned and new proposals were put
forward for the future. The ideology of gentry revolutionism had outlived
its usefulness ; the left-wing exiles pronounced more or less resolutely for
democracy and the liberation of the country by the people.
It was soon apparent that democracy could be interpreted in various
ways. On the second anniversary of the November Insurrection Kre-
powiecki took the rostrum during a public celebration in Paris with
a violent oration in French. He condemned the pernicious theory of
“national unity” which during the last rising had become a tool of the
counter-revolution. He criticized the gentry and declared his solidarity with
the peasants in their class struggle, extolling the traditions of Chmielnicki
and Gonta. His speech provoked a riot; not only the conservatives, but
also a considerable number of democrats protested against so sharp a break
with the noble traditions of the Poland of the gentry. Krepowiecki had
to resign even from the Polish Democratic Society. There followed a schism
in the democratic camp. The moderate majority among the democrats
believed that it would be able to win over all classes of the nation, both the
gentry and the people, to support the cause of independence; theirs was
a type of “gentry democracy” characteristic of social conditions in Poland.
The radical minority rejected all compromise with the gentry and adopted
the point of view known today as “revolutionary democracy”.
The group of Polish refugees interned in Switzerland linked up with
Giuseppe Mazzini and took part in 1834 in his abortive expedition to
Savoy. This military venture led to further collaboration in the form of the
alliance of fraternal organizations, “Young Italy”, “Young Germany”,
THE GREAT EMIGRATION 401
and “Young Poland”. It was in this way that the Polish Left Wing shook off
the dictatorial authority of the Carbonarist “Vente” and formed its own,
autonomous organization within the framework of the general European
revolutionary movement.
Lelewel, who had been expelled from France, settled in Brussels and
took over the leadership of “Young Poland”. It was intended that it
should remain a small secret organization working to control other groups
of exiles by infiltration. It did not succeed in this aim, but it was joined in
1835-1837 by many active men of ideas and initiative who returned to
Poland as emissaries and played an important role there. Depleted by this
main effort, “Young Poland” suspended its activity in the following years.
Some of its members, like Karol Stolzman, continued to maintain contact
with Mazzini in London.
During this period the Democratic Society’s membership rose to several
thousand persons and spread throughout France. Members living together
in one locality formed a section of the Society and kept in contact by cor-
responding with the leading of Central Section in Paris. The Society was
founded by the Left Wing which had seceded from Lelewel’s Committee.
The first statement issued by its founders in 1832 contained some revolu-
tionary-democratic accents and spoke in a general way about “the land and
its fruits being common to all”. Gradually however, new people joined and
the scales were tipped in favour of a more moderate point of view. The
Central Section of the Society moved from Paris to Poitiers. After debates
which lasted several months, the revolutionary-democratic opposition was
purged from the Society in 1835. Work then began on a more detailed
programme. A project outlined by Wiktor Heltman was after a public
discussion accepted as binding by a vote of the Society.
This programme, called the Poitiers Manifesto of 1836, was the result
of a carefully constructed compromise between the liberal gentry tradition
and the revolutionary-democratic programme. Its cardinal principle was:
“Everything for the people, everything by the people” ; it declared that all
classes were to be equal and that serfdom and labour services were to be
abolished. It tried nevertheless to present these slogans in a manner ac-
ceptable to the gentry. It stated therefore that the revolutionary government
would, on the day of the rising, grant full property to every peasant who
tilled even the smallest strip of land. This appeal was to spur the people on
to fight for their liberty, without discouraging the participation of the
gentry. In fact, the manifesto did not suggest taking away manorial farmland
from the gentry nor did it propose that landless peasants should be given
land. The doctrine of the Democratic Society was deliberately vague on this
point. It permitted the Society to appeal to the patriotic sentiment of all
classes, but it created a state of permanent uncertainty in Poland. Many
members of the Society believed that the Poitiers Manifesto was the first step
toward a larger and more just settlement of the agrarian problem in a liber-
26 History of Poland
402 ON THE EVE OF AN AGRARIAN REVOLUTION (1832-1849)
ated Poland. Other less radical members would have been quite satisfied if
the manorial farm had continued to exist in Poland alongside with peasant
ownership. Yet the continued existence of manorial farms would have meant
leaving a large number of peasants without land.
Far away from the country and with an uprising a long way off, it was
easy to cloak these controversial questions and insist upon the Society’s
Manifesto as a dogma, while leaving the question of interpretation open for
the time being. The Democratic Society adopted a rigid set of rules ; it only
accepted members whom they considered safe, demanded strict discipline,
and purged anyone for the least deviation from the programme. Power lay
in the hand of a five-men Central Board (“Centralizacja’’) elected every year
by postal vote of all members. The Board had its seat first in Poitiers and
then, after 1840, in Versailles. It kept in close touch with the sections by
means of circular letters and various news sheets. In practice, the members
of the board were always elected from among a dozen or so persons
belonging to the same group. Wiktor Heltman and Wojciech Darasz
represented the democratic tendencies while the right-wing Tomasz Mali-
nowski inclined towards the liberals.
The Democratic Society’s compromise doctrine was opposed by the
extreme Left Wing led by Krepowiecki and Pulaski. This latter group was
backed by several hundred soldiers, who had Janded in Portsmouth in 1834,
many of whom were of peasant stock. When the insurrection collapsed they
were ruthlessly persecuted in Prussia. Because they refused to accept the
Tsarist amnesty, they were jailed in the fortress of Grudzigdz. They were
ultimately expelled from the country and in Portsmouth found a haven in old
barracks where they received a pitiful allowance. At first they joined up
with the local Democratic Society section, but soon became critical of its
programme. Under the influence of Krepowiecki and Stanistaw Worcell, they
broke with the Society and formed, in 1835, the “Grudziaz Commune of the
Polish People”. Following its example, another Commune was formed in
St. Hélier on Jersey Island. This group was composed of a small number of
intellectuals and called itself “Human”, a name which recalled the peasant
uprising of 1768 in the Ukraine.
Both Communes rejected the programme of the Democratic Society,
claiming that it did not satisfy the needs of the people. The proposed grant
of freeholds, in fact, favoured the landed peasants and ignored the landless ;
it perpetuated the existence of the big landowners and, though it abolished
caste privileges, it maintained the privilege of money. The members of the
Communes adopted a utopian-socialist line, denying the right to private
property, claiming that all land belonged to the people. They imagined that
the government of the people would distribute land and individual work-
shops for life. The basic feature of their programme was the abolition of the
gentry’s property rights, and the assumption of power by the people.
With such views, the Communes remained isolated among the exiles, and
THE GREAT EMIGRATION 403
, Joachim Lelewel
did not succeed in establishing continued contact with the homeland, in
spite of the fact that their publications did influence revolutionary democrats
there. Owing to their isolation from society, the Communes became less
active as the years passed. Their most prominent members, Krepowiecki and
Worcell, withdrew and this dwindling refugee group became a kind of
political sect with a growing inclination to mysticism. The slogans it had
uttered, however, were revived later in the underground movement at home.
After 1840, the extreme Left Wing and the moderate centrists around
26*
404 ON THE EVE OF AN AGRARIAN REVOLUTION (1832-1849)
Lelewel lost much of their importance. Numerical strength lay with the
rival groups of the Democratic Society and the Czartoryski clan. The
latter had the support of the majority of notables in exile and the less
politically conscious emigrants who respected authority. In exile, Czarto-
ryski had gradually changed his point of view, from conservatism to
liberalism, a fact which reconciled the former Kalisz group to him. He
believed in constitutional monarchy, his group adopted the name “Third
of May” and considered the old prince as “the de facto king”. Czartoryski
tried to persuade his confidants among the Polish aristocracy of the necessity
to abolish serfdom (it being understood that landlords would receive
compensation). He also tried, though in vain, to induce them to make
preparations for another uprising which he considered a means of
counteracting a social revolution. In making his revolutionary plans Czarto-
ryski counted upon a European war which might break out as result of the
Anglo-Russian conflict in the Near East. He therefore maintained relations
with British and French diplomatic circles who used the Polish question as
a trump card in their dealings with the Holy Alliance. From his Paris
residence, the Hétel Lambert, Czartoryski despatched his agents to the
Balkans and the Near East trying to win over the Turkish government to his
side and to gain favour with the Rumanians and South Slaves. The
activity of Polish agents contributed in a certain measure to awakening the
national consciousness in the Balkans and in the formulation of their
political programmes. It was of little immediate use, as far as the Polish
cause was concerned. Czartoryski invariably appealed in his policy to two
parties who were unwilling to lend him effective support, the big landowners
in Poland, who opposed the uprising on principle, and to the governments of
France and Britain, to whom the Poles were only a convenient tool.
Closely connected with the political struggle of the exiles was their
cultural activity, especially in the field of poetry, music, painting and
creative science. The influence of the exiles on the homeland in matters
of politics and culture was exceptionally strong. They supplied the
ideological content and the aesthetic criteria which inspired the nation in
the succeeding generation. We must not forget, however, that the exiles,
immersed as they were in the currents of western-European affairs, were
concerned above all with their national problems, the most acute question
being the crisis of the feudal system and the imminence of an agrarian
revolution. This was the focal point of interest in every group of political
exiles. They could do little, in a practical sense, except point the way and
elaborate theories and programmes. The actual liberation had to be under-
taken by the country itself.
CONSPIRACY WITHIN POLAND 405
CONSPIRACY WITHIN POLAND
Attempts to prepare the country for another uprising after the failure of
the November Insurrection met with the general opposition of the propertied
classes. At the same time the mass of the population could be reached only -
with great difficulty by patriotic propaganda. In these circumstances, the
underground movements of the 1830’s and 1840’s found their recruits
mainly among the poor or déclassé gentry, the employees on the estates, the
city intelligentsia and students. The propaganda for these secret associations
was at first carried on mainly by emissaries from the emigration and only
gradually did the country emancipate itself from their tutelage.
In 1832 many insurgents found a temporary asylum in Galicia and
Cracow. In collaboration with them Lelewel’s Committee planned to begin
a fresh struggle in the Russian zone. Colonel Jézef Zaliwski, who had
returned from Paris, assumed that small detachments of revolutionaries could
operate in the woods and effectively hold the enemy army in check ; he
expected the partisans to win over the peasants with vague slogans about
social liberation. In the spring of 1833 the first partisan groups crossed
the frontier from Galicia and Pomerania. The attempt failed : the partisans
were either caught or forced to withdraw. Some of them died on the scaffold,
while others were exiled or confined in Austrian prisons for many years.
These failures caused the conspirators to put off their preparations for
revolt and concentrate instead on ideological propaganda. This action was
undertaken in Cracow and Lwow by various secret organizations in co-
operation with the Carbonarists and later with “Young Poland”. In 1835
an emissary of “Young Poland”, Szymon Konarski, was instrumental in
forming the Association of the Polish People, a secret society which soon
extended from Cracow across Galicia and throughout Russian Poland. The
Association evolved democratic principles which were not very clearly
defined and tried to mobilize the people for the fight for independence.
Clandestine groups were formed by students in schools and universities, and
among junior officials, tenant farmers and the provincial gentry. Konarski
himself was very active in the Ukraine and succeeded in rallying important
groups of the Ukrainian landowners to the cause.
Soon, however, opinions began to differ within the Association in respect
of tactics and policy. The moderate wing wished to postpone undertaking
armed action to a distant future. For the time being, they wished to work
exclusively among the educated section of the population. A typical
spokesman for this point of view was Franciszek Smolka, a Lwéw lawyer.
The radical wing stressed the necessity of disseminating propaganda among
the common people and appointing an early date for the uprising. Members
of that wing, especially the Cracow University students, campaigned
personally among artisans, while others went to enlist Polish and Ukrainian
406 ON THE EVE OF AN AGRARIAN REVOLUTION (1832-1849)
peasants for the revolution. Radical circles began to display their feelings
against the gentry. Gustaw Ehrenberg’s popular song gave vent to these
feelings in its mocking refrain: O czes¢ wam, panowie magnaci! (Hail,
Milords the magnates!). Konarski, however, was forced to seek the support
of the wealthy gentry east of the Bug. He made concessions to them in his
programme, and though issuing slogans for the liberation of the peasants, he
made the solution of the peasant problem dependent upon the goodwill of
the gentry.
In 1837 there was a crisis within the underground movement. The Left
Wing in Galicia founded its own organization which began to carry on more
open propaganda for an uprising among the peasants. This resulted in mass
arrests involving the Warsaw movement as well. Smolka tried to find his
own way out of this situation by suspending all the activities of the As-
sociation. The Galician underground survived a few years under different
names, but almost all these groups were eventually discovered. Konarski,
who worked in the Wilno area, was arrested and shot in 1839, after having
heroically endured the ordeal of a brutal criminal examination. Thousands
of Polish patriots were in prison, either at the Warsaw Citadel or in the
former Carmelite building in Lwéw. Hundreds were deported to penal
servitude in Siberia, or rotted in the Austrian fortresses of Spielberg and
Kufstein. The dragging out of underground activities over so many years
had led in practice only to many new victims.
In 1839 a new stage of underground activities began in direct collabora-
tion with the Central Board of the Polish Democratic Society at Versailles.
Its emissaries organized a secret Committee in Poznan which was headed by
Karol Libelt, a philosopher and educationalist. This Committee abstained
from large-scale recruiting, but made good use of the possibilities offered by
legal publications to popularize democratic principles. Prussian censorship
having been relaxed, journalism began to blossom in Poznan. Progressive
weeklies and monthlies like “Tygodnik Literacki” (Literary Weekly) and
“Rok” (The Year), prepared the minds of the “enlightened” readers for the
acceptance of the principles of the Poitiers Manifesto. The same kind of
activity was envisaged for Warsaw, where the periodicals were to publish
economic and literary articles under the cover of which political ideas
might be propagated.
The long term propaganda inspired by Versailles paid little attention
to feeling current in Poland. Unrest among peasants compelled to perform
labour service in Galicia and Congress Poland and among the evicted
peasants in the Poznan province was reaching boiling point. Artisans and
factory workers were beginning to organize their own conspiracies against
both the partitioning Powers and against oppression by the employers. In
view of these explosive sentiments many of the local consiprators were
inclined to break with the attitude adopted at Versailles and to bring forward
the date of the rising. This view gamed the upper hand, especially in the
CONSPIRACY WITHIN POLAND 407
secret organization in the Kingdom which went at that time under the name
of the Association of the Polish Nation.
The moving spirit of the radical wing was Edward Dembowski, a very
able young landowner who contributed his talent, his wealth and in the
end, his life to the cause of the revolution. He turned Warsaw’s “Przeglad
Naukowy” (Scientific Review) which he had founded, into the chief organ
of progressive political thinking. With considerable courage, he began to
unite the independent secret organizations which sprang up spontaneously
among the Warsaw artisans, in provincial towns and even among peasants.
Threatened with arrest, he fled to Poznan in 1843. There he spent about
a year publishing many articles on philosophical and literary subjects which
always contained strong political allusions, and extolling, though watchful
of the Prussian censorship, the revolutionary spirit and the democratic
ideology, proposing the return of the land to the people and the abolition of
the gentry’s rights over it. In Poznan Dembowski made contact with two
secret organizations, Libelt’s Committee, which was growing ever more
dependent on liberal circles among the gentry, and an independent radical
organization, called Union of the Plebeians. The latter was led by the owner
of a printing shop, Walenty Stefanski, who conducted a mass campaign
among artisans, college students and sometimes peasants, reaching the small
towns in the Poznan area, Pomerania and Silesia. His aim was to speed up
the outbreak of insurrection. True to his habit, Dembowski established rela-
tion with the “Plebeians”, as well as with some patriotically minded
landowners. He encouraged both to oppose Libelt. Expelled from Poznan by
the Prussian police, he soon appeared in Galicia, where he started an
adventurous career as an emissary of the revolution.
In 1844 a new underground venture flared up and collapsed—the Peasant
Association—founded by Father Piotr Sciegienny, son of a peasant from
Kielce district, and a village parson in Lublin voivodship (province). He had
been campaigning among the peasants in both regions for a number of years
rousing in them a national and revolutionary spirit. A “Letter by Pope
Gregory XVI” which was, of course, apocryphal, distributed by him, called
upon the peasants and poor townspeople to rise against the masters and put
an end to class exploitation. He also predicted, that common people of
Poland and the Russian troops would join hands and fight together against
the squires and the Tsar. Sciegienny was in contact with the national
underground movement. He was arrested just at the moment when he was
ready to launch his mass campaign. Deprived of his holy orders, he was
pardoned under the gallows. His death sentence was commuted to hard
labour for life and he was sent to the Nertchinsk mines in Siberia.
The case of Sciegienny, the priest and patriot engaged in conspiracy was
not exceptional. While the higher ultramontane clergy, obedient to directives
from Rome, condemned the attempted insurrections and at best supported
“organic work”, some provincial priests conducted patriotic and even re-
408 ON THE EVE OF AN AGRARIAN REVOLUTION (1832-1849)
volutionary agitation among the people. Roman Catholicism, as opposed to
Orthodox Russia and Protestant Prussia became a pillar of Polish nationality.
It is true, however, that the religious, mystic and romantic patriotism, wide-
spread in Poland in the nineteenth century, had not much in common with
a sense for politics and also obstructed the development of a democratic phi-
losophy, on which the success of the insurrection depended.
The spontaneous extension of secret mass organizations gave leaders of
the Central Board food for thought. The chief exponent of the country’s op-
Position to it was Henryk Kamienski, a wealthy landowner from Congress
Poland and a well known author of works on economics. Kamienski was
a level-headed, devoted patriot. Having once resolved that the mass
participation of peasants was a precondition for a victorious insurrection,
he accepted the Poitiers Manifesto and sought only the right opportunity to
apply it. He had no faith in the effectiveness of conspiracies inspired by
agents coming from abroad. He advised instead a mass propaganda cam-
paign elaborating democratic principles, to be expounded by the educated
classes to the people. A population properly indoctrinated would rise and
take up arms as one man. The “People’s War” launched by the masses could
quickly overpower the enemy. Because social revolution was indispensable
for such a war, anyone standing in the way of revolution should be
threatened with the death penalty. Such were the views Kamienski published
anonymously in his Prawdy zywotne narodu polskiego (Vital Truths of the
Polish Nation) and, in an abbreviated form in the Katechizm demokratycz-
ny (Democratic Catechism). Both pamphlets published in 1844-1845 were
distributed clandestinely throughout the country, inciting the people to rise
and adding a radical twist to the movement, most probably quite contrary
to the author’s intention. On the other hand, the upper classes to whose patri-
otism the “Vital Truths” were appealing, condemned the author as a blood-
thirsty terrorist proposing the massacre of the gentry.
The Central Board at Versailles concluded that further postponement of
armed action might lead to spontaneous local risings and to general disaster.
They let it be known therefore in 1843 that they agreed to an early uprising
which they fixed for 1846.
This decision, determined by the internal situation, influenced the develop-
ment of the conspiracy. Membership increased and former opponents among
liberal landowners adhered to the movement. Their action was prompted
by the prevailing wave of patriotism as much as by the conviction that they
would have to be present at the decisive moment in order to have a say in
future decisions. All influential positions, like those of the “provincial dis-
trict commanders” were taken on the eve of the outbreak by the landed
gentry.
This development caused anxiety among the radical Left Wing. Would
the new gentry conspirators be sincere in carrying out the necessary social
revolution? Dembowski joined forces with Stefanski’s “Plebeians” and tried,
THE DISASTER OF 1846 409
at the end of 1845, to overthrow the Poznan Committee and to put genuine
democrats in power. At the crucial moment, one of the Poznan landowners
simply denounced Stefanski to the Prussian police. The leader of the “Plebe-
ians” was put behind bars, and the leadership of the conspiracy remained
in the hands of the “Moderates”.
Ostensibly, the conspirators accepted the Poitiers Manifesto and agreed
with the principle of peasant emancipation. In practice, however, the Left
Wing alone stood for a “People’s War”. The Right Wing was afraid of such
a war and encouraged an uprising only in the hope that the struggle for
independence would neutralize the threatening class struggle. Wherever it
was possible, the progressives went to the villages to preach revolution.
Disguised as peasants, they explained to the illiterate villagers that the
overthrow of the foreign government would free them from labour services
and make them owners of their Jand. Such approaches frightened the gentry
members of the underground. They held the view that the uprising ought
to originate from outside the common people, with the gentry and their
servants. Only when the gentry had power firmly in their hands would
they announce the liberation to the peasants and keep them well under
control with the regular army. This was the idea of Ludwik Mierostawski,
whom the Central Board of Versailles had appointed Commander-in-chief.
The leaders of the underground therefore opposed attempts at campaigning
beforehand among the peasants. In fact, such action had only too often
contained overtones of propaganda directed against the gentry.
The conspirators were starting a war against the three states of the Holy
Alliance without international force to back them, without arms and
without being properly organized. They began it because they could wait no
longer. The country was facing a social upheaval and the peasants were
liable to march against the manors. There was a possibility of combining the
class struggle with the liberation movement. This chance was not taken
advantage of because the moderate leaders hoped instead that a national
insurrection would stop the peasant upheaval. This lack of consistent tactics
on the part of the revolutionaries plunged the country headlong into disaster.
THE DISASTER OF 1846
Galicia was, for many reasons, the worst trouble spot in Poland in the
1840’s. Economically, it was the most backward area. Agriculture was on so
low a level that it did not provide enough food for the peasant smallholders.
Serfdom and labour service were still in force. The introduction of money
rent was prohibited and the exploitation of peasants by the gentry was more
and more oppressive. Though the patents issued by Joseph II permitted the
peasants to file lawsuits against the manor and to complain to the district
commissioner, such lawsuits were as a rule lost and this only increased the
410 ON THE EVE OF AN AGRARIAN REVOLUTION (1832-1849)
bitterness of the country people. The Austrian bureaucracy in principle kept
watch over the feudal system in the villages but it made use of the growing
class antagonism to keep the Polish gentry within bounds. Democratic
propaganda collapsed in the 1830’s when the local underground centres had
been broken up and became active again on a very small scale only shortly
before the rising. The left-wing conspirators could not muster sufficient
support in the impoverished and backward small towns. Preparations for
the rising were undertaken by the gentry and this sufficed to arouse the
suspicion and anxiety of the country people.
The time for the nation-wide rising was set for Shrovetide, 22 February,
1846. Yet in some places, especially the Tarnow region, the peasants had been
arming themselves several weeks beforehand, they placed guards along the
roads and attacked travellers. In order to forestall the peasant movement,
the conspirators pretended that there was an imminent danger of arrests, and
advanced the date for the attack on Tarnéw by four days. The Austrian
chief of the district, Breinl, appealed to the peasants, promising them liberty
and imperial favour if they marched against the insurgents. On that
momentous night some peasant groups stopped the Polish armed units as they
advanced on Tarnéw, took them prisoner and delivered them to the
Austrians. The attack on Tarnéw was halted and the following days saw the
whole peasantry of central Galicia rise against the manors.
Specially appointed members of the National Government gathered in
Cracow to await the outbreak of the revolution. Cracow, this last free morcel
of Polish territory was to sound the call for battle. Instead, the Austrian
army marched into the town on 18 February. Simultaneously mass arrests by
the Prussians were reported from Poznan (as a result of treachery among
the landowning circles). Thus the best organized region, the Poznan area, was
itself unable to fight. The leaders, who had remained in Cracow, began by
cancelling the call to revolt, but later they decided nevertheless to start it.
Owing to the avalanche of preventive arrests and to contradictory orders
issued by the leaders, the plan of a simultaneous rising of all Polish districts
was frustrated completely. In less than a score of places small groups rose in
revolt, but they soon disbanded themselves realizing that the country as
a whole remained immobile.
In Cracow, however, street fighting broke out on 20 February. It was
followed up by peasants in the neighbourhood taking up arms. Three days
later the Austrian General Collin retreated from the city with his tiny army
corps and retired to the Silesian border. On 22 February the National
Government came out into the open in Cracow. It comprised Jan Tys-
sowski, Ludwik Gorzkowski and Aleksander Grzegorzewski. A manifesto
was published announcing equality for all citizens, abolishing labour services
and rents without compensation for the squires, and offering state lands to
volunteers who would participate in the rising. These provisions were some-
what wider in scope than those of the Poitiers Manifesto.
THE DISASTER OF 1846 411
On 22 February, all attacks against the partitioning Powers except
those in the Cracow area had already been squashed. A movement against the
gentry was spreading in central Galicia. Peasants attacked the manors and
plundered them killing the gentry and their agents. The fate of the country
depended on whether or not the two elements could be merged, on whether
the peasant class struggle could become a part of a nation-wide agrarian rev-
olution. Dembowski tried to bring this about when he arrived in Cracow,
but he found that the situation had changed, because Tyssowski had dis-
missed his colleagues within two days and had proclaimed himself dicta-
tor. Dembowski persuaded Tyssowski to appoint him as secretary and went
to work with a feverish activity. He issued new, more radical appeals, sent
propaganda agents into the villages, organized a club, set up a revolutionary
press and warded off attacks on the government undertaken by the conserva-
tives. All these desperate efforts proved in vain. An Austrian column was
marching from the east on Cracow and its commander, Colonel Benedek, was
openly inciting the peasants to fight against the gentry. A smal] detachment
sent out against him was defeated and routed near Gdéw, Dembowski was
shot by the Austrians in the Cracow suburb, Podgérze, where he was trying
to meet the peasants at the head of an unarmed procession. After Dembowski’s
death the collapse followed. Tyssowski took the remainder of the revolution-
ary units out of the city and handed their arms over to the Prussians. Crac-
ow was occupied by the Russians and the Austrians. Several months later
the area of the Free City was formally incorporated into the Austrian State.
Austrian bureaucracy knew how to make use of the peasants to counteract
the Polish uprising at the decisive moment. This does not mean that the peas-
ants rose to defend the Emperor, or that their movement was the work of
the Austrians. The peasants had risen spontaneously against feudal oppres-
sion while in many regions they fought the partitioning Powers as well. The
village of Chocholéw in the Tatras participated openly in the national up-
rising, mobilized by the teacher Jan Andrusikiewicz. The Austrians, in turn,
employed force to pacify the peasants when they were not confronted by
the insurgents.
Within a few days peasant movement resulted in the ransacking of some
400 manors and about a thousand casualties. Labour services virtually ceased
to be performed throughout central Galicia and soon the resistance movement
spread to the rest of the province. The peasants, moreover, found a leader,
a villager from Smarzowa, by the name of Jakub Szela, who presided over
the lynching of his masters, the Bogusz family, then surrounded himself
with armed bodyguards. He secured the obedience of the peasants within an
area of several score square kilometres and negotiated with the Austrian
authorities.
The Vienna government praised the Galician peasants before the world
for their loyalty to the Emperor, but it was in no mood to grant them con-
cessions at the expense of the gentry. Peasant resistance was put down by
412, ON THE EVE OF AN AGRARIAN REVOLUTION (1832-1849)
a large number of troops with the help of mass floggings. Szela was interned,
and the Galician villages were once more compelled to perform labour service.
Nonetheless, the suppressed jacquerie had established certain incontrovertible
facts which had their repercussions even beyond the boundaries of the pro-
vince.
The world-wide publicity given to the incidents in Galicia, utterly dis-
credited Metternich’s régime and convinced the conservatives throughout
the Hapsburg monarchy and abroad of the necessity to make concessions to
the people. This explains the eagerness with which agrarian reform was
introduced in Austria, Germany, Hungary and elsewhere, as early as 1848.
Another result of the Galician uprising was that it encouraged peasants to
rise in other countries in Rumania, Lombardy and France. In the Congress
Kingdom by 1846 whole districts had ceased to render labour service. The
Tsar made haste to issue an ukase forbidding the eviction of peasants and
any arbitrary raising of labour dues, but even then it was difficult to get the
peasants to return to order. To sum up, even though it failed, the peasant
movement had strengthened class consciousness in the villages throughout
Poland.
The movement had failed because of the fundamental error the peasants
had committed by letting themselves be used against the Cracow insurgents
who were promising them freedom. The Cracow rising was crushed, and this
fact left the peasants isolated against the Austrian troops. It was a serious
defeat for the Polish democratic group. The peasant on whom the insurgents
had counted turned against them, mainly because of the mistakes the demo-
cratic conspirators had committed.
The year 1846 shook the entire nation to its roots. Margrave Aleksander
Wielopolski reproached Metternich for his perfidy in a widely publicized
open letter. He advised the Polish gentry to give up the idea of independence
and to merge with Russia on the basis of a voluntary association. This was
a sign of the growing tendency among Poland’s aristocracy to seek accomo-
dation with foreign rule. The democrats did not wish to give up hope of
winning over the people to support the national cause, but there was the fear
of another massacre, and care had to be taken more than ever less slogans be
issued against the gentry. It took the left-wing conspirators defeated in 1846
a long time to recover from the blow, and a long time before they again
found a common language with the peasants.
In spite of the grave consequences which followed the Galician peasant
movement, one can hardly overlook the fact that in its historical perspec-
tive it did have some positive effects. Though fraught with tragic mistakes,
the national movement attacked the very foundations of the feudal system
and speeded up the abolition of serfdom and the labour services. The libera-
tion of the peasant from the yoke of feudalism was the indispensable prelude
to his achieving political maturity and becoming nationally conscious. Ina
THE POZNAN RISING OF 1848 413
much as the Tarndéw jacquerie hastened the emancipation of the peasant, it
also advanced the cause of Poland’s independence.
THE POZNAN RISING OF 1848
The events that had taken place in Galicia were a prelude to the revolution
which swept across Europe two years later. The demands of a bourgeoisie
for power, the desire of oppressed nations to liberate themselves, the new
demands of the peasants, and the first demands of a young working class
were the issues that caused the outbreak of a long series of stormy events
which began in Italy and France and later shook central Europe.
The 1848 Revolution often called “Springtime of the Nations” placed
the Polish question once more on the order of the day. 1846 had reminded
Europe of that nation of revolutionaries who were always ready to ally
themselves with any subversive force. Both the revolutionary leaders and
the defenders of the old order realized that the Poles would rise against the
Holy Alliance, if there was a revolution, that they would liberate themselves
if the revolution was victorious, or go down with the revolution if it failed.
On the eve of the French February uprising, the national celebrations staged
by Polish exiles in Paris, London and Brussels were occasions for the local
revolutionaries to demonstrate. Marx and Engels fraternally embraced by
Lelewel were also among the speakers. The leaders of the Communist Union
declared that Polish independence was indispensable and that the prerequisite
for her liberation was the agrarian revolution. By the end of February 1848
the people of Paris had overthrown the monarchy of Louis Philippe. Three
weeks later street fighting broke out in Vienna and in Berlin. Two of the
partitioning Powers were in a state of crisis and two parts of Poland there-
fore seemed to have regained their freedom of action, but they were not
ready for the struggle after their recent defeat of 1846.
The Grand Duchy of Poznan had just witnessed the trial of the partici-
pants in the earlier rising. Sentenced to death or to terms of imprisonment
they were awaiting their fate at the Moabit prison in Berlin. Some of their
comrades, whe had been released were again agitating in Poland, distributing
leaflets in towns and villages about the imminent revolt. The news of the
victory of the revolution in Berlin caught them by surprise on 20 March.
If the Germans supported the cause of freedom, they would certainly fight
Tsarism in alliance with the Poles. This hope caused the Poznan “Plebeians”
to postpone storming the Citadel which threatened the city.
They were also checked by liberal landowners, like Maciej Mielzyfski
and Gustaw Potworowski. These two leaders of the “organic work” move-
ment (after Marcinkowski’s recent death) now joined the revolution in order
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to “legalize” it. They calculated that the uprising might induce the govern-
ment to grant the province home rule at least. In fact the Prussian authorities
were too frightened to oppose the first Polish demands. A National Commit-
tee was speedily elected in Poznan and a delegation was despatched to
Berlin. Its members, mostly moderates, presented no claims, but merely asked
the King for a “national reorganization”. At that time the Berlin population
was cheering and welcoming the Polish prisoners released from Moabit pris-
on. Mieroslawski announced a Polish-German crusade against Tsar Nicholas.
He advocated the speedy rearmament of Poland, but without provoking the
Germans.
Throughout the Poznan area detachments of riflemen and scythemen
were hastily formed. The poor people in town and country were eager to
take up in the hope of finding better living conditions in liberated Poland.
Upon an appeal issued by the National Committee, the gentry joined the
movement assuming leadership of the subdistrict committees, in order to
prevent “excesses”, and to keep the mass of peasant volunteers in check.
The Left Wing saw in these revolutionary cadres the beginnings of a national
armed force, while the right wing treated the armaments as a demonstration
and a means of bringing pressure upon the government in order to obtain the
desired concessions. The new Prussian government composed of liberals,
seemed to yield to the Poles, but the generals and the local bureaucracy who
THE POZNAN RISING OF 1848 415
had recovered their nerve after the first scare, were already preparing to
repress the Polish movement. Dominated by the moderates, the National
Committee failed to take advantage of its initial opportunity to attack, It
put off proclaiming radical principles and confined its activity to one single
province.
By the end of March Mierostawski had arrived in Poznan and took over
personal command of the Committee’s War Department. He promised to
revive the plans which had been frustrated two years before of having two
revolutionary armies coming from Poznan and Galicia to attack Warsaw
simultaneously. Yet Mierostawski had no confidence in the men with whom
he was to collaborate. He suspected the landed gentry of harbouring counter-
revolutionary designs, and accused the peasants of thinking solely of mas-
sacring their masters. According to him, Poland’s future should be assured
by the “Polish middle class”, meaning the impoverished gentry and the urban
poor. Out of these elements, and especially out of officers returned from
abroad, he wanted to create cadres for the regular army of his dreams.
While he thus dreamt, he neglected to advance the cause of the revolution.
Meanwhile, the Prussian government sent General Willisen, a liberal
friendly to the Poles, to Poznan, with the instructions to pacify the province
by persuasion because German opinion was still favourably disposed towards
the Poles. Willisen promised the members of the National Committee that
the local administration of the province might be taken over by the Poles ;
but he demanded in return that the Polish volunteer detachments be dis-
banded. The Right Wing agreed to this but dared not force a surrender in
the face of 20,000 armed insurgents. This difficult task was given to the dem-
ocrats, Libelt and Stefanski. Mortally afraid of an armed struggle, which
might cause the peasants to rise against the gentry, they, too, agreed to con-
cessions. Negotiations took place on 11 April at Jarostawiec, at a moment
when the Prussian columns were preparing to attack the insurgent camp at
Sroda. In the course of feverish debates Mierostawski succeeded in forcing
Willisen to agree to let some 3000 soldiers keep their arms temporarily.
After concluding the Jaroslawiec agreement, the landowners considered
that the revolutionary movement had come to an end. It was exceedingly
dificult to keep down the revolt of the scythemen. In pleading with them
to disband, each volunteer was promised 3 morgs (3/4 ha) of land. Playing
thus into Willisen’s hands, the gentry presumed that they would be given
authority over the province. The Prussian army, however, were ruthlessly
pacifying the country, while the local bourgeoisie and the German settlers
armed against the Poles. The Prussian government refused to reorganize one
part of the province which they maintained was “German”. The mass of
the peasantry was eager to obtain arms in order to retaliate against the
Prussian provocation. Fearing an armed conflict which might degenerate
into a social revolution, the Right Wing forced the National Committee’s
hand at the end of April, and compelled it to adopt a resolution agreeing to
416 ON THE EVE OF AN AGRARIAN REVOLUTION (1832-1849)
total disarmament. The resolution was rejected by Mierostawski who com-
manded the four military “camps”, which had been established after the
Jarostawiec agreement. These camps might have become the nucleus of
a nation-wide insurrection. Mierostawski, however, did nothing to establish
the necessary links with the peasant movement spreading throughout the
province. The Prussian army pacified the villages and then turned against
the Polish camps. Mierostawski succeeded in concentrating his forces and
repelled the assault of one of the Prussian columns at Milostaw on 30 April.
Two days later he won another battle at Sokofowo but suffered heavy casu-
alties.
There was still a chance of rousing the population to fight against the
foreign enemy. The gentry officers exerted all their efforts to forestall a strug-
gle which might bring disaster, if it was lost, or prove an even greater ca-
lamity, if it degenerated into a victorious revolution. Some officers deserted,
others encouraged the soldiers to desert, while still others began negotiating
with the enemy behind Mierostawski’s back. Within ten days they succeeded
in dispersing the unit several thousand strong of the victors of Milostaw.
A lawyer by the name of Jakub Krotowski (Krauthofer), who was one of
the most enterprising local democrats, organized a partisan movement in the
Poznan area. These efforts, however, were soon frustrated.
After the province of Poznan had been pacified by force, the “reorganiza-
tion” scheme was abandoned. Quite obviously, a revolutionary movement,
which had not gone beyond the boundaries of one province, had to yield
to the superior force of the enemy. The Congress Kingdom, intimidated by
Paskevich’s army of occupation, did not rise in 1848 and the conspirators
working in Warsaw decided not to call a revolt. Galicia did not stir either.
The Poznan area thus remained isolated, but the importance of the events
which took place there in the course of seven stormy weeks went beyond
the boundaries of the province.
The greatest surprise of the Poznan rising was the behaviour of the peas-
ants. The poor people of the countryside, farm hands, day labourers and
smallholders, were in the front line, but even the yeomen farmers joined them
in opposing the Prussians when their gentry leaders no longer wanted to
fight. This was proof of the awakening to a higher degree of national con-
sciousness among the masses of this economically advanced province, a fact
which warmed the hearts of all patriots after the recent Galician tragedy.
The propertied classes, in turn, were less prone than ever before to under-
take revolutionary ventures. In the presence of Prussian oppression, however,
they were compelled to keep up their opposition to the government, though
obviously this was a legal opposition. Their principal aim was thenceforth
to enlist the support of the middle classes, the bourgeoisie and the wealthier
peasants, calling upon them to defend the faith, the Polish language and
their native land. Anti-German propaganda adopted from this time onwards
Polish participation in the
European revolutions, 1848
(0) 400 Kms
— ————— ee
0 ; 200 Miles
International boundaries
Boundaries of tha Congress Kingdom af Poland
Boundaries of the Garman Union, 1815-1866
Centres of revolutionary fighting with Polish participation
Major battles of the Mickiawicz Legion and of tha Polish Legion
in Hungary
Major centres of the revolutionary movement in the Grand Duchy of
Poznan, in Silesia and Galicia
N Warsaw 1978 j imprint PPWK. Zam. 9074/79- X-30 218-10 285 egz.
THE POZNAN RISING OF 1848 417
nationalistic overtones and the Catholic clergy played an important role in
this respect.
While freedom of the press and freedom of association still existed in
Prussia, some liberal leaders founded in 1848 the Polish League, a mass
organization to ensure the legal protection of Polish national! identity. The
League was soon forbidden to function, but the guiding principles it had laid
down were followed throughout the second half of the century. The impact
of Germanization, which threatened all Polish social classes in Prussia, facili-
tated the task of the upper classes in their call for solidarity and weakened
the position of the radicals.
The third surprise of the revolution in the Prussian-dominated zone was
the national awakening in Pomerania and Silesia. Before that time, these
provinces had taken little part in patriotic activity within the Poznan area.
Now, the Gdansk area of Pomerania joined first the Poznan movement, and
then the Polish League. From this time they continued to work hand in hand
with Great Poland. As for Silesia, the revolutionary movement of 1848
comprised both Poles and Germans. The tide of peasant risings extended to
Polish and German districts, Polish and German revolutionaries jointly
defended the barricades in Wroctaw. Independently of this movement, the
Silesian Poles developed a national movement of ‘their own. Upper Silesia
elected mostly Polish peasants to the Berlin National Assembly. On their
behalf Father Jézef Szafranek tabled a motion demanding equality of rights
for the Polish language. Polish political clubs and other societies were founded,
and the “Dziennik GérnoSlaski’’ (Upper Silesian Daily), a paper with a pro-
nounced national inclination, began publication. Jézef Lompa himself was
among the more active members of the movement. All these Polish organiza-
tions in Silesia were disbanded when the revolution collapsed. They had issued
no call for independence and were associated only indirectly with the Poznan
national movement, but even this limited activity was considerable step for-
ward in the national thinking of this area and of the first collective effort
undertaken to defend Polish national rights.
When the German revolution was defeated in the first half of 1849,
Polish nationals lost the civil rights which had been granted them, but the
revolution did have a beneficial effect on the progress of the agrarian reform.
Under the pressure of the peasant movement in which Silesia had played an
important role, the Berlin Assembly was compelled to revise the settlement
laws. Smallholders were now included in the arrangement and could own
their land. All peasants were permitted to buy out their landlord’s rights by
instalments and some other dues were abolished without compensation to the
Jandlords. Thus the revolution of 1848 destroyed feudal institutions that
had existed in the areas of the Prussian part of Poland. By the middle of the
century, this province entered an area of advanced capitalism.
27 History of Poland
418 ON THE EVE OF AN.AGRARIAN REVOLUTION (1832-1849)
GALICIA IN 1848
After the revolution in Vienna, the Austrian part of Poland, Galicia, was
granted more freedom of action than was allowed in the Prussian sector,
particularly as a result of the precarious conditions prevailing in the Haps-
burg monarchy. Galicia, however, was in no position to take advantage of
the opportunity offered and the revolutionary movement in that area re-
mained rather weak, although it did last much longer.
As soon as the first news of the events in Vienna reached Cracow and
Lwéw, street demonstrations forced the local authorities to release all political
prisoners. The liberal bourgeois leaders in Lwéw under Smolka’s leadership
presented a petition to the Emperor to grant them civil rights, to institute
Polish as the official language in the administration, the courts and the schools,
and to abolish labour ‘service. This petition was also signed by many land-
owners. The delegation sent to Vienna was carried away by revolutionary fev-
vour and went beyond the contents of the petition, demanding national in-
dependence. Naturally, there was hardly a chance of winning this fight
single-handed. The peasants were indeed suspicious of the Polish nationalist
movement and, after the experiences of 1846, no one dared to proclaim their
emancipation because it might give rise to a new social upheaval. A National
Committee was set up in Cracow with the participation of members of the
Versailles Central Board, who had returned home from Paris. Even that
Committee did not go beyond calling upon the landed gentry to liberate the
peasants from labour dues of their own free will. Only a very few of the
landowners responded to the appeal, although everybody was aware that
labour services could not be perpetuated. Other questions were also involved,
especially the compensation of the landlords and the peasants’ rights of access
to woods and pastures. Count Franz Stadion, the Austrian governor, availed
himself of the gentry’s hesitation to announce that the Emperor had ordered
the abolition of all labour services in Galicia and to promise that the landlords
would receive compensation from the government. Thus he gained favour
with the countryside and weakened the opposition of the landed gentry. Now
the Austrian army could clamp down on the revolutionary movement which
was brewing in Galicia. After brief street skirmishes, Cracow was shelled on
April 26. The local Committee was disbanded and the returned exiles were
expelled from the town.
In the meantime, the Austrian Constitution granted freedom of as-
sociation and freedom of speech to Galicia as well. A National Council was
set up in Lwéw with a large membership, which sought to centralize all
political activities in the province. Similar councils were established with the
participation of the bourgeoisie and the urban intelligentsia in other cities and
towns. Moreover, units of the National Guard, wearing uniforms reminiscent
of the Polish pattern, were organized in some towns. Publication was started
of a number of political dailies and general elections to the Vienna parliament.
GALICIA IN 1843 419
took place. This vigorous movement, however, dared not to resist the oc-
cupying power. For one thing, it could not count on the support of the
peasants, while on the other hand, the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia ex-
perienced a political awakening in opposition to the Poles. Both gentry
and intelligentsia in the Lwéw area ignored the existence of another nation-
ality in Galicia and refused the Ukrainians the very civil liberties they were
trying to obtain from Vienna. This conflict between the two nationalities was
exploited by the Austrian bureaucracy.
Under the pressure of revolutionary events the majority of the Polish
landowners joined the movement and supported the National Council. Later,
however, their own personal interests gained the upper hand and caused them
to change their attitude. In the summer of 1848, conservative lobbies were
created in an effort to get government support against the Polish revolutionary
movement. The National Council was about to split when internal events
precipitated the collapse of the revolutionary movement. The reactionary
forces destroyed the working class revolution in Vienna and the same hap-
- pened in Lwéw. The Austrian commanders instigated street fighting and
shelled the city, crushing the resistance of the barricades on 2 November,
before it could spread. In consequence the Polish National Councils were
dispersed and the national guards disbanded. The Polish journals closed down
and military rule held sway once more in the province.
Though the revolution failed, its greatest gain survived, in the form of the
emancipation of the peasants, which was assured throughout the Austrian
Empire by a special act of parliament. The reform, which had been forced
through at the time of upheaval by the solidarity of the peasants themselves,
went far beyond what had been granted by earlier reforms in Prussia. It
provided that everyone, even the least smallholder, should own his land. Freed
from serfdom and labour dues, the peasants obtained their land theoretically
free of charge ; in reality, the fact that the gentry were promised an indemnity
from the government resulted in the peasants having to pay compensation
of a kind, though the amounts were reduced and well concealed because the.
indemnity fund was to debit the peasant taxpayer as well. Stadion’s first
announcement guaranteed the peasants their grazing and forest rights, but
a few years later at the time reactionaries were in power, the validity of this
right was generally denied. The villages with their small, scattered holdings
and an acute lack of fire wood and grazing grounds, remained economically
dependent upon the manors. Nonetheless, the act of abolishing feudalism had
opened the road to capitalism in the Austrian part of Poland as well.
Seven months of political freedom revitalized that most backward
province where, until that time, only a very few groups of the intelligentsia
had taken part in underground activities. In 1848 thousands of people, from
the aristocrats down to the peasants, consciously particigated in public life.
During this period, also, political programmes and attitudes were established
that were to be characteristic of this province until the end of the century.
@7°
420 ON THE EVE OF AN AGRARIAN REVOLUTION (1832-1849)
There was the conservative programme of the landowners looking to the
Crown for support against the social movements; the programme of the
“democrats”, or rather of the bourgeois liberals defending civil and national
rights, but powerless before the government because they had no mass
backing ; and the social programme of the peasants who demanded “forests
and grazing grounds” and laboured under the illusion that they might win
favour with the Emperor. Finally, the essential feature of the conditions
prevailing in Galicia was the weakness of the revolutionary-democratic
element, which might have lent staunch support to the peasants and won them
over to the fight for national independence. This movement had a spokesman
in the person of Julian Goslar, the son of a manor official. The young Goslar
had worked closely with Dembowski and had been imprisoned several times
for his political activities. He was hanged in 1852 after another revolutionary
incident. There was no one in the succeeding generation to emulate him in
this economically backward country, which was still haunted by the mem-
ories of 1846.
POLES IN EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS
The events that took place in March 1848 caused crowds of exiles to flock
back to the country. Before long the defeat of the Poznan rising gave the
signal for a new migration towards the West. The former émigrés were joined
by new young exiles fleeing from oppression or looking for other battlefields
to fight for the cause of freedom.
By the middle of 1848 the European revolution was entering its crucial
stage, but it had not yet broken down. Bitter political struggles were in full
swing in France and in Germany. In Italy and in Hungary the fate of the
revolution was being decided on the battlefield. Exiled Poles were ready to
-engage in any of these struggles, confident that the cause of progress was their
own cause. From private to general, they were welcomed everywhere with
open arms, as faithful and reliable allies of every revolutionary movement.
In Italy, the national movement began even earlier than the Paris
February Revolution. Through his agents, Adam Czartoryski appealed to
“‘liberal”’ Pope Pius IX to create a Polish legion to fight on Italy’s side against
the Austrians. At the beginning of his pontificate Pius IX had shown favour to
the Poles ; but he did not want war with Austria and refused to agree to the
scheme for a legion. Mickiewicz then appeared in Rome on his own. Received
by the Pope, he called upon him to back Poland’s cause and the cause of
freedom in the world. Conservative compatriots regarded Mickiewicz as
a dangerous revoluyonary and made it impossible for him to extend his stay
in Rome. The Polish poet summoned a handful of enthusiastic young men and
proclaimed at the meeting on 29 March, 1848, the “Set of Principles” (Sktad
POLES IN EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS 421
zasad) of the Polish Legion. It was a poet’s revolutionary creed, couched in
lofty language. Mickiewicz’s idea was to create a Polish army unit at the side
of the Italians which would attract and enrol all Slav soldiers serving in the
Hapsburg army. In response to Mickiewicz’s call several hundred Polish exiles
hurried to Italy. One of their companies commanded by Colonel Mikota;j
Kamienski took part in the war of 1848 in Lombardy. Another one fought
a year later in defence of Republican Rome. In Milan, in Genoa, and in
Florence the Polish legionaries fought on the side of the people against the
reactionary forces. In 1849 Mickiewicz himself became the editor of the
newspaper “La Tribune des Peuples” published in Paris. The editorial board
comprised democrats of different nationalities, and the aim pursued by the
paper was to act on French soil as a defender of all nations who were fighting
for liberty. “La Tribune des Peuples” in which Mickiewicz published excellent
articles, cooperated with the French leftists and was suspended when the
reactionaries gained the upper hand.
At that time in 1849, Mierostawski, the former leader of the Poznan
insurgents, still commanded Italian forces in Sicily and later on German forces
in Baden. The conservative General Chrzanowski was at the head of the
Piedmontese army which was beaten at Novara. Agents of the Polish
Democratic Society took part in the German uprising in Dresden. Earlier,
General Jozef Bem, who had become famous as artillery commander during
the November Insurrection, gallantly defended besieged Vienna. After the
fall of that city, he left for Hungary looking for another battlefield.
The Hungarian uprising directed against Austria was the last great mili-
tary undertaking of this revolutionary period and all Polish patriots looked
to it with great hope. Several thousand young Poles secretly crossed the
Carpathian Mountains and fought gallantly in dozens of battles under the
leadership of General Jozef Wysocki. The Commander-in-chief in Hungary
at various times was General Dembinski. The most famous among the Poles
was General Bem who was appointed commander of the Transylvanian army
and recaptured that province which had been all but lost to the enemy ;
he pursued a strategy of constant attack, never Jost his temper in defeat, and
was beloved by his subordinates and respected by the local population.
During the Hungarian campaign the Poles were confronted with the
thorny Slav problem. 1848 awakened political consciousness in many nations
subjected to the Hapsburg monarchy, the Czechs, Slovaks, South Slavs and
Rumanians. Polish scholars and politicians made, in the preceding years,
a contribution to the national revival of the Czechs, Slovaks and South
Slavs, but the Poles opposed Panslavism inspired by Russia which appeared to
them as a tool of Tsarist policy. The year 1848 should have united all Slavs
under the banner of freedom. All of them were soon in conflict with the
Hungarians whose leaders refused to treat them on a basis of equality. The
imperial government was not slow in taking advantage of these antagonisms
and exploiting them against Hungary. Thus the Czechs, the Croats, and the
422 ON THE EVE OF AN AGRARIAN REVOLUTION (1832-1849)
Transylvanian Rumanians, or rather the leading groups of their urban intel-
ligentsia joined the reactionary camp. Most of these minorities were Slavs ;
and the idea of all Slavs being brothers met with a lively response in Poland.
A large Polish delegation attended the Slav Congress in Prague in June, 1848.
Polish patriots never tired in their endeavour to get all Slavs to join the
revolutionary movements. Thus, for example, they made contact with the
Left Wing in Bohemia and induced them to join the struggle against the
Hapsburgs. In Hungary the agents of the Hétel Lambert tried to convince the
Hungarian authorities that the granting of equal rights would induce national
minorities to stop their collaboration with the reactionaries.
When Nicholas I sent Paskevich’s armies to help the Austrians, he declared
in his manifesto that he would fight not only the Hungarian, but also the
Polish rebels. Soon after, the Hungarian army laid down its arms before the
Russians, while the Polish legionaries under Bem and Dembinski sought refuge
in Turkish dominions. Poles were to be found in the revolutionary camp up
to the very last. The logic of events demanded even that the Czartoryskis
work hand in hand with the revolutionaries, if they wanted to do anything
for Poland, whereas those Polish conservatives who aligned themselves openly
with the party of “order” actually renounced their country’s independence.
The same relationship to the Polish question prevailed in various other
political camps in Europe. The united reactionaries were firm and systematic
in combatting all Polish aspirations. The French and German liberals pfo-
claimed their friendly feelings for Poland, as long as they were backing the
revolution ; but they turned against the Poles the more fiercely, the faster
their conversion to the counter-revolution had taken place. Only genuine
revolutionaries remained faithful to their friendship for Poland. This was
true particularly of the leaders of the working class. The “Neue Rheinische
Zeitung”, published in Cologne, condemned. in 1848 the old outrage of
Poland’s partitions, as much as the new outrages committed by the Prussians
in the Poznan province. It commended the services rendered by the Poles to
the revolutionary cause and declared repeatedly that “the establishment of
a democratic Poland is the first condition for the establishment of a democratic
Germany”.
POLISH CULTURE IN THE ROMANTIC PERIOD
The period of the greatest national calamities experienced after the November
Insurrection became, paradoxically, a time of unusual achievements in art,
poetry, music, painting and the humanities. The talents which had been
maturing in the preceding decade seemed to have acquired depth in the
atmosphere of defeat and were broadened by their experience of exile. They
assumed the mission of showing the nation the new paths ahead. At a time
POLISH CULTURE IN THE ROMANTIC PERIOD 423
Adam Mickiewicz
when Polish politicians were either Josing their contacts with the country, or
had to go underground, patriotic poetry reached ever wider circles and the
authors achieved in the eyes of the people the rank of teachers of the nation,
of national “bards”. All institutes of higher learning, with the exception of
Cracow, were closed in Poland. Systematic research, especially in the field
of science, was rendered difficult. These were the reasons for the one-sided
development of Polish learning and culture directed towards the study of
humanities.
424 ON THE EVE OF AN AGRARIAN REVOLUTION (1832-1849)
Juliusz Stowacki
Contemplating the disaster that had come upon Poland, the great Ro-
mantic poets devoted themselves almost entirely to the task of digging deep
into the meaning of the nation’s history. In Dziady (Forefathers’ Eve) Mickie-
wicz cqntended with God himself over the martyrdom of Poland ; in Ksiegi
pielgrzymstwa (Books of Pilgrimage) he tried to outline for the exiles a model
programme for the fighters for liberty. In Pan Tadeusz he evoked the
unforgettable image of a vigorous, living country, with a treasure chest of
emotions, for a nation of prisoners and exiles. During the same period Juliusz
POLISH CULTURE IN THE ROMANTIC PERIOD 425
@
Stowacki, Mickiewicz’s undaunted rival, was writing Kordian, the drama of
the gentry revolutionaries, while in Gréb Agamemnona (Agamemnon’s Tomb)
he hurled his indictment against Poland’s gentry-tainted past ; in Beniowski
he settled his accounts with the émigré groups and coteries, dazzling the reader
at once with the masterly handling of the poetic form and an extraordinary
blend of concealed feeling, irony, and subtle witticism. The third man of the
great Romantic trinity, Zygmunt Krasinski, proceeded from a conservative
position and took up the topic of the impending social revolution which was
disturbing Europe. His Nieboska komedia (Undivine Comedy) was an apoca-
lyptic vision of the ultimate clash between a corrupt aristocracy and the
plebeian rabble. The works of these “bards” served to inspire several gen-
erations of Poles. : ;
Their poetry did not propose a practical way out of the tragic reality of
the present, but proclaimed only the mystic creed that Poland, exalted to the
figure of a “Christ” or a “Winkelried” among the nations, would some day
rise from the dead, as had Christ. Polish idealistic philosophy took the same
line, with Cieszkowski, Trentowski and Libelt transposing Hegel’s concepts
to meet the requirements of Polish Messianism which promised the martyr
nation an era when “the Holy Ghost” would descend to deliver its people. The
most extreme type of Polish Messianism was the doctrine of Andrzej To-
wianski, whose teachings directed his disciples to redeem the nation and the
world by exercising their willpower and raising their moral standards. For
a number of years Towianism held sway over many brilliant minds, among
them Mickiewicz and Stowacki, a fact which prejudiced their creative talents.
Polish historiography followed a different line, largely owing to Lelewel.
Domiciled in Brussels, he was involved continuously in problems of his exiled
countrymen which he could not influence directly. He gained the stature, in
the eyes of his compatriots and those of strangers, of an ideological patriarch
of Polish democracy. Foreigners considered him an excellent connoisseur of
medieval numismatics and historical geography. For his compatriots, he crea-
ted an optimistic concept of national history. Communal institutions peculiar
to Poland since time immemorial, which had been distorted in the course of
centuries by the influence of the magnates and by those who aped foreign
customs, would be reestablished in a vivid and liberated Poland. This philo-
sophy of history became the basis of all programmes of Polish democracy in
this period. Lelewel himself and Mickiewicz, professor of Slavonic literatures
at the Collége de France, were the main spokesmen for Polish learning and
culture in the eyes of progressive Europe.
In Poland creative writing developed along different lines according to
the means of expression and upon the political point of view. Aleksander
Fredro, an original playwright, produced his best comedies soon after the
November Insurrection, Zemsta (Vengeance), Sluby panienskie (Maidens’
Vows), and Dozywocie (Life Annuity). He did not bore his audiences with
any political problems, but enchanted them with the charm of his dialogue and
426 ON THE EVE OF AN AGRARIAN REVOLUTION (1832-1849)
e
scintillating humour. Reaping success from the very start, his plays have
remained in the repertory of Polish theatres. Apart from Fredro, the writings
of the conservative authors were tainted with a clear ideology. They defended
the time-honoured traditions and customs of the gentry and contrasted them
with the progressive “alien” ideas, either in the form of a historical novel, as
for instance in Henryk Rzewuski’s Listopad (November), or in rhymed tales
like those by Wincenty Pol. The liberal trend of advocating moderate reform
and “organic work” found its medium in the contemporary novels popularized
by prolific writers like J. I. Kraszewski and J. Korzeniowski. The realistic
novel of the period usually dwelt on the topic of evolution and changes oc-
curring in the society. of the landed gentry. It is significant, however, that the
fate of the peasant gets sympathetic consideration in these novels.
A third trend in literature was inspired by the democratic ideology. Here,
the poetic form was preferred, and quite often anonymous verses made the
rounds: The main exponents of this concept, which was concentrated on the
impending insurrection, were the Warsaw Bohemians closely allied with
Dembowski who consistently exposed the hypocrisy of salon society, the so-
called Enthusiast Circle fighting for the emancipation of women, and in
Poznan Ryszard Berwinski, author of a revolutionary Marsz w przysztos¢
(March into the Future).
In 1845 the impending agrarian revolution was reflected in a peculiar
poetic controversy. Zygmunt Krasinski was deeply shocked by the Katechizm
demokratyczny (Democratic Catechism), whose author, Kamienski, threatened
the foes of the insurrection with the death penalty. The poet protested in his
Psalm mitoscit (Psalm of Love) against the propaganda directed against the
gentry. He countered it with a slogan, most popular afterwards, in right-wing
circles, “Z szlachta polska polski lud” (The Polish people with the Polish
gentry). Stowacki answered Krasinski with a beautiful poem declaring himself
unambiguously on the side of the people and the revolution. As had been seen,
Mickiewicz too was roused from his mysticism by the revolution. He served
the idea of the Polish Legion and became editor of “La Tribune des Peuples”’.
In two fields of the arts, music and painting, Poland produced two
unique talents of European stature. Fryderyk Chopin became world famous
in Paris as a composer and virtuoso. In spite of the strong ties that bound him
with the traditions of classical music, he introduced novel elements into piano
harmony and technique. To his countrymen he was the exponent of the
romantic pathos of the struggle for liberation, to the world he remained the
explorer of the treasury of melodies drawn from Poland’s folk music. “By
birth a Varsovian, by sentiment a Pole, by his talent a citizen of the world”,
as Norwid beautifully said. At the same time Piotr Michalowski became one
of the great romantic painters in Paris. His works portrayed scenes of village
life and were a combination of brilliant modern technique with a keen realistic
gift of observation. Michatowski’s way of painting was a generation ahead of
POLISH CULTURE IN THE ROMANTIC PERIOD 427
Cyprian Kamil Norwid
the tastes, which prevailed in Poland at the time. His works were hardly
known in the homeland and did not influence his contemporaries.
Only a very thin stratum of Poland’s society was familiar with these
achievements in Polish art. Poland’s cultural life was stultified by a backward
educational system, discouraged by foreign rule, especially in the Congress
Kingdom and Galicia, and in the villages by the landowners. The problems,
feelings and aspirations of the mass of the people were mirrored in the
428 ON THE EVE OF AN AGRARIAN REVOLUTION (1832-1849)
Fryderyk Chopin
national poetry, music and philosophy, but the masses themselves did not
benefit from these achievements at the time.
The era of the “three bards” came to a close after 1848, though there
remained a number of romantic successors: K. Ujejski, T. Lenartowicz,
M. Romanowski and W. Syrokomla, and their poems later inspired the
young revolutionaries of 1863.
A man almost unknown and never understood by his contemporaries was
Cyprian Kamil Norwid, a great artist, thinker and pioneer of new forins
P. Michalowski, Portrait of an Old Peasant
430 ON THE EVE OF AN AGRARIAN REVOLUTION (1832-1849)
and content in the reflective lyric. In his firm belief that the country would
be revived by the common people and that a new Polish art would grow
from popular roots, he was likewise a man of his epoch, but what he wrote
about the essence of art and the role it plays in stimulating the minds of
the people in everyday life could only be understood by the third generation.
In the 1850’s Warsaw once more regained its position as the main centre
of Poland’s intellectual and cultural life. The city was growing fast and
improving, new dwelling houses and public buildings were erected, like the
Vienna Railway Station, Europejski Hotel, the Land Credit Association, all
designed by H. Marconi in the Renaissance style. Like Paris, Warsaw planned
big arteries of communications, gas and running water were piped to the
houses and horse-drawn buses came into being. The newspapers changed rapid-
ly and became a profit-making concern. In the Wielki Theatre Stanislaw Mo-
niuszko’s operas, Halka and Hrabina (The Countess), saw their first perform-
ances and aroused the patriotic feelings of the audience. The Warsaw School
of Fine Arts produced a group of young painters like W. Gerson, F. Kos-
trzewski, J. Szermentowski and others who went into the countryside to
study the landscape of the Polish village and the characteristics of the village
and the peasants. In Warsaw, too, J. I. Kraszewski and Korzeniowski were
writing their novels.
Intellectual activity which had been disorganized after the 1831 débacle,
began to revive in a number of quarters, such as the Cracow Scientific Society,
the Poznan Society of the Friends of the Sciences, and finally also in Warsaw’s
Main School (Szkota Gtéwna). Besides history and philosophy, the physical
sciences, physiology under Professor Majer, geology under Professor Zejssner,
medicine under Professors Diet] and Chatubinski, began to have a share in
the achievements of these institutions. Even before the January Insurrection
bourgeois circles began to take a lively interest in practical and technical
problems, in the worship of labour, thrift, and cautions politics, all of which
foreshadowed the coming of the era of positivism. In the meantime, however,
more and more attention and space was devoted in novels, in poetry and
on the stage, by the artist painter, and particularly by the journalists, to the
most vital issue of the day, the peasant problem.
Chapter XVII
THE PERIOD OF THE JANUARY
INSURRECTION
(1850-1864)
THE REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION IN RUSSIA
AND POLAND
\
In the 1850’s the Russian part of Poland was the last sector where the peasant
did not own his land, where he was subjected to the authority of the manor
and compelled to render labour dues. The extent of compulsory labour in the
Kingdom was dwindling, though, and conversion to rents was taking place.
Arbitrary eviction of peasants from the land was officially prohibited by the
ukase of 1846, but the peasants were less patient in their submission to
remaining feudal conditions. Backed by the Tsarist government, the land-
owners aimed at introducing agrarian reforms which would leave in their
hands the larger part of arable land and all forests. If this happened, a
considerable part of the peasantry would become complete proletarians. The
peasants on private estates complained more generally against such a reform.
They were striving not only to get rid of labour dues, but also to recover the
land which had been taken from them, to keep their right of entering the
woodland and perhaps even to divide the landlords’ estates among themselves.
The expected conversion to freeholds could become the starting point of
a social upheaval and therefore could also become a powerful factor in the
national liberation movement.
In the early 1850’s, reaction got the upper hand in Europe, while Russia
was still subject to the autocracy of Tsar Nicholas. The crisis came during the
Crimean War of 1854-1856. This war which was waged against Russia by the
western Powers did not, however, fulfil the hopes of the Polish exiles.
Napoleon III and Palmerston used Poland as a trump card in their game of
diplomacy, but were by no means eager to unleash a revolutionary struggle,
which might serve to liberate the oppressed peoples of Europe. Nonetheless,
the defeat in the Crimean War revealed the weakness of Nicholas’ Russia and
marked the beginning of reforms which had repercussions on conditions in
Poland as well. The new Tsar, Alexander II, received a friendly welcome in
Warsaw. Yet he disappointed Polish hopes when he sternly told the repre-
sentatives of the gentry : “Points de réveries, Messieurs, point de réveries”’.
Nevertheless, the general line of approach was more liberal and this, coupled
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THE REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION IN RUSSIA AND POLAND 433
with Russia’s temporary entente with France, began to ease the situation in
Poland. An amnesty brought the release of many political prisoners. Censor-
ship was relaxed. The government granted permission for the establishment of
an Agricultural Society in Warsaw and for the opening of a Medical Acade-
my. In the more liberal atmosphere of the post-Crimean period new politi-
cal groups were formed within a very few years.
At the head of the Agricultural Society, which had immediately attracted
several thousand landowners as members, stood the well known leader of
“organic work”, Count Andrzej Zamoyski. The Society pursued the economic
aim of improving agricultural techniques and the social aim of achieving
gradual abolition of labour services in a manner which would be as advanta-
geous as possible to the gentry. This aim, which was of vital importance in
view of peasant opposition, could not be achieved without government sup-
port. Zamoyski and his advisers had therefore no intention of antagonizing
the government by presenting political demands. All they could do was to
count on favourable circumstances in the future which might force St. Pe-
tersburg to seek! an accomodation with the Poles.
The bourgeosie was ready to go somewhat further. Its potential power and
economic influence were growing fast. In 1851 the Kingdom had been incor-
porated into the Rusian customs area, which assured Polish textiles a wider
access to eastern markets than ever before. This quickened considerably the
concentration of the textile industry in the Lddz district. In 1854 the first
completely mechanized cotton mill of Scheibler started operating there. The
Warsaw metallurgical plants also were equipped with machinery. In the early
1860’s a few factories in Warsaw were already employing several hundred
workmen each. A new branch of industry, sugar production, came into being,
based mainly in the western part of the country. Warsaw was connected by
rail with Vienna, Berlin and St. Petersburg, which made it a busy emporium.
The local industrialists and financiers had close connexions with the banks in
Berlin and Paris. They purchased real estate and used gentry capital in their
enterprises. These circles had an interest in seeing the autonomy of the King-
dom increased. They were particularly eager to obtain municipal selfgov-
ernment and equal rights for the Jews. Naturally, no thought was further
from the big financiers than engaging in revolutionary activities, but among
the well-to-do Warsaw intelligentsia patriotic circles existed which had the
intention of influencing public opinion. An influential figure in this milieu was
Edward Jurgens who was an opponent of conspiracy. The Left Wing called
his circle the “Millenary Group” for its alleged desire to postpone the fight
for Poland’s freedom for a thousand years.
Once again, the real conspiracy was begun by university students. Several
thousand Poles were studying in the universities of the Russian Empire, mostly
sons of landowners and impoverished gentry families. They had their semi-
public organizations for mutual aid and smaller closely-knit groups of
political leaders engaded in conspiratorial activity. At the General Staff
28 History of Poland
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Academy in St. Petersburg was a group of capable Polish officers gathered
round Zygmunt Sierakowski. They established contact with Russian revolu-
tionaries, with Tchernyshevski and Dobrolyubov, and made plans for a joint
action against the Tsarist system at some time in the future. Concurrently,
Polish exiles in London, especially Stanislaw Worcell, collaborated with
Hertzen and with the editors of the famous “Kolokol” (The Bell).
The opening of the Medical Academy in Warsaw in 1857 permitted the
expansion of student circles. They went on gradually from semi-public
work for united aid to planning revolutionary activity and established
relations with Russia and in the West. The man they accorded the greatest
respect was General Mieroslawski who lived in Paris. It was generally known
PATRIOTIC DEMONSTRATIONS 435
that he belonged to the circle of Prince Napoleon Bonaparte, the radically-
minded cousin of Napoleon III, and he was expected to obtain the support of
the Second Empire for the coming Polish insurrection. In his public speeches
in Paris Mierostawski violently attacked the doctrine of “organic work” and
threatened the gentry with ruin, if they did not take part in the revolution.
In Poland he had the reputation of being a Red extremist, but he could more
appropriately be called a demagogue trying to establish his authority over
the conspiracy, always with the illusion that “Poland’s third estate’ would
subdue both gentry and peasants in the coming insurrection.
The Franco-Austrian war of 1859 and later the unification of Italy
electrified Polish public opinion. It was possible to think that, thanks to
French help, a Polish Cavour or a Polish Garibaldi would emerge and achieve
a similar success. Mierostawski cooperated closely with Garibaldi, and be-
cause there was a fair possibility of a new Austro-Italian war breaking out
at the end of 1860, Mierostawski sent directives to the young people of
Warsaw asking them to be more audacious in their public demonstrations. The
Hotel Lambert group also encouraged the aristocracy at home to assume the
leadership of the Polish cause. The crisis of the labour service system in the
Russian part of Poland, the obvious weakness of the Russian Empire and the
unstable international situation were all factors in awakening long repressed
hopes in Poland. Once more the regaining of national independence seemed
within reach. Few people in Poland counted on an early armed insurrection,
but many circles yearned to demonstrate their national feeling in the open.
PATRIOTIC DEMONSTRATIONS
In June 1860 the funeral of the widow of General Sowinski, one of the
soldiers of the November Insurrection, gave rise to the first public demonstra-
tion in Warsaw. In October of the same year the population of the capital
openly ignored the meeting of the three monarchs (the Emperors of Russia
and Austria, and the Regent of Prussia). Later in the same year, on the
memorable anniversary of November 29, the people sang for the first time
in the streets of Warsaw the patriotic religious hymn Boze cos Polske (God
who hast Poland), as well as the anthem (Jeszcze Polska nie zginela). The
disconcerted police did not deal effectively with these demonstrations.
The demonstrations were controlled by a number of allied students’
groups. Some of them had links with Mierostawski and aimed at mobilizing
the Warsaw streets, perhaps looking forward to a possible armed rising,
if a European war should break out. Other groups of young men were in
contact with the “Millenaries”, who looked favourably upon popular resti-
veness because they believed that such demonstrations might bring the gov-
ernment to seek a compromise and introduce reforms. The patriotic spirit
28*
436 THE PERIOD OF THE JANUARY INSURRECTION (1850-1864)
pervaded the petty bourgeoisie, tradesmen and factory workers and Warsaw
vibrated with militant recollections of 1794 and 1830.
At the beginning of 1861 everyone expected the long promised Tsarist
ukase, which was to abolish serfdom in Russia. Some agrarian unrest could
be envisaged in this connexion. In February the peasant question was to
be discussed at the annual Warsaw meeting of the Agricultural Society.
The Polish landowners did not want the government to steal a march on
them in settling this crucial problem. The “Millenaries” proposed that
a political appeal be addressed to the Tsar, but Andrzej Zamoyski firmly
rejected this suggestion. The Warsaw bourgeoisie decided therefore to stage
demonstrations in order to put pressure on the landowners and force them
to present an appeal. At the same time, the conspiratorial circles believed
it possible that a real mass demonstration might lead to a clash with the
army and perhaps even to revolution.
On the thirtieth anniversary of the battle of Grochéw, on 25 February,
1861, the organizers led a procession carrying patriotic emblems to the mar-
ket place of the Old Town. It was dispersed by the police. Two days later,
on 27 February, a larger crowd demonstrated in the street, in the Kra-
kowskie PrzedmieScie, one of Warsaw’s main streets. A military detach-
ment fired one volley into the crowd, killed five and wounded almost a score.
Wary of the aroused people, Viceroy Gorchakov withdrew his troops to
the barracks and refrained from any further repression.
The bloodshed forced the propertied classes into action. That very night
a gathering in the Merchants’ Club selected a Delegation from the lead-
ing representatives of Warsaw’s bourgeoisie. Jointly with the leaders of the
Agricultural Society, they drafted an adress to the Tsar which recalled in
very general terms the historic rights of the Polish nation. In the negotia-
tions which followed Gorchakov agreed to a solemn funeral of the five
victims. The members of the Delegation tried to convince the Viceroy that
they alone, if given a free hand, could prevent open revolt. At the same
time they were explaining to the craftsmen and the angry students that
only a dignified, calm approach and “moral” force could compel the govern-
ment to grant concessions. By this manoeuvre, the Delegation kept the
situation under control. The funeral of the victims was absolutely without
incident although a very large crowd attended. The young revolutionary
leaders could not bring themselves to issue a call to arms. The Tsarist authori-
ties, taken- aback by the extent of the movement, remained passive at the
time, but had no intention of backing down on matters of principle.
The political crisis had its repercussions throughout the country. Cities
and towns staged demonstrations on the Warsaw pattern, committees were
formed, and occasionally some unpopular officials were forced to resign.
In Lédz a crowd of weavers demolished in several factories the new ma-
chines, which had deprived them of work. Peasants, excited by the news
PATRIOTIC DEMONSTRATIONS 437
of emancipation in the neighbouring provinces of the Empire, stopped
performing labour dues. Resistance against compulsory labour extended
to more than 160,000 farms in April and May 1861, and this example
incited peasants to disobedience. Tenant farmers stopped paying rents,
farm hands demanded land from the demesnes. To save themselves from
the threatening peasant revolt, the government temporarily announced that
from the autumn peasants could change from labour services to rents.
In the political field, St. Petersburg also retreated step by step, obliged
to avoid an open clash with the Poles at a time of internal and external
difficulties. An ukase issued by the Tsar announced the nomination of
a State Council with advisory functions and the inauguration of elected
urban and district councils. Margrave Aleksander Wielopolski was appoin-
ted a member of Administrative Council. Thus the government offered the
Polish aristocrats a share in authority in exchange for their assistance in
subduing the revolutionary movement. In order to carry out this policy
Wielopolski disbanded both the Agricultural Society and the Municipal Dele-
gation. A demonstration in protest against these measures, which took place
on 8 April, was dispersed by the army ; several hundred people perished
in the bloody massacre on Warsaw’s Plac Zamkowy.
In the general indignation which followed these reprisals, neither the
Polish gentry nor the bourgeoisie saw their way clear to follow Wielopolski.
On one hand, the concessions granted by the government seemed insufficient,
even to the circles close to Andrzej Zamoyski. For one thing they embraced
only the Congress Kingdom and ignored the interests of the Polish gentry
in Lithuania, Byelorussia and the Ukraine. On the other hand, the pressure
exercised by public opinion kept the landowners from entering into an
agreement with the occupying Power. It they did, left-wing patriots might
easily take radical step of backing the peasants against the gentry. Therefore
the landowners and the bourgeoisie though accepting the Tsar’s concessions,
did not openly dissociate themselves from the opposition exhibited by the
entire nation. Demonstrations continued in spite of vexatious behaviour by
the police. The population wore mourning, patriotic hymns were sung in
the churches and the people obeyed the directives of secret organizations.
This propaganda spread among the poor of the urban centres. Its slogan
that all creeds were equal excited the Jewish population. It tried to attract
the peasants and reached out to Lithuania and to the other parts of parti-
tioned Poland. In spite of class antagonism which divided the country,
there seemed to be complete solidarity as far as the demand for independ-
ence was concerned. The government was unable to cope with the move-
ment. In October 1861 the martial law was proclaimed in the Kingdom
and troops forced their way into two of Warsaw’s churches, arresting the
majority of the faithful attending a patriotic Mass. After this act of vio-
lence, demonstrations ceased and the national movement went underground.
438 THE PERIOD OF THE JANUARY INSURRECTION (1850-1864)
THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION
The period of demonstrations and “moral revolution” was not favourable
to the establishment of a distinctive revolutionary party, but it facilitated
the recruitment of members for spontaneously created secret organizations.
In the spring and summer of 1861, many groups were formed in Warsaw
and in the provinces by young people of the intelligentsia and by artisans.
They all called themselves “Reds”, which amounted only to the belief, that
no armed insurrection was possible in Poland, without some social reform.
In the beginning, part of the Red groups were under the influence of the
“Millenaries” but soon there emerged a Left Wing, to whom demonstrations
were not merely a means of arousing patriotic feelings or putting pressure
on the government, but a means to enrol the support of the masses in pre-
paring for an insurrection. An outstanding radical figure in the movement
was Ignacy Chmielenski who bitterly accused the “organic work” party of
betraying the national cause for the sake of their own petty class interests.
In October 1861 immediately after the proclamation of martial law, several
of the Red circles united as a result of the efforts of the writer, Apollo
Korzeniowski. A City Committee was formed, whose members decided
upon the amalgamation of all secret societies in the capital. The Committee’s
delegates, mostly young people, including the brothers Frankowski, Sza-
chowski, Wasilewski and others toured the provinces to organize additional
cells there.
Following the principle that the leaders of the movement should reside
within the country, the City Committee did not accept Mierostawski’s
leadership, but got in touch with the Sierakowski circle in St. Petersburg.
This circle sent Jarostaw Dabrowski to Warsaw, who, while acting publicly
as a staff officer of the Tsarist army, soon became “the Head of the City
of Warsaw” and of its Red organization. Dabrowski based the conspiracy
mainly on the metal-workers. By spring 1862 the unification of all of
Warsaw’s secret organizations had been accomplished. The City Committee
was already at that time calling upon the propertied classes to accept its
authority.
These classes, the landowners and the bourgeoisie, anxiously watched
the development of the conspiracy, afraid of the possible insurrection as
well as of the radical programme of the Reds. Nonetheless, the camp of
the “Moderates” (or White Party) could not make up their minds to come
to terms openly with the Russian government, firstly because the state of
martial law gave no evidence of Russian willingness to make concessions
and, secondly, because even the die-hard conservatives had to take public
Opinion into account. The Whites therefore sought a middle road between
striking a bargain with the foreign ruler and accepting a revolution. They
thought they could find that middle road, as before, in the programme of
“organic work” embellished with patriotic phrases and promises of an insur-
THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION 439
rection at some time in the distant future. The White Party was composed,
in the countryside, of former members of the Agricultural Society. It was
directed, since the end of 1861, by a secret Directory in which Leopold Kro-
nenberg, a Warsaw banker, played a leading role. The Directory had consid-
erable financial resources at its disposal but, torn with dissent, it remained
rather inactive.
The state of martial law did not pacify the country with its undercur-
rent of conspiracy. The villages, too, were in ferment and refused to agree
to conversion to rents on the onerous terms imposed by the government.
In May 1862, St. Petersburg decided to make further concessions to the
Polish upper classes with a view to pacifying the country. The Grand Duke
Constantine (brother of the Tsar) was appointed Viceroy. Wielopolski was
appointed chief of the civil administration. The Tsar approved the ukases
as elaborated by the Margrave in respect of compulsory conversion to rents,
the granting of equal rights to Jews, the expansion and Polonization of
public education. The University of Warsaw, suppressed after 1831, was re-
opened under the name of Main School. All these reforms were designed
to appeal to the gentry and the bourgeoisie and were intended to draw them
away from the struggle for independence. The Right Wing of the big land-
owners among the Whites were impressed and inclined to come to terms
with Wielopolski.
At this very moment in May and June, Dabrowski, the chief of the
Warsaw conspirators, was planning to launch an armed attack without de-
lay. At the same time he was head of the secret “Officers? Committee of
the First Army” composed of several hundred officers stationed in Poland,
both Russian and Polish, united in the revolutionary movement. The or-
ganization cooperated with the revolutionary movement in Russia, the
“Zemlya i Volya” (Land and Liberty) Committee,.as well as with the
St. Petersburg group led by Sierakowski. The alliance with the Russian
revolutionary movement opened new vistas to the Red conspiracy. The
officers of the Russian garrison in Warsaw engaged in the conspiracy were
ready to open the gates of the Citadel to the insurgents. This audacious
plan caused anxiety among the moderate wing of the Red camp. Various
groups of the centre, until then divided among the Whites and the Reds,
were now pressing hard for the two organizations to unite, to reject any
compromise with the Russian government and, at the same time, to post-
pone the armed struggle. Dabrowski foiled this attempt and preserved the
Committee’s existence by maintaining a separate Red organization. He had,
however, to give up the idea of an immediate armed rising and to agree to
admit some moderates as members in the Committee. Some time earlier,
the Russian high command had got wind of the revolutionary organization
within the army. Three officers of the Warsaw garrison (Arnholdt, Sliwicki
and Rostkowski) were shot. During the summer, Ignacy Chmielenski, in
agreement with Dabrowski, organized in Warsaw several attempts on Con-
440 THE PERIOD OF THE JANUARY INSURRECTION (1850-1864)
stantine’s and Wielopolski’s life. The attempts failed and the men directly
involved died on the gallows. But the revolutionary terror coupled with
Tsarist reprisals made it difficult for the Whites to go over to the side of
the government. The negotiations between the Grand Duke Constantine and
Andrzej Zamoyski were torpedoed. The Whites advanced demands, which
seemed unacceptable to the Russians, that the reforms should also apply
to Lithuania and Ruthenia (Ukraine). After this fiasco the Tsarist govern-
ment exiled Zamoyski from Poland.
Meanwhile, the secret Red organization was expanding. Its network
embraced cities and towns in Russian Poland and extended as far as Poznan
and Galicia. The organization took the title of National Central Committee
and, operating underground, proclaimed itself the supreme national au-
thority. In the meantime, in August, Dabrowski was arrested and Agaton
Giller, the representative of the right wing Reds enjoyed the greatest influ-
ence in the Committee. He established the principles of building a “secret
Polish State” which was to harness the entire nation and compel the people
to obedience. The organization possessed an efficient network of local au-
thorities. It had an underground press and established a national tax, which
it collected under pressure of public opinion even from those who opposed
the movement. The Central Committee announced to the peasants the
conversion to freeholds, while promising the gentry that they would be
compensated by the government for its loss of income. Giller expected in
this way to be able to rally all classes to the national cause. Giller and
Zygmunt Padlewski (Dabrowski’s successor as Head of the City of War-
saw), went to London to negotiate with Hertzen and Ogariev, the editors
of “Kolokol”. In the agreement they concluded it was stated that the Polish
movement was democratic in character, that it was intended to give the
land to the peasants apd that it recognized the right of Lithuania and Ru-
thenia to self-determination. In exchange, the leaders of the revolutionary
movement in Russia promised the Poles assistance in their fight against the
Tsarist Empire.
It took time to prepare the insurrection, in particular to buy and import
the necessary weapons. In agreement with the Russians of the “Zemlya
i Volya” Committee, the Central Committee planned the armed insurrec-
tion for the late spring of 1863, Wielopolski frustrated this plan by putting.
forward his scheme for the conscription of politically disloyal young men.
The levy was announced in advance, but the exact date remained a secret
and so did the list of the victims. In this manner, the Margrave expected
either to smash the Red organization, or else force it to start fighting at
a most inconvenient moment. In fact, the rank and file of the Red organiza-
tion brought pressure to bear upon the Central Committee and demanded
that it give the signal for the insurrection as soon as the conscription was
started.
At the last minute the right wing of the Committee with Giller in the lead
THE ARMED STRUGGLE OF 1863 441
did their utmost to prevent the insurrection, but the scales were tipped by
Padlewski supported by an enthusiastic group of “voivodship commissars”
who had come to the meeting from the provinces. The day before the levy,
on 14/15 January the younger conspirators left Warsaw secretly and went
into hiding in the neighbouring woods. A week later, on 22 January, the
Central Committee as the Temporary National Government issued the
Manifesto for the Insurrection and called the nation to arms. The Mani-
festo announced that all peasant landholders should own the land they cul-
tivated. All labour service and rents were consequently abolished and the
landowners were promised government compensation. The landless popula-
tion were promised 3 morgs of land from government estates, provided they
took part in the fight for liberation.
THE ARMED STRUGGLE OF 1863
During the night of 22/23 January, 1863, small units of insurgents attacked
the Russian garrisons in some 20 places. The odds were heavy, for only
a small part of the 20,000 conspirators took part in the fight. There was
a shortage of arms, because supplies from abroad had not been brought in
on time and the Tsarist regular army occupying the Kingdom had 100,000
men under arms. Though attacking by surprise, the insurgents were success-
ful in only very few of the first engagements, but the Tsarist commanders
realized the danger they were facing and ordered the garrisons to concentrate.
The Whites were opposed to the insurrection, which they expected to
fail quickly and did what they could to persuade the armed units to dis-
band. The insurrection continued however, thanks to the spirit and devotion
of a few revolutionary volunteers. In the regions of Podlasie, Sandomierz
and Kielce several units, numbering a few thousand men each, went into
action in February. They were composed mainly of artisans, workers from
the mining areas and petty gentry. The outbreak of the insurrection caused
fresh peasant revolts. In many districts peasants raided and pillaged the
manors, bound the owners and their employees with ropes and carted them
to town. The Russian troops tried to put down the jacquerie in defence of
the gentry and fought the rioting peasants as they did the insurgents.
Simultaneously the insurgents promised the peasants their freeholds and
called upon them to join the fight. The gentry were anxious because they
feared that further resistance to the movement might turn it against them
and bring on social revolution.
At the same time Bismarck took advantage of the Polish insurrection
as a welcome opportunity to offer the Tsar Prussia’s military assistance.
The Russo-Prussian Convention, signed by General Alvensleben in St. Pe-
tersburg on 8 February, made the Polish Insurrection into an international
problem. Napoleon III intervened with the obvious design of exploiting
A. Grottger, Battle, 1864-1866
THE ARMED STRUGGLE OF 1863 443
the situation against Prussia. He succeeded in drawing Austria and England
into the diplomatic game which did not exclude the possibility of military
action. Having once resolved to take advantage of the Polish Insurrection,
Napoleon wished to make sure that it would not collapse too early. He put
pressure on the Whites through the intermediary of the Hotel Lambert,
demanding that the insurrection be continued and gave some hope of mili-
tary assistance. These suggestions from Paris fell on fertile ground, because
the Whites realized, that they could no longer stand aside while the nation
had risen in revolt.
In the second half of February, the Whites decided to join the insurrec-
tion. The Directory led by Kronenberg at once endeavoured to wrest the
leadership from the Reds and to take the radical content out of the move-
ment. Their plan was made easy by the difficult situation of the Reds. On
the eve of the revolution the Central Committee had appointed as dictator
Mierostawski, the only prominent commander linked with the camp of the
Reds. Mierostawski arrived in Poland, but was defeated in two ill-fated
skirmishes and returned to Paris. The members of the underground govern-
ment travelled around the country looking for a convenient place to establish
themselves in the open under the protection of the insurgent army. In prac-
tice, the head of the revolutionary movement was Warsaw’s “Head of the
City”, Stefan Bobrowski, a dedicated and energetic young man. Faced with
this situation, the leaders of the Whites assembled in early March in Cracow,
where they usurped the power of the National Committee and appointed
General Marian Langiewicz dictator. This popular commander was to
serve as a screen for a new completely White government, but Langiewicz’s
unit was dissolved a week later and the unhappy dictator imprisoned by
the Austrians. Bobrowski then announced that the secret Temporary Govern-
ment was taking command once more. For a time the insurrection was safe,
but within the next few weeks the Whites, in cooperation with the right
wing of the Reds, achieved a change in the composition of the government
and Giller was once more placed at the head. The separate organization of
the Whites was disbanded. The gentry and the bowrgeoisie joined the move-
ment, making sure that their influence would prevail.
The insurrection had one peculiar aspect right from the beginning. It
was directed by the National Government hiding in Warsaw, which issued
its instructions under its famous anonymous seal. The civilian chiefs of
voivodships, districts and towns were named by and subordinated to the
government. The organization extended its efficient supervision throughout
the country and was well obeyed by the population. It levied taxes, settled
disputes, punished traitors and spies. Last but not least it waged war against
the Russian Empire which gradually mobilized some 300,000 soldiers for
the fight.
The Polish units consisted at first of a few thousand men and because
such units could hardly cope with the enemy’s overwhelming strength, they
444 THE PERIOD OF THE JANUARY INSURRECTION (1850-1864)
quickly disintegrated. Instead, smaller partisan units came into being, each
of them consisting of about 500 men and capable, if well commanded, of
holding its own for several months, harassing the enemy, avoiding capture
and even attacking occasionally and scoring successes. In the latter part
of the spring and during the summer several scores of such units were active
in the field. The partisan movement embraced all regions of the Kingdom,
Lithuania, and part of Byelorussia; Galicia and Prussian Poland sent
volunteers and funds across the borders. The principal problem was the
lack of weapons. Large sums were expended for their purchase from arma-
ment manufacturers abroad, but the supplies reached the camps only with
considerable difficulty, so that most of the partisans were equipped only
with scythes. With their supreme devotion to duty the insurgents might
have been able to keep the strongest European army in check, but they
could never defeat it, nor hope to hold a single district for any length of
time.
Without outside help the Poles could be victorious only if the mass of
the people rose and if the movement were changed into an agrarian revolu-
tion and spread to Russia as well. The leaders of the left wing of the Reds,
Sierakowski, Dabrowski and Padlewski, were thinking in these terms. The
Whites, however, prevented moves in this direction, as soon as they came
into power. The Polish peasants, who had hesitated at first, showed more
and more sympathy for the movement, when they saw that the promises.
made to them were being kept faithfully. Labour dues and land rents had
ceased to exist and the national government saw to it that they were not
reimposed. Freeholds thus became a reality, but the government was di-
rected by the Whites and did not countenance further peasant demands. it
granted no land to the landless and postponed calling the whole population
to arms to some time in the future. Pinning al] their hopes on an interven-
tion by the Powers, the Whites were reserving their forces for the expected
European war. For the time being they wanted to survive and indulged
only in armed demonstrations. In the early summer war seemed imminent,
because the Russian government refused to accept the diplomatic notes
addressed to it from Paris, London and Vienna, but Napoleon, yielding to
the arguments of his partners, did not go to war and, in spite of the loss
of prestige, left Poland to her fate.
The Red politicians were quite aware of the fact that the insurrection
was in danger of collapse. Twice, in May and September 1863, they suc-
ceeded in wresting the famous official seal from the rival Whites and form-
ing their own National Government. Both attempts were short-lived, and
the Whites returned to the helm after a few weeks. In the late autumn
dictatorial power was at last assumed by Romuald Traugutt, who was to
carry out the Red’s national programme of relying on the peasants. Prep-
arations were made for a mass-levy as opposed to reliance on the ‘elp of
the western countries. Relations were to be established instead with the
THE EMANCIPATION OF THE PEASANTS 445
revolutionary movements. This new policy had come several months too
late. The people were exhausted and worn out by the unequal struggle. The
best had either fallen in battle or been betrayed. Warsaw’s city organization,
which had been protecting the government, had crumbled away. Muraview,
Governor General in Wilno, the cruel “Hangman” as he was called, had
put down the rising in Lithuania by applying mass reprisals. Thanks to the
energetic attitude of Traugutt and his closest friends, especially General
Jézef Hauke-Bosak, the units of the revolutionaries survived the bitter win-
ter in the southern part of the Kingdom. In April 1864, however, Traugutt
was arrested and hanged soon after. The secret organization was wiped out,
and the armed insurrection had come to an end.
THE EMANCIPATION OF THE PEASANTS AND THE END
OF THE PERIOD OF NATIONAL RISINGS
No sooner had the threat of a European war disappeared, that the Tsarist
government openly changed its policy in Poland. Wielopolski was the first
to leave Warsaw and Grand Duke Constantine soon followed him. General
Berg was appointed Viceroy and decided to break down Polish resistance
with the brutal use of force. Permanent pacification of the country was,
however, unthinkable without a preliminary settlement of the agrarian
question. The decree of the National Government, which had granted
freeholds to the peasants, was an incontrovertible fact, and the Tsarist
government could do nothing but confirm it. Abandoning the policy, he
had been following up to this time of backing the interests of the landed
gentry, the Tsar entrusted the execution of an agrarian reform in Poland
to Russian liberal bureaucrats headed by Nicholas Milyutin. The relevant
ukase issued by the Tsar on 2 March, 1864, gave the peasants the land thev
cultivated and granted the proprietors compensation from State funds. All
further promises, such as the granting of land to the landless and the return
of land illegally taken from the peasants, were to be fulfilled only in a very
small measure. In fact the Tsarist reform simply sanctioned the state of
affairs created by the insurrection. Consequently it granted the peasants
more land on much easier conditions, than those provided by the Russian
reform of 1861. A similar measure applied as well to the western provinces.
of Russia, where the Tsarist government has been obliged to revise the
provisions of the 1861 reform to the advantage of the peasants, soon after
the outbreak of the Polish Insurrection in the spring of 1863. The January
Insurrection had, then, contributed to improving the standard of life not
only of the Poles, but also of the Lithuanian, Byelorussian and Ukrainian
peasants. The immediate effect of this move was all to the advantage of
Russia. The peasantry discontinued its armed struggle and tried to ingratiate
themselves with the Russian commissars, while they awaited the distribu-
446 THE PERIOD OF THE JANUARY INSURRECTION (1850-1864)
tion of the land, but, contrary to the expectations of the bureaucrats, the
peasants who had been granted land did not become in the long run Joyal
subjects of the Tsar.
The end of the insurrection marked the end of the process of abolishing
feudal conditions in Poland. In all of the three parts of the country under
foreign rule, however, this was carried out only partially. The reforms were
introduced from the top, by governments whose hands had been forced
either by the popular masses and by the revolution, or by the state of
international relations. The reforms abolished labour dues, the power of
the lord of the manor over the peasant, some other privileges and class
differences. They were not genuinely democratic reforms. In the new bour-
geois society, the landowner had to maintain his economic dominance over
the landless peasants and the small-holders. The reform in Galicia proved
more radical than the Poznan reform, while the reform in the Kingdom was
more radical still. The more advantageous the conditions offered by virtue
of the reform, the greater were the possibilities for a swift development
of capitalist relations.
As has been mentioned before, from the end of the eighteenth century
on the issue of peasant emancipation and the struggle for independence
were closely intertwined. This was due not only to the fact, that Polish
patriots were promising freedom to the peasants to encourage them to join
the struggle for national liberation. There was another reason as well,
namely, that the abolition of feudal servitude created a nation of new, free
citizens, conscious fighters for freedom, whether in the present or succeeding
generations.
The series of insurrections did not bring about Poland’s independence.
The defeats caused material losses, reprisals, and continued restriction of
national liberty. We have seen what was the cause of these defeats. The
greater strength of the enemy and the indifference of the European Powers
were not the only reason. Causes may be also found in the inconsistency
of the patriots themselves and the opposition of Polish counter-revolution-
aries. And yet the balance-sheet of a century of effort did not show only
losses. Even the lost revolution paved the way for a broader and clearer
national consciousness. Each successive national movement embraced a
greater number of people and was larger in scope. The army of the Duchv
of Warsaw had been led by aristocrats. The November Insurrection was
started by gentry revolutionaries. The first to join the ranks of the Janu-
ary Insurrection were young workers and craftsmen, and the last to leave
the partisan struggle were the peasant volunteers. Finally, 1863 created in
Poland the conditions necessary for the development of capitalism with its
accompanying labour movement, which in later years caused the collapse
of the partitioning Powefs. Already in the early twentieth century the sons
of the peasants who had been emancipated by the National Government
began to struggle by word and deed for Poland’s independence.
J. Malczewski, The Last Stage, 1883
Last but not least the international aspect of Poland’s fight for independ-
ence must be remembered. For 70 years risings were ever imminent and at
times were extremely effective as a factor counterbalancing the hegemony
of the Holy Alliance. In this respect alone they were an encouragement to
all progressive efforts in Europe and all peoples struggling for national
independence. This found its expression not only in the participation of
Polish volunteers in the Hungarian campaign, in Garibaldi’s march, or on
the barricades of the Paris Commune. The November Insurrection certainly
contributed to the establishment of Belgian independence, and Poland’s
example awakened national consciousness in the backward peoples of the
Balkans. Nor was it an accident that the Polish question had the lasting
sympathy of all progressive circles in Europe. Volunteers from all corners
of the world fought in the Polish ranks, including many Russians and Ger-
mans. Leading revolutionaries of the nineteenth century, with Marx and
Engels at their head, were unanimous in their defence of Poland.
As is generally known, the “Polish Meeting” which was convened in
London in July 1863 became the starting point for the discussions which
448 THE PERIOD OF THE JANUARY INSURRECTION (1850-1864)
led to the foundation of the First Working Men International. Its first
General Council declared a year later : “The struggle for independence was
carried on by the Poles in the common interest of the nations of Europe.
That is why its defeat is at the same time a heavy blow to the cause of
human civilization and progress. Poland had undoubtedly the right to de-
mand universal support for her efforts to win independence from the leading
nations of Europe.”
At this time, in 1864, this resolution was only a token of friendship. The
future was to show that the revolutionary labour movement could become
one of the deciding factors which brought Poland her desired liberation
half a century later.
Chapter XVIII
POSITIVISM AND TRI-LOYALISM.
THE BEGINNINGS
OF THE WORKING-CLASS
MOVEMENT (1864-1885)
THE AFTERMATH OF DISASTER
For the politically conscious elements of society the defeat of the January
Insurrection was the greatest blow that the nation had suffered since the
partitions, Between 1861 and 1864 Poland had, in fact, believed in the
immediate possibility of regaining full independence within extensive state
frontiers. The autonomy of the Kingdom gained in 1862 was generally
considered insufficient. In the spring of 1863 the armed intervention of
the Powers was expected to result in independence. Simultaneously, the
conviction was current that the peasant problem, the most outstanding
social issue of the time, would be solved in such a way as to return the
peasant into a conscious citizen and patriot. The gentry hoped, at the
same time, to preserve its privileged position in society. The bourgeoisie
was even more of the opinion that after agrarian reform the peasants would
become the basis of national strength and the foundation on which the
modern capitalist Polish State would rise.
The year 1864 dispersed all these hopes. Reality appeared so terrible
by comparison with the recent illusion that it was regarded only as a disaster
offering no prospects for a better future. The peasant had just receive his
land from the hands of the Tsarist government and for another generation
would not become a basis for the national struggle for freedom. There was
no realization that a land reform, more advantageous for the peasants than
that in Russia, would shortly hasten the development not only of the class
consciousness, but also of the national feelings of the peasantry and that
already by the end of the century the Polish village in the three areas of
partition would become an essential factor in the growth of national strength.
The fact similarly was often overlooked that the land reform offered
some parts of the country possibilities for rapid economic progress. In the
Kingdom and in Silesia the second half of the century saw the development
of large-scale industry, thus giving rise to a factory proletariat, which was
29 History of Poland
450 POSITIVISM AND TRI-LOYALISM (1864-1885)
not only to mark a new direction in social development, but also to contri-
bute a powerful force in the struggle for national liberation. Thus, the so-
cial upheaval, which was regarded by the bulk of the conservative prop-
ertied classes as a national disaster, contained within it the seeds of a bet-
ter future. This, however, was to appear only in the next generation, that
happier generation which not only struggled for independence but gained
it. One thing was regarded at this time, and for that matter two genera-
tions later, as an undoubted disaster, the weakening of the Polish element
in the eastern borderlands. Looking at this matter from the perspective of
the hundred years which separate us from Muraviev’s persecutions, one
comes to the conclusion that in one way or another the fate of the Polish
elements in these lands was already sealed. The dominant force which
eliminated the Polish element from the eastern borderlands was the awak-
ening of the national feeling of the masses in central and eastern Europe.
In the final analysis, it is this process which shifted the Polish political
border from the areas between the Dnieper and the Bug to the area between
the Vistula and the Odra. Thus, this historic period, which began with
the disaster of the January Insurrection and ended with the downfall of
the post-1919 Poland, created all the conditions for the emergence of the
State which lies at this present time within the Polish frontiers.
THE POST-1863 EMIGRATION
It was a tradition of Polish history in the epoch which followed the parti-
tions, that after disasters many individuals in danger of persecution by the
conqueror would seek their salvation in emigration. In their new home
they would attempt not only to continue their conspiratorial activity, but,
above all, would devise new social concepts and political programmes. The
same occurred after 1864. The influence of this new emigration on the
country, however, cannot be compared with that of the Great Emigration,
whether politically, ideologically or culturally. After 1831, as after 1794,
the country lapsed into lethargy ; in the social sense things returned, at least
superficially, to the state existing before the insurrection and the country
entered a period of reaction. After the January Insurrection of 1863/1864,
on the contrary, a basic transformation of economic and social conditions
took place. The elimination of the last vestiges of feudal conditions in the
Polish countryside occurred. This went on at a more speedy pace in the
Russian area than had taken place first in the Prussian and then in the
Austrian zones. In addition, in the Prussian area the ending of the “Settl-
ement Reform” came at the end of the 1850’s. In Austria it was the 1860’s
which saw the rapid destruction of the peasants’ traditional rights and the
THE RUSSIANIZATION POLICY IN THE KINGDOM 451
consequent struggle for “woods and pastures” conducted with great inten-
sity by the village and manor. As a result, all the three areas underwent,
more or Jess simultaneously, profound social changes. Soon a rapid in-
dustrialization of the Kingdom occurred and brought with it demographic
changes. In the face of these great transformations the role of the political
emigration remained limited and its influence on the shaping of political
life in the country—small. In the immediate future the Austrian area became
the centre of relatively free political life and thus numerous individuals
returned to the country to engage in some work, but in the main their ac-
tivities were professional.
This does not mean that there were no outstanding thinkers among the
post-1864 exiles, capable of creating new and even viable political and
social conceptions. Their Left Wing sought a new approach to the problem
of the historical territories of the former Polish State. There was an attempt
to find a solution which would rescue the idea of the Jagiellonian State and
uniting the “Three Nations”, in face of the awakening national conscious-
ness of the Ukrainians and Lithuanians. In these ideas a programme was
put forward, in one form or another, of a federation of these peoples in
a spirit of equality and fraternity based on a revolutionary social ideology,
which in that generation could only, in effect, be socialist. This is the reason
why the supporters of these concepts, like J. Dabrowski and W. Wro-
blewski, found themselves on the barricades of the Paris Commune in 1871
and became the connecting link between the tradition of the January In-
surrection and the modern revolutionary movement.
The participation of Poles in the First International was quite con-
siderable and it is they who, after the fall of the Paris Commune, sought,
as envoys of the International, to bring the socialist movement into Russia
by way of the Polish territories. This had no immediate or essential impact
on the development of the ideology of those active in the country. It was
only years afterwards, when the issues resulting from the direct effects on
the January Insurrection had been solved in the country and new social
movements began to arise, that the ideas which had been preserved in
exile began to influence the views of the younger generation.
THE RUSSIANIZATION POLICY IN THE KINGDOM
The most important social problem which faced the Kingdom after the col-
lapse of the insurrection was the peasant problem. The 1864 ukase granted
the peasants the ownership of the land in their possession as well as the
lands which had beén illegally taken away from them since 1846. The
peasants were not required to make direct payment for the acquisition of the
29°
452 POSITIVISM AND TRI-LOYALISM (1864-1885)
land, in contrast to the peasantry of the rest of Russia, while the previous
owners received their compensation in bonds. On the other hand, the peasants
were made to pay a relatively high land tax.
The new organization of the Kingdom and, in particular, the execu-
tion of agrarian reform was to be supervised by the Executive Commit-
tee, composed of Russian officials vested with extensive powers. The initial
premise of the Executive Committee was to gain the favour of the peas-
antry for the Russian government and to weaken the gentry politically. In
the course of putting into practice the ukase the anti-gentry policy was con-
siderably relaxed, especially in relation to the wealthiest landowners. The un-
economic aspects of the reform appeared, after a certain period of time, in
a manner most unfavourable to the peasants. No re-allotment of land was
carried out and the peasants’ rights to woods and pastures were not abolished,
in expectation that this would become a cause of dispute between the village
and the manor. A separate machinery of local and central authorities ad-
ministering peasant affairs was set up with the purpose of keeping the
peasants under government tutelage. In the long run this also turned out to
be unfavourable to the peasantry’s economic interests. The Executive Com-
mittee likewise did not intend to abolish the manor farms and had no
concern for the fate of landless peasants. They received such small allotments
that they could not support themselves from them. The peasants received
only 27 per cent of the state and secularized Church lands. Most of these
estates were used to reward, as after 1831, a new group of Russian dignitaries.
In all, the area of land cultivated by the peasant increased as a result of
the reform from 8 to 10 per cent and at the beginning of the 1870's
amounted to 8,2 million morgs. This area increased afterwards, steadily but
slowly, as a result of a voluntary division of manorial lands, and reached
a total of almost 11 million before the First World War. It was primarily the
wealthiest section of the peasantry which benefited from this process, The
land hunger caused by the population increase resulted in a recurrent pro-
letarianization of a considerable part of the rural areas, finding its expres-
sion in the division of holdings, an increase in the number of the landless
and a growing wave of emigration.
While in the early years land reform improved the peasant’s position,
it simultaneously weakened very considerably the position of the gentry.
It was in the first place the medium gentry which, economically weaker,
could not find at the outset sufficient resources to make the transition to new
methods of management not based on serfdom. Because it was precisely the
medium gentry which had sacrificed a great deal for the cause of the
insurrection and suffered from repression, it becomes clear that the reform
resulted in the ruin of many estates. This caused numerous gentry families to
seek employment in the cities, in trade, industry and the professions, a move-
ment which was rendered difficult, because at the same time the administration
was being russified, which deprived them of those possibilities which existed,
THE RUSSIANIZATION POLICY IN THE KINGDOM 453
for example, in the Hapsburg monarchy, where the road to government ap-
pointments was open to the déclassé gentry.
In this difficult situation for the ruined gentry of the Kingdom the role of
women, who had to find employment in these new conditions, increased.
This resulted in a movement towards emancipation earlier, than was noted
in western or central Europe.
A result of the increased influx of the gentry to the cities was the
cultural transformation of urban life. The towns, hitherto largely pop-
ulated by German and Jewish inhabitants, as was true for all this part of
Europe, now became more closely connected with a Polish culture of spe-
cifically gentry character. This affected, above all, the rapidly growing in-
telligentsia. This social group, the most active culturally, now transmitted
gentry traditions to broader sections of the community, which were only, at
this time, awakening to a full cultural life. Thus, both the urban proletariat
and the entire Polish bourgeoisie, took on many of the Polish gentry tradi-
tions. Here we have a distinct feature of Polish culture, which gives it its
uniqueness among European nations. The nineteenth century saw the tri-
umph of bourgeois culture in all of Europe, but in Poland the picture was
different and for casual observers it created the appearance of inferiority or
backwardness in Polish cultural life. It made it more difficult for foreigners
to understand many of the phenomena of Polish social, cultural and po-
litical life.
Political repression was the prime factor in aggravating the crisis of the
landowners. Already during the insurrection Muraviev, the Governor Gen-
eral of Wilno, proceeded to attempt the eradication of the Polish element
in Lithuania. He carried out Jand reform in such a way as to weaken the
Polish gentry. The western provinces of the Empire were not granted
institutions of local self-government (zemstva), which in Russia strengthened
the position of the landlords. The government confiscated a large number of
Polish estates, and exiled to Siberia entire villages inhabited by small land-
holders of gentry origin who considered themselves Poles, because in these
lands belonging to the gentry was equivalent to feeling oneself to be a Pole.
The Polish language was eliminated from government correspondence and
the Roman Catholic clergy was prohibited from keeping civil registry books
in Polish. In these provinces Catholicism was usually synonymous with
Polish nationality and it was only in the native Lithuanian areas that the
Catholic peasants spoke Lithuanian. The Polish language was prohibited in
schools and eliminated from shop signs and commercial correspondence.
Poles, not only gentry but peasants as well, were forbidden, once and for
all, to buy land. In addition, all Polish landowners had to pay a permanent,
special tax or contribution. The result of these regulations was a considerable
decline in the percentage of the Polish population in Lithuania, Byelorussia
and the Ukraine.
_The action of the government in the Congress Kingdom was somewhat
454 POSITIVISM AND TRI-LOYALISM (1864-1885)
different and more long range. The land reform laws provided for new
structure of village administration. Single village units were created, under
the name of a gromada (sub-commune) from which the gentry estates were
excluded. These units were not set up in the villages inhabited by the petty
gentry. Several sub-communes were joined together with the adjoining ma-
nor estates into larger units called gmina (commune). Their village-elder
(wojt) was formally elected by a meeting from which, however, both the
rural poor and the estate owners and priests were excluded. A strict super-
vision was exercised over the gromada and gmina by government officials,
called “commissars for peasant affairs”. All this was to serve the purpose
of rendering cooperation between the Polish educated classes and the rural
population impossible.
On the basis of the emancipation laws the government could undertake
a policy of unifying the Kingdom with the Empire and of suppressing an
independent Polish existence. In 1866 the Council of State and the Admin-
istrative Council were abolished and the Kingdom’s budget incorporated
into that of the Empire. A year later the various government commissions
were abolished, eliminating thereby the administrative separateness of the
Kingdom from the Empire. The Commission of Justice maintained itself
for a few more years ; after its abolition new courts on the Russian pattern
were introduced. The Napoleonic Civil Code, however, remained in force.
The administration was reorganized in 1867 when ten smaller provinces
(gubernie) were set up. When Berg died in 1874 the office of Viceroy was
abolished. The supreme civil and military authority in the Kingdom was
henceforth exercised by the Governor General. This new administration was
staffed entirely by Russians. Simultaneously, the institutions of self-govern-
ment (zemstva) which existed in the Empire were not introduced into the
Kingdom, because they could have been taken advantage of and fallen into
the hands of the Poles.
The government expended its greatest efforts on the Russianization of
education, This policy was still more severe in the western provinces of the
Empire, which had belonged to Poland before the partition, than in the
Congress Kingdom, where the process took place gradually and could not be
fully implemented. The Main School in Warsaw was replaced as early as in
1869 by a Russian University. In the course of the next few years the sec-
ondary schools were Russianized. In 1885 Russian was introduced as the
language of instruction in primary schools and only the Polish language and
religion were to be taught in Polish. Russian teachers were not introduced,
however, into the primary schools on the correct premise that they would an-
tagonize the peasant children and render their Russianization impossible. As
a result in remote localities teachers’ colleges were set up where peasants’
sons, mostly those of illiterate parents, were educated according to Russian
precepts. Teachers educated in this way were to carry out the Russianization
of the Polish peasantry. During the first generation a considerable section of
THE RUSSIANIZATION POLICY IN THE KINGDOM 455
these teachers answered the hopes placed in them, but their sons, often also
teachers, became in the future the first Polish educational and social leaders
amongst the peasantry.
The second factor, apart from education, which had a strong influence
on the peasantry’s attitude was the Church. In order to make the clergy its
obedient instrument the government decided to make the Catholic hierarchy
dependent upon itself and to sever its connections with Rome. The majority
of monasteries were closed down, Church property was confiscated and the
entire clergy was to be paid by the State, thus becoming, to a considerable
degree, materially dependent on the Russian authorities. The Tsarist govern-
ment broke the Concordat with Rome, and the Polish bishops were placed
under the authority‘of the Spiritual College in St. Petersburg. The Catholic
hierarchy opposed these steps and numerous bishops were exiled as a result.
Their dioceses were accordingly left vacant. In time, the resistance of the
upper hierarchy began to weaken, but the ranks of the faithful remained
staunch and the threats of the government to introduce Russian for sermons,
singing and prayers proved ineffective. After 1871 the Russian government
began to retreat from this hopeless struggle. On the other hand, the liquida-
tion of the Uniate Church was carried out to its completion. The tool of
the Tsarist government, Michat Popiel, the administrator of the Uniate
diocese in Chelm, went over in 1875 with a majority of the communes to
the Orthodox faith. This gave rise to a fanatical resistance of the faithful
who did not wish to relinquish Catholicism. The government punished the
resisting peasants with flogging and entire Uniate villages were exiled to
Siberia. In spite of this, numerous Uniates baptized their children in secret
and had secret weddings in Galicia or in the forests celebrated by disguised
Catholic priests. The result of these persecutions was to bring about a closer
identification of the Uniate population in the Russian areas with Polish
nationality, a process which was the opposite of that taking place simultane-
ously in the Austrian area, where the Uniate Church became synonymous
with the rising Ukrainian national consciousness. Ultimately, it was only
after the election of Leo XIII as Pope that the relations between the Vatican
and St. Petersburg were normalized. In 1882 the Concordat was renewed
and the vacant sees were again filled.
Thus, in general, one can describe the policy of the Tsarist government
towards the Poles after the January Insurrection as one of repression, Rus-
sianization and the destruction of all social forces which could offer resis-
tance to Russian rule in Poland.
456 POSITIVISM AND TRI-LOYALISM (1864-1885)
THE POLISH PROVINCES OF PRUSSIA. THE KULTURKAMPF
AND THE NATIONAL REVIVAL IN SILESIA
In the Prussian area government policy up to the end of the 1860’s was
less determined. Bismarck’s government fought, of course, against all Polish
national aspirations but the Polish community after the failure of the 1848
uprising, and even more so after the disaster of 1863, did not consider il-
legal action and saw the proper field for the national cause in economics and
education. A struggle for the land was waged between the Poles and the
Germans and, for the moment, it was the Polish gentry which suffered,
losing its supremacy in the amount of the land it held by comparison with
that held by German landowners. This took place with extensive assistance
from the authorities. In 1880 the Prussian junkers in the Poznan area held
50 per cent more land than the Polish gentry, whom the Prussian govern-
ment considered to be the essential political strength of Polish nationality.
In Pomerania this relation Was still less favourable to the Polish gentry, not
to speak of Silesia, where there was no large property in Polish hands at
all. The reprisals for the assistance which the Poles in the Prussian area
gave to the January Insurrection were relatively mild. The great trial,
which took place in Berlin in December 1864, of the organizers of assistance
for the insurrection resulted in eleven death sentences but these were all
against persons who were absent. The rest of the accused were sentenced to
a year of imprisonment or two. In 1866, after the victory over Austria, an
amnesty was proclaimed from which the Polish prisoners also benefited.
In any case, Bismarck could not conduct too bitter a struggle against the
Poles in Prussia, because at this time he was in conflict with the liberal op-
position, while in the international arena, in preparing for a diplomatic
victory over Austria and France, he made effective use also of the Polish
question. It was only after the final unification of Germany in 1871 that
the situation changed. An almost complete Germanization of the school
system took place and, simultaneously, the government undertook the per-
secution of the Polish element in the Church. %
The Kulturkampf, in its wider German meaning, was an expression of
the struggle of the bourgeoisie for the completion of the building of an
unified German State. The aim, above all, was to secularize the German
school system in order to utilize it for strengthening German national
consciousness. In the political field this was a struggle against particularism
which had been so strong in Germany since medieval times, but in the Polish
provinces this struggle of the Prussian State assumed a different character.
Bismarck’s purpose was to gain for the struggle against the Catholic Party,
which in Prussia had the sympathies also of non-Catholic conservatives,
a part of the junkers, who always had very strong anti-Polish traditions.
That is why Bismarck strongly emphasized the anti-Polish character of the
Kulturkamp}. As a result, he provoked the resistance of broad masses of the
THE KULTURKAMPF AND THE NATIONAL REVIVAL IN SILESIA 457
Polish population which, up till then, had not been particularly hostile to the
Prussian State. In particular, the Kulturkampf brought about an awakening
of Polish consciousness in Upper Silesia, where, precisely at this time, the
masses were beginning to take an active part in political life.
The Kulturkampf was carried out both in the German Reich and within
the Kingdom of Prussia. But it was precisely the Prussian Diet and govern-
ment that were most deeply involved in it, just as they were in any anti-
Polish campaign. One of the reasons was that there existed in the German
Parliament powerful parties, such as the “Zentrum” and the Social Demo-
crats, which opposed anti-Polish legislation and were generally against any
anti-Polish campaign.
As in Germany, so also in the Polish provinces of Prussia the hierarchy
of the Church committed itself to the struggle against the government with
the greatest distaste. Mieczyslaw Ledochowski, the Archbishop of Gniezno
and Poznan, a cosmopolitan prince of the Church, with little consciousness
of Polish patriotism, represented an ultra-loyal position with regard to the
government up to 1872. The law, which deprived the Church of its super-
vision over education, was the most important factor affecting conditions
in the Prussian area. The Prussian government used it for the purpose of
eliminating Polish from the schools in order to make the educational sys-
tem a tool of Germanization. There followed the laws of May 1873, which
subjected the clergy to the control of the State. It was these which finally
forced Ledéchowski, who up to now had not even opposed the teaching of
religion in German, to adopt a decidedly hostile position. In 1874 he was
arrested, along with a large number of Church dignitaries in Prussia. From
then on, the entire clergy entered into the struggle against the pressure of
Germanization which, as a result, made Polish nationalism and Catholicism
identical in this area. This had immediate effects beneficial to the national
cause, especially in Upper Silesia, but in the next generation it also resulted
in the fact that the western Polish lands became a stronghold of clericalism,
which prevented new and more progressive social ideas from penetrating to
the masses.
It was due to the Kulturkampf that the Prussian area first obtained civil
registry offices, bu@, like the secular school, it served the purposes of Ger-
manization in the Polish lands.
In Silesia the Polish national movement was connected to a consider-
able degree with the very rapid growth of industry. The peasant, divorced
from the land, came into contact with a socially more mature environment
and became a more politically conscious individual. If one compares an
analogous situation in Mazuria and Warmia, where there was no industry
and the peasant population also spoke Polish, it becomes clear that in Upper
Silesia it was the Polish industrial working class which constituted the
fundamental element in the national revival in this area. The pioneer of
this movement was a Silesian school teacher, Karol Miarka. In his youth
458 POSITIVISM AND TRI-LOYALISM (1864-1885)
he considered himself a German. It was only when he was 33 years old that,
after becoming acquainted with the Polish literary language and with the
richness of Polish literature, he became aware that he was a Pole and from
this moment on, he devoted all his energy to the cause of awakening the
national consciousness of his compatriots. He began to write stories for
working people, helped in this by Pawet Stalmach, a worker in the national
movement in Austrian Silesia and the editor of the “Gwiazdka Cieszynska”
(The Cieszyn Star). From 1896 on, Miarka edited his own paper, “Katolik”
(The Catholic), in which he declared his views clearly in defence of the
Polish language, though maintaining, at least superficially, an attitude of
loyalty to the Prussian State. This paper became extremely popular and
though it faced financial difficulties, especially in the period of the Kultur-
kampf, when the editor was fined and imprisoned, it became a political
power and decided the vote of the Polish miners and peasants at elections.
Elections to the Reichstag were universal, direct and by secret suffrage.
Miarka allied himself with the leaders of the Catholic “Zentrum” and
ensured that the only deputies elected from Upper Silesia were those who
had his support. Miarka was an opponent of a class-conscious labour move-
ment, while the “Zentrum” which he served, represented neither the interests
of the people nor the Polish cause. However, the fact that Miarka mobilized
his readers to offer resistance to the government for the sake of the defence
of Catholicism advanced the cause of national development of this prov-
ince. The great majority of the population of Silesia realized that it was
Polish, though this was then still understood primarily in ethnic and lin-
guistic terms. The political consequences, inducing a different attitude to-
wards Prussia as an alien state, which might arise from this feeling, could
not yet become strongly marked. The struggle for the rights of the Polish
language was waged in alliance with the clergy which, in its upper ranks,
was not Polish at all.
About 1878 Bismarck realized that the struggle against the Catholic
Church had become pointless. Under pressure from the upper bourgeoisie
and large-scale industry he made the transition to a protectionist trade po-
licy and, drifting away from the liberals, he sought the support of the
conservatives and the “Zentrum”. In this connexion #he moderated his
hostility to the Vatican, which had gone on for a number of years, but this
did not, however, in any way lessen the severity of the policy of Germaniza-
tion as applied to the Poles.
THE AUTONOMY OF GALICIA
At the same time as the Congress Kingdom fost the last remnants of its
autonomy and the Germanization tendency in the Prussian area became
sharper, Galicia obtained broader political freedoms. This was a result of
THE AUTONOMY OF GALICIA 459
the crisis of the Hapsburg monarchy which, in the face of social changes
and separatist national aspirations, had to seek a compromise with the
propertied classes in the various provinces. The beginning of this develop-
ment came with the Austrian defeat in Italy in 1859 when the representative
of the Galician conservatives, Count Agenor Gotuchowski, was called to
join the government. A year later the October “Diploma” of the Emperor
Franz Joseph promised the granting of autonomy to the “historic” units
of the monarchy. In 1861 Galicia, like the other provinces, obtained its
own Provincial Seym with, it is true, much restricted rights. The land-
owning majority in the Seym was fully prepared to reach an understanding
with the government on the condition that they would take control of the
country into their own hands. Nevertheless, when the January Insurrection
followed, the leaders of both the Red and White factions in Galicia coop-
erated with it. This resulted in reprisals and in February 1864, when the
movement was already declining, a state of emergency was declared in
Galicia.
These repressions turned out to be more vexatious for the Poles than
harmful. The head of the government, the centralist Schmerling, was faced
with such strong opposition in the monarchy that he could not wage a strug-
gle with the Poles on a large scale. In any case, the Polish politicians, who
in Galicia were almost exclusively representatives of the wealthier gentry,
had many interests in common with influential circles among the Austrian
aristocracy. Thus, they were not faced with far-reaching reprisals. Immedi-
ately upon the fall of Schmerling’s government the state of emergency was
lifted and the new Prime Minister, Belcredi, made it possible to start again
the quest for autonomy. In the autumn of 1865 the Seym met again. The
electoral law of 1861 for Galicia provided for a division of electors into
four curiae: the curia of large holdings where the owners of large estates
elected 44 deputies, the two curiae of towns and commercial-industrial
chambers represented by 26 deputies, and the curia of the small holdings,
by which was meant the peasants, which in two-stage, indirect elections
chose 74 deputies. The elections were open without balloting which, as a
result of the low level of political consciousness of the peasants, made it
possible for the administration to exert considerable influence on the results.
The law was extremely unfair, because one deputy to the Seym was chosen
by 10-20 electors in the curia of the large landowners, while a deputy from
the peasant curia represented, at times, tens of thousands of voters. Up to
1873 the Galician Seym elected a delegation to the Vienna Parliament
(Reichsrat). After 1873 there were direct elections in the country based on
a law similar to that for the Seym.
Political activity in the Austrian area was particularly vigorous in 1866-
1873, when a struggle was waged in the entire monarchy for the establish-
ment of the constitutional system on a firm basis. After the war of 1866 the
Polish politicians perceived new international prospects. Beust, the Austrian
460 POSITIVISM AND TRI-LOYALISM (1864-1885)
chancellor, was prepared to seek revenge for Sadova and sought to reach a
political and military understanding with France. The Polish diplomats from
the group of Prince Czartoryski assumed that the moment had arrived for re-
newing diplomatic manoeuvres aimed at coordinating French and Austrian
policy directed against Russia and Prussia. As is known, all these schemes be-
came unreal with the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870, while the
defeat of France and the unification of Germany dealt, it appeared, the fi-
nal blow to the Polish hopes of regaining independence with the assistance of
European powers.
Nevertheless, it was precisely this unstable international situation which
helped the Polish politicians of Galicia to a considerable degree in gaining
a broad autonomy which was preserved up to the fall of Austria and the
rebuilding of an independent Polish State. The Polish politicians in Austria
were basically supporters of the federal programme and opponents of cen-
tralism. They could not, however, oppose decisively any Vienna govern-
ment, even a centralist one, because in the event of war such a government
might favour a solution of the Polish question. It was not only this consid-
eration which weakened the Polish opposition against centralist cabinets.
A more significant role was played by the social and national problems in
the province.
The main social problem of Galicia at this time was the question of
woods and pastures left in abeyance by the legislation of 1848. The struggle
for the rights of the peasants to woods and pastures was for them an ex-
tremely important issue. The moment these rights were lost the peasant was
forced to buy building material and fuel from the manor and to rent pas-
ture. This forced him to seek work in the manor and revealed a new form
of dependence, not feudal but capitalist in essence, of the peasantry on the
manor. The gentry, in struggling for autonomy, in effect for taking over
the administration in Galicia, thus fought for a solution of the problem of
woods and pastures on terms advantageous to themselves. In practice, dis-
putes concerning woods and pastures were referred to the courts, but cases
usually ended in favour of the manors. The state of acute class struggle
between the peasant and the gentry had repercussions also on the attitude
of the peasantry to the national question. In the eyes of the peasantry Polish
nationality was represented by the gentry and for this reason the over-
whelming majority of the peasantry did not wish for generations to admit
to a solidarity with Polish national aspirations. It was where serfdom and
questions of woods and pastures had been settled earlier, as in the former
area of the Free City of Cracow, or where serfdom had been less arduous,
as for example in the mountain areas, that the peasantry’s consciousness of
being Polish developed more rapidly. In the remaining areas the peasantry
for many years, up to the end of the nineteenth century, did not consider
themselves Poles.
The low level of political consciousness among the peasantry had its
THE AUTONOMY OF GALICIA 461
roots in the general economic backwardness. The country was agricultural
and the villages were overpopulated, but the sale of agricultural produce
was not profitable because of the long distances from markets. The exten-
sion of the railways caused a flooding of Galicia with industrial goods
produced in the western parts of the Hapsburg monarchy. This ruined the
meagre beginnings of local industrial manufactures. Galicia, which had
been one of the most fertile Polish provinces, became the poorest of the
three partition areas. From the mind-19th century, but especially towards its
end, the oil industry began to develop in Eastern Galicia, but it did not play
a considerable role in the economy of the province as a whole. It employed
only a few thousand workers and the profits went mainly to foreign capi-
talists, who had invested in Galician oil and who sought to obtain a tariff
policy which would give Galicia the smallest benefits.
The second factor which weakened the political position of the Galician
gentry in Vienna was the awakening of national consciousness among the
Ukrainian population of Eastern Galicia. Once the Ukrainian peasant had
been aware only of his social and class interests. Because the Polish land-
owner, however, spoke a different language and adhered to another reli-
gious rite, these factors hastened, or at least facilitated, the awakening of
national feeling among the Ukrainians.
At the outset the Ukrainian, or Ruthenian, as they were called at the
time, intelligentsia in Eastern Galicia was composed primarily of the Greek
Catholic clergy and a few government officials, lawyers and doctors. In
these years, the national feeling of this intelligentsia in a modern sense was
only just taking shape. To some extent they adhered to the traditional con-
nexion with the gentry, though this was weakening, and thus with the
old Polish tradition, but only a few considered themselves still to be politi-
cally and nationally Poles of Ruthenian origin (Gente Rutheni natione
Poloni). A much stronger group felt a community of interest with Russia
and considered the Ukrainian language to be one of the Russian dialects.
This group, known as the Russophils and later as the Old Ruthenians,
considered themselves in effect to be Russian. They were highly conserva-
tive and strongly supported by the Greek Catholic clergy of the metropoli-
tan Curia in Lwéw. Though loyal for the time being towards Austria, they
had decided sympathies with St. Petersburg. The weakest group at the time
were those who considered the Ukrainian, or “Little Russian”, to be separate
and distinct and who thus considered the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia
and the Dnieper region a single separate nation. This idea had already
emerged in the declarations made by the Galician Ruthenians at the Slav
Congress in Prague in 1848. It was from these factors that the Ukrainian
national movement was in the course of years to arise and the very name
of Ukraine, which took root only in the last years of the nineteenth century,
was to play a considerable role in the moulding of distinct national con-
sciousness.
462’ POSITIVISM AND TRI-LOYALISM (1864-1885)
The Polish politicians of the 1860’s and the 1870’s who came in contact
with the Ukrainian problem were mostly of the opinion that a separate
Ukrainian nationality did not exist at all and that the Greek Catholic
population of Eastern Galicia, even if it did not speak Polish, was only a
separate Polish tribe like, for example, the Kashubians in Pomerania or
the Highlanders in the Tatra mountains. This illusion could not, however,
be maintained. When the Ruthenian deputies in the Seym undertook the
defence of the peasants’ interests and had recourse to Vienna with their
national demands, account had to be taken of this factor. Therefore the
Polish political leaders tried to achieve a settlement of the Ruthenian ques-
tions. The Ukrainian politicians aimed at an administrative division of Ga-
licia into an eastern region, where the Ukrainian population was in a clear
majority, and a western or Polish region. This point of view was energeti-
cally rejected by the Polish gentry politicians who feared that the division
of Galicia would do away with the existing monopoly of power enjoyed
by the wealthy East Galician gentry to the advantage of Ukrainian intelli-
gentsia, among whom, moreover, radical ideas were already spreading in
the 1890’s. The Polish bourgeoisie of Eastern Galicia saw also a danger to
its own position arising from the Ukrainian national movement. Only some
West Galician politicians and a very few representatives of the East Ga-
lician magnates, therefore, could agree to the idea of granting the Ukrainians
concessions in the field of culture, especially in regard to the school system,
to which the peasant nation, awakening to a new life, attached special im-
portance. The conservative-minded Ukrainian politicians, following the
example of the Poles, at this time thought that the only road forward lay
in complete loyalty to Vienna.
In 1866-1878 the government in Vienna was mostly in the hands of
the Centralists, but it had to take into account the position of the Polish
deputies in the Reichsrat. The Poles, on their side, did not support the
federal programme proclaimed by the Czechs. This skilful game succeeded
in obtaining for them far-reaching concessions leading towards the extension
of Galician autonomy. An important part was played in this by Count
Agenor Gotuchowski, the Minister of State in 1859-1860 and the Viceroy
of Galicia in 1849-1859, 1866-1868 and 1871-1875. The general policy
of the dynasty in internal politics was in any case established for the entire
period of the last years of the Hapsburg State, once the agreement with
Hungary had been reached at the end of 1867. In the countries of the Crown
of St. Stephen power now passed into the hands of the Hungarians, while
in the lands west of the Leitha river it was reserved for the Germans. The
Germans were, however, weaker in the western half of the monarchy than
the Hungarians were in the eastern. For this reason they needed a reliable
ally. Towards the end of the 1860’s Polish conservative politicians counted
on an European war in which the Hapsburg monarchy would be their ally.
This made possible the conclusion of a compromise between the Polish gentry
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY IN THE CONGRESS KINGDOM 463
in Galicia and the dynasty, which was to endure for half a century. It did
not lead to Poland’s independence and it preserved at the same time the
supremacy of the conservatives opposed to economic and social progress.
In spite of everything this alliance gave at least to one of the Polish areas
the possibility of a free national life.
The Galician politicians did not reconcile themselves immediately with
the new political situation in the Hapsburg monarchy. In December 1866
the Seym declared the loyalty of the Galician gentry to the dynasty in the
famous address which ended with the words, “‘At your side, Sire, we stand
and wish to stand”. The Austrian Constitution, which was enacted a year
later, however, narrowly restricted once more the extent of local autonomy.
In September 1868 the Seym passed a resolution in which it demanded
separation almost as far reaching as that obtained by the Hungarians.
A struggle to implement this resolution was waged in the Reichsrat in
Vienna. When in 1870 the moderate federalists led by Alfred Potocki came
to power for a short time, the government was prepared to consider the
Galician resolution, but it came on the agenda only during the succeeding
government of Hohenwart, who did not have a parliamentary majority.
The resolution was not passed, but Galicia obtained during this period
a number of concessions enacted by imperial decrees. In addition, it became
a custom from this time onwards that at least one Polish minister should
sit in the government as minister for Galicia. The Galician school system,
including the universities, was Polonized together with the entire civil
service and the courts. In 1872 the Academy of Sciences and Letters was
established in Cracow, the only scientific institution of this type in Poland.
It should be added that after the abolition of the Warsaw Main School in
1869 the only Polish universities were in Cracow and Lwéw. Up to 1915
the Viceroy of Galicia was always a Pole and, in fact, real power over the
country lay in his hands.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY
IN THE CONGRESS KINGDOM
A feature which probably had the greatest significance for the life of the
nation was the development of large-scale industry in the Kingdom of
Poland after the January Insurrection. This industry was based on founda-
tions built in earlier years, especially under Lubecki, but the solution of
the agrarian problem and, later, the commercial policy of the Russian
Empire established the basic direction of development. A significant part
was played here by foreign capital which was invested in the factories in
the Kingdom in order to get inside the Russian tariff barrier, which from
1877 was rising ever higher. The Congress Kingdom had its own source of
464 POSITIVISM AND TRI-LOYALISM (1864-1885)
cheap manpower, but at a higher stage of development than in the interior
of Russia, which made possible its use in factories demanding skilled
workers. Industry found its supply of workers in craftsmen who were be-
ing turned into proletarians as a result of the industrialization. The neces-
sary credit institutions already existed and commerce was highly developed.
Foreign capital was interested in penetrating the immense Russian market.
For this reason Polish industry was not established to serve Poland’s needs
and did not draw much benefit from such investment. As a result the needs
of the country were met either by the handicraft industry, the goods of
which were more expensive than factory goods, or by imports. Industry
did, however, introduce modern conditions into the life of the country.
Industry and trade, with their attendant credit institutions provided employ-
ment not only for the landless or small-holding peasants, but also for the
intelligentsia of gentry descent. All this gave rise to new social problems.
Already in the 1870’s the working class appeared as a factor which from
the outset, through its mere existence and later through its own consciousness,
transmitted new impulses to political life. In the twenty years after the
insurrection it multiplied threefold from 50,000 to 150,000.
Between 1865 and 1880 the technical revolution in industry was com-
pleted. Mechanical looms were introduced in most factories, in both the cot-
ton and woolen industries. In the metallurgical and engineering industries
large-scale plants, where the basic processes of production were mechanized,
likewise played a dominant role. Similar progress took place in the sugar
industry as well. Only the foundries lagged behind in technique for a while.
In 1865 180 plants employed steam power, with 375 engines developing
3746 h.p., but in 1878 there were already 674 plants with 807 engines
developing 14,627 h.p. Simultaneously, the productivity of labour was
doubled between 1864 and 1880. An ever greater degree of concentration
may be seen in industry. In 1886 there were 11,000 factories in the King-
dom employing 70,000 workers, but in 1880 there were less than 10,000
employing 120,000 workmen. The value of production in these plants was
estimated in 1866 to be 52 million roubles rising in 1880 to 170 million.
An essential condition for the development of industry was the expansion
and intensive use of the railways. The transport of coal on the Warsaw-
Vienna main line increased elevenfold in this period. A number of new
railway lines were constructed. In 1866 Lédz was linked up with the rail-
way network by means of a branch of the Vienna line. From 1870 Warsaw
was linked with Moscov through Terespol and Smolensk, and from 1873
with Kiev. In 1877 the Vistula line linked Warsaw with Mtawa on the
Prussian border in the north and with Volhynia through Lublin in the south.
In 1885 the Dabrowa Basin was connected with the Vistula line at Deblin.
In this way the network increased in the Kingdom from 635 km in 1862
to 2084 km in 1887, but the Congress Kingdom, nevertheless, had one of
the poorest railway networks in Europe. At the end of the nineteenth century
OBrzezany
Buczacz |
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POSITIVISM 465
there was one kilometre of railway to 4700 inhabitants in the Kingdom
while in Russia the ratio was 1 : 3200 and in Germany 1: 1400. Only Tur-
key, Bulgaria and Greece were in a worse position than central Poland.
This was a very clear example of the discriminatory economic policy of
the Tsarist régime.
Up to the end of this period, however, the impulse of spontaneous
economic development was stronger than the deliberately harmful action
of the Russian government, and it was decisive for the development of
industry up to the second half of the 1880’s. The value of industrial produc-
tion reached 200 million roubles, trebling itself since 1863. The general
growth of the Kingdom’s industry in the years 1887-1889 was estimated at
almost fivefold, whereas in the same period industrial production in the
Empire increased only twofold. This was particularly so in the cotton in-
dustry which rose in the Kingdom almost forty times, but only twice in
Russia.
Such a rate of industrialization changed not only the demographic posi-
tion by causing a sharp growth of the population in general and a particu-
larly marked one in the towns, but by bringing into existence new social
conditions it had a decisive influence in shaping new ideologies. These were
the social sources of the intellectual concept known as positivism.
POSITIVISM
Warsaw positivism was not a distinct philosophical school as in the West,
but manifested itself in a specific approach to social and national problems.
It was primarily a return to the slogans of “organic work” known already
in an earlier period. Its main concern was for economic advancement and
its utilization for the national cause, because the acquisition of the education
which would make work possible in the new economic conditions would
lead to the spread of education and Polish national consciousness among
the masses and imbue them with the national tradition. In short, this was
the ideology of a burgeoisie growing in strength and numbers, opposed to
both political romanticism and gentry traditions, yet, at the same time,
preaching to the peasants and workers the principle of class solidarity. If
the ideals of the previous generation had proclaimed insurrectionary strug-
gle as the national aim, it was now in humdrum, but steady work in the
economic and social field that a solution was seen of a situation which after
the collapse of the insurrection in 1864 and of France in 1870, whose aid
had been counted upon, seemed to hold no hope for Poland.
The positivists proclaimed a break with the philosophy of insurrection
and declared their reconciliation with the existing conditions which seemed
to have stabilized after 1871. The foregoing of aspirations to independence
was to be accompanied by a retreat from participation in political affairs,
30 History of Poland
466 POSITIVISM AND TRI-LOYALISM (1864-1885)
a retreat which was, of course, only an apparent abnegation, because it
was linked with the highly political stipulation of loyalty towards foreign
rule. This concept, adopted in Galicia .for current political needs, after
a certain time took on a different meaning. It gave rise to a general concep-
tion called “tri-loyalism” by which was meant the reconciliation of every
Polish province with its own foreign government. The upper classes of the
landowning aristocracy and great financiers saw in this principle a safe-
guard of their own social position.
The political programme of the Galician conservatives was formulated
as early as in 1869 in a satirical pamphlet entitled Teka Stanczyka (Stan-
czyk’s Portfolio) after Stanczyk who was the clown of King Sigismund I,
in which the passion for conspiracy was ridiculed and plots were condemned
as the greatest danger to the national cause. This pamphlet was written for
current needs in opposition to bolder democratic views demanding autonomy
from the Austrian government. It was only in the course of time that the
ideas expressed in “Stanczyk’s Portfolio” took on a more general meaning and
the name “Stanczyk” became the nickname for conservative West Galician
politicians. They were regarded with respect, however, by conservatives in
other areas, because they were the only politicians who by their willingness
to compromise had obtained concrete political advantages.
The political conclusions drawn from “organic work” were contrary
to the national traditions and could not take permanent root in the con-
sciousness of socially active elements in the Polish nation. Nevertheless, posi-
tivism left a permanent mark on the attitude to national issues of both
contemporaries and succeeding generations. The programme of the positivists
was put into effect up to the end of the period of subjection. Above all,
they insisted upon the duty of spreading education amongst the masses. This
was carried out by dedicated persons in the Kingdom under most difficult
conditions and here their work was to be a substitute for the lack of Polish
schools in opposition to the policy of Russianization evident in official educa-
tion policy. Among the pioneers in this movement were Konrad Prdszynski,
writing under the pseudonym Promyk, who from 1881 began to publish
the “Gazeta Swiateczna” (Holiday Gazette). He wrote an excellent primer
which was widely used as an instrument for combatting illiteracy. Another
prominent person was Mieczyslaw Brzezinski who popularized the natural
sciences and edited the journal “Zorza” (The Dawn), which was similarly
designed for a wide readership.
The centre of learning at the beginning of this period was the Main
School in Warsaw which operated in the years 1862-1869 and maintained
close contacts with contemporary European learning. It had important
scientific achievements in the field of biology—the Warsaw School of Henryk
Hoyer, Sr. and in chemistry through the works of Jakub Natanson. Many
eminent scholars emerged from this school like the linguists, Jan Baudouin
de Courtenay and Adam Krynski, as well as writers and journalists like
POSITIVISM 467
Bolestaw Prus
Aleksander Swietochowski, Henryk Sienkiewicz, Bolestaw Prus and Adolf
Dygasinski. The closing of the Main School in 1869 was a particularly
painful blow. Learning in Warsaw flourished afterwards as a result of the
efforts of individuals or small groups of scholars, assisted by the intermittent
support of private patrons. In these primitive conditions and in spite of the
obstacles created by the Tsarist authorities it was, nevertheless, possible
to initiate and go a long way towards completing such collective enterprises
of major importance for learning as the Polish Geographical Dictionary,
30°
468 POSITIVISM AND TRI-LOYALISM (1864-1885)
Maria Konopnicka
the Dictionary of the Polish Language and the Great Illustrated Encyclo-
pedia. Eminent scholars like the geographer W. Nalkowski, the ethnographer
O. Kolberg, and the sociologist L. Krzywicki were active in Warsaw during
this period.
Learning in Galicia enjoyed a greater freedom and could draw on the
resources of the universities. The Cracow Learned Society, which was con-
verted in 1873 into the Academy of Science and Letters became an institu-
tion embracing all Poland, enrolling outstanding scholars from all three
POSITIVISM 465
Henryk Sienkiewicz
J. Matejko, Stanczyk, 1862
regions of the country. The humanities were particularly distinguished by
the development of historical studies. The “Cracow School”, recognizing
the need for a critical and severe appraisal of the past, sought to show that
the cause of Poland’s downfall should be sought in Polish society itself. The
historians of this school, like W. Kalinka, J. Szujski and their younger
contemporary, M. Bobrzynski, adopted the point of view of the ruling
“Stanczyk” group, condemning the worship of conspiracy and revolution-
ary romanticism and exalting strong monarchical rule. This does not alter
the fact that they raised the critical analysis of sources and historical method
to a higher level. Lw6w University also followed suit and here K. Liske’s
seminars produced a host of energetic and talented historians.
In the physical sciences the achievements of Z. Wroblewski and K. Ol-
szewski, who first achieved the condensation of oxygen and nitrogen ob-
tained international recognition. Many Polish scholars continued their work
POSITIVISM 471
ia i eS See et eee
Maria Sktodowska-Curie
in western Europe, where many of them occupied chairs or became heads
of institutes. Thus Maria Sktodowska-Curie, twice winner of the Nobel
Prize, became while in Paris one of the discoverers of radioactivity ; E. Ha-
bich was the organizer of the oldest technical college in South America.
Among the Poles exiled to Siberia there were also outstanding scientists who
explored and investigated the country like B. Dybowski, A. Czekanowski,
J. Czerski.
While the most important achievements in literature of the romantic
period were poetic works of high quality, it was prose, serving the needs
of the times, and, in particular, the novel which flourished in Poland and
abroad.
A pioneer of these new ideas was Aleksander Swietochowski, an ex-
tremely versatile writer, whether as a journalist, novelist or playwright, who
condemned class prejudices and clericalism bitterly and fought for the
472 POSITIVISM AND TRI-LOYALISM (1864-1885)
emancipation of Jews and equal rights for women. He was firmly convinced
of the progressive role of the bourgeoisie, but at the same time opposed all
political activities aimed at fighting for independence and resisted the work-
ing class movement from its very inception. He urged political solidarity
.and while he condemned the clericalism of the upper classes, he recognized
the social function of the clergy which, according to him, “constantly and
over a large time shall exercise tutelage over the ignorant masses”. Eliza
Orzeszkowa fought in her novels for the emancipation of women, for res-
cuing the village from poverty and backwardness, sharply criticizing reli-
gious fanaticism and obscurantism and passionately demanding rights for
the Jews. The ideas of “organic work” were expressed in her novel dealing
with the life of the petty gentry Nad Niemnem (On the Neman). Bolestaw
Prus (1845-1912), whose real name was Aleksander Glowacki, was a writer,
journalist and thinker. In his novel Placéwka (The Outpost) he presented
the struggle of the Polish village against German oppression as a model for
society illustrating the ignorance and backwardness of the Polish peasant.
Lalka (The Doll) was the first great novel in Polish literature about the
Polish urban middle class presenting a broad picture of life, social problems
and conflicts in the period after the 1863 Insurrection.
Frequently in this period the expression of sociological concepts and
ideas of freedom took the form of historical themes, even in remote times,
like Bolestaw Prus’s Faraon (The Pharaoh). A similar didactic aim is evi-
dent in the works of Henryk Sienkiewicz, the writer of colourful! historical
novels such as Krzyzacy (The Teutonic Knights), the trilogy Ogniem i Mie-
czem (With Fire and Sword), Potop (The Deluge) and Pan Wolodyjowski,
and Quo Vadis, a novel about Nero’s Rome and the first Christians, for
which the writer received the Nobel Prize. The influence of French natural-
ism showed itself in the novels and short stories of Dygasinski and the novels
and plays of Gabriela Zapolska.
The poetry of this period was represented by the introspective poet Adam
Asnyk and by Maria Konopnicka, a fighter for progress and enlightenment,
who drew much of her inspiration from folk art.
Journalism, which developed considerably during this period and in
which the best writers engaged, likewise served to proclaim the slogans of
positivism.
Art in this period, while deprived of state support, received private
encouragement, no longer from the aristocracy as had been earlier but from
the wealthy bourgeoisie. It severed its links with romanticism, though that
tradition was to some extent continued by the paintings of Jan Matejko.
Closely connected with the Cracow school of history and working in Crac-
ow, he created his great historical tableaux. He imposed on Polish society
his own vision of the past to such effect that to the present time the average
Pole visualizes the national heroes as represented by this great painter in
his compositions like the Battle of Grunwald, Stanczyk and Skarga’s Sermon.
A. Gierymski, Sand-diggers, 1887
It was realism, however, which became dominant in art thanks to painters
of everyday life of such ability as Jozef Chetmonski, Maksymilian Gierym-
ski. The most eminent of the realist painters, Aleksander Gierymski, became
a precursor of Polish expressionism. It should be noted that Polish art did not
so much follow the fashion of St. Petersburg, Berlin, or Vienna, as that of
Rome and especially Paris and was linked in this period even more closely
with west-European art.
THE BEGINNINGS
OF THE POLISH WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT
The growth in numbers of the working class gave rise to a labour movement
simultaneously in all the three regions of Poland. Although political and
social conditions were different in each of these areas, the working-class
movement constituted the first political and social movement in the period
after 1863 embracing the entire Polish nation.
Its beginnings may be found in the most industrialized region of Poland,
in Silesia. Working-class organizations began to arise in Germany in the
474 POSITIVISM AND TRI-LOYALISM (1864-1885)
1860’s, led first by F. Lassalle and later developed by the Marxists, A. Be-
bel and W. Liebknecht. At this time Lassalle’s emissaries were already active
in Wroctaw and in the general election to the North German parliament
of 1867 the socialists obtained 4000 votes in Upper Silesia. The greater part
of the German and Polish workers voted together in solidarity. In 1875
the unification of the two socialist parties in Germany took place and in
the 1878 elections 23,000 votes were obtained by the socialists in Silesia,
of which Polish votes certainly constituted an important part. The same
region was also a field of activity by trade unions directed by liberal bour-
geois leaders, which pass by the name of the “Hirsch-Duncker Unions”.
When in 1878 the anti-socialist legislation in Germany went into effect, the
socialist movement in the Polish provinces of Prussia ceased to exist. It
revived shortly afterwards, but inspiration for this came, not as in earlier
years, from the German socialists, but from the Polish movement in the
area belonging to Russia.
In the Congress Kingdom the working-class movement was rooted in
native conditions, drawing its strength from the old revolutionary tradi-
tions among the handicraft workers. This spirit was reawakened by the
initiative of young intellectuals who had made contact with the socialist
revolutionary movement at Russian universities. The most outstanding of
these young men was Ludwik Warynski, who came from a gentry family
in the Ukraine. During his studies in St. Petersburg he belonged to a circle
of Polish revolutionaries, who in 1874 decided to start their action in Poland,
where socialist groups were beginning to arise among the Warsaw workers. In
1878, under Warynski’s influence, “Resistance Funds”, little groups formed
for the purpose of agitation, were formed. These Warsaw socialists, among
whom a prominent theorist, Aleksander Wieckowski and his successor,
Stanislaw Mendelson, drew up the first Polish socialist programme, which
was printed in Geneva in 1878, known, however, as the “Brussels Pro-
gramme” because for reasons of secrecy Brussels was given as the place of
publication. It was, on the whole, expressed in general terms, but it stressed
the class struggle and international solidarity. It shows that the young
revolutionaries, opposed the rejection by the positivists of the struggle to
change the existing situation. While they did not ignore national aspirations,
they proclaimed, above all, the international slogan of a general revolution
of the peoples.
In 1879 Warynski had to escape from Warsaw and leave for Galicia.
In this economically retarded area there was virtually no industrial prole-
tariat. The first socialist groups arose in petty-bourgeois and handicraft
circles under the inspiration of former members of the left-wing democratic
movement in Lwéw which had supported the 1863 Insurrection. A leading
part was played by printers who in this part of Europe were always the
most politically conscious element among the working class. For several
years Bolestaw Limanowski, an exile from Lithuania, who had taken part
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE POLISH WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENT 475
in the demonstrations before 1863 and had been deported to Siberia, had
been foremost in these activities. In years to come he was to become the first
outstanding Polish socialist to lay more stress on national than on class
aims. Shortly afterwards he was compelled to leave Poland for a long time
and became primarily a prolific writer and historian of the democratic
school combatting, almost alone, the ideas of the Cracow school of history.
It was Limanowski who introduced Warynski to the socialists in Lwéw.
Warynski, a born conspirator, wished immediately to set up a secret socialist
organization in Lwow. The Lwow socialists determinedly opposed this step,
considering that in constitutional Austria conspiracy was unnecessary and
even harmful. .The twenty-two years old Warynski departed for Cracow,
where there was no socialist organization at all, and there formed a con-
spiracy which was immediately discovered by the police. An investigation was
begun in which the Austrians collaborated with the Prussian and Russian
police. The result of their discoveries were arrests in Warsaw and a trial in
Cracow in 1880, followed for two months with the greatest interest by the
public. During this episode ultra-conservative circles and their Cracow
newspaper “Czas” (Time) strongly denounced socialism, seeing in it the
principal danger to society. More democratic and liberal papers defended
the accused. Ultimately the 35 accused were set free and several foreign
subjects were deported. A most important part in this famous trial was
played by Warynski and Mendelson. Afterwards they both imigrated to
Geneva, from whence they conducted agitation in Poland. In Galicia the
Cracow trial was a stimulus to the growth of the socialist movement. Al-
ready in 1879 a socialist programme for Galicia had been elaborated, but
its extremely moderate demands showed the backwardness of this area.
Perhaps the most significant fact for Poland as a whole was that one of
the Lwow socialists, the young poet, Bolestaw Czerwienski, in 1881 wrote
the words to the anthem Czerwony Sztandar (The Red Flag), which in the
history of socialist movements in Poland played a more important role
than many well-written pamphlets. The song became well known through-
out Europe.
After the Cracow trial Warynski, Mendelson and Limanowski came
together in Geneva. Limanowski was already publishing there the paper
“Réwnosé” (Equality) in 1879. A dispute arose between them about the
question of independence which was to be continued by three generations
of socialists in Poland. Limanowski, as an advocate of independence, shortly
afterwards left the paper, and the attitude of Warynski and Mendelson was
represented at a celebration in Geneva of the fiftieth anniversary of the
November Insurrection by Kazimierz Dluski, who ended his speech with
the words, “Down with patriotism and reaction, long live the international
and the social revolution !”’ Patriotism in this sense was understood as the
separation of the Polish question from general revolutionary aims and as
a position in which the influence of a gentry mentality was dominant. For
476 POSITIVISM AND TRI-LOYALISM (1864-1885)
the moment this was a somewhat theoretical question, because the hopes
of socialists for a speedy social revolution were in any case illusory and
the struggle for independence did not have any chance of success, but it was
precisely on this basis that a division of the Polish working-class movement
into two mutally hostile sections arose. /
Mendelson with a few companions departed shortly afterwards to the
Prussian area to organize the socialist movement there among both Polish
and German workers. He wished to give proof in practice of his internation-
alism. The activities of this small group in Poznan lasted for only a month
because the police took them into custody.
Warynski went back to Warsaw at the end of 1881 and the fruits of
his activity there were most serious and important. Fascinated by the “Na-
rodnaya Volya” movement, the leading revolutionary organization in Rus-
sia, which aimed at the overthrow of the Tsarist régime by means of con-
spiracies and terrorist activity, he resolved to establish a similar organization
in the Kingdom.
THE “PROLETARIAT”
The secret organization established by Warynski, which had already taken
on the characteristics of a political party, called itself the “Proletariat”.
Its first political pronouncement in August 1883 had revolutionary and
internationalist overtones. The party organized strikes and one of them in
the textile factory in Zyrardéw involved 8000 workers and ended in victory.
The year 1883 saw the greatest flourishing of the party. Outside Warsaw
it was active already in Lodz, Zgierz and Bialystok. In September 1883
a secret paper also called “Proletariat” began to appear, the first of its kind
to be published in the Kingdom after the collapse of the January Insurrec-
tion. It was, however, precisely at this time that Warynski was arrested.
After this misfortune the party was led for a time by Stanislaw Kunicki,
who was connected with the “Narodnaya Volya” and was inclined to fol-
low its example in the use of terror. At this moment the “Proletariat” con-
cluded an agreement with the “Narodnaya Volya” as the two organizations
which expected to undertake the struggle for power, the one in Russia, the
other in Poland. It followed from the agreement that the “Proletariat” was
to conduct its activities where the majority of the population spoke Polish.
“Narodnaya Volya”, moreover, guaranteed the “Proletariat’s” complete
independence and agreed to work in collaboration. Shortly afterwards the
two organizations were discovered by the police, but this agreement and
the activity of the “Proletariat” gave rise to a tradition of revolutionary
class struggle. In the summer of 1884 the police arrested Kunicki and
Ludwik Janowicz, the leaders of the “Proletariat”, and shortly afterwards
THE “PROLETARIAT” 477
Ludwik Warynski
two hundred of its members were imprisoned. Twenty-nine of them were
tried by a court martial. The case lasted a month and Warynski emerged as
a hero. He delivered a magnificent speech which was his last great political
act. On 30 December, 1884 judgement was announced, condemning six of
the defendants to death by hanging, i.e., those who had been tried for acts
of terror. S. Kunicki, P. Bardowski, a Russian judge, M. Ossowski and
J. Pietrusinski, were hanged on the slopes of the Warsaw Citadel. They
became heroes in the tradition of the revolutionary working-class move-
ment.
At the same time the trial showed that the country, which had languished
in lethargy since the disaster of the Insurrection of 1863 was awakening to
a new life and that the struggle, interrupted in 1864, was renewed upon the
478 POSITIVISM AND TRI-LOYALISM (1864-1885)
basis of combining the old insurgent traditions “for your freedom and ours”
with the new ideals of the revolution. Though the mode of expression was
different, the content was to be to a considerable degree the same, because
it was a struggle for the freedom of the Polish people.
The rest of the accused were sentenced to deportation and penal servi-
tude. Warynski was imprisoned in the notorious Schliisselburg where he
died of tuberculosis if 1889. He was the outstanding figure of this period
of the struggle for liberation.
. After the trial of the “Proletariat”, arrests did not cease, but the Tsarist
government, not wishing to give publicity to the revolutionary working-
class movement, deported those arrested to Siberia by administrative means.
Of these many perished in the extremely severe conditions there. This was
the fate of Maria Bohuszewicz, who up to 1885 had led the activity of the
moribund party.
In 1887 a few intellectuals revived the organization, but this activity
was on a much smaller scale and lasted only one year. Very soon they, too,
were imprisoned. This was the “Second” or “Little Proletariat” and for
this reason the first organization was traditionally referred to as the “Great
Proletariat”. From this time on, however, there was a labour movement in
existence which continued to develop and, even if particular organizations
were broken up by the gendarmerie, the movement resurrected itself time
and again, gaining ever more experience, developing new forms of organiza-
tion and continually perfecting its ideology.
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE PEASANT MOVEMENT
During this same period, when the working-class movement emerged in
the Polish territories, an independent peasant movement also began. It was
in the Prussian area that Polish peasants first revealed activity of an eco-
nomic nature. From 1862 onwards J. Kraziewicz established in Pomerania
peasant organizations, or “agricultural circles”. This movement spread quite
rapidly so that in 1867 a “diet” of peasants was convened in Torun. The
first agricultural circle in the Poznan area was set up in 1866. It is only
then that the landowners decided to assert their leadership over this spon-
taneous movement. In 1873 tutelage was established over the agricultural
circles under the direction of Maksymilian Jackowski, an outstanding and
dedicated man. Soon, the number of circles increased to 150 and they
contributed in a considerable degree to raising the level of agricultural
techniques among the peasants of the Prussian area. Later, when the Prus-
sian government began its struggle against the Poles for the ownership of
the soil this had a decisive importance on the successful repulsion of this
dangerous attack.
THREE PROVINCES AND ONE NATION 479
The peasant movement in the Prussian area, under the patronage of the
landowners, did not have a class character. It was the Austrian area which
saw the beginnings of a peasant political movement. The Galician gentry
did not take the initiative in spreading education in the villages. It was
customary to regard the peasantry as a hostile element. When the gentry
had obtained autonomy in Galicia and taken the administration into its
own hands, it felt safe with regard to the peasantry and did not in the least
consider it a duty to raise the level of education among the former serfs.
The primary and secondary school system was controlled by the Provincial
School Council, which included a number of devoted and energetic educa-
tionalists. The Council was, however, dependent on the Viceroy and the
Seym, which approved the school budget. The landowning majority in the
Seym hamstrung the aotivity of the School Council and the expansion of
the school system, with the result that the opportunity which autonomy
offered for promoting the national cause and winning over the peasantry
was not taken. Just as in the question of woods and pastures, an obstinate
class egotism had prevailed with regard to the school question, which was
considered only in the light of keeping the peasants in a state of dependence
in order that they might easily be exploited. The gentry found an ally in the
clergy which was under the direction of an ecclesiastical hierarchy, closely
linked with the gentry and its interests. Care was taken that the badly paid
teachers did not gain authority in the countryside.
The initiative in organizing an independent peasant movement did,
however, come from a priest in opposition to the hierarchy. This was Sta-
nistaw Stojalowski, endowed with unusual organizing abilities, but at the
same time something of a demagogue. From 1875 he edited “Wieniec” (The
Wreath) and “Pszczotka” (The Bee), papers which had up to that time been
published for the purpose of keeping the peasants obedient towards the
upper classes. Stojalowski began a tremendous political drive in which,
though he formulated no far-reaching programme, appeal was made to free
the villages from their dependence on the gentry. Stojalowski proclaimed
the necessity of thrift, education and the establishment of circles of an
economic character. In a short time he gained such popularity that thousands
would come to his meetings. In 1883, on the 200th anniversary of the relief of
Vienna, 12,000 peasants appeared in Cracow on his orders. The authorities
realized that Stojalowski had become a political power and soon launched
a struggle against him, which was to make him a tribune of the people.
THREE PROVINCES AND ONE NATION
The policy of the three Powers dominating Poland in the first years after
the insurrection took on a different aspect in each of the three areas. Each
480 POSITIVISM AND TRI-LOYALISM (1864-1885)
area entered the era of capitalism under different conditions not only in the
political, but also in the economic and social sense. Galicia had the broadest
political possibilities, but also the least advantageous economic conditions. It
had none of the conditions for industrial development, the modernization of
its social relations and the raising of the general level of culture. The
Congress Kingdom, subject to brutal political oppression, simultaneously
entered an era of rapid industrialization which led to rapid modernization.
Finally, the Prussian area, where the possibilities of political life were very
restricted, nevertheless, benefited from the achievements of a modern state
and drew benefit from belonging to a power whose economic development
was extremely rapid. Though the Poznan and Pomeranian territories
remained agrarian, agriculture in both these provinces was raised to a high
level of efficiency, which strengthened the Polish community in its strug-
gle against oppression. Upper Silesia, on the other hand, became a great
mining and metallurgical area. While it is true that the Poles could work in
these industries only as unskilled workers and that they took second place
to the Rhineland, with the result that the workers were paid on a lower
scale than in other provinces of the Reich, it was precisely the existence of
this great industrial basin which established the basis for a national revival
in the province.
The growing significance of the Congress Kingdom, by comparison with
the other areas, was shown by the growth of its population. In the second
half of the nineteenth century the population of the Kingdom increased from
4.8 mln to 10 mln, or by 108 per cent. The population of Galicia from
4.6 mln to 7.3 mln (59 per cent); the population of the Poznan province,
most strongly affected by emigration, from 1.4 mln to 1.9 mln (36 per cent).
The differing conditions of life in the three areas also entailed the closer
connexion of the Polish territories with the three foreign States, to which
they had heretofore belonged only in an administrative sense. The expansion
of the railway network played a very important role in this respect. It
connected the individual Polish areas with Russia, Germany and Austria and
absorbed them into foreign economic systems, with a consequent growth in
the influence of foreign culture and ideas. This in turn threatened the nation
with a dissolution of its cultural unity which up to this time had remained
homogeneous, not withstanding the loss of independence.
It was precisely in this field, however, that the Polish nation displayed
unusual vitality and powers of resistance. It developed and enriched its own
culture, common to all the three areas, by drawing into it an ever widening
mass of the people.
The progressive emancipation of the peasantry was of particular im-
portance in this respect, which had its basis in the fact that from the
end of the Middle Ages up to the time of the January Insurrection the
amount of land in peasant possession had shrunk with each generation. From
this time onwards a contrary process took place. In all three areas under
THREE PROVINCES AND ONE NATION 481
foreign rule, the peasants began to buy land back from the landlords. In the
Kingdom this took place in the years 1864-1890, largely as a result of the
settling of the woods and pastures question. In the Poznan atea, somewhat
later, after 1880, the peasants took advantage of unfavourable world prices
for agricultural produce, which severely affected the great landowners, and
enlarged their holdings by purchase of land. The situation was most dif-
ficult in Galicia, but even there the peasants had also secured their position
against the estate and soon began to attack the weakened medium landowners
by means of land purchase, thus increasing their total holdings by com-
parison with the holdings of the gentry.
All these social and economic features increased markedly in the fol-
lowing two decades and gave rise to political changes within Polish society.
The general economic development, though uneven in the different areas,
strengthened democratic tendencies in all of Poland. The working class
became stronger, especially with the increased concentration in industry.
The position of the peasantry also was stronger, while the bourgoisie enriched
itself and the landowning gentry was on the whole able to adapt itself to the
new economic conditions. Further development of literature and journalism
and in learning and the arts was apparent. All this gave the leading groups
in Polish society a feeling of power and strengthened that faith in the future
of the nation, which had been weakened by the disaster of the insurrection.
Chapter XIX
THE FORMATION
OF MASS POLITICAL PARTIES.
NATIONALISM AND SOCIALISM
(1885-1904)
THE PRUSSIAN EXPULSIONS.
THE COLONIZATION COMMISSION
In the middle of the 1880’s changes of attitude took place among the
socially conscious sections of the nation. The influence of positivism had
come to an end. The appearance of a revolutionary working-class movement
was in itself proof of the fact that the political passivity proclaimed by the
positivists was out of date. The publication of Sienkiewicz’s Trilogy in
1884-1888 may be regarded as the sign of this change. Because of the
author’s obvious talent it immediately gained a wide readership and became
an important factor in shaping Polish thought. These novels were a glorifica-
tion of Poland’s gentry in the past, for which reason conservative circles gave
the author, until recently a positivist, their support, but the younger genera-
tion found in this historical novel, with its seventeenth century theme, an
extollation of Poland’s former strength and moral comfort for the present.
The younger generation, disarmed physically and spiritually by the disaster
of the Insurrection of 1863-1864 and the slogans of “organic work”, now
once more yearned for military action and the tradition of knighthood. It
rejected political passivity and felt that the sober slogans of the positivists
served to mask the selfish class interests of a bourgeoisie growing in wealth.
At this juncture, when the attitude of political passivity was disap-
pearing, a new blow was dealt to the Polish nation. In March 1885 the Prus-
sian government expelled from the eastern provinces of the State all foreign
citizens of Polish nationality. About 30,000 Poles were involved in these
“Bismarckian expulsions” and in a very short time they were expelled from
homes which had been theirs often for many years. This regulation, issued
at a time of complete peace, gave rise to general indignation against Prus-
sia, not only in Poland, but also throughout Europe and even among a large
part of the German people.
There had been insufficient time to recover from this unexpected blow
when the King’s speech in the Prussian Parliament on January 1886
foreshadowed new and much more significant moves in the struggle against
THE PRUSSIAN EXPULSIONS 483
the Poles. In April 1886 the Prussian Parliament established a special fund
of 100 million marks for the purpose of purchasing land from the Poles,
on which German peasants were to be settled. From this time onwards the
struggle with the Poles entered a dramatic phase, because it was already
clear that the aim was to extirpate the Poles from their western territories.
In his speeches Bismarck proclaimed that he had begun a struggle with
the Polish gentry and did not in the least aim at the Polish peasant, whose
loyalty towards the State, he pretended, had remained unchanged. But the
struggle on both sides spread to an ever greater part of the population and was
transformed into a.struggle between the two nations, giving rise to fierce
national feeling on both sides, a development which Bismarck, who was
always guided by reason of State, did not favour at all. Just as in the
period of the Kulturkampf Bismarck’s motives, when he began this strug-
gle, were different from those of the social forces which supported him in
the campaign. Once more these proved to be the stronger. The National
Liberals, with whose support Bismarck established the Colonization Com-
mission, regarded the settlement campaign more as an experiment on a much
broader scafe than a mere struggle against the Polish gentry. They desired
a general change in the agrarian system. Their aim was the creation of
a strong and prosperous peasantry, which would socially and, therefore,
politically counterbalance the power of the Prussian junkers. The growth
of chauvinism in Germany was to their advantage; the bourgeoisie aban-
doned its liberal ideas and regarded nationalism as a useful instrument in
the struggle with the growing socialist movement. It was for this reason that
to the very end of the Prussian monarchy it was precisely the National
Liberals who remained the most determined advocates of expelling the
Poles from Germany’s eastern borderlands.
Bismarck, on the other hand, took his stand, as always, upon immediate
political expediency. In the 1870’s the Kulturkampf had, in his view, the
internal aim of smashing the “Zentrum”, the bastion of particularism, and
the external purpose of opposing the threatening Franco-Austrian-Catholic
coalition. Now such a coalition was not a threat, because from 1879 Austro-
Hungary had been an ally of Germany. The aim now was, on the contrary,
to strengthen and implement the alliance with Austro-Hungary. Bismarck
was aware that the Dreikaiserbund, concluded in 1872 and renewed again
in 1881, did not fully guarantee the preservation of good relations between
Russia and Austria. Fearing a possible Austro-Russian conflict, he knew that
Germany would be forced to side against Russia. He understood that in
such a case the Polish question would again present a problem. He consid-
ered, therefore, that before such an eventuality should happen, it was neces-
sary either to exterminate or at least to weaken the Polish element in Prus-
sia to such a degree that a reconstituted Polish State would have no cause to
claim Poznan or Pomerania. He desired, at the same time, to remind Rus-
sia, by the very fact of pursuing a struggle against the Poles, that the three
31°
484 THE FORMATION OF MASS POLITICAL PARTIES (1885-1904)
partitioning Powers had in common an important problem, more vital than
expansion in the Balkans, namely the Polish question.
These were the motives of the Prussian government when it began its
struggle to wrest land from the Poles in Poznan and Pomerania. Once the
struggle had begun, the initial causes gradually lost their significance. The
results of the struggle, however, were permanent. The different classes of
Polish society experienced a great shock and it was clearly understood that
the nation stood in mortal danger. Though it is true that in the Poznan area
resistance was not organized immediately, especially when the activity of
the Colonization Commission in its first years was not too dangerous and
met with serious technical difficulties, both sides realized that the further
development of the conflict was inevitable and that alternative methods
would be utilized in the struggle for ownership of the soil.
THE POLISH LEAGUE
Probably the first tangible political result of the German attack was the
creation in Switzerland of the so-called Polish League. The initiative for
this step came from Zygmunt Milkowski, one of the more eminent members
of the democratic emigration after 1863-1864, himself a well-known novelist.
In 1887, a year of tension in international relations as a result of the Bal-
kan crisis and an expected Austro-Russian war, he published a famous pam-
phlet entitled Rzecz o obronie czynnej i o Skarbie Narodowym (Regard-
ing Active Resistance and a National Fund). He proclaimed that it was
time to break with political passivity and that a positive attitude coordinated
in all the occupied areas, would force the enemies to change their conduct
towards the Poles. In the pamphlet, preparations for insurrection were not
recommended, but a deliberate abandonment of the concept of insurrection
was condemned. Milkowski put forward the idea of establishing a national
fund to be used for propaganda abroad. The pamphlet made a tremendous
impression on the youth of Poland. It was a challenge to the prevailing posi-
tivist ideology and to the slogans of “tri-loyalism”. It was followed immedi-
ately by the idea among the emigrants of establishing a secret organization,
which would direct Polish politics in all the three areas. Thus, the Polish Lea-
gue was established, headed by a committee with the traditional name of
“Centralizacja”, under the chairmanship of Mitkowski. The social principles
proclaimed in the League’s statute may be considered to be generally
democratic. They were not, however, elaborated in detail, though on the
other hand considerable attention was paid to the possibility of a conspiracy
for the purpose of preparing the Poles for the event of European conflict.
This organization would have remained an ephemeral émigré project,
had it not been joined by a group of young men in Poland connected with
the periodical “Glos” (The Voice), established in Warsaw in 1886. The
THE POLISH LEAGUE 485
most important among them was Jan Poptawski who had been sentenced
to deportation in 1878. While in exile he had met the Russian “Narodniks”
and absorbed some of their ideas of agrarian socialism. After his return to
Poland he collaborated at first with positivist journals, but, at that time, his
anti-gentry views became more marked. To Poplawski the common people
embodied all the positive characteristics. “Without traditions and even
without culture, the Polish people have preserved their nationality more
fully and strongly than the educated classes”. It was these ideas which this
group introduced into the Polish League, of which they soon completely took
cOntrol. Zygmunt Balicki, Poptawski’s close collaborator, was responsible
for the establishment of a large organization of university students called the
Union of Polish Youth (Zwiazek Miodziezy Polskiej, abbreviated to “Zet’”).
Modelling itself on the Free Masons, it had at first three and later two
degrees of initiation. This organization remained under the leadership of the
Polish League and it was active in all university centres where Poles studied,
at home and especially abroad. The organization was a political force for
many years and those who had been its members adopted an attitude of
mutual solidarity, which gave them an immense influence on the whole of
Polish political and social life up to the reestablishment of independence and
later. Soon “Zet” began to establish itself in the secondary schools also and
in the self-education circles which were being organized and which, though
they usually arose spontaneously, quickly came under the influence of the
“Zet-Brotherhood”. Thus, around 1890 a general political awakening took
place in which the young intelligentsia played a leading role.
This movement was connected with the general abandonment of the at-
titude which had prevailed since the collapse of the insurrection in 1864.
At first the general public, frightened and passive, regarded illegal social
work as likely to lead to fresh persecution which was to be avoided at all
costs, but in 1885 changes in the attitude of a large section of the intel-
ligentsia could clearly be seen. This showed itself not only in illegal political
action, but also in educational and cultural work which was almost as
dangerous for the foreign rulers.
The illegal campaign of popular education in the Kingdom was one of
the finest achievements of the period. Gradually an entire network of secret
schools was established, whether primary for the mass of the population, or
secondary of all types, reaching ultimately to university level. This organiza-
tion was active not only in Warsaw, but also in other towns and small com-
munities of the Kingdom. Everywhere the illegal teaching of the Polish
language, history and geography was carried on. According to Russian
official sources, in 1901 clandestine teaching embraced a third of the
country’s population and the majority of the peasants owed their literacy to
the secret school system. This effort had, of course, not only an educational
significance. It brought about an awakening of national and social conscious-
ness and, because those who participated in this work, come from a variety
486 THE FORMATION OF MASS POLITICAL PARTIES (1885-1904)
of groups with different points of view, it stimulated both nationalism and
socialism.
In practically all the state secondary schools of the Russian part of
Poland secret self-education circles were established, effectively resisting at-
tempts at Russianization by the authorities and teachers. Secrét courses
of Polish history and literature also were held. The major role in this effort
was played by women. The historian Wladyslaw Smolenski, who took part
in this work, writes about them as follows, “Imbued with the mission of
struggle for national existence, in their homes they taught with undaunted
zeal children who were deprived in the secondary schools of their native
language, history and literature ; they lit up with the torch of Polish culture
the basements and attics of the workers, the provincial towns and the manor
houses”.
A clandestine course of higher education was established for women in
which the most eminent Polish scholars in Warsaw lectured. It was called
the “Flying University” because the lectures were obliged continually to
change from one place to another. It had twenty-or-so lecturers and several
hundred students. Its courses lasted for twenty years and became legal only
after the 1905 Revolution. In addition, all girls’ private schools gave secret
courses in Polish history and literature ; clandestine secondary schools for
girls were also established.
Whole areas of social and cultural activities were forced underground as
a result of the pressure of the Tsarist government, which did not permit
Polish initiative in the cultural field. The Poles were assisted by their old
tradition of conspiracy, inherited from the 1863 Insurrection. In this respect,
no other people in this part of Europe had as fine a record. A nation,
deprived of sovereignty, was able to establish in the cultural and educational
field a network of organizations which, in practice, were immune from’ the
persecutions of foreign governments. All those who participated in this work
were of course well aware of the personal risks involved. Though im-
mediately after 1864 all illegal work was frowned upon by the great majority
of the well-to-do, in the middle of the 1880’s an increasing number of persons
working with dedication in the field of secret education, were accorded
recognition among the educated classes. -A large part was played in this by
literature which glorified the heroes of this activity and found a common
language with the Polish readers, in spite of the severity of censorship, which,
as is usual in such cases, was not able to break down the conspiracy of
understanding between the author and the reader.
THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT
In this period the socialist movement also took on a new scope. In Galicia
it benefited from those gains which had been won by the proletariat in its
THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT 487
struggle in the western and more industrialized provinces of the monarchy.
Simultaneously with the establishment of an all-Austrian party, a Social-
Democratic party was organized in Galicia in 1892, led by Ignacy Daszyn-
ski, an able speaker and agitator. Galicia was also, in spite of its general
backwardness, slowly entering the era of capitalism. For military reasons
the Austrian government enlarged the railway network and this entailed an
improvement of conditions in industry. A more rapid development of the
oil industry in the area, first at Jasto, and then at Drohobycz and Borystaw,
hastened the growth of the working class. Thus the basic conditions for the
development of the socialist movement had arisen. The newly-formed party
ultimately called itself the Polish Social-Democratic Party of Galicia and
Cieszyn-Silesia and played in the life of this province a much more impor-
tant part than was warranted by its essentially weak social basis. Its full
significance dates from the time it began to send deputies to the Austrian
Parliament. This became possible after a constitutional reform introduced
in Austria an electoral class (curia) based on universal suffrage in 1897.
As in all of Poland, in Galicia the decision to celebrate the workers’
holiday on May Day became a stimulus for the movement. In 1890 May
Day was held in Lwéw, Cracow, Warsaw and Ldédz. The Polish proletariat
thus gave evidence of its political existence.
In the Congress Kingdom the working-class movement grew with the
expansion of industry. The value of industrial production in the next twenty
years again doubled, from 200 to 400 million roubles. The number of work-
ers in the Kingdom increased at the same time from 150,000 to 270,000. What
was still more important, however, was that an increasing number of
workers were employed, as a result of concentration of industry, in large:
industrial plants. This increased the working class feeling of strength and
hastened the development of its experience.
Along with the growth of the working class, a rapid urbanization oc-
curred. The population of Warsaw increased almost fivefold in the period
from the Insurrection of 1863-1864 to the outbreak of the First World
War rising from 200,000 to 900,000. Lodz, the textile centre and the
most important industrial town in the Kingdom, grew tenfold from 50,000
to 500,000. This process was aided by a fundamental change in agriculture.
At this time the Kingdom ceased to export grain, because the European
markets were flooded by cheap American grain. Local grain was sold at
lower prices to towns and factory areas with a consequent lowering of the
cost of food for workers and townspeople in general.
Under such economic and social conditions the working-class move-
ment gained strength in spite of repression. In 1892 a strike accompanied by
disturbances occurred in Lédz on the occasion of May Day, with troops
being sent out against the workers. It was clear that the proletariat in the
Kingdom was mature enough for the formation of a mass socialist party.
Once more the exiles were responsible for its organization. In the autumn of
488 THE FORMATION OF MASS POLITICAL PARTIES (1885-1904)
1892 a famous meeting was held in Paris under the chairmanship of Lima-
nowski and with Mendelson as its principal organizer. The meeting set out
a programme of the Polish Socialist Party and the Union of Polish Socialists
Abroad was formed, with the aim of assisting the movement in Poland. The
programme, modelled partly on the recently formulated Erfurt programme
of the German Social-Democratic Party, was reformist in nature. It aimed
at the creation of a democratic Polish republic, but fully socialist aims were
postponed to a later stage. Thus this working-class party linked the emanci-
pation of the working class with simultaneous national liberation. It was this
feature of the party which attracted to it, along with sincere socialists, also
those for whom socialism was only a slogan to win the masses to a political
programme of struggle for national independence.
In 1893 the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) was established in the King-
dom and controlled by a Central Workers’ Committee. The party at once
began a skillful campaign of agitation. Above all, it distributed secret
literature at first smuggled in from abroad. The secret paper “Robotnik”
(The Worker) was published regularly from 1894. It symbolized the strength
of the party, inasmuch as the gendermerie could not for a long time discover
its printing works or interfere with its distribution. Jézef Pitsudski soon
became its editor and the de facto leader of the party. He had returned in
1892 from exile in Siberia and had joined the Wilno branch of the Polish
Socialist Party.
At the same time, in 1893, a second socialist party was established. It was
internationalist in character and consistently put more emphasis on the class
struggle. This was the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland founded
by Rosa Luxemburg and Julian Marchlewski. It considered itself to be
continuing the work of the “Great Proletariat” and held the view that the
slogan of a struggle for national independence was at that time injurious to
solidarity with the working-class movement of Tsarist Russia, whose govern-
ment was its common enemy. After temporary setbacks, the party became
active again under the leadership of Feliks Dzierzynski under the name of
the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, abbreviated
as SDKPiL. This party stressed its close links with Rusian Social Democrats.
Rosa Luxemburg continued to be its principal theorist. In opposition to the
exploitation of patriotic slogans by the propertied classes, she maintained
that the Kingdom, as well as the other two areas, had grown economically
as a result of association with the larger states to which they belonged and
were therefore “organically incorporated” in them. Thus, economic reasons
were an obstacle to regaining political independence. The social revolution,
by abolishing social and political oppression, would also thereby do away
with national oppression in all its manifestations. Rosa Luxemburg and
Marchlewski soon afterwards went to Germany, where they were active in
the German Social Democratic movement without ceasing to maintain their
contact with the SDKPiL. In the Kingdom the antagonism between the
ATTEMPTS AT COMPROMISE WITH THE GERMAN AND RUSSIAN GOVERNMENTS 489
®
SDKPiL and PPS became deeper. The dispute on the national question in
Poland deepened the divisions existing on a world-wide scale between revolu-
tionary and reformist views in the working-class movement.
At the same time as the Polish Socialist Party arose in the Kingdom,
a Polish Socialist Party of the Prussian area was established. Its organ was
the “Gazeta Robotnicza” (The Workers’ Paper) which had begun publica-
tion earlier in Berlin. In 1901 the paper was transferred to Katowice in order
to strengthen Polish socialist agitation in Upper Silesia. At the outset the
Polish Socialist Party of the Prussian area was considered a branch of
German Social Democracy, which assisted it financially, but soon disagree-
ment between the two parties arose, because the German Socialists did not
agree to nominating Polish socialist candidates in Upper Silesia, on the
grounds that the country had never belonged to Poland. The German Social
Democrats were not united in their attitude on the question of Poland’s
independence. Wilhelm Liebknecht was an outstanding friend of Poland, but
he died in 1900 and the new leader of the party, August Bebel, in spite of
his sympathy for Poland, inclined rather to the views of Rosa Luxemburg.
As a result the Polish Socialist Party of the Prussian area ultimately in
1913 set up an organization separate from that of the German party.
The influence of the PPS in the Prusian area was relatively small. Since
the Kulturkampf the masses in this area had come under the strong influence
of the clergy, who were opposed to class agitation and had organized
a labour movement under their own sponsorship, both in the Polish lands of
the Prussian State and in Germany itself, especially in Westphalia, where
there were numerous Polish workers: The clergy under the influence of
Leo XIII’s encyclical Rerum novarum of 1891 undertook this campaign
precisely at the time when the mass socialist parties were being found. On
the initiative of Archbishop Florian Stablewski, “Societies of Polish Work-
ers” began to be organized in 1892. Since 1905 the paper “Robotnik” (The
Worker) edited by Father Adamski was published, while the Gniezno theo-
logical seminary held courses on social questions. Polish workers’ unions were
established still earlier, The strongest was the Bochum Polish Workers’
Union, founded in 1902, which later led to a unfication of all the unions
of this type.
ATTEMPTS AT COMPROMISE WITH THE GERMAN
AND RUSSIAN GOVERNMENTS
These workers’ unions, which pursued a policy of class conciliation, tended
in the national question likewise to put forward passive slogans, defending
the status quo, and were not in the least dangerous to the Prussian State.
This resulted from their desire to gain the support of all those, both Poles
and the Germans, who wished to oppose the danger of socialism. Immedi-
490 THE FORMATION OF MASS POLITICAL PARTIES (1885-1904)
e
ately after Bismarck’s fall in 1890 Polish conservatives launched a broad
political campaign aimed at creating some type of a modus vivendi with the
Prussian State. These attempts at conciliation were connected with the activity
of the landowner, Jézef Koécielski, who, through his connexions at the
Court, came into contact with the new chancellor, Caprivi, at a time when
he was in a difficult situation in the Reichstag and wished to win over the
Polish deputies.
Caprivi’s first significant move in the international field was the refusal
to renew the 1887 secret treaty, which linked Berlin and St. Petersburg
diplomatically, but which was undoubtedly at variance with the Austro-
German alliance. This severance of established links between the two north-
ern courts, which was in a way the foundation stone of Polish subjection,
was of immense significance for the future fate of Poland. At the time it
gave rise only to a temporary relaxation of the German anti-Polish policy.
It lasted barely as long as this brief first Russo-German tension, which mani-
fested itself most sharply in a customs war, resolved by the signing of a ten-
year trade treaty in 1894. Both Powers found a new area for imperialist
expansion in the Far East, where they worked together against Japan.
It was not only international circumstances which frustrated a Polish-
German conciliation. The basic cause lay in the fact that the German
bourgeoisie, abandoning liberal ideas in the new period of imperialism,
adopted extreme nationalist slogans at home as the best antidote to socialism.
The bourgeoisie was likewise aware that these slogans made it possible to
mobilize the energies of the broad masses for imperialist aims. In order to
put into effect the building of a navy in the interests of heavy industry, it
was necessary to create a huge propaganda machine. For this purpose the
“Allgemeiner Deutscher Verband” (General German Union) was established
in 1891, renamed the “Alldeutscher Verband” (Pan-German Union) in
1894.
The Polish Parliamentary Club in the Reichstag gave the government
their support not only for its projects of military and naval expansion, but
also for its economic policy, which during Caprivi’s time stressed more the
interests of large industry than those of agriculture. In this way Polish con-
servatives agreed even to a policy which was contrary to the economic inter-
ests represented by them. They were willing to sacrifice a great deal in order
to stop the ruthless oppression and extermination begun by Bismarck. In effect,
some relief was obtained. Perhaps the most essential was the granting of
the right to have its own inspectors, to the Union of Polish Cooperatives.
This made it possible for the Polish cooperatives to extend their activity
very considerably, which was of great importance in the struggle for land
ownership. The concessions which the Poles obtained in the field of educa-
tion proved, however, to be temporary. In general, the government had
exhausted the possibilities of a compromise, which could be reconciled with
the ideas of growing nationalism. All legislation of an anti-Polish. nature,
ATTEMPTS AT COMPROMISE WITH THE GERMAN AND RUSSIAN GOVERNMENTS 491
including that in respect of the Colonization Commission, remained in force
and was to be still further enlarged.
The attempts at conciliation ultimately came to an end in 1894 shortly
before Caprivi’s fall. During four years the Polish deputies had shown con-
siderable subservience to the government’s requests in Parliament, with-
out receiving any further concessions in return. In the end they had to
give up this policy under the pressure of indignant Polish opinion. It was
clear that the policy of conciliation was that of the Church hierarchy and
the aristocracy and was of an anti-democratic character. The Polish bour-
geoisie and petty bourgeoisie also regarded socialism as an enemy, but the
socialist movement was still weak in the Prussian area. Thus it was con-
sidered that the dominance of the aristocracy and Church hierarchy consti-
tuted a much greater danger. The Prussian area was undergoing the same
changes as the other parts of Poland, drawing the broad masses into po-
litical life. The emergence of mass political parties, first the socialist, then
the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois, and finally the peasants, made impossible
a policy of conciliation in Germany, just as similar attempts failed withiri
the Tsarist system.
Simultaneous attempts at a compromise with Russia were of a somewhat
different nature. It was stressed here that national salvation was to be found
in conciliation with Russia, on the basis of Pan-Slav solidarity and the
community of economic interests linking the two countries. These ideas
were voiced in the Petersburg paper “Kraj” (The Land) founded and ex-
pertly edited by W. Spasowicz. A lawyer by profession, living in St. Pe-
tersburg, he was close to the Russian liberals, admired Russian culture and
at the same time was aware of the merits of Polish intellectual culture. As
a literary critic and journalist, he worked for a cultural rapprochement of
the two peoples. He saw a possibility of a Russo-Polish union, setting forth
as his ideal a multinational, liberal state like Switzerland. Spasowicz was
connected with the Polish aristocracy and the great financiers, who sup-
ported the paper and regarded the ideas expressed in it as corresponding to
their social and economic interests.
Repeated attempts to obtain a more liberal attitude from the Russian
authorities in the Kingdom met with absolute unwillingness on the part of
those directing Tsarist policy. Such attempts were made by Zygmunt Wielo-
polski, the son and heir of the Margrave Aleksander Wielopolski, who had
connexions with the Court. The government of the rigid Alexander III
with the administration of Hurko, the Warsaw Governor-General, and of
Apukhtin, the curator of the Warsaw school district, was a period of ruthless
persecution of all things Polish in every cultural field. Alexander III’s death
in 1894, when the conciliation attempts in Poznan had broken down, seemed
to be a turning point. All those who wished for an understanding with the
Tsarist régime placed their hopes in the young Nicholas II. After Hurko’s
retirement, the new Governor-General in Warsaw, Count Shuvalov and
&
492 THE FORMATION OF MASS POLITICAL PARTIES (1885-1904)
later Prince Imeretinsky, knew how to give support to these illusions by
their polite behaviour and the maintenance of good relations with the Polish
aristocracy.
The Tsar’s visit to Warsaw in 1897 was the climax of these illusions.
He was presented with a million roubles raised by public subscription,
which he donated to be used for the building of a Polytechnic. He also
allowed the erection of a monument to Mickiewicz. The donations for this
monument revealed the immense change in the attitude of the Polish peas-
ants, who contributed what they could by the thousand. Basically, how-
ever, the Kingdom did not obtain real concessions. Shortly afterwards the
advocates of the policy of compromise were brought into discredit by
Pitsudski’s publication of a memorandum by Imeretinsky, which was spiri-
ted away from St. Petersburg. He spoke contemptuously of the party of
conciliation with Tsarism and considered the parties opposing the Tsarist
government as the real factor to be taken into account. The publication of
this memorandum was a painful blow to the policy of compromise.
POLISH NATIONALISM AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY
It was after 1900 that a new attempt at conciliation with the government
was made by the National Democratic Party, which had emerged from the
Polish League. Within a few of after its foundation, an essential change of
outlook had taken place in the League. The heirs of the January Insurrection,
believing in the old ideals of fraternity between nations, had lost influence
and their place was taken by a young group, led by Roman Dmowski, then
a university student. In 1893 Dmowski, together with Balicki and Poplawski,
transformed the Polish League into the National League. In the next few
years this organization developed a pronounced nationalism, departing from
democratic ideas. This ideology corresponded to the attitudes prevalent
among the bourgeoisie of practically all Europe. It was a sign of the arrival
of a new area, the era of imperialism.
It should be emphasized, however, that the origins of Polish nationalism
differ somewhat from similar movements in western Europe. French nation-
alism, whose beginnings were in Dérouléde’s “League of Patriots”, Pan-
Germanism which started in Austria but was supported by west German
big industry, as well as Imperialism in Great Britain, were connected to
a large degree with the establishment of great monopolies which sought to
mould public opinion for the purpose of opposing socialism and gaining
support in the struggle for markets and colonies. Although in Poland the
nationalist movement had similar local roots, especially in the Russian area,
it was also a reaction to what was happening in other countries. On the one
hand, it was an answer to the attack of German nationalism, on the other,
THE PEASANT MOVEMENT IN GALICIA 493
it resulted from the ideological influence emanating from France and England
with which the Polish intelligentsia always had intellectual, artistic and
literary connexions. It is true that in Poland, too, financial institutions
arose which took control of important branches of economic life, such as,
for example, the Commercial Bank in Warsaw. These institutions could not
be indifferent towards politics. It was a fact, however, that the Polish
nationalist movement during its formation was not dependent on commercial
bodies, and the parties or social organizations, established by the National
League or secretly led by it, were not at that time connected with industrial
monopolies. That took place later during the 1905 Revolution, when it was
shown that these parties could serve the interests of the propertied classes.
Up to the outbreak of the 1905 Revolution the nationalist movement
adopted, at least in theory, an anti-Russian attitude aimed at securing inde-
pendence. In 1894 Dmowski sought to organize a demonstration on the
occasion of the hundredth anniversary of Kilinski’s uprising in Warsaw,
which resulted in reprisals by the authorities against members of the League.
The paper “Glos” (The Voice), which up to this point had represented the
point of view of this group, ceased to appear, and Dmowski and Balicki
had to take refuge in Galicia. The “Przeglad Wszechpolski” (The All-Polish
Review) began to be published by Dmowski in Lwéw as a theoretical paper.
In Cracow Poptawski edited “Polak” (The Pole), which was intended for
agitation among the peasants and smuggled into the Kingdom.
The National Democratic Party was formally established in 1897 and
soon became the strongest political representative of wide sections of the
urban population with considerable support among well-to-do peasants.
In the near future the party was to evolve still more clearly along nationalist
lines.
THE PEASANT MOVEMENT IN GALICIA
During this period the first modern mass peasant party was born in Galicia.
The initiative came from intellectual groups with a point of view close to
that of the Warsaw “Glos”, whose organ was the “Przeglad Spoteczny”
(The Social Review) founded in Lwéw in 1886. It was founded by Bo-
lestaw Wystouch, who had become acquainted with socialist ideas while
studying in St. Petersburg. After imprisonment in Russia he took refuge in
Galicia and played an important role as the promoter of the peasant move-
ment.
It was precisely in this period that the situation in Galicia became more
acute. The conservative politicians understood that the broad masses were
awakening from political lethargy, as was shown by Stojalowski’s activity
and the first socialist circles. In 1888 Count Kazimierz Badeni, a man who
494 THE FORMATION OF MASS POLITICAL PARTIES (1885-1904)
believed in strong government, came to power in Galicia as Viceroy. The
first political problem with which he dealt was Russophilism among the
Ukrainians. The activity of Tsarist agents among the Uniate clergy, which
began to develop favourable leanings towards the Orthodox Church, had
been discovered. Badeni successfully combatted these tendencies among the
Uniate hierarchy and, moreover, reached in 1890 a compromise with the
Ukrainian politicians, giving the Ukrainians some concessions in the field
of education. From this time onwards the Greek Catholic hierarchy became
the mainstay of the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia.
In the same year Michal Bobrzynski, a historian of the Cracow school
and one of the outstanding Galician conservative politicians, became the
head of the Provincial School Council. His achievement was the develop-
ment of primary education in the area under Austrian rule which until now
had been sunk in illiteracy. Many criticism can be made of the social direc-
tion which Bobrzynski gave to the Galician school system, but it is true that
it is from his time that a serious effort to develop general education in this
province began.
Badeni, as Viceroy, fought against the peasant movement with police
repression which had the principal result of hastening of its radicalization.
The Peasant Party was founded in 1895 and its real leader was Jan Sta-
pinski, a young agitator of peasant family. He edited, first with the help
of Wystouch and afterwards on his own account, the periodical “Przyjaciel
Ludu” (The Friend of the People). This paper waged an unflinching struggle
against the great landowners. In the meanwhile Stojalowski, persecuted
and imprisoned by Badeni, attacked with mounting fervour the ruling
classes of Galicia, though often in demagogic terms. The peasany leaders
soon found a political platform. Badeni, having become prime minister of
Austria, introduced a fifth curia, based on universal suffrage, to elect mem-
bers of the Vienna Parliament. In the 1897 Parliament Polish deputies
appeared who did not join the Polish Club. These were the Socialists led
by Daszynski, an extremely able parliamentary orator, and the Peasant Par-
ty followers of Stapinski. This showed clearly that the political hegemo-
ny of the conservative “Stanczyk” group was coming to an end. At the
same time the conservatives had compromised themselves politically in the
Prussian area, when Koscielski’s policy of compromise broke down in 1894.
Socialist parties and the National Democrats came into existence in the
Congress Kingdom, and a socialist and a peasant party were formed in
Galicia. It could be clearly seen that, in spite of the borders and differing
political and constitutional conditions, Polish society, as a whole, under-
went simultaneous and identical political changes.
THE DEFENCE OF POLISH NATIONALITY IN THE PRUSSIAN AREA 495
THE DEFENCE OF POLISH NATIONALITY
IN THE PRUSSIAN AREA
During the last years of the nineteenth century which saw the formaiion
of democratic political parties in the, Austrian and Russian areas, the Prus-
sian area likewise underwent social and economic changes. The provinces
of Poznan and Pomerania had to fight, above all, against the intensification
of Germanization and make ever greater efforts to retain ownership of the
soil for the Poles. In this field, effective means of defence were soon dis-
covered. On the basis of a law dating from Caprivi’s time concerning vested
property, the Land Bank began to divide up and settle peasants on landed
estates. The Bank was created with some financial assistance from the gentry
in Galicia and the Congress Kingdom. It was followed in its operations by
the Land Purchase Bank, which succeeded in attracting even west German
capital because of its high dividends. The Polish peasant succeeded in pay-
ing a high price because of his desire to own his own land. It soon became
clear that the Poles were conducting their own settlement campaign more
effectively than the Colonization Commission, which received ever greater
financial support from the Prussian State.
Perceiving the ineffectiveness of the methods adopted against the Poles,
the Prussian government abandoned the principle, sacrosanct until now, of
equality of all citizens before the law and in 1904 issued a decree which
permitted the authorities to prohibit the erection of houses in the new set-
tlements if these new villages contradicted the aim of the law of 1886,
designed to preserve the German element in the population. The Poles sought
to overcome this obstacle by settling purchasers of the new holdings in for-
mer estate buildings. This decree gave rise to the famous case of the peasant,
M. Drzymata, who when the authorities refused to grant him permission
to put up a house, lived in a wagon on his property. The German govern-
ment fought the Poles not only by depriving them of land. From 1898 on-
wards more new laws against the Poles were issued. The policy of German-
ization became sharper and more extensive, especially in the field of educa-
tion. The introduction of religious instruction in German in the primary
schools led in 1901 to the notorious Wrzesnia (near Poznan) affair, where
a teacher used corporal punishment to force unwilling children to follow
his subject in German. The parents supported their children and, in conse-
quence, scores of people were given prison sentences of many months. Once
again the affair received wide publicity all over Europe.
The Germanization of the Polish areas under Prussian rule was given
a spurious authenticity by changing place names. Attempts were made to
change the spelling and often the sound of Polish surnames when birth
certificates were issue. This often resulted in friction with the population.
It was also sought to enlarge the Prussian administrative machinery in
the Polish areas in order to increase the number of German ofhfcials, who
496 THE FORMATION OF MASS POLITICAL PARTIES (1885-1904)
were brought in from other provinces and given special bonuses to encourage
them to remain in a foreign environment. Attempts were made to establish
German cultural institutions and large funds were earmarked for this pur-
pose. All this had the aim of strengthening the German element in the
eastern borderlands annexed by Germany.
Initiative came not only from the State, but from private sources as
well. In 1894 the “Deutscher Ostmarkenverein” (The German Union of the
Eastern Marches) was set up in Poznan. It was called the H.K.T. (“Haka-
ta”) by the Poles from the initials of its founders Hansemann, Kennemann,
and Tiedemann. This society was founded by the Prussian junkers who had
become active politically during Caprivi’s government and formed the
Agrarian Union to defend the economic interests of the landowners against
the influence of big industry. Soon the “Hakata” became closely linked
with the government, but it always preserved an appearance of independence
in pursuit of its tasks of conducting a constant anti-Polish agitation. It also
initiated some government action, representing it as the realization of the
desires of the German community itself.
The anti-Polish campaign was conducted in a planned and systematic
way. New settlements, at first haphazardly established, were carefully lo-
cated. Because rural population was greater than the urban some towns were
surrounded by German agricultural settlements, in order to create strong
German islands in an ethnically Polish area. Such a policy of settlement
would indeed have proved effective in the long run, but there was insufh-
cient time for its fulfilment.
The Germanization of many towns failed, in spite of the fact that the
Germans had at their disposal, in the struggle with barely a few million
Polish subjects, all the resources of the most powerful European state. Thus,
for example, Poznan was 50.76 per cent Polish in 1890 and 57.07 per cent
in 1910, according to official statistics which, as was proved later, were
falsified to the advantage of the Germans. :
In this same period the Polish national movement in Upper Silesia made
further progress. After the termination of the Kulturkampf the clergy, being
reconciled with the government, ceased to support the Polish cause in Si-
lesia and even began to assist the government in its campaign of Germaniza-
tion. In this province, where there were practically no native intellectuals,
it was very difficult for the Polish population to free itself from the influence
of the clergy, but the national movement, once awakened, could no longer
be suppressed. A Polish press, independent of the “Zentrum” began to
develop. It was run by journalists of Silesian origin and newcomers from
Poznan and Pomerania. The most important papers of that time were the
“Nowiny Raciborskie” (The Raciborz News) and the “Gazeta Opolska”
(The Opole Gazette). Their editors were opposed to the “Zentrum” and the
clergy’s sponsorship of the Polish revival came to an end. In the first years
of the twentieth century, at a time when the Polish Socialist Party was al-
-
THE DEFENCE OF POLISH NATIONALITY IN THE PRUSSIAN AREA 497
F===J under 2 Hectares
anaaAt 2-5 »
5-20 a”
ES above 20 ,,
———————
ee _
Percentage of total
area of peasant=
farms =
Percentage of all
peasant farms
| {yuu
THE KINGDOM
OF POLAND
|
nD
pyininarees’
ll
=WEST PRUSSIA
jpn’
=GRAND DUCHY =
= OF POZNANS=
|
OUT
|
III. Structure of peasant farms in Poland c. 1900's
ready active in Upper Silesia, the influence of the National League also
began to spread. From its ranks came the most vigorous of the younger
generation of Silesian politicians, Wojciech Korfanty. In the 1903 elections
to the German Parliament Polish candidates, independent of the “Zentrum”,
were put up in the seven Silesian constituencies. Against the wishes of the
“Zentrum”, a Polish candidate was elected, Korfanty, who in the final vote
received the support of the Polish Socialist Party. This first Polish electoral
victory is considered correctly as a turning point in the history of the prov-
ince. It showed that the struggle against German clericalism had been won
and from this time onwards the Polish movement had a completely inde-
pendent character.
32 History of Poland
498 THE FORMATION OF MASS POLITICAL PARTIES (1885-1904)
_ The development of national consciousness among the Mazurian and
Warmian population of East Prussia and among the Kashubians in Gdansk-
Pomerania was much slower. There, too, 1848 had marked the beginning
of a national revival, but in Mazuria and Warmia the movement remained
weak in spite of the efforts of individuals from other provinces and even
from Warsaw. The essential cause lay in the fact that this was an agricul-
tural territory without industry. The Mazurian peasants were, moreover,
mostly Protestant like their junker masters. Prussian propaganda was even
able to use the Polish language in its encouragement of Mazurian particu-
larism. The economic backwardness of these lands did have the result that
the peasant, remaining in his village, preserved his Polish, but, on the other
hand, social advancement in Mazuria and Warmia was possible only by
the acceptance of German culture and language. The situation was better
in Kashuby, where the proximity of the industrial area of Gdansk and the
Catholicism of the local peasants and fishermen always resulted in the
election of a Polish deputy to the German Parliament from the maritime
Gdansk-Pomerania district of Kartuzy, Puck and Wejherowo.
ECONOMIC EMIGRATION
It can be stated that in general by the turn of the century Polish social and
political life had become much more democratic. The mass of the people:
began to have an increasing influence over the attitude of the nation as
a whole. This was the result of economic expansion. One of the important
factors which strengthened the position of the ordinary people of Poland
was emigration, which took on a tremendous scale in the last decade of the
nineteenth century. The first wave of emigration came from the Prussian
area in about 1870 and consisted mainly of craftsmen. In the 1880’s it was
the peasantry from the province of Poznan who emigrated primarily to the
United States, but also to the west German industrial areas. In the 1890's
peasants from the Congress Kingdom began to emigrate, first to Brasil and
then to the United States. Galicia was the last to experience emigration, but
it was here that the largest exodus of Polish peasants took place. The total
for Galician emigration has been estimated at about half a million. Apart
from permanent emigration, seasonal migration also had increasing impor-
tance. Landless peasants or small-holders, mainly from Galicia, went to un-
dertake agricultural work in the eastern provinces of Germany, especially
in Western Pomerania, where their labour, because of shortage of workers
among the local population and the departure of Germans for west Germany
in the Ostflucht (Flight from the East), was vitally necessary to agriculture.
Whether the emigrant returned home or remained abroad, he sent money
back to his family, with which land was bought. Emigration, involving
ECONOMIC EMIGRATION 499
‘|
u|
ll.
li
alli
lf
y
|
i
|
|
|
yh
|
‘|
Tl |
IV. Emigration from Polish lands, 1870-1914
millions of people, on the whole helped considerably in raising the economic
and cultural level of the Polish countryside.
Thus large Polish centres were formed abroad, especially in the United
States, where the Polish masses were at first organized by the clergy, but
later by more progressive, lay intellectuals. The beginnings of Polish organi-
zations in America date from the political emigration after the January
Insurrection, which founded a Polish press. As a result, by the end of the
century the general level of political consciousness of the Polish peasant was
probably higher among the emigrants in America than at home. The future
showed that the general balance-sheet of emigration, though a negative
phenomenon, in the long run had some positive aspects. It enriched the
~~
32°
500 THE FORMATION OF MASS POLITICAL PARTIES (1885-1904)
Polish village and it produced an important political factor for the national
cause, the influence of the Polish community in the U.S.A.
One must not forget either the great contribution made by Polish work-
ers, peasants, technicians and intellectuals to foreign civilizations in the
nineteenth century. This is especially true in Russia. Increasingly large num-
bers of Polish professional people, technicians and traders, emigrated to the
interior of the Tsarist State, attracted by the possibilities offered by expand-
ing industry. They frequently became prosperous and, on the whole, were
respected. In earlier periods emigration from Poland to Russia had been
that of political prisoners, who were settled in the eastern provinces of the
Empire, especially Siberia. The Polish prisoners contributed a good deal
to the economic and cultural development of those remote lands, and indeed
to the scientific study of them. Many of these people won the sympathy and
gratitude of the local population. In 1883 a general amnesty made possible
the return from Siberia of thousands of deportees. Many of them, however,
remained there permanently. It is characteristic that they became the pioneers
of a Russo-Polish rapprochement among the most progressive circles of
both peoples. A similar role was played by the subsequent wave of deportees,
who were sent to Siberia for participation in the working-class movement
and the 1905 Revolution. The economic emigration, mostly of professionally
qualified persons, strengthened sympathy for the Poles in all ranks of Rus-
sian society and its contribution to raising the cultural level of the eastern
regions of the Empire was considerable.
“YOUNG POLAND” AND THE ARTS
The social and ideological transformation at the turn of the century was also
reflected in the field of culture. In the twilight of positivism Polish literature,
as ever reflecting trends current in Europe, passed into a new period cor-
responding to modernism, which in Poland was referred to as the era of
“Young Poland”. Its main centre now was Cracow.
Stanistaw Przybyszewski, who had earlier made a name for himself in
Berlin as a writer in German, arrived in Cracow in the last years of the
nineteenth century. The periodical “Zycie” (Life), under his editorship
became, along with the Warsaw “Chimera” edited by Zenon Przesmycki-
Miriam, the organ of a new literary and artistic trend voicing aesthetism
and the cultivation of form and, simultaneously, the criticism of uninspired,
Philistine attitudes. Poland witnessed once more a wave of lyrical, verbose
poetry, enamoured of eroticism and complicated symbolism, and consciously
harking back to romanticism. A cult of Slowacki was born in Poland,
though he was interpreted and understood in a peculiar fashion. Thus the
poet gained a posthumous victory as it were over Mickiewicz in Polish
public opinion. The outstanding poets of this generation were Kazimierz
“YOUNG POLAND” AND THE ARTS 501
Stanistaw Wyspianski
Tetmajer, an admirer of decadence ; Jan Kasprowicz, a peasant’s son, who
dealt with social and religious problems in his lyrics and drama; and
Leopold Staff, whose work enjoyed a vogue for a long time after this period.
The greatest creative artist of this generation was Stanislaw Wyspianski, an
eminent impressionist painter, as well as a poet and playwright, whose
visionary works once again brought the national question to the forefront
as had occurred under the romantics. Wyspianski’s plays fascinated an entire
generation by their break with the doctrine of conciliation and loyalism put
forward by the “Stanczyks”. They fought also against the mysticism of the
Romantic epoch and once more called upon the nation to perform concrete
deeds. His Wesele (The Wedding) of 1901 and Wyzwolenie (The Deliverance)
of 1903 expressed both contemporary national ideals and acute social criti-
cism. Wyspianski’s great stagecraft, moreover, enhanced the suggestive power
of his works.
Another spokesman, alongside Wyspianski, of new national and social
L. Wyczétkowski, Digging Beetroot, 1892
ideas, and the spiritual mentor of his generation was Stefan Zeromski. His
novels dealt with troublesome and painful subjects, uncovering the wounds of
society, scourging the selfishness of the upper classes and demanding from
intellectuals sacrifices for the good of the cause, even of their personal hap-
piness in his Ludzie bezdomni (The Homeless) of 1900. Zeromski also revived
the cult of armed struggle for independence. His novel Popioty (Ashes) of
1904 deals with the Napoleonic epoch, as does his play Sutkowski. The
January Insurrection is touched upon in many of his other works. Wladystaw
Reymont is famous, above all, as the author of Chlopi (The Peasants) writ-
ten in 1904-1909, an extensive novel about the life of a Polish village, for
which the author received the Nobel Prize in 1924. The novel of manners
with topical and journalistic undertones, was represented by Wactaw Siero-
szewski and Jozef Weyssenhoff. Waclaw Berent’s works like Zywe kamienie
(The Living Stones) presented a particular version of Nietzsche’s ideas. Dra-
ma was represented, apart from Wyspianski and Kasprowicz, by Tadeusz Rit-
tner, Jan August Kisielewski and Karol Hubert Rostworowski.
“YOUNG POLAND"? AND THE ARTS 503
Olga Boznanska
The theatre played a tremendous role as a centre of national culture. In
Warsaw the stage was the only place where Polish could be used publicly.
While bowing to the taste of its‘bourgeois audience, the theatre cultivated
also, thanks to a group of excellent actors the traditions of the Polish comedy
of manners and founded the cult of Shakespeare. The Cracow theatre,
with Kazimierz Kaminski and Ludwik Solski as its principal actors, working
in more liberal conditions, appealed to the national spirit from the stage,
504 THE FORMATION OF MASS POLITICAL PARTIES (1885-1904)
boldly presenting a contemporary, serious repertoire of Henrik Ibsen, Mau-
rice Maeterlinck, Stanistaw Przybyszewski. The experimental theatre was
represented by Tadeusz Pawlikowski, who began the staging of plays in
a naturalistic and symbolic way, while Wyspianski, as author, stage designer
and director, fought against the limitations of the traditional “box” theatres.
The “Young Poland” period brought also increased activity in the field
of music. Numerous symphonic works were composed by Mieczystaw Kar-
lowicz, Ludomir Rdozycki and Karol Szymanowski and virtuoso performers
were prominent like Ignacy Paderewski and Aleksander Michalowski.
In the arts, modern Polish painting began to take shape from the inter-
play of various trends: impressionism, postimpressionism, symbolism and
“secession”. Colouristic painting, especially landscapes, was represented by
Jan Stanistawski, Jézef Pankiewcz and Leon Wyczotkowski who was also
an excellent graphic artist. Symbolism had an exponent in Jacek Malczewski,
who used concrete forms and sharp lines in his work, thus combining the
fantastic with the realistic. Portrait painting was done by Olga Boznanska
and Teodor Axentowicz. The Cracow “secession” which sought to create
a uniform style for all fields of visual art, tried to employ elements of
Polish folk art and in this Wyspianski played a vital role.
In architecture, after a long period of bad taste and shoddy building,
when speculative house building in the rapidly growing towns ignored the
best principles of town planning and when public buildings, erected by
a foreign administration purposely gave the cities a foreign look, like
the Prusso-Nuremberg style in Poznan and the pseudo-Byzantine in the
Kingdom, there appeared at the beginning of the twentieth century, especial-
ly among the Warsaw architects, Jan Heurich, Czestaw Przybylski and
others, a tendency anticipating functionalism, aimed at freeing the facade
from heavy decoration.
The clientele of the artists also changed in this period. Alongside rich
merchants and industrialists, there were now prosperous representatives of
the urban intelligentsia, lawyers, doctors and professors.
All this showed that the Polish nation had broken with the moods
emanating from the downfall of the Insurrection of 1863-1864 and that in
the new era, which the twentieth century was ushering in, it was preparing to
play a role corresponding, at least to some degree, to its historical tradition.
At the end of the nineteenth century, historical writing, breaking away
from the influence of the Cracow school, appealed to these traditions. The
majority of historians in Warsaw writing about modern times, like Tadeusz
Korzon and Wladystaw Smolenski, represented an optimistic view of the
national past, especially of the country’s economic and cultural resurgence
in the eighteenth century. In Lwow Szymon Askenazy, an excellent historian,
wrote on the diplomatic history of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
and on the Polish insurgent movement, in a spirit of independence and
heroism, thus exerting a strong influence on many Polish intellectuals.
Chapter XX
THE PERIOD OF REVOLUTION
AND THE APPROACHING
EUROPEAN WAR (1904-1914)
CHANGES IN RUSSIAN ECONOMIC
POLICY TOWARDS POLAND
The revolution, which as a result of defeat in the Japanese war of 1904-1905
spread over the Tsarist Empire, took on somewhat different aspects in the
Congress Kingdom. The Polish lands under Tsarist rule were, as regards
economic and social conditions, more advanced than Russia and the national
question was closely connected with the social and political demands of the
bourgeoisie, workers and peasants. The Russian Revolution was prepared by
a rapid process of industrialization which was begun by the economic policy
of Witte, who first took office as minister of finance in 1892. At that time the
State itself directly financed the creation of great industrial concerns, primari-
ly to achieve the expansion of the railway network. This became possible
owing to the shift in Tsarist foreign policy. Russia concluded an alliance
with France in 1891-1894 which made it possible to obtain immense French
loans. Although Witte supported the development of industry in ethnically
Russian lands, he took a different attitude towards the border regions, espe-
cially towards the Kingdom.
This was revealed in his tariff policy. The government placed customs
duties on raw materials required for the industry in the Kingdom and in this
way supported production in the interior of Russia. Russian industry found
itself close to the source of raw materials and, as a result of differential rail-
way rates, freight charges were markedly more expensive in the Kingdom
than in Russia. For political and economic reasons foreign capitalists, who
until that time had preferred to invest in the Kingdom, now transferred their
capital to the interior of Russia.
The industrial relationship between the Kingdom and the Empire was
reversed. From the end of the nineteenth century Russian industry developed
more rapidly than that of the Kingdom, while in relation to the whole of the
Empire, the percentage of the Kingdom’s industrial production began to drop.
In some fields Russian industry not only began to drive out Polish products
from the Empire’s markets, but also became competitive in the Kingdom itself.
506 THE PFRIOD OF REVOLUTION AND THE APPROACHING WAR (1904-1914)
Thus, if the Kingdom, in the thirty years after the Insurrection of 1863-1864
was in a favourable position by comparison with the rest of the Empire, at
least economically, from the end of the century it experienced discrimination
in this field as well. These changes took place slowly and unevenly in the
various sectors of the economy.
The years preceding the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war reveal
economic difficulties all over Europe. The Kingdom felt this more acutely on
account of the hostile economic policy of the Russian government.
A spontaneous resistance of the Polish working class developed as the crisis
progressed. Strikes occurred more frequently and were accompanied by
violence. The Kindom experienced the revolutionary ferment even more
than the rest of the Empire, and this was still further increased by the out-
break of the war with Japan.
This situation compelled the large industrialists and great landowners to
organize themselves and seek a rapprochement with the government, which
appeared to be the only power capable of maintaining social order. Such is
the background to the founding in 1904 of the Conservative Party, or so-
called “Realists”.
On the other hand, in the summer of 1904 both Pilsudski and Dmowski
arrived in Tokyo, independently of each other to confer there with the
Japanese general staff. Pilsudski wanted to obtain assistance for his plans for
an insurrection, to which Dmowski was opposed. The Japanese, however,
gave up the idea of a Polish diversion, which was by then unnecessary in
view of their decisive victories in Manchuria.
THE 1905 REVOLUTION IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE
AND POLAND
When the liberally-inclined Prince Sviatopelk-Mirski formed his government
in Russia, a memorandum was presented to him by the National League. It
demanded the introduction of Polish into the schools and the administration
of the Kingdom, together with municipal and rural local government. The
Polish Socialist Party, on the other hand, organized its first armed demonstra-
tion in Warsaw on 13 October, 1904. Shots were fired for the first time at the
Russian police in Grzybowski Square by armed groups of the Polish Socialist
Party. A similar armed movement embraced Russia. The sign for a general
revolutionary movement in the whole Monarchy was “Bloody Sunday”,
22 January, 1905, when the priest Gapon set out for the Winter Palace,
Yeading thousands of Petersburg workers, to present a loyal address to the
Tsar. A massacre was the answer, and it provided the spark for the powder
barrel.
In Warsaw the SDKPiL and the PPS proclaimed a general strike. This
moment may be regarded as the beginning of the Revolution in the Kingdom.
cat —
f—- GRAND DUCHY \
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Industry in Poland and neighbouring countries, c. 1910
----— —200, 000 |
==> 50, 000
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workers
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= metallurgy
Timber
Industries:
Textile and
clothing
eS Food
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@ Vari
—-—- Boundaries international
Boundaries of tha Polish
——-— Kingdom,the Austrian Lands
and the Prussian Provinces
Boundaries of guberniyas
-~-—-- and between West
and East Galicia
\
1
508 THE PERIOD OF REVOLUTION AND THE APPROACHING WAR (1904-1914)
The strike lasted almost a month and took on, from the outset, a stormy
character. Violent demonstrations took place, resisted by the Tsarist army
and gendarmerie. Dozens of people were killed and hundreds wounded. The
strike spread to other towns and factory settlements, resulting everywhere in
bloody clashes with the army. About 400,000 workers went on strike during
January and February. The wave of strikes, mostly successful, continued in
the following months.
Because of the revolution, which embraced the entire Empire, the
proletariat of the Kingdom obtained important concessions from the
employers. Average wages increased by 50 per cent and the hours of work
were reduced.
Already in the early spring the strike movement spread to the country-
side. At first these were strikes of agricultural workers, but soon the struggle
of the villages for pastures and woods began, leading to disturbances and the
unauthorized cutting of the landowners’ timber by the peasants. Finally,
the movement took on the shape of a struggle for national rights, for
introducing Polish into the villages administration, which was conducted in
full solidarity by all peasants, rich peasants, small-holders and landless
labourers.
At the same time as the general strike in Warsaw a school boycott was
organized at the end of January, which was to exert a profound influence on
that generation of the young intelligentsia. It was called on the initiative of
the Union of Socialist Youth, which was under the influence of both the
SDKPiL and PPS, as well as the Jewish Socialist Party, the Bund, but from
the outset it was joined by organizations under the influence.of the National
League, like the unions created in the secondary schools by “Zet”, such as
“The Red Rose” and “The Future”. The National League was not eager to
support the school boycott, but Dmowski understood that, with tempers at
such a revolutionary pitch, it was necessary to go along with the general
movement in order not to lose control over the events. This showed his
superiority over the “Realists”, who opposed the revolutionary movement in
principle, and thus were in a worse position than the League. In the field of
education this became quite clear. During 1905 the government made minor
concessions with regard to the use of Polish in schools, but the boycott of the
Russian schools continued. Finally, in October, an ukase permitted the
establishment of schools with Polish as the language of instruction.
The boycott of the Russian schools went on with undiminished force until
1908, when the National Democrats began to withdraw from this campaign.
In 1911 the National League announced its opposition, after overcoming
strong internal resistance, which Jed to a split. At that time, the SDKPiL also
ceased to support the campaign, but in spite of this, the boycott lasted until
1914, supported by a fraction of the National League and the Polish Socialist
Party.
The school strike was of great significance for the awakening of national
S. Lentz, The Strike, 1910
310 THE PERIOD OF REVOLUTION AND THE APPROACHING WAR (1904-1914)
feeling among the youth. Moreover, the necessity, caused by the boycott,
of leaving the Kingdom to study in Galicia and abroad not only raised the
professional qualifications of the young people, but also drew them closer
to their compatriots in the other parts of Poland. Young people were also
more inclined to left-wing views, a fact which was of significance for the
future development of the nation, because it was this generation which was
soon to rebuild the Polish State.
While the strike action was waged in the secondary schools and the
university was boycotted, attempts were also made to Polonize the primary
schools. In October 1905 the Union of Primary School Teachers was founded,
under the influence of progressives, while the National League called into
being the Society of Primary School Teachers of the Pojish Kingdom, which
then had the same aim of Polonizing education. This campaign met with
active support from the entire peasantry. It proved that the policy of the
Tsarist régime, which had sought since the January Insurrection to base itself
on the Polish peasantry as the social foundation of its rule, was a total failure.
Similarly, as a result of the ukase of April 1905 with regard to religious
tolerance, the Uniates in Podlasie, recently forcibly converted to Orthodoxy,
returned to Catholicism en masse.
It could be said, in general, that the concessions made by the government
up to the middle of 1905 signified the attainment of equal rights by the
Kingdom, thus satisfying the aspirations of the “Realists”, but public opinion
did not want to stop at this, seeing the possibility of obtaining, thanks to the
revolution, much greater national gains.
Throughout 1905 the Kingdom witnessed a growing revolutionary fer-
ment, in which a leading part was played by the proletariat. May Day in
1905 led to bloody demonstrations. In June 1905 a strike in Lddz resulted in
a fierce struggle between the workers and the Tsarist troops. Here, for the
first time in the Empire, barricades were erected and the Lodz workers offered
armed resistance to the Russian troops for three days.
The SDKPiL and PPS members conduced considerable revolutionary
agitation at this time in many of the military garrisons in the Kingdom and
organized the Warsaw Committee of the Military-Revolutionary Organiza-
tion.
In the cities, towns, factory settlements and villages, the factory owners
and the large landowners sometimes turned for assistance to the gendarmerie
and Tsarist army. This helped the peasantry in no small degree to realize
that the Tsarist government was not its friend, but its most bitter enemy, the
mainstay of social and national oppression.
At this time armed groups of the PPS had driven the gendarmerie from
the streets of the towns and compelled the government to introduce in the
struggle against the revolution its ultimate argument of force, the army. The
reprisals against the revolutionaries became ever more severe and many
S. Maslowski, Spring of 1905, 1906
armed fighters were sent to the gallows. In July 1905 an outstanding member
of the PPS Fighting Organization, Stefan Okrzeja, was executed.
The domestic forces of reaction, moreover, engaged in armed struggle.
In the middle of 1905 Dmowski set up the National Workers Union, sub-
ordinated to the National League. The Union also formed armed groups,
but they fought not with the gendarmerie, but with the socialists. For many
months fratricidal combat took place among the workers, especially in
£4dz, for which Dmowski openly assumed responsibility. This coincided
with his foundamental conception which was he must become the feal
representative of the Polish propertied classes and approach the Tsarist
government with an offer to defeat the revolution in the Kingdom with
local forces, in exchange for political concessions, by which he understood
sharing power with the Poles.
$12 THE PERIOD OF REVOLUTION AND THE APPROACHING WAR (1904-1914)
The high tide of the revolution was the general strike in October 1905,
which forced the Tsar to issue, on Witte’s advice, his Manifesto of 30
October, promising a constitution. This Manifesto was regarded in Poland
as ushering in an era of freedom. Tremendous and unprecedented demonstra-
tions took place in Warsaw, to which the authorities replied with a mas-
sacre and on 11 November a state of siege was declared. It was precisely at
this time, that Dmowski made his basic proposal to Witte, calling for
autonomy for the Kingdom, with the guarantee that the Poles would
themselves suppress the revolution in Poland, but Witte was in a much better
position than Gorchakov and Alexander II in 1861, when the Margrave
Wielopolski made similar proposals. In 1905 the Poles could find no support
abroad for their aspirations. Even more important, the Tsarist régime
could count on an awakened Russian nationalism and see in the struggle
with the foreigner a very powerful anti-revolutionary force. Persecution of,
rather than reconciliation with the Poles strengthened the régime’s hand in
this game and Dmowski’s offer was rejected.
A general crisis of the revolution soon occurred. In December 1905 the
workers’ uprising in Moscow began, and upon the news of the struggle of the
Moscow workers with the army, the PPS proclaimed on 22 December
a similar uprising in the Kingdom. The attempt to seize power by the PPS,
which had a temporary success only in Ostrowiec, ended, like the bloody
struggle in Moscow, with the victory of the Tsarist troops. Thereafter, the
revolution started to decline.
In this period the internal split in the Polish Socialist Party began to
widen. The working class rank and file considered the activity of the Fighting
Organization to be a weakening of the basic trends of class struggle. This
organization was controlled by a group of “old” members headed by
Pilsudski, Bolestaw Jedrzejowski, Leon Wasilewski and Witold Jodko-
Narkiewicz. The “old” members were opposed by a “young” group including
M. Koszutska, J. F. Ciszewski, M. Horwitz-Walecki and M. Bielecki, which
desired cooperation with the Russian Revolution and denounced the tradi-
tional insurrectionary ideas. From the outset, both sides sought to avoid an
open break, especially when it seemed that the revolution would triumph,
but towards the end of 1906, when it became obvious that disaster was im-
minent, a split took place at a meeting in Vienna, with the majority fol-
lowing the “young” group. The latter set themselves up separately as PPS
Left Wing, while the minority asumed the name of the PPS Revolutionary
Wing and continued its armed action. These came to an end ultimately in
1908, resulting in many casualties, though without, of course, changing the
actual situation.
From the middle of 1906 the revolutionary spirit had collapsed both in
the Kingdom and in Russia and the strike movement died down. In the
final result it undoubtedly brought about a rise in the Polish workers’
standard of living and their economic position did not revert to the pre-1905
THE REORIENTATION OF THE POLICY OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATS 513
conditions. What was more important, the revolutionary movement deep-
ened fundamentally the political, social and national consciousness of the
Polish masses.
THE REORIENTATION OF THE POLICY
OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATS
National Democracy made progress in Russian Poland in the years fol-
lowing the defeat of the revolution. This was shown in the elections to the
Duma, which were boycotted by the socialist parties. Out of the 36 deputies
elected to the First Duma, on the basis of a curial voting system which
favoured the propertied classes, 25 were National Democrats. There were
also 25 Poles in the Duma elected from the western provinces of the
Empire. In the Duma itself the Poles did not play a particularly significant
part. But this was still a period of relative liberalism in the whole Monarchy,
which made it possible to obtain legal sanction in the Kingdom for many
social and national organizations, such as for example, the hitherto illegal
“Macierz Szkolna” (School Union), which up to the end of 1906 had been
able to set up 141 schools with 63,000 pupils. Other educational, scientific
and cultural organizations were established. The cooperative movement,
a permanent gain of the revolution, developed very rapidly. Its pioneers
included individuals who had recently taken part in conspiratorial action,
but now adopted legal methods, like Edward Abramowski, who had been
active in the labour movement but later became an anarchist ; and Stanislaw
Wojciechowski, a co-founder of the Polish Socialist Party, who became one
of the chief organizers of cooperatives. In practice, this movement, as well
as all open social activity, was taken over by the National Democrats. They
were tO maintain the same number of deputies elected to the Second Duma.
The elections strengthened both the extreme wings of the parliament. The
Polish Club put forth a project for autonomy for the Kingdom, but it was
not even considered because the Second Duma was quickly dissolved and the
electoral law amended in such a way that the Kingdom lost more than half
of its seats.
Though the concept of a legal struggle for autonomy had collapsed,
Dmowski did not, however, relinquish the policy to which the propertied
classes had been driven by the revolution. Therefore in 1908, a year which
became a turning point in many fields, Dmowski supported the policy of the
Russian government not only in the domestic but also in the international
fields.
This was shown, in the first place, in the support given to the Neo-
Slav movement, which called for solidarity with the Slav peoples, oppressed
by Austro-Hungary and Turkey. This was contrary to Polish tradition in the
33 History of Poland
$14 THE PERIOD OF REVOLUTION AND THE APPROACHING WAR (1904-1914)
period after the partitions and Dmowski had to overcome strong opposition
to this policy within the National League. Nevertheless, Polish politicians
took part in the Slav Congress in Prague in 1908 on the recommendation of
the League. Dmowski believed that in this way the Russian nationalists, who
were the sponsors of this movement, would be more likely to offer conces-
sions to the Poles, but these hopes also proved in vain. The next Congress
in Petersburg in 1909 revealed a Russo-Polish conflict, so that the Poles did
not attend the subsequent Congress in Sofia in 1910. The Poles had be-
come indignant at the separation of the Chelm district from the Kingdom
and its establishment as a separate province, which was finally carried out
in 1912, with the new provinces placed under the administration of the
governor-general of Kiev.
An even more important event in 1908 was the publication of Dmow-
ski’s book Niemcy, Rosja i kwestia polska (Germany, Russia and the
Polish Question), which was immediately translated into other languages. It
became the manifesto of a new Polish policy. In it Dmowski proclaimed the
principle that Germany was Poland’s main and most dangerous enemy, for
which reason in the approaching European conflict Poland must side with
Germany’s opponents, Russia and her allies.
The solution of the Polish question lay, according to him, not in in-
dependence, but in the basic concept of integration. This could take place
only in the event of a Russian victory, because a victory of her enemies
would lead inevitably to a new partition. This line of reasoning was contrary
to the whole tradition of the Polish insurrectionary struggle, and to Polish
history since the partitions when the most important aim was always the
regaining, even if only partial, of independence. Because Dmowski’s concep-
tion expressed the real interests of the propertied classes, it gained consid-
erable popularity among many of the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia..
Seeking to enhance the appeal of his policy, Dmowski attempted to give it
chauvinist content for which reason his adherents in Galicia waged a bitter
struggle with the Ukrainians and indulged increasingly in violent anti-
Semitic agitation. In 1912 Dmowski proclaimed an economic and cultural
boycott of the Jews.
Just as the founding of the Polish League had its roots in both the local
and international situation, Dmowski’s new policy also had a twin aspect.
1908 witnessed the aggravation of the situation in Europe, as a result of the
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austro-Hungary. Russia, defeated
in the Far East, resumed its expansionist policy in the Balkans. From the
moment when the Entente between Great Britain, France and Russia had
been achieved, the Polish people were faced with the approach of a world.
war.
THE EXPROPRIATION DECREE IN PRUSSIAN POLAND 515
THE EXPROPRIATION DECREE
IN PRUSSIAN POLAND AND THE NATIONAL LEAGUE
The general situation in Poland influenced Dmowski more than the interna-
tional scene. The attention of all the Polish parties was drawn to the intensi-
fied pressure on the Poles by the Prussian government in the last years
of Biilow’s chancellorship. At the end of 1907 the Prussian Landtag began
to debate a project for the forcible expropriation of Polish landed estates,
while, in the following year, the Reichstag discussed a special bill relating to
the use of the Polish language. The expropriation law came into force in
1908 ; the government could, on this basis, purchase estates compulsorily from
Polish landowners and colonize them with German settlers. This decree was
contrary to the principle of the inviolability of property and therefore its
passage was opposed by conservatives, but in an atmosphere of fervent
nationalism sacred and established principles could be infringed. The Poles
were faced with the fact that the struggle for ownership of the soil in
which they had fought the Germans so effectively, was entering a new and
extremely dangerous phase. It appeared that the existence of Poles in the
Prussian area was in mortal peril. The idea still prevailed that the land-
holdings of the Polish gentry were synonymous with the Polish nation as
such. It was not appreciated as yet that Polish nationality was deeply
grounded in the peasantry of Poznan and Pomerania and in the working
class of Upper Silesia. Undoubtedly, after the destruction of the Polish
landowners, these social groups would be the next object of attack and the
Germans, meeting increasing resistance, would use still more ruthless meas-
ures, but this was outside the comprehension of contemporaries.
The process of integrating the Polish nation progressed steadily, especial-
ly as a result of the development of education and national consciousness.
The working-class movement was the first real manifestation of this trend
in the social and political field. The nationalist movement also emphasized
this unity of the three areas, seeing in this slogan an effective propaganda
weapon. The National League conducted its activity under the guise of
All-Polish slogans and its first legal organ was called “Przeglad Wszechpol-
ski” (All-Polish Review). The politicians of the League employed this name
as well, imitating in this, by the way, the name of the “Alldeutscher Ver-
band” (Pan-German Union).
Therefore, the 1905 Revolution in the Congress Kingdom had its impact
also on the two other areas. The school strike spread swiftly to the Poznan
province, where in 1906 a general boycott by school children took place,
with a refusal to attend religious instruction given in German. While the
strike was suppressed after a year, it helped considerably in arousing
a marked solidarity of the Polish people against the Prussian authorities. It
showed that the national movement had embraced all elements of the nation
and even the conservative Poznan press affirmed that this strike had been
33°
516 THE PERIOD OF REVOLUTION AND THE APPROACHING WAR (1904-1914)
initiated by the masses and supported, above all, by them, and that the upper
classes joined it only later.
It was at the time of the 1905 Revolution that the All-Polish movement
began also to penetrate the Prussian area. “Zet” organizations had been
active there from the end of the nineteenth century, conducting agitation
among Poles in Wroclaw and Berlin. The first paper under the League’s
influence, the “Dziennik Berlifski” (Berlin Daily), edited by Marian
Seyda, appeared there. It attacked the loyalism of the landowner politicians
towards Germany. Seyda moved soon afterwards to Poznan and with the
help of Bernard Chrzanowski began to spread the League’s views among the
gentry. In 1904 a clandestine National Democratic Party was founded, with
a programme including more democratic slogans now that the earlier
preponderance of clergy and aristocrats was no longer a factor. Since 1905
the All-Polish group was in control of the “Kurier Poznanski” (The Poznan
Courier) and for a short while also of the “Oredownik” (The Messenger),
an old and well-established paper of the petty-bourgeoisie. In 1907 a legal
Polish Democratic Society was set up, with members among both the petty-
bourgeois and gentry.
One of the results of the 1905 Revolution was the organization of a peas-
ant political movement in the Congress Kingdom. As early as 1904 a secret
organization, the Polish Peasant Union, was established, under the influence
at the outset of the Polish Socialist Party. This was the first peasant polit-
ical organization in the Kingdom which supported the struggle for Poland’s
independence and the social liberation of the village. The Polish Peasant
Union lasted up to 1907, when it was destroyed by the Tsarist gendarmerie.
During the revolution itself the National League tried also to organize its
own adherents among the peasants, creating the National Peasant Union.
Soon both the National Peasant Union and the earlier National Workers
Union broke with the League, because of its pro-Russian policy and the
adoption of reactionary social policies. From the end of 1907 the radical
peasant groups had their own publication “Zaranie”’ (The Dawn), which
called for the emancipation of the village from the influence of the Church
and manor and also for a partition of the landowners’ estates. In spite of
everything, however, the peasant movement in the Kingdom did not create
a mass political party before the First World War.
On the other hand, it was in the years of the revolution that the peasant
movement developed on a very large scale in the Austrian area.
POLITICAL CHANGES IN GALICIA
The 1905 Revolution had vitally affected the situation in the Austrian area.
Democratic forces grew stronger, under the influence of the Russian Revolu-
tion, in the entire monarchy, especially in its western and more industrial-
POLITICAL CHANGES IN GALICIA $17
ized area. This compelled the government to introduce in Austria in 1907
universal, secret, equal and direct suffrage in elections for the Reichsrat in
Vienna, but Galicia itself, which benefited from this, had also undergone
distinct changes in its economic, social and political life from the end of
the century. Mention has already been made of the large-scale emigration
from Western Galicia. With the help of this movement, the purchase of
estates of the gentry increased, thus enlarging the property of the village
and raising both its standard of living and culture. This was reflected in the
political field by the progressive weakening of the position of the Galician
landowners.
The Galician working class likewise strengthened its position. The pro-
cess of rapid industrialization reached this province also, though to a lesser
degree than elsewhere. Considerable expansion of the oil industry took place.
While in 1895 Galician oil production amounted to not quite 2 million
quintals, by 1908 it reached 18 million or 5 per cent of world production.
The mining of coal also increased. The more up-to-date among the proper-
tied classes broke with the conservative “Stanczyk” tradition, according to
which economic backwardness constituted a guarantee of social order.
The new electoral law changed the relative positions of the political
forces in Galicia. The position of the conservatives collapsed. In 1907 the
National Democrats, led by Stanistaw Glabinski, a Lwéw University pro-
fessor, won 16 seats in Parliament, while the Peasant Party, led by Stapinski,
gained 17. From the outset, the Peasant Party deputies refused to join the
Polish Parliamentary Club, with the result that the chairmanship went to
Glabinski, who therefore became the representative of Polish policy in Vien-
na. Through the intermediary of Bobrzyfski, who was now appointed
Viceroy in Galicia, the conservatives induced the peasant deputies to join
the Polish Club in exchange for a number of concessions mostly of a per-
sonal nature. This gave rise to the beginning of demoralization in the peas-
ant movement, which began to be infiltrated by various careerists.
In 1913 a split in the Peasant Party took place. The victor was the
talented Wincenty Witos, who now became the leader of the newly formed
Polish Peasant Party—‘‘Piast”. Stapinski’s authority was undermined and
he was left at the head of only the radical minority of the Left Wing of the
Polish Peasant Party. The Peasant Party, though divided into two factions,
remained an important political force in Galicia, but it should be noted that
the Polish Social-Democratic Party, though having a much narrower social
basis in this unindustrialized area,.played a relatively greater role.
In effect, its influence was not limited to the working class. It reached
the landless peasants and had a following among the intelligentsia. It be-
came in practice the leading force in the struggle for democratizing condi-
tions in Galicia. This was borne out especially in the struggle for a reform
of the electoral law to the Galician Seym, where the curial system was still
in force, making it impossible to elect representatives of the working class.
S18 IHE PERIOD OF REVOLUTION AND THE APPROACHING WAR (1904-1914)
The struggle for electoral rights was closely associated in Galicia with
the Ukrainian question. Just as towards the end of the century the Polish
peasantry had formed its own political representation, creating its own
organizations independent of sponsorship by intellectuals, so the national
consciousness of the Ukrainian peasants also took shape only at this time.
Different Ukrainian parties arose representing the various social sections
of the newly awakened nation; an Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party,
a Peasant Radical Party, and the Ukrainian National Democracy, the latter
just as chauvinistic as the Polish National Democrats, came into being.
The Polish National Democrats after 1905 gained the support of Polish
middle-class in Eastern Galicia, who felt their position to be threatened by
the rapidly growing Ukrainian intelligentsia, still stronger because of its
peasant origin and thus closely linked with its own predominantly peasant
community. At the beginning of the twentieth century the social problem
in the eastern Galician countryside manifested itself in tremendous peasant
strikes. Directed against the Polish landowners and suppressed by an ad-
ministration which was Polish, the strikes, though of an economic character,
took on, as a matter of course, a national aspect.
Simultaneously the Jewish problem in Galicia became more acute and
from the end of the century zionist tendencies developed, first among part
of the intellectuals and then among broader masses of the Jewish population.
The main Ukrainian demands before 1914 were for proportional repre-
sentation in the Seym and for proper rights in primary and secondary edu-
cation, together with—and this was most annoying to Polish nationalists—
the creation of a Ukrainian University in Lwéw. These just demands were
rejected by Polish public opinion in Eastern Galicia, dominated, as it was,
by the nationalists.
THE DEBATE ON POLITICAL ATTITUDES
ON THE EVE OF THE WORLD WAR
The political tension in Galicia was revealed by the unexpected assassination
in 1908 of the Viceroy, Andrzej Potocki, by a young Ukrainian nationalist.
The most eminent conservative politician in Galicia, Bobrzynski, took over
the post. During his term of office, the 1911 elections to Parliament brought,
as a result of administrative pressure, a decisive defeat of the National
Democrats and, once more, a conservative, ‘Leon Bilinski, professor at Lwow
University and previously many times a minister, became the chairman of
the Polish Parliamentary Club. Bobrzynski fought against the All-Polish
group among the National Democrats for reasons of general Austrian policy,
because they would be pro-Russian in the event of an outbreak of an Euro-
pean war. The electoral reform became the crux of the political battle.
The draft of the new electoral law, which was extremely complicated and
THE DEBATE ON POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE EVE OF THE WORLD WAR 519
gave very slight concessions to the Ukrainians and democratic forces, was
passed during the 1913 session of the Seym. It met with the decided resist-
ance of the All-Polish group and of the die-hard Eastern Galician land-
owners, aided by the bishops. This was the reason why Bobrzynski was
compelled to resign the office of Viceroy and his place taken by Witold
Korytowski, a politician of lesser calibre, with whom it was easier for the
National Democrats and the “die-hards” to come to terms. In the following
year an electoral law was finally passed, which did not differ markedly
from the previous year’s draft. It did not, however, go into effect before the
outbreak of the war and Bobrzynski’s resignation destroyed his efforts to
reach some kind of Ukrainian-Polish agreement. This problem remained
unsolved when the First World War broke out.
Since 1908 Galicia had been a base for those members of the Polish
Socialist Party who, after the defeat of the revolution sought in the Austrian
area possibilities of putting into effect a new conception, conceived by the
Right Wing of the party. In view of the approaching conflict between the
partitioning Powers, this group resolved to make preparations for insurrec-
tionary action. The “Zwiqzek Walki Czynnej” (Union of Active Struggle)
was formed, embracing the most active members of the PPS Fighting Or-
ganization and some of the Galician youth, an organization only formally
subordinated to the PPS Revolutionary Wing. The Union was a kind of se-
cret military school, which was to produce future officers for the insurrec-
tion. Its founders were Kazimierz Sosnkowski, Marian Kukiel and Wla-
dystaw Sikorski. Pitsudski took over the command of the Union having
closed down the activity of the Fighting Organization with a successful raid
on a railway mail coach in Bezdany near Wilno. The Union sponsored the
establishment of riflemen’s unions in various Galician towns, taking advan-
tage of an Austrian law which permitted the formation of para-military
societies. In connexion with this, Pilsudski came into contact with the
Austrian military authorities, who assisted him, hoping to create an anti-
Russian diversion if war were to break out. Soon, an analogous secret or-
ganization, under the leadership of a section of the National League, called
the “Polish Army” was formed, which set up its own “Riflemen’s sections”.
In 1912 the outbreak of the First Balkan War brought about new ten-
sion in Europe. It was then decided to give both secret organizations a legal
political form. At the end of 1912 a Provisional Commission of Confeder-
ated Independence Parties was established, composed of representatives of
the Polish Socialist Party, the Polish Social-Democratic Party, the National
Workers Union, the National Peasant Union and several smaller political
organizations from Galicia and the Kingdom. Sikorski, who was then begin-
ning his political and military career, joined the Commission as the repre-
sentative of one of these small groups, the Polish Progressive Party. A Polish
Military Fund was established earlier, which collected money to prepare an
insurrection. Anti-Russian sentiments fell on fertile ground in Galicia, where
520 THE PERIOD OF REVOLUTION AND THE APPROACHING WAR (1904-1914)
the insurrectionary traditions were openly encouraged. The German peril
was more obvious to the other two areas, for which reason an anti-Tsarist
attitude could spread only to relatively few social groups. In the Kingdom
the propertied classes and the intelligentsia linked with them, had been
inclined to adopt, after the defeat of the 1905 Revolution, Pan-Polish ideas,
which, as is known, were pro-Russian.
In the Kingdom, only the PPS Revolutionary Wing and a few small
groups of intellectuals were in favour of insurrection, but al! the socialist
organizations were extremely weak after the defeat of the revolution. Only
after 1912 did they regain slowly, as a result of the rising tide of revolution
in the Empire as a whole, the possibility of action. The PPS Revolutionary
Wing, moreover, paid relatively little attention to the struggle for workers’
rights, expending almost all its energy in preparing the insurrection. On the
other hand, SDKPiL and PPS Left Wing, by rebuilding their organizations
among the workers of the Kingdom, regarded the problem of war in a to-
tally different light and considered it to be an imperialist conflict. Their
programme called for a struggle against all the forces striving towards waz,
and, in the event of its outbreak, for opposition to the governments conduct-
ing this war. In this fashion these parties strove towards their fundamental
aim, the preparation of a social revolution.
Thus, Polish society was divided, in face of the approaching war, between
three points of view : the first and traditional one, represented by Pilsudski,
the PPS Revolutionary Wing and all those who eagerly awaited the outbreak
of the European war in order to launch an insurrection against the Tsarist
régime ; the second, led by Dmowski, did not favour a war, but, if it were
to occur, considered Russia’s victory as the best result, because it would
bring about an integration of all the Polish territories under one rule, which,
as a consequence, would give the Poles such weight that they would have
to obtain considerable autonomy, and according to this concept unification
would preserve and strengthen Polish nationality and, in addition, a victo-
rious Russian Empire would be a safeguard against the possibility of a social
revolution ; finally, the third orientation was that of the socialist parties
which wished to oppose the war, and, in event of its outbreak, prepare
a social revolution.
If the first two concepts, which had been current for a few years before
the war, appealed to the national interests, conceived in a nationalist spirit
or moulded by slogans of solidarity for independence, the internationalist
and revolutionary concept placed social aims in the forefront. The SDKPiL
had even adopted a negative attitude to the slogan of Polish independence.
This limited considerably the influence of this party within the Polish com-
munity.
Chapter XXI
THE FIRST WORLD WAR
AND THE REBUILDING
OF THE POLISH STATE
(1914-1918)
PILSUDSKI AND THE LEGIONS
The outbreak of the war did not find the various Polish social groups and
parties unprepared. Already on 2 August Pitsudski received permission from
the Austrian government to march into the Kingdom. This took place only
after the outbreak of the Russian-Austrian war on 6 August, a few days
after the beginning of the Russo-German conflict. This difference in dates
was not advantageous to Pilsudski. His plans depended on a march to the
Dabrowa Basin, where the Polish Socialist Party had some influence among
the workers. In the meantime the region had already been occupied by the
German armies. Pilsudski had to march towards Kielce where no particu-
larly favourable conditions existed, to begin agitation for an uprising. Never-
theless, he was convinced that the appearance of Polish uniforms would
fascinate Polish youth, which would join the insurgent army in large num-
bers. Such a military response was necessary for his political reckogning which
he based on the experience of the January Insurrection. Just as the National
Central Committee which began the uprising in 1863 proclaimed itself the
Temporary National Government, but simultaneously established a dictator-
ship, so Pitsudski wished in 1914 to realize both these aims immediately.
He surprised the politicians of the Commission of Confederated Independence
Parties by announcing that a secret national government had been created
in Warsaw which had appointed him commander of the armed forces and
that “all must adhere to its orders”. Actually all this was fiction. The march
of Pilsudski’s units led to the capture of Kielce, but it did not provoke an
uprising in even a small part of the Kingdom. The inhabitants of this area
did not see the Tsarist régime as the sole enemy, because for forty years
the Germans had conducted a most vehement campaign of extermination
against the Poles. In addition, on 7 August the Germans bombarded Kalisz,
a town already behind the German front lines, and almost completely
destroyed it which had a strong influence on the feelings of Polish people
in the Kingdom. Besides, the German and Austrian armies invading Russian
$22 THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE REBUILDING OF THE POLISH STATE (1914-1918)
territories, moreover, addressed the inhabitants with proclamations so for-
mulated that they could only confirm the Poles’ convictions that nothing
could be expected from the Central Powers. Austria disappointed them
completely. It is true that in the first days of the war the Emperor Franz
Joseph, taking the advice of leading Polish politicians, principally Bobrzyn-
ski, had the idea of issuing a manifesto which would declare the creation
of Poland as a third member of the dual monarchy, but German diplomacy
and the Hungarian political leaders determinedly opposed this idea.
Pitsudski’s rash venture ended in failure. He was left alone in the King-
dom with a handful of soldiers against a passive, if not hostile, population.
In Galicia, on the contrary, his actions were popular, but influential poli-
ticians were decidedly opposed to Pilsudski, seeing in his men the nucleus
of a social revolution. Thus both the conservative politicians and the Nation-
al Democrats wished, for various reasons, to paralyse Pilsudski’s independ-
ent action. The disposition of Polish youth, especially in Lwow and Eastern
Galicia, was so militant that the National Democrats could not openly
voice their pro-Russian programme, which was equally unsafe, for fear of
police action. They therefore had to pretend loyalty to the Austrian mon-
archy while waiting for further developments.
This led to the creation on 16 August 1914 of the Supreme National
Committee (Naczelny Komitet Narodowy, abbreviated as NKN) in Crac-
ow, which was to unite all Polish parties in the Austrian area. It was to
look after military action which was to be put under the control of the
Austrian command. The Polish Legions were created as an unit associated
with the Austro-Hungarian army and Pilsudski was compelled to let his
units become the nucleus of this formation. From then onwards the concept
of an insurrection and an independent national government was doomed to
failure. Undoubtedly, this was a victory for the Cracow Conservatives and
a tactical success for the National Democrats, who became part of the Su-
preme National Committee and promised to organize in Eastern Galicia
another unit, called the Eastern Legion. In practice, they employed delaying
tactics until the retreat of the Austrian armies enabled them to withdraw
from the whole affair. The Eastern Legion was moved from Lwéw to the
west and disbanded at Mszana in Western Galicia. Such a gesture was made
possible for the politicians of Dmowski’s party, because Russian propaganda
proved much more effective than anything which the Central Powers could
put out on the Polish problem.
On 14 August 1914 the Russian Commander-in-chief, the Grand Duke
Nikolai Nikolayevich, issued a manifesto to the Polish people. In it he
proclaimed the unity of all Polish lands under the sceptre of the Tsar and
in a rather ambiguous way promised autonomy to these territories. Not only
was the manifesto remarkably well written, but what is most important,
is that it was the only document which set out a concrete programme for
PILSUDSKI AND THE LEGIONS 523
possible implementation in the event of victory. This excited an enthusiastic
response in the Kingdom on the part of a large section of public opinion,
prepared for years, by National Democratic propaganda, to accept this
conception. The burgeois-gentry elements especially saw in their support of
the Tsarist régime security against the spectre of revolution.
Hence, the Polish question depended upon the development of military
events, in the first place, on Polish territory. The first weeks of the war
showed the weakness of the Austro-Hungarian army. Galicia to a large
extent was occupied by the Russians, with the Austrians holding only
Cracow and a portion of the Kingdom of Poland, but Prussia held on to all
her territory. Until spring 1915 Russia remained a formidable force, especial-
ly when on the French front the German war plans were halted by the battle
of the Marne and nothing foretold a swift defeat of the Anglo-French ar-
mies. The prolongation of war, moreover, made the British blockade a par-
ticularly effective weapon. In these circumstances the superiority of the
views favouring the Allies in 1914-1915 was decisive. Pilsudski, however,
held in check by the political control of Galician politicians and the Austrian
high command, attempted to create for himself some sort of independent
force. Towards the autumn of 1914 he organized the Polish Military Or-
ganization (Polska Organizacja Wojskowa, abbreviated as POW) which,
under his command, was to act in the rear of the Russian front as an intelli-
gence unit and a subversive force. In fact, this organization was weak, but
in Pilsudski’s game it gave him some trump cards, which later, as the mili-
tary situation developed, he was able to use cleverly. He was also clever
enough to embellish his own military activities with legends. At the head
of the Legions’ First Brigade he played-a useful part in the retreat of the
Austrian army from the Vistula to Cracow and later took part in the
winter counter-offensive, in which he fought victorious encounters near
Lowczowek and Limanowa.
Pilsudski gathered in his headquarters devoted politicians and writers
over whom he was able to obtain a personal influence. It was among these
young people that the cult of the “Commander” was begun, which lasted
to the end of his days. The legend of a man, who first worked in the under-
ground, and then began a soldier’s career fascinated wide and diverse ele-
ments in the Polish population who longed for their own army and were
prepared to serve in it in the last years before the outbreak, when historical
writing encouraged the cult of the Polish soldier, especially in the Napole-
onic period and during the Polish insurrections.
At the turn of 1914 and 1915 the Second Brigade of the Legions fought
in the eastern Carpathians. The majority of the officers were Galicians,
socially inclined to be conservative. The most popular officer in the brigade
was Colonel Jézef Haller. Both brigades were controlled from the point
of view of organization by the War Department of the Supreme National
$24 THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE REBUILDING OF THE POLISH STATE (1914-1918)
Committee, headed by Colonel Wtadystaw Sikorski in cooperation with
Professor Stanistaw Kot and Marian Kukiel. Soon the War Department
came into conflict with the First Brigade and thus began a vehement strug-
gle, both personal and political, symbolized by the antagonism between
Pitsudski and Sikorski which lasted until the Second World War. Pilsudski
adopted a flexible attitude and sought to free himself from the control of
the headquarters of the Legions, which itself was controlled by an Austrian
general, and from the Supreme National Committee which adhered to
a pro-Austrian policy. This antipathy between Pitsudski and Sikorski de-
pended rather on tactics than basic differences of opinion. But, when per-
sonal animosity was added, together with Pilsudski’s tendency ‘to invest
himself with a cult of hero-worship, the matter in fact became one of the
important factors of Polish political life during the course of the next gen-
eration, even when the earlier differences had long lost their meaning.
Even though in the winter of 1914-1915 a pro-Russian attitude in the
Kingdom prevailed, the military operations of the Legions exerted an in-
fluence on the imagination of a large part of the Polish intelligentsia. Op-
ponents of the Legions came forward, at the same time, with the idea of
creating legions on the Russian side also. This idea met with great opposi-
tion. Attempts to organize in Pulawy a Polish Legion, begun with the sup-
port of the Russian general staff without the approval of the government,
produced meagre results and did not achieve any political significance.
The struggle between the various points of view transferred itself abroad
and especially to the United States. The position of the American Poles
could be of help for one side or the other. They could supply volunteers
and money, they could also influence, to a certain degree, the American
government and public opinion. In the autumn of 1915 the Supreme Nation-
al Committee sent its representatives to America. Under their influence
a Committee of National Defense was set up, an organization which sym-
pathized with Pilsudski, but shortly afterwards Ignacy Paderewski arrived
in the United States, a man who enjoyed tremendous popularity with public
opinion as well as in government circles and among the Poles in the U.S.A.
He came out on the side of the Allies and was decidedly against the propa-
ganda of the NKN. He found support in the Polish national organizations.
influenced by the clergy, while the NKN found its followers in more pro-
gressive or socialist organizations.
Attempts to carry on propaganda in Europe were made from Switzer-
land. There a philanthropic organization was set up under Sienkiewicz
and Paderewski with headquarters in Vevey, whose purpose was to give
material aid to the Polish population who had suffered as a result of hostili-
ties. At the end of 1915 a secret Political Circle was organized in Lausanne
in support of Dmowski’s views which acted as an intermediary between the
Poznan politicians and the Polish National Committee active at this time
in St. Petersburg.
THE AUSTRO-GERMAN OCCUPATION OF THE KINGDOM 525
THE AUSTRO-GERMAN OCCUPATION OF THE KINGDOM
In May 1915, after a break-through on the Russian front near Gorlice, the
German and Austrian armies moved to the east. The Polish lands came under
the rule of the Central Powers. Thus, the Polish question took on a new
aspect. The Congress Kingdom was divided into two occupation zones, with
Warsaw and a larger part of the territory under the German General
Governor, General Beseler, and the smaller part with its seat in Lublin as an
Austrian General Government.
In retreating from the Kingdom the Russians forced the population to
abandon their homes and to move east. For this reason the armies of the
Central Powers were, at first, greeted with relief, but soon the mood changed
when it was realized that an occupation which began with the division of
the Kingdom brought no solution to the Polish problem. In effect, the gov-
ernments of the Central Powers did not wish to consider it. On the contra-
ry, the occupation of large territories in the east was for them a bargain-
ing point for the peace settlement. The tradition of alliance between the
three Emperors still had significance as an alliance which could guarantee
the permanence of monarchies in this part of Europe. This was especially
true at the Tsar’s court, where ultrareactionary circles were always pro-
German, and it was understood that Tsarism was in a position of peril and
only an understanding with Berlin could maintain the existing social order.
The prolongation of the war, in fact, forced the leaders of the Central
Powers to seek new political and military advantages in a war which was
growing harder and exhausting economic and human resources.
The overall situation was not understood by the Poles, who wanted to
conduct a political game with the Central Powers. The Supreme National
Committee considered that once the Kingdom was freed from Tsarist rule
it would be necessary to mobilize the total resources of the country for the
Legions. Pitsudski, on the other hand, felt that procrastination would pro-
duce greater benefits for the Poles. For this reason he enlarged only the
Polish Military Organization, which became a semi-secret organization and
refused to submit to the control of foreign political or military agencies. As
a result of the opposition of his followers, as well of all those, of course,
who counted on a German defeat, recruitment to the Legions organized by
the War Department of the NKN yielded very poor results. Enlarged to
three brigades, the Legions found themselves on the Volhynian front, where
they fought brave but bloody battles on the Styr and Stochdd. In the eyes
of the German units they won themselves a fine reputation. In short, this
was to influence political decisions, over which the German military were
gaining an ever greater authority.
The Kingdom was treated by the occupying Powers as a conquered
territory. Food and all manner of raw materials were removed to their
countries. Industry was systematically destroyed, factory installations were
526 THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE REBUILDING OF THE POLISH STATE (1914-1918)
dismantled and valuable machines earmarked for scrap in order to obtain
non-ferrous metals, the lack of which was felt more and more acutely in
Germany. When there arose a shortage of manpower in Germany, Polish
workers were encouraged to take work there, and, when voluntary recruit-
ing did not yield sufficient results, compulsion was used.
These actions made closer contact between the Central Powers and Po-
land difficult. This fact was not ignored by the Warsaw General Governor,
Gen. Beseler. For this reason, in spite of the war, the Kingdom had opportu-
nities of much greater freedom in its political life than it had under the
Russian government. Various parties began to carry on legal activities. It
was precisely in this period that the peasant movement in the Kingdom
reached its final organization. The Independent Peasant Union developed
its Right Wing organization, while the Left Wing concentrated around M. Ma-
linowski, editor of “Zaranie” and was to form later the Polish Peasant
Party “Wyzwolenie” (Liberation). Parties of socialist leanings, like the Pol-
ish Socialist Party, the PPS Left Wing and the SDKPiL, began to issue their
own publications. In this way the Austro-German occupation zone of the
Kingdom became a school of fresh political life.
THE DECLARATION OF 5 NOVEMBER, 1916
The year 1916 clearly showed that the war would not be decided by swift
military operations, but that it was a war depending on supplies of arms,
food and men. The battle of Verdun, a German attempt to force France
to make peace, resulted in an enormous loss of human life. The Germans
began to understand that they also lacked the human resources to provide
fresh reinforcements at the front. In those circumstances attention was
drawn to the Kingdom of Poland which was a reservoir of recruits as yet
not fully exhausted. To get these recruits it was necessary to create a Polish
administration which would be able to obtain recruits in the name of Poland.
This was the origin of the Proclamation of the Two Emperors on 5 Novem-
ber, 1916.
This declaration was preceded by long negotiations between both Powers
and the Polish politicians in the Kingdom. Some Polish leaders did not wish
to become involved at all in cooperation with the Central Powers. They
were called “Passivists” in opposition to the “Activists” who wished to
take advantage of the favourable situation. A part of the “Activists” wished
to bring about an agreement with the Austrian government only. This
conception, in view of the development of events, became less and less
realistic when the Austro-Hungary position became weaker. Already in 1915
Austria needed help from Germany in order to subdue Serbia. From May
1915 Austro-Hungary had to fight on the Italian front. Finally, and this
was most important, Brusilov’s offensive in the summer of 1916 smashed
THE DECLARATION OF 5 NOVEMBER, 1916 527
the Austrian front on a broad sector in Volhynia, in view of which the
Germans had to bring to the eastern front considerable forces from Verdun.
As a result, the entire Russian front found itself under German command.
This weakened Austria’s political prestige considerably, giving the Germans
the upper hand in dealing with the Polish question. That is why another
section of the “Activists” considered that Poland’s future should be linked
with Germany. These politicians acted in isolation and never gained wide
support. Finally, the third splinter group of the “Activists” were those, who
in collaboration with the governments of the Central Powers saw other
possibilities. They did not wish to prejudice any solution, but only to take
advantage of temporary opportunities to create Polish institutions in educa-
tion, administration and, above all, the army. This last conception was
represented by Pilsudski. At this time he was quite clearly removing himself
from the Polish Socialist Party and from socialism in general, seeking
already to enlarge the area of his political influence, appealing to a section of
the Polish propertied classes.
On 5 November, 1916, a declaration of William II and Franz Joseph
promising the creation of a Polish State as a hereditary constitutional
monarchy was proclaimed simultaneously in Warsaw and Lublin. It did not
arouse enthusiasm in the Kingdom, but was on the whole favourably received
in Galicia, though that area was not embraced by it. At the same time,
a separate rescript of the Emperor Franz Joseph was issued in which Galicia
was granted a separate status, thus giving effect to the resolution of 1868,
but no one attached any importance to this rescript, because it was obvious
that the Polish question, having been once raised, could not thereafter be
disregarded. For this reason partial solutions of the problem were without
significance.
The Declaration of 5 November became the starting point for arguments
between Polish politicians in the Kingdom and the Central Powers, which had
not been foreseen by the German politicians. The occupying Powers had all
the material arguments on their side and the Poles could offer only passive
resistance.
The clumsiness of German propaganda worked to the advantage of the
Poles. Beseler’s proclamation of 9 November in which he announced
recruitment to a Polish army, made the worst possible impression. While it
was to have Polish uniforms and standards, it was “temporarily attached to
the German army, in the sence of its being subordinate to the German High
Command and of military law”. Thus instead of the expected formation of
a Polish government and administration, the occupying Powers demanded
only the donation of blood. The Polish answer was, of course, decidedly
hostile. Demonstrations took place in the streets of Warsaw, organized by
the Left, demanding the calling of a Polish government and Seym. Simul-
taneously, the Polish Military Organization announced a recruiting campaign
of its own and though the Germans saw in this organization a kind of military
$28 THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE REBUILDING OF THE POLISH STATE (1914-1918)
training, which could be utilized in the formation of regular army units,
it was, in fact, the nucleus of an armed force independent of the occupying
Powers.
For this reason Beseler had the Polish Legions transferred from the
Volhynian front to the Kingdom and the German occupation zone. They were
to became the cadres for a future Polish army, dependent of the Germany
military authorities. Simultaneously, on 6 December a Provisional Council
of State was established which was “empowered to cooperate in the creation
of further state institutions in the Kingdom of Poland”. It was composed vf
fifteen members nominated by the German authorities and ten by the
Austrian. It was to be a consultative body and not representative of the
country as a whole. Nevertheless, prominent politicians of all shades of
opinion agreed to accept the nomination. The opening of the Council took
place on 14 January, 1917.
THE DOWNFALL OF THE TSARIST REGIME, 1917
In international politics the Polish question was regarded, in the first years
of the war, as an internal Russian problem and therefore neither France nor
Great Britain wished to raise this touchy issue, but soon Russia’s attitude
began to change. After the fall of the pro-German government of Stiirmer,
his successor, Trepov, proclaimed in the Duma the concept of “creating anew
a free Poland in her ethnographical boundaries, indissolubly connected with
Russia”. This was a step further than the manifesto of the Grand Duke
Nikolai, which spoke only of autonomy. On 25 December, 1916 the Tsar
issued an order to the army and navy in which mention was made of
“creating a free Poland out of all its three areas”. All this showed that the
declaration of 5 November was not without influence on the development
of the Polish question in the international] field. Shortly, President Wilson
also, whose country was preparing to enter the war on the side of the Allies
spoke in his message to the Senate on 22 January, 1917 about a free and
united Poland with access to the sea. All these by no means specific or
binding declarations showed, however, that the Polish problem had become
a vital issue, in spite of the wishes of the political and military authorities
of all the belligerent powers. -
In such a situation the fall of the Tsarist régime in March 1917 became
a turning point in the history of the Polish question in international relations
and, at the same time, changed fundamentally the situation in the Polish
territories. One partitioning Power ceased to exist and only Germany could
be the real enemy of the revival of the Polish State. Austria, on the eve of
internal disintegration and dependent on German military aid, could think
only of her own salvation. With the fall of the Tsarist régime it might have
THE DOWNFALL OF THE TSARIST REGIME, 1917 529
appeared that now Germany would become the master of central and eastern
Europe, and thus would decide the fate of Poland. This situation strengthened
the position of the “Activists” in Warsaw, especially when the social implica-
tions were to their advantage. With the Tsarist régime there disappeared not
only one of the partitioning Powers, but also one of the guarantors of the
existing social order. Ultra-reactionary, monarchist circles now had to seek
support from the German Empire.
For the Polish Left Wing the situation was likewise becoming completely
different. Up to this time the Russian government was, in its opinion, the
principal bastion of reaction in Poland, and the struggle against it was
a struggle not only for national, but also for social freedom. With the fall
of Tsardom Imperial Germany became the chief enemy, both in a national
and a social sense. Declarations which were coming in from Russia on the
Polish question made this matter ever more obvious. Already on 28 March,
1917 the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies issued an appeal
to the Polish nation, accepting Polish independence as its basis. Two days
later the Provisional Government, as a result of this appeal, expressed its
agreement to the creation of an independent Polish State remaining in a free
military union with Russia. In this way Polish sovereignty was given inter-
national recognition by both sets of belligerents. Both Russia and the Central
Powers recognized, at least in theory, the principle of Polish independence.
This increased the freedom of movement of those Polish politicians, who
had up to now sided with the Entente. Dmowski had been in the West since
the end of 1915, attempting, within the limits of loyalty of a Russian subject,
to conduct discreet propaganda in French and British government circles in
favour of the Polish cause. His arguments were for a long time without
avail, because the western Powers wanted, at all costs, to keep the Tsarist
government in the Allied camp, and their raising of the Polish question
would be precisely the strongest argument for the pro-German forces in
Russia, which were advocating a separate peace with Germany.
Simultaneously with Dmowski’s activity, Paderewski agitated in favour
of Poland in American government circles, which resulted in the message of
Wilson on 22 January, 1917. After the new Russian declaration on the Polish
question, France took the initiative into her hands. Already on 5 June, 1917,
a decree of President Poincaré was issued regarding the formation in France
of a Polish army. The Polish National Committee, established in Lausanne
by Dmowski, moved to Paris and was shortly afterwards recognized by the
Allied governments as the official body to represent Poland. At the same time
a Polish army was being formed in Russia. Already on the basis of the
Emperor Nicholas’s order of December 1916, the creation had been started
of a volunteer division of Polish riflemen, recruited from Polish soldiers in
the Tsarist army. After the revolution the movement for setting up separate
Polish units proceeded apace. The rank and file hurried to the Polish flag in
the hope of returning home. According to the intention of Polish conservative
34 History of Poland
530 THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE REBUILDING OF THE POLISH STATE (1914-1918)
gentry circles these units were to isolate the Polish soldiers from the influence
of the Russian revolutionaries.
A Supreme Polish Military Committee, presided over by Wladyslaw
Raczkiewicz, was created at a meeting of Polish military figures held in
Petrograd in June 1917. On the initiative of this Committee, the Russian
High Command nominated General Jézef Dowbér-Muésnicki Commander of
the First Polish Corps which began to be formed in the area of Minsk. In
this way, while in the country the occupation government could not recruit
an army for itself, the organization of Polish armed forces, against Germany,
had begun in its rear.
THE REGENCY COUNCIL
The politicians, who in the Kingdom collaborated with the occupying Pow-
ers, tried to draw advantage from this state of affairs. At meetings of the
Provisional Council of State there were arguments about the organization
of the army and its legal relationship to the Central Powers. Beseler
considered himself the commander of the future Polish army. The military
oath, which insisted on the soldiers’ obedience to the German command,
gave cause for a breakdown of negotiations. Pilsudski and his followers left
the Provisional Council of State and that part of the legionaries which
sympathized with him refused to take the oath. In consequence those
legionaries who were Russian subjects, mostly from the First Brigade, partly
from the Third, were interned in camps. A very small unit, called the
“Polnische Wehrmacht”, under Beseler’s command was formed from the
small group of legionaries who took the oath. Legionaries who were Austrian
subjects were sent back to Galicia and those, who sympathized with Pilsud-
ski, drafted in the Austrian army. A Polish auxiliary corps was formed from
the remainder, its most outstanding officer being Colonel Jézef Haller. This
move showed the rivalry between the governments of Vienna and Berlin in
the Polish question, which Austrian diplomacy did not wish to abandon.
The Germans took less account of the Poles and this explains why they
arrested Pilsudski and imprisoned him in Magdeburg which helped im-
mensely in increasing his popularity. The arrest of Pilsudski meant that the
independence movement passed decidedly over to the side of Germany’s
enemies. Shortly afterwards the rest of the members of the Provisional
Council of State resigned. Thus in the summer of 1917 pro-German feeling in
Poland had for practical purposes disappeared.
It was in such a climate that the Polish parliamentarians from Galicia
passed an important Resolution on 28 May, 1917, in which they called for
the reunion of all the Polish lands in an independent State with access to
the sea. This was a break with the pro-Austrian orientation and showed that
even such moderate politicians, like the majority of this group, did not
THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND THE PEACE TREATY OF BRZESC S31
consider Russia after the fall of the Tsarist régime to be an enemy of
Poland.
While the Western governments were ever more involved in the Polish
question, Great Britain was fighting the mortal danger of submarine warfare
and the Russian army was evidently falling into disintegration. For Polish
conservative circles it became obvious that, although Germany would not
gain a victory in the west after the entry of the United States into the war,
a compromise might be arrived at in which Germany would retain the pos-
sibility of deciding the fate of eastern Europe. This was understood by
leading persons in Imperial Germany and therefore a new attempt to gain
advantages for Germany in the Polish question was in the interest of both
sides. In September 1917 a Regency Council was formed in Warsaw, which
was nominally to exercise power in the Kingdom until the proclamation of
a king. The regents were to call into being a Polish government, with a new
Council of State filled partly by nomination and partly by election. The
range of activity of these authorities was subject to the control of the
governor-general and, what is most important, the Regency Council was not
allowed to have diplomatic relations with foreign countries. In October the
regents were appointed from persons of known conservative views,
Monsignor Kakowski, the Archbishop of Warsaw, Prince Zdzistaw Lubomir-
ski and Jozef Ostrowski.
At the outset the regents were inclined to an Austro-Polish solution,
because at that moment in the light of the relations between the two Central
Powers this was the most likely solution, though Germany demanded as the
price of giving the Kingdom to Austria a reduction of its size and the incor-
poration of certain frontier districts to Prussia in return for compensation to
Poland in the east. The question of these border adjustments dragged on
until the end of the war, as did the problem of- possible compensation which
Poland would receive for this in the east, but in this question the German
occupation authorities supported Lithuanian as well as Ukrainian national-
ism as a safeguard against revolutionary movements coming from Russia. At
the end of 1917 an independent Lithuanian State, with its capital in Wilno
was established under German protection. Thus, both the German plans of
annexation in the west and the Reich’s policy in the east created considerable
obstacles to an understanding with Imperial Germany, even for reactionary
Polish politicians.
THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND THE PEACE TREATY
OF BRZESC LITEWSKI (BREST LITOVSK)
After the outbreak of the Socialist Revolution in October 1917 few people
in Poland were aware of the fact that a new epoch in history had begun.
What was primarily seen was the immediate effect of the revolution, in which
34°
§32 THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE REBUILDING OF THE POLISH STATE (1914-1918)
Russia definitely withdrew from the war. For Polish socialists prospects of
a Socialists Revolution now opened, while for reactionary politicians it
became still more obvious that collaboration with Germany was necessary at
any price, inasmuch as she was the only power in this part of Europe which
could defend the existing social order. The leaders of the German Empire
understood only the immediate consequences of this great upheaval. They
saw that at this moment their military and political position had been
strengthened. In opening peace negotiations in BrzeSé (Brest Litovsk) at the
end of 1917 they considered the Polish question could not be used to
advantage and was in fact rather inconvenient. Jan Kucharzewski, the Prime
Minister nominated by the Regency Council, was not allowed to be present
at the negotiations.
The Poles were shocked by the separate peace treaty between the
Ukrainian Central Council and the Central Powers. This treaty was to
give the Central Powers access to Ukrainian grain, without which the
German and especially the Austrian population was threatened by famine
and revolution. This is why far-reaching concessions were granted to the
Ukrainians. The Chelm district was handed over to them as well as part of
Podlasie and, in addition, they were promised Eastern Galicia. The news of
this gave rise in Poland and, especially in Galicia, to violent demonstrations,
strikes and disorders of almost revolutionary proportions. Even the officers
of the Polish Auxiliary Corps, loyal to Austria, could not resist this pressure.
On 15 February practically the entire corps under the command of Haller
crossed the lines of the Austrian front, arms in hand, to join the Polish units
formed out of the disintegrating Russian army. The corps had to continue its
march farther to the east to avoid the Austrian and German units which were
then occupying the Ukraine. Finally, on 11 May at the battle of Kaniéw on
the Dnieper Haller’s troops were surrounded by German units. They fought
bravely, but owing to the supremacy of the enemy they were forced to
capitulate. Nevertheless, a large part of them, together with Haller, managed
to fight its way into the interior of revolutionary Russia. Haller himself
hastened through Murmansk to Paris, where he was placed in command of
the Polish army being created there. This was under the political guidance
of the Polish National Committee and was being recruited from Polish war
prisoners from the German and Austrian armies, who had been stationed in
the west, in considerable numbers, especially in Italy.
After the treaty of Brzes¢, which was concluded with Soviet Russia in
March 1918, the situation for the Poles once more became complicated. Not
only the “Passivists”, but Pilsudski’s followers also now regarded Germany
as Poland’s principal enemy and considered that a defeat of Germany could
be inflicted solely by the Western Allies. For all those, who strove for an
independent Poland and rejected the idea of a social upheaval, Bolshevik
Russia did not seem to be a suitable ally, but one which rather began to ap-
pear increasingly dangerous. The Polish propertied classes had a completely
GERMANY’S DEFEAT. THE POWERS ON THE POLISH QUESTION 533
negative attitude to the new Russia. The Polish units created by former
Tsarist officers in the area embraced by the revolution now became a defence
force for the Polish landowners against the Byelorussian or Ukrainian
peasantry. Thus it was easy for them to reach an understanding with the
Germans who were entering into these territories. General Dowbér-MuSnicki,
who had already engaged in a struggle with Bolshevik troops, immediately
after the Brzes¢ treaty reached an agreement with the Council of Regency.
Ultimately, after long negotiations and vacillations, in spite of the obstacles
put forth by the Polish Military Organization, MuSnicki’s corps surrendered
to the Germans and was demobilized, with the disarmed soldiers returning to
Poland.
GERMANY’S DEFEAT. THE DECLARATION
OF THE POWERS ON THE POLISH QUESTION, 1918
In March 1918 the Germans undertook a final offensive on the Western
front aimed at forcing France to conclude at least a compromise peace. The
“Activist” group in Poland, already quite small, still calculated that, if
Germany were to be successful in this offensive, she would maintain her
hegemony in the East. The German political and military authorities also did
not wish to declare themselves on the Polish question until the issue on the
Western front had been decided. In such a situation even the National
Democrats participated in the elections to the Council of State, which were
boycotted only by the left-wing parties. It became obvious that questions
of foreign policy no longer divided the Polish community, but rather internal
social issues. The SDKPiL and the PPS Left Wing strove for a social
upheaval on the model of the Russian revolution. The rest of the Polish Left,
however, linked the slogan of independence with social reform rather
than with a social upheaval. Its various groups were organized in a secret
Convention directed by Pilsudski’s men, who in addition had under their
control the Polish Military Organization, which did not limit its now secret
activity only to the Kingdom, but sent out emissaries to wherever Polish
groups might be found. The Polish Socialist Party renewed in the autumn the
activities of the Fighting Organization. Its most outstanding feat was the
assassination of the German chief of the political police in Warsaw in
October 1918. The main slogan became the struggle with the occupying
Power. Thus when Germany suffered defeat and the occupation régime col-
lapsed of its own accord Pilsudski’s men had gathered all the trump cards in
their hands.
In the summer it became clear that Germany would not be able to obtain
even a compromise peace. The offensive on the Western front broke down and
from July 1918 the military defeat of Germany was already inevitable.
§34 THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE REBUILDING OF THE POLISH STATE (1914-1918)
Feverish diplomatic talks now began between Germany and Austria, because
both Powers understood the value of the Polish question when the expected
peace negotiations began.
At this moment a fact of considerable importance for the Polish ques-
tion occurred. On 29 August, 1918 the Soviet government annulled all the
partition treaties. The partitions of Poland were thus cancelled de jure and
this gave rise to the necessity of a new settlement in this part of Europe.
From this time onwards none of the European powers could deny the inter-
national character of the Polish question and the possibility of a return to the
status quo of 1914 in the Polish territories, disappeared. The ultimate solu-
tion depended on whether it would be decided solely by foreign governments,
or whether the Poles would find sufficient strength to influence the construc-
tion of their own national State.
In the meantime the revolutionary mood was spreading to every major
section of the Polish population, especially in the Kingdom, where owing to
the disorganization of the factories the workers were suffering hunger and
unemployment. This was not without influence on the views of Polish
politicians, even those who were conciliatory towards the Central Powers.
While in March 1918, Prince Ferdynand Radziwill, the president of the
Polish Parliamentary Club in Berlin, might still issue a conciliatory declara-
tion and the Polish deputies voted for the war credits, already in June the
Club selected a new president, Wladyslaw Seyda, a National Democrat,
and adopted a more hostile stand. In Vienna, as long as Count Czernin, one
of the authors of the treaty of Brzes¢, was in control of foreign policy, the
relations between the Polish Club and the government were for practical
purposes severed. After Czernin’s fall from office, Burian became Minister
of Foreign Affairs and returned to the plan of an Austrian solution of the
Polish question. The effective result was the abandonment of the trial of those
legionaries of the Polish Auxiliary Corps, imprisoned in Marmaros Sziget in
Hungary, who had not succeeded in crossing the front lmes in February, and
who were facing severe sentences. Their release without sentence was, in fact,
a capitulation of the Austrian government, because the trial had aroused
considerable interest and highly patriotic speeches have been made in the
courtroom.
The fate of Poland at this time depended, on the one hand, on the
Entente governments which soon, having gained a military victory over
Germany, would dictate conditions to her, and, on the other hand, on the
situation in Poland.
Already, during the negotiations at BrzeS¢, President Wilson had pro-
claimed, on 8 January, 1918, his programme for a general peace in his fa-
mous Fourteen Points, of which the thirteenth related to Poland. Although
it sounded very fine and could seem to be a fulfilment of all the aspirations
of the Poles for their own independent State, it was formulated so obscurely
that it made possible an interpretation, according to which the Prussian area
THE LIBERATION OF THE AUSTRIAN AREA 535
would for the most part remain within the German State. Wilson had
emphasized that the independent Polish State “should include territories
inhabited by an indubitably Polish population”, and, as was known, almost
every part of the Prussian area could be the subject of dispute, because it was
not ethnically homogeneous. Similarly the phrase dealing with Polish access
to the sea did not simultaneously provide for the incorporation of Pomerania
and Gdansk into Poland. Later the British and French declarations on the
Polish question went further in an anti-German spirit and the Polish Na-
tional Committee gained an increasingly strong position when the Western
Powers granted it large credits and the possibility of conducting consular
activity as the representative of the future Polish State. On 3 June, 1918
the governments of Great Britain, France and Italy stated that “the creation
of a united and independent Polish State with free access to the sea
constitutes one of the premises of a lasting ... peace”.
THE LIBERATION OF THE AUSTRIAN AREA
In face of the collapse of the Central Powers, ruling circles in Austria at-
tempted at the last moment to reshape the monarchy into a federal State. But
this half-century old conception now came too late. On 15 October the
Polish deputies in Vienna declared to Emperor Charles that they ceased to
consider themselves his subjects.
The legal liquidation of the multi-national monarchy had begun. The
Emperor Charles’ manifesto proclaimed not only the transformation of the
monarchy into a federal State, but also promised the unification of the
Austrian Polish territories with the rest of Poland. This was a result of the
request for peace, which the Austrian government had sent to Wilson. The
American answer, however, ruled out this conception. Wilson declared that
the Fourteen Points he had issued were already partially out of date because
the Allied governments had recognized the Czechoslovak National Council
as a de facto government. This statement was tantamount to the end of the
Hapsburg State. On 19 October, 1918 a Polish National Council was formed
in Cieszyn which declared the adherence of the Cieszyn area to Poland.
Simultaneously, the Czechs in this area set up their own “Narodni Vybor”
(National Council) and on 5 November both committees concluded an
agreement dividing Cieszyn-Silesia into a Polish and Czech area on an eth-
nic basis. The Poles did not know, however, that earlier on 28 Septem-
ber Masaryk, the chairman of the Czech National Council, had concluded
a secret treaty with the French government which provided for the incorpora-
tion of Cieszyn-Silesia in the future Czech State. The agreement of 5 Novem-
‘ber was only a tactical move for the Czechs and it was shortly broken.
On 29 October, 1918 a Polish Liquidation Commission was set up in
$36 THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE REBUILDING OF THE POLISH STATE (1914-1918)
Cracow which assumed power over all of Galicia without regard to Ukrainian
demands in relation to the eastern part of the province. This Commission did
not consider itself any longer an organ of the Austrian authorities and,
therefore, it can be regarded as the first fully independent governing body in
the Polish territories.
THE SWIEZYNSKI GOVERNMENT
The Regency Council, nominated by the occupying Powers, also sought to
become such an independent Polish authority. When on 4 October Prince
Max of Baden, the new German Chancellor, sent a request for peace to
President Wilson, the Regency Council, understanding that it could not persist
in the idea of creating a State at the side of the Central Powers, issued
a proclamation dissolving the Council of State and promised the creation of
a government composed of representatives of all political groups. This govern-
ment was to establish the franchise for election to the future Seym, which
would decide upon the Constitution, but contact with the Left was impossible
for the Council of Regency. The growing pressure of the masses, which were
becoming increasingly revolutionary, forced all the parties which did not want
to lose their support in the community to take a more radical stand. In the
first place, the Polish Socialist Party broke with the directives of the Conven-
tion of Pilsudski’s followers, and on the contrary, imposed its leadership on
the Left Wing. In these conditions neither Daszynski, the leader of the Polish
Social-Democratic Party in Galicia, nor Witos, the leader of the right-wing
Galician Peasant Party, agreed to enter the coalition government proposed by
the Regency Council.
There were vacillations as well within the Polish Socialist Party. This
party rejected in September 1918 the idea of carrying out a revolution similar
to the one that had taken place in Russia, with the establishment of the
dictatorship of the proletariat, but the plan of Jedrzej Moraczewski, one of
the leaders of the Convention, who in understanding with the National Dem-
ocrats proposed a coalition of all Polish parties in favour of independence,
was also discarded. The formation of a united front between the PPS and
the extreme Left was frustrated on the one hand by the influence of the
Convention, and on the other, by the SDKPiL. This explains why the PPS
Party Conference passed a resolution in October, from which it followed
that the Party was prepared to cooperate with radical-democratic elements,
even though non-socialist, if it could also carry out its programme of social
reform.
In fact, the socialist parties had no mass organization at this moment, but
only cadres which could follow public opinion and even influence it, but
which did not have an adequate executive machinery. This was a consequence
THE LUBLIN GOVERNMENT 537
of the general situation in the country. Industry was destroyed and the
working class impoverished and dispersed. In 1918 only 14 per cent of the
total labour force employed in 1914 was at work in the Kingdom. The entire
community regarded the enemy and the occupation governments as the
cause of its misery and, therefore, the regaining of independence was
a universal demand. Wide hopes were placed on the revival of Poland, with
each social group seeing in it what it wanted to. This desire for independence
was a most powerful factor which was to decide the future fate of the
nation.
While for the parties of the Left cooperation with the Regency Council
was impossible and equivalent to political suicide, the National Democrats
accepted the proposal of the Regency Council. On 23 October the National
Democrat government of J. Swiezynski was established. This government
could not, however, assume real power, which remained in the hands of
the Germans, nor gain the support of the Left. It was dismissed on 4 No-
vember, having discredited both the Regency Council and the National
Democrats.
THE LUBLIN GOVERNMENT
As a result of the dissolution of Austrian authority in the Kingdom a Pro-
visional Government of the Polish Republic was established on 7 November
1918 in Lublin. Daszytski became Prime Minister and the government was
composed of representatives of the Polish Socialist Party, the Peasant Party
“Wyzwolenie” and radical democratic intellectuals. Witos hesitated : though
he signed the manifesto, he later withdrew, realizing that the composition
of the government was too left-wing for his liking. The Lublin Government
lasted, in fact, only five days, but the very fact of its creation and, above
all, the programme outlined in its manifesto played a crucial role in crystal-
lizing the political situation in these’days, in a sense which was decisive for
the future. The manifesto put forward a programme of radical social transfor-
mation. It introduced immediately the eight-hour working day, proclaimed
the nationalization of forests, while referring more important issues to the
decision of the Seym, which was to be elected on the basis of general, equall,.
secret and proportional ballot, giving both passive and active electoral
rights to all adult men and women. Equal political rights for women, a fact.
of immense significance, can be considered the result of social development
in Poland during the previous two generations.
The programme of the November Manifesto, had it been put into effect,
would have brought Poland closer to socialism. The next few weeks were
to decide whether these words would remain only a programme or be put
into practice. The immediate political effects of the proclamation became
§38 THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND THE REBUILDING OF THE POLISH STATE (1914-1918)
obvious immediately. The Council of Regency understood that it had to
disappear. The only way out was to surrender authority but in such a way
as to save as much as possible of the social position represented by the
Regents. Pilsudski’s return from prison now appeared to be a way out of
the situation. Swiezynski’s government had already nominated him Minister
of War and requested the German chancellor to set him free. Shortly after-
wards revolution broke out in Germany. The monarchy fell and Pitsudski
was released and arrived in Warsaw on 10 November. The next day the
Regency Council gave him command over the army by which were meant
the few units of the “Polnische Wehrmacht”. The command of the Polish
Military Organization which began to disarm the Germans, was his in any
case. Upon hearing that the Republic had been declared the German troops
began to set up Soldier’s Council in solidarity with the revolutionary move-
ment in Germany, and, for this reason, they were ready to give up their
arms in order to speed their return home. Pitsudski reached an agreement
with the Warsaw Soldiers’ Council on the basis of which the peaceful evacua-
tion of German troops from the Kingdom took place. Pitsudski aimed at
the creation of a coalition government, but when the socialists began to
organize demonstrations in Warsaw against the Regency Council, in order
to keep a left-wing government in power, he decided, when the Regency
Council transferred civil authority to him as well, to entrust Daszynski, as
the Premier of the Lublin Government, with the task of forming a cabinet.
Eventually, Moraczewski became Prime Minister on 18 November. He
was more subservient to Pitsudski and continued to have contacts with the
National Democrats, because Pitsudski did not abandon the idea of creating
a government on a broader political basis. For the time being Moraczewski’s
government was, in principle, the continuation of the Lublin Government
and it protested that it wished to carry out the Lublin Manifesto. On 2 No-
vember a decree was published on the basis of which Pilsudski took over
the office of provisional head of State until the Seym could be convened.
He also kept for himself the supreme command of the army. In this way the
reconstituted Polish State was formally established.
LIBERATED POLAND
More than two years were to pass before the situation in Poland was finally
stabilized, her borders determined and her political and social order consoli-
dated. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to consider the factors which had
brought about the fact that the Polish people which for over a century had
been without their own State now regained it, finding themselves once more
among the free nations and able to shape their political life in independence.
The fundamental force, which was present during the whole period of
LIBERATED POLAND 539
subjection with greater or lesser intensity but never dead, was the determi-
nation of the Poles themselves, because they had never been reconciled to
the partitions or to the loss of their independence. The proof of this lies in
the history of the years after the partition, a history marked by the frequency
of insurrection and constant efforts to rebuild an independent State. That
Poland regained her independence in the second decade of the twentieth
century must be explained by an additional factor. It was of fundamental
importance that, if the Polish desire for independence immediately after the
partitions embraced only a fraction of the nation, by the beginning of the
twentieth century it had spread to the entire community. Certainly this de-
sire was not equally strong in all sections of the community or in all parts of
the country, but the effect was no longer that of a small élite. At the begin-
ning of the nineteenth century those who fought for Poland’s freedom were
mainly the middle or déclassé gentry : the officers in Dabrowski’s Legions
or the conspirators of the November Insurrection in 1830. From the middle
of the century it was the intellectuals of gentry and later of bourgeois or
peasant origin who founded the Red organization in 1862-1863 and later
organized workers’ and peasants’ associations, It was they who carried edu-
cation to the lower classes. Though the Polish intelligentsia might provide
the nucleus for the National League, the “Zwiazek Walki Czynnej” and the
socialist movement, they were powerless until they began to express the
needs of the masses. All the Polish insurrections failed, in some measure be-
cause the participation of the masses was insufficient, but when the thrones
of the three partitioning Powers had tottered, there existed in Poland an
active working class, peasantry and petty-bourgeoisie and a talented intelli-
gentsia. This, probably, should be regarded as the major reason why Poland
regained its independence.
The will of the nation would not have been sufficient by itself. A neces-
sary condition was an international situation which made possible the ful-
filment of these aims. War between the partitioning Powers, the military
defeat of the Central Powers, the Russian October Revolution, the Novem-
ber Revolution in Germany and the disappearance of the Hapsburg mon-
archy, all these historical events, occurring independently of the Polish will,
made possible the realization of Polish aspirations.
POLAND 1918-1939
by Henryk Wereszycki
Chapter XXII
THE DEMARCATION
OF THE FRONTIERS
AND THE ENACTMENT
OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1918-1921)
THE FIRST MOMENTS OF INDEPENDENCE
When in November 1918 the first government of independent Poland began
to operate in Warsaw the sovereignty of the State and the authority of the
government did not in the least extend to all the Polish territories. In signing
on 11 November an armistice with the Allies the Germans did not give up the
occupation of the territory they held in the east. The Allies did not require
this, because they did not wish to deprive western Europe of the cordon
which the German armies were to create against the danger of a socialist
revolution. The fate of the German armies in the east and that of the coun-
tries occupied by them was to be decided later. By this action the Allies,
without realizing it, placed the destiny of these territories into the hands of
the indigenous peoples. These countries were in many cases, however, not
homogeneous with regard to nationality. In this part of Europe there were
rarely well-defined frontiers dividing one nationality from another.
On 1 November Lwéw was occupied by the Ukrainians. At this time
the majority of the city’s inhabitants were Poles and there were numerous
Polish enclaves in the Ukrainian territories throughout Eastern Galicia.
The Polish population of Lwow offered an armed resistance and a Polish-
Ukrainian war began. The Polish nationalists realized that the Ukrainian
conflict was an excellent means of drawing the attention of the radical Polish
masses away from burning social problems. This is why a bitter agitation in
the name of bringing aid to struggling Lwéw was launched against the Mo-
raczewski government especially by Pilsudski, whom the propertied classes
and the right-wing parties considered the standard bearer of the Left.
A second cause for dispute was Poland’s attitude towards Germany. The
Moraczewski government had established diplomatic relations with the
newly-formed German Republic and accepted a German envoy to Warsaw.
Pitsudski was anxious that the armies retreating from the Ukraine and
Byelorussia should march to German through East Prussia, without crossing
Polish territory, because they were still such a powerful force that there
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could be no effective defence against them, if they had wished to reoccupy
the Kingdom. An agreement was reached according to which the retreating
German armies avoided Poland. Only then could diplomatic relations with
Germany be broken off and adherence to the group of countries at war with
THE FIRST MOMENTS OF INDEPENDENCE 545
Germany effected, which was, of course, of great importance in view of the
Peace Conference assembling in Paris.
The Polish National Committee, with its seat in Paris, had in its hands
the possibility of becoming the sole representative of Poland accredited to
the governments of the victorious coalition, but it had little authority in the
country and was compelled to agree to a compromise. Professor Stanislaw
Grabski, a former socialist, who was now a National Democratic leader and
a member of the Paris Committee, was entrusted with the mission to War-
saw, but he succeeded only in as far as Pilsudski sent his own delegates to
Paris to join the National Committee. Grabski’s efforts to bring about the
formation of a coalition government at the time yielded no results. For this
reason a plan was conceived by right-wing groups to overthrow the govern-
ment by force.
On the night of 4 January, 1919 an attempt at a coup d’état in Warsaw
ended in failure. Its authors did not, however, suffer personal consequences,
because Pilsudski in fact sympathized with the idea of disposing of the so-
cialist-peasant government and replacing it with a more right-wing admini-
stration, which he considered necessary in view of relations with the Entente
and Poland’s immense economic difficulties. In effect, the Moraczewski gov-
ernment was denied the cooperation of the propertied classes, while itself
it rejected a revolutionary solution of the economic difficulties,
As in neighbouring countries, swept by revolution, Councils of Workers
Delegates began to be formed in the industrial centres of Poland. In practice,
they developed only in the Kingdom, where the working class had the strong-
est traditions.
In December 1918 the two extreme left-wing parties, the SDKPiL and
the PPS Left Wing joined together to form the Communist Workers’s Party
of Poland, from 1924 KPP, or the Communist Party of Poland. The Com-
munist Workers’s Party wished to adopt the policy of the Bolsheviks and
through the Councils of Workers’ Delegates to get the working class to take
power in the country. At the same time the PPS acted in the Councils with
a completely different aim of depriving them of their revolutionary charac-
ter. The PPS won a small majority in the Councils. Only in the Dabrowa
Basin did the Communists, with support of the Councils, take power into
their hands for a short while and create a Red Guard.
At this critical moment the existence of a government with a socialist
reputation was of immense significance. Moraczewski’s cabinet had recourse
to the army to put down Communist action in the Dabrowa Basin and in
Warsaw. It also expelled from Warsaw the Soviet Red Cross mission, which
had proposed the establishment of diplomatic relations with Russia. On its
return journey the members of the mission were murdered near the frontier.
With the help of the PPS Moraczewski was able to paralyse and climinate
the Workers’ Council movement. Simultaneously, in order to weaken the
35 History of Poland
$46 THE DEMARCATION OF THE FRONTIERS. THE CONSTITUTION 1921
revolutionary pressure of the working class, the Moraczewski government
hastily put into effect its programme of social reform.
A series of decrees instituted social insurance for the workers, established
factory inspectors, introduced the eight-hour day and, above all, announced
a very democratic franchise which gave women the right to vote. Women’s
suffrage did not assist the Left, because women, especially in the country-
side, were prone to clerical influence and the majority of them voted for
right-wing candidates. Nevertheless, these were achievements designed to
forestall revolutionary action which the Right afterwards could not easily
abolish. Moraczewski’s decrees were, however, a step backward by compari-
son with the Lublin Manifesto. The nationalization of the forests, for ex-
ample, had now been abandoned. ‘
THE LEGISLATIVE SEYM
Ten days after the unsuccessful right-wing coup the government resigned at
Pilsudski’s request. The new cabinet under Paderewski was purely bourgois
in character. The coming to power of the Right removed the possibility of
far reaching legal and social changes. There remained a revolutionary way
of satisfying the needs of the working classes. Not only the propertied
classes, but also the well-to-do peasantry were strongly attached to the
principle of private property and feared the revolutionary terror which they
observed in Russia. The left-wing intelligentsia, reared in the tradition of
struggle for social and national liberation, had high hopes that the desired
Polish State would be based on social justice and carry out a revolution “‘in
full majesty of the law”, with the progressive forces winning a legal majority
in the Seym.
The Paderewski government assumed office on 16 January, 1919 and the
elections to the legislative Seym were held ten days later. For the time being
they were conducted only in certain areas of the Kingdom, because some
regions were still occupied by German armies, and in Western Galicia. East-
ern Galicia, on the other hand, was to be represented in the Seym by depu-
ties who had been elected to the Austrian Parliament, before the war, and
similarly, the Prussian area .by the Polish deputies elected to the German
Parliament. No elections took place in the Cieszyn area where fighting
between the Poles and Czechs broke out 23 January, ended only by the
intervention of the allied governments.
An exceptional situation existed in the Prussian area. Immediately after
the November Revolution power was assumed by Polish-German Councils
of Workers and Soldiers Delegates, but side by side with them were created
purely Polish People’s Councils, which established a People’s Supreme Coun-
THE LEGISLATIVE SEYM 547
cil claiming authority over the country. The right-wing politicians of the
Prussian area were in a majority everywhere and worked on the assumption
that the Polish-German frontier would be defined by the peace treaty, for
which reason Prussian sovereignty should be recognized up to that moment.
Despite the right-wing leadership’s views fighting broke out in Poznan with
the German troops on 27 December, 1918, an event which quickly led to
the liberation of the entire Poznan province. As a result the Allied Powers
forced both sides to conclude a cease-fire. The liberated districts retained to
some extent a distinction between themselves and the government in Warsaw
and even set up a tariff ‘barrier against the Kingdom in order to maintain
their higher standard of living, especially in foodstuffs and to safeguard
themselves against revolutionary upheavals. It should be noted that this
area was not devastated by war at all, and that during the war and blockade
its agriculture had flourished. For this reason, the Poznan province was in
a much more advantageous situation after the armistice than the ruined King-
dom or even Western Galicia.
The Right Wing triumphed in the elections to the Seym. It did not gain
an outright majority, but did obtain 35 per cent of the seats, while the Left
gained 26 per cent and the Centre 35 per cent ; the Communists boycotted
the election. In this way the Centre had the decisive voice on the resolutions
of the Seym, because it could support the proposals either of the Right or
the Left according on the situation and the issues at stake. Together with
other peasant groups,'a vital part in the Centre was played by the “Piast”
Peasant Party, led by Wincenty Witos. Thus the representatives of the pros-
perous peasants were in control of developments in Poland and this in a
period when her Constitution was being ‘drawn up. This had an unfavour-
able effect for the future fate of the State.
The Seym constituted itself on 14 February by electing its Marshal ; the
candidate of the Right, Wojciech Trampczynski, was elected with a small
majority.
Pitsudski formally resigned his provisional power as head of State. On
20 February the Seym enacted the “Little Constitution”. It resolved that
the Seym should exercise sovereign and legislative power, and that the head
of State should be the supreme executor of the Seym’s resolutions. In col-
laboration with the Seym, he was entrusted with the formation of govern-
ments, which, like himself, were to be responsible to the Seym. The Seym
then unanimously appointed Pifsudski head of State, and he now resumed
office with its approval. This resolution made Poland a Republic with the
balance of power weighted in favour of the legislature.
The main task of the Seym was to enact a permanent Constitution, but
more urgent matters arose in the meantime and the work on the Constitution
dragged on until 1921. In this period a war was being waged on almost all
the borders. The defence of Poland herself was confused with the desire to
35*
$48 THE DEMARCATION OF THE FRONTIERS. THE CONSTITUTION 1921
expand beyond the ethnographic frontiers to the eastern borders of the
former Commonwealth, inhabited in the main by Ukrainians, Byelorussians
and Lithuanians.
In the early months the hardest battle was fought with the Ukrainians.
Lwéw was isolated and, for a certain period, cut off. It was only in the
spring that the Ukrainians had been forced behind the Zbruch river as a re-
sult of fierce fighting, after the arrival of General Haller’s army from France.
The Polish National Committee had delayed sending this army to Poland
in the belief that while it had it at its disposal it could be used as an instru-
ment to gain power in Poland. After Paderewskf’s appointment as Prime
Minister and the creation of a government of right-wing complexion, though
nominally non-party in outlook, the struggle for power was shelved, espe-
cially when extremely urgent problems at home and abroad, had to be solved.
The chaos caused by the policy of devastation adopted by the occupying
Powers did not cease with the moment of liberation. It was slow to disap-
pear and in this connexion a more significant part was played by the volun-
tary effort of the population than by the official authorities who were inefh-
cient in the early days of their formation. The currency question was the
most difficult, a general feature in this part of Europe where a galloping
inflation occurred, which was not as severe in Poland as in some other
countries. Stabilization of the Polish mark established under German occupa-
tion was quite impossible as long as war lasted. The propertied classes could
overcome the revolutionary situation only by requisite reforms and the or-
ganization of an efficient administration. Though the Councils of Workers’
Deputies and the militias, created during the period of driving out the occu-
pation authorities, had been abolished within a few months, the question of
social reform demanded by the mass of the population, called for action.
The problem of a land reform and the compulsory division of large estates
was desired by the landless and small peasants.
In the summer of 1919 this issue was the main subject of discussion
in the Seym. Every one agreed to the principle of agrarian reform, but
a conflict arose over the size of estates not liable for division and over the
possibility of dividing Church lands. The initial principles of the reform
were agreed on 10 July, with the stipulation that areas of less than 80 or
180 hectares, according to the quality of soil and their location, should not
be subject to division. On 22 July a bill was passed establishing the Central
Land Office, which was to carry out the reform. Shortly afterwards the Seym
passed a number of laws affecting the workers ; introducing an 8-hour day,
compulsory insurance and the rights of persons renting houses. Housing was
of great importance because there had been virtually no new building since
the beginning of the war. Almost all these laws, though they were later
modified, survived the twenty years between the two world wars and made
Poland one of the most progressive countries in the field of social legislation
in the capitalist world.
THE PEACE TREATIES 549
THE PEACE TREATIES
The Paderewski government attained one undoubted success. During its
tenure of office the Versailles Treaty was concluded in June 1919 which,
while it did not fully satisfy Polish aspirations, gave international standing
to a part of the Polish western frontier. The peace negotiations, took place in
a situation unfavourable for Poland. Great Britain supported the claims of
Germany, wishing to preserve her power on the continent as a counterweight
to the French hegemony and to Soviet Russia. Because Poland was considered
a French field of influence, Germany was strengthened at Poland’s expense.
Upper Silesia, therefore, was not given to Poland ; it was decided instead to
conduct a plebiscite there as well as in Mazuria and Warmia in East Prus-
sia. Gdansk also was not incorporated in Poland, but made a Free City over
which Poland did obtain suzerain rights. Supervision of the Free City was
entrusted to the League of Nations. For the moment, therefore, Poland had
regained the Poznan area, with some diminution in its western districts, and
only a part of Gdansk-Pomerania, reaching the sea by a thin strip of ter-
ritory barely 70 kms wide. At Versailles the treaty on the protection of
national minorities was imposed on Poland, but Poland obtained no recipro-
cal advantage. In this way the German minority in Poland had international
protection, but the Polish minority in Germany was deprived of its rigths.
In spite of everything, the Versailles Treaty was of fundamental significance
to Poland, because it restored her existence as a sovereign independent
State, thus legalizing in international law what had already taken place
in fact.
The peace treaty concluded shortly afterwards with Austria did not settle
the problem of Poland’s right to certain territories formerly ruled by Austria.
It was left to the great Powers to decide such problems as the question of
Cieszyn and Eastern Galicia. In September 1919 the Allied Supreme Council
decided to hold a plebiscite in the disputed Polish-Czech area. In November
the Supreme Council granted Eastern Galicia to Poland for 25 years, with
the provision that a plebiscite should be then held. The Polish Seym,
however, rejected this decision. On the question of Poland’s eastern frontier
the Supreme Council at first forbade Polish military action in Lithuania but
afterwards granted Poland the eastern frontier of the Congress Kingdom,
with the addition of the district of Bialystok, but without the Suwaiki
district. Possession of lands farther to the east was not resolved. The Western
Powers still counted on the rebuilding of Tsarist Russia and did not intend
to question her rights to these territories.
Against the background of the struggle for the agrarian reform, a rap-
prochement took place between the various peasant parties, for which reason
these parties, who had at the end of 1919 a majority in the Seym, could
form a Centre government. This government of L. Skulski lasted for a half
a year. It did not settle two basic problems : to begin the implementation of
550 THE DEMARCATION OF THE FRONTIERS. THE CONSTITUTION 1921
the agrarian reform and to stabilize the currency. It fell during the difficult
war situation which arose in the middle of 1920.
THE WAR WITH SOVIET RUSSIA
While on the western borders a solution was awaited from the peace
conference, fresh fighting broke out in the east at the beginning of 1919 with
the Red Army.
Pitsudski organized an expedition against Wilno and occupied it in
April. Fighting became general on the whole eastern front and resulted in the
occupation by Poljsh troops of Byelorussian ond Ukrainian territory up to
the line of the Berezina, Sluch and Zbruch. Secret Polish-Soviet negotiations
in the autumn of 1919 led to a de facto armistice of a few months.
Pitsudski’s idea was to create between Poland and Russia a barrier of
States in some measure dependent on Poland. This was the so-called “federal
idea”. An attempt to put this concept into practice was the alliance with the
Hetman Petlura, whom Polish troops were to assist in regaining power in
the Ukraine in the struggle against the Bolsheviks.
In exchange for this, Petlura surrendered Eastern Galicia to Poland. The
Ukraine created by him would have really found herself in the Polish
field of influence and, in this way, Poland might have decided the fate of
eastern Europe. The Ukrainian masses did not support this policy, while in
Poland the plan met with opposition from the National Democrats who
wanted to create a national State in which the Polish element would be the
largest section of the population and remaining nationalities would be
Polonized. In this connexion, there was a conflict of views within the PPS ;
the Communist Workers’ Party of Poland opposed these schemes vigorously.
The Soviet government, aware of Poland’s internal situation, proposed
peace negotiations at the end of December 1919. Patek, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, acting on Pitsudski’s instructions, first tried to keep these
proposals secret, and when they became known, he sabotaged them.
He succeeded in breaking off talks on the pretext of a dispute on the
place of negotiations. Immediately afterwards, in April 1920, a Polish of-
fensive, which had long been in preparation, was launched, leading to the
capture of Kiev on 8 May, but only a few days later the Soviet counter-
offensive began. Budénny’s cavalry appeared in the Ukraine and it forced
the Polish army to retreat as far as the Bug and the Dniester. In July large
Soviet forces attacked on the northern front, effecting a breakthrough, and
advanced with tremendous speed up to the outskirts of Warsaw, reaching
Ptock in the north. The defeat came as a shock to Poland. Skulski’s govern-
ment fell. In July a nonparliamentary government headed by Wladystaw
Grabski was formed and, in addition, a State Defence Council was created,
THE WAR WITH SOVIET RUSSIA 551
which was to have the decisive voice in the conduct of the war and the con-
clusion of peace.
A volunteer army was organized. The government and the parties and
social organizations supporting it mobilized Polish resources to repel the Red
Army. A Land Reform Law was hastily passed which went further, in many
respects, than the initial principles accepted a year earlier. The Prime
Minister went to Spa, where a conference of the Prime Ministers of France,
Great Britain and Belgium was being held. The Powers made the grant of
assistance to Poland dependent on the acceptance of a number of conditions.
Grabski had to agree to submit the Cieszyn issue, the borders with Lithuania,
the Gdansk-Polish treaty and Eastern Galicia to the decision of the Supreme
Council. In exchange the British government promised to propose to the
Soviet government the conclusion of an armistice, with the demarcation line
running along the Bug and east of Bialystok as proposed in December 1919
by Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary. In addition, the Western
governments promised Poland material aid and an Allied military mission,
led by General Weygand, went to Warsaw. The British government proposed
mediation, but the Soviet government rejected it, agreeing only to direct
Polish-Soviet negotiations for an armistice and peace. In this situation the
Grabski government fell and the State Defence Council called into being
a coalition government under Witos, the leader of the “Piast” Peasant
Party, and Daszynski, the leader of the PPS. This government declared itself
a “Government of National Defence” and appealed directly to the Soviet
government for an armistice. The Soviet authorities replied that they were
prepared to negotiate both an armistice and peace simultaneously and
proposed Minsk as the place for negotiations. At the same time a Provisional
Revolutionary Committee of Poland was established on 2 August, 1920 in
Bialystok under Julian Marchlewski. This Committee started to organize
a revolutionary authority in this area.
At this juncture the Polish army could draw upon the material aid
promised by the Western Powers only with difficulty. The shipments of am-
munition and arms sent to Poland from France and Great Britain were held
up on the way by transport workers, dockers and railway men in various
countries. Nevertheless, some supplies did arrive and helped to strengthen
the main sector of Polish defence before Warsaw, which General Tukhachev-
sky’s armies approached in the middle of August.
The Polish government, mobilizing all its resources in order to strengthen
its defences, agreed at the same time to direct negotiations with the Soviet
government, and a Polish delegation was sent to Minsk on 14 August. At
the precise moment when it crossed the front, a large scale operation,
prepared by the Polish High Command since the beginning of August, was
launched. The general plan of operations was to disengage from the enemy,
who had already broken through the Bug defences and to concentrate
a striking force on the Wieprz, on the left wing of Tukhachevsky’s advancing
552 THE DEMARCATION OF THE FRONTIERS. THE CONSTITUTION 1921
armies. This force was to attack in a northerly direction, turn the Soviet
left wing and roll up the front attacking Warsaw. Pilsudski himself took
command of this group. The operation was completely successful. In a few
days the Polish troops occupied Brzes¢ and then Lomza, thus cutting off
considerable Red Army forces and compelling them to cross the German
border into East Prussia.
At the same time Budénny’s cavalry army was repelled near Hrubie-
szOw and a counter offensive was launched on the entire front.
Peace negotiations were being conducted in Minsk during these battles
and the Polish side would not accept the Soviet conditions. When the
situation on the front changed, both sides agreed on 2 September to transfer
the peace negotiations to neutral Riga, where they were continued from
21 September. The Polish delegation was headed by the Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Jan Dabski, and the Soviet by an outstanding diplomat,
A. Joffe. During these talks large military operations continued, which ended
in October with the success of the Polish troops in the battle on the Neman.
Preliminaries of peace were signed in Riga on 12 October and ratified on
2 November. Thus the war was concluded, though the final peace treaty was
signed only on 18 March, 1921. The frontier thus established between Poland
and the Soviet Republics of Byelorussia and the Ukraine ran to the east of
the Lwéw-Wilno railway line and further to the north it separated Lithu-
ania from Soviet Byelorussia with a strip of territory linking the Wilno area
with Latvia near Daugavpils (Dyneburg). In the south the Zbruch river was
the border, but further to the north the frontier moved eastwards in Volhynia
and Polesie. In this way Poland received large territories inhabited by
Byelorussians and Ukrainians.
During the Riga negotiations Polish troops under General Zeligowski oc-
cupied Wilno with the area of “Central Lithuania”, allegedly on their own
account but in reality on Pilsudski’s orders. The Soviet troops had turned
over Wilno to the Lithuanians during their retreat. This territory was soon
afterwards in 1922 formally annexed to Poland.
THE DEMARCATION OF THE WESTERN FRONTIERS
The retreat of the Polish army in the summer of 1920 had a prejudicial
effect on the fate of the western frontiers. On 28, July the Council of
Ambassadors hastily marked out the Polish-Czech border line leaving within
Czech territory a large amount of Polish population. At the same time,
a plebiscite was held in Mazuria and Warmia with the Prussian administra-
tion and police present and many brutal acts of violence were committed by
Prussian officials. Moreover, 150,000 German citizens brought in from the
Reich were permitted to vote. Polish efforts to have the plebiscite postponed
The Silesian uprisings
1919-1921
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Plebiscite areas
aw-ee Final frontier of Poland established in 1919-1922
THE MARCH CONSTITUTION, 1921 555
were of no avail, because the Western Powers were aware of the fact that the
date appointed by them considerably improved German chances. The Poles
suffered a defeat and already in August a territorial settlement, on the basis
of this plebiscite, took place with the result that Poland obtained only a few
villages in the plebiscite area.
A plebiscite also took place in Upper Silesia on 20 March, 1921. The
Allied authorities, who controlled the plebiscite area, were in practice
unfavourably disposed to the Polish cause. They condoned German terror
and allowed 200,000 people to vote, who, though born in Silesia, had not
lived there for a long time. Ultimately 500,000 voted for Poland, 700,000
for Germany. The Supreme Council was to carry out a division of the area
on the basis of this result. Great Britain and Italy were not favourably
inclined towards Poland and only France supported the Polish point of view,
though not very determinedly.
In May 1921, fearing an unfavourable decision by the Allies the Polish
population of Upper Silesia took up arms. This was already the third Polish
rising in Silesia ; the risings of August 1919 and August 1920 had ended in
failure. This time the insurrectionary forces took control of the industrial
district after fierce fighting. An intervention by the Allied Powers led to
an armistice and after long negotiations the decision was reached to grant
Poland the south-eastern part of Upper Silesia, including about half of the
industrial area.
Thus the frontiers of the Polish State were determined and they were to
last until the Second World War. Poland extended over 388,634 sq.km and
was divided into 16 voivodships. It was a state with a large number of
national minorities amounting to 31 per cent of the population in 1921. All
Poles, moreover, did not find themselves within the borders of the reconsti-
tuted State. In particular, the Opole area, Warmia and Mazuria together with
the area west of Poznan and western portions of Gdansk-Pomerania remained
under German rule.
THE MARCH CONSTITUTION, 1921
The Seym enacted the Constitution on 17 March, 1921. This was a democratic
parliamentary Constitution. The head of State was to be a president, with
limited powers and elected by a National Assembly, consisting of both
Chambers of Parliament in joint session. The president was invested with the
right to appoint the government which was, however, responsible to the
Seym. The president did not have the right to dissolve the Seym, unless he
had the approval of a three-fifths majority of the Senate to this effect.
Parliament was composed of two chambers : the Seym and the Senate. The
Senate had no initiative in legislation and could postpone a bill passed by
the Seym for only sixty days. The March Constitution guaranteed civic
556 THE DEMARCATION OF THE FRONTIERS. THE CONSTITUTION 1921
rights, the freedom of education and association. It also guaranteed property
rights, with such modifications as might be in the public interest. It provided
for the possibility of compulsory purchase of land and the regulation of its
sale. Fundamentally, this Constitution was modelled on European systems
and in particular on the French, and similar, systems.
Thus at the beginning of 1921 the Polish State had fixed frontiers and had
achieved its internal consolidation. It was, however, only experience of
public life which could mould the true social and political nature of the
new State.
Economic issues were to be decisive. Poland emerged from the wars with
her economy in ruins. The devastation caused by military operations, and,
above all, by devastation by the occupying Powers were estimated at from
30 to 70 thousand million pre-war francs, which was an immense part of the
national wealth. Industry had suffered, especially in the Kingdom and there
was far-reaching destruction and diminution of capital. In agriculture, build-
ings and stocks were destroyed and livestock depleted. Trade was disor-
ganized and the railway and road network destroyed to a large degree, and
poorly adapted to the needs of the new State. The war had consumed eighty
to ninety per cent of the community’s savings. Under these circumstances,
total production in 1919 reached only 30 per cent and in 1920 40 per cent
of the pre-war level. Moreover Poland entered the new stage in her life with
immense debts, resulting from being forced to pay a part of the debts of the
partitioning Powers, mainly of Austro-Hungary, without being granted rep-
arations for the damage consciously perpetrated by the Germans. The main-
tenance costs of Polish troops in France and expenses incurred for the war
materials furnished by the Allies also had to be paid for. These obligations
amounted to about three thousand million zlotys, payable in gold. They
burdened the budget right up to 1939, when they still amounted to 78 per
cent of the State’s foreign debts.
In these circumstances the easiest immediate solution of administrative
and economic problems seemed, at first, to be inflation, which was equivalent
to burdening the working people with the expenses of the recovery. The
standard of living of the mass of the people fell, while the owners of
factories, especially in big industry, were given tremendous bonuses. The
capitalists received credits and advances for deliveries to the State, which
they later repaid in depreciated currency. In effect, this was subsidizing
capitalists at the expense of the workers. As a result of this policy economic
reconstruction was fairly rapid, but the poverty of the population increased
and social tension grew. Inflation lasted in Poland until the end of 1923. It
then became socially dangerous to the propertied classes themselves, and, by
turning into a superinflation, it ceased to bring any economic advantages
at all.
At the outset, however, it enabled industry to compete in the internatio-
nal markets on the basis of its falling labour costs, but the main difficulties of
THE MARCH CONSTITUTION, 1921 557
industry were not removed. From the mid-nineteenth century Polish produc-
tion was designed for foreign markets, in the Kingdom for eastern markets,
and in Upper Silesia for Germany and Austro-Hungary. The domestic market
could not fully replace the export market not only because its capacity was
small in view of the low standard of living in the country, but also because
production was not suited to its needs. In time Polish industry was to
readjust to the changed conditions, but this involved an immense outlay.
There arose, moreover, the question of who was to pay. Not only the urban
workers and the capitalists were in dispute over this, but agriculture and
industry also. The big estates in a predominantly peasant country were
stronger politically and imposed an economic policy on the country at
variance with the needs of industrialization, which was the direction in
which Poland could develop economically. These contradictions between
social and economic interests explain the constant political tension and the
wavering political equilibrium in the first period of independence. Soon
other contradictions were to appear as a result of the multinational
structure of Poland’s population.
Chapter XXIII
PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT
(1922-1926)
THE 1922 ELECTIONS
After enacting the Constitution the Seym still did not dissolve, prolonging
its own existence until the passing of the electoral law which only took
place in July 1922. The period of a year and a half between the enactment
of the Constitution and the elections in 1922 was marked by a fierce po-
litical struggle on the question of who was to bear the burden of stabilizing
the country’s finances and of economic reconstruction. During this period
of over twelve months cabinet crises were frequent, but in general the
Centre groups controlled the government and a decisive role was played,
in particular, by the “Piast” and its leader, Witos.
In such a political situation it was, of course, impossible to stabilize the
budget or to curb the mounting inflation.
The new Seym differed from the first one with the appearance of
a strong group representing national minorities who gained one fifth of
the seats. The largest minority group were the Jewish deputies, with the
Ukrainians slightly fewer, because in Eastern Galicia they had boycotted
the elections not wishing to recognize the annexation of this territory
by Poland. For this reason only Ukrainian deputies from Volhynia and the
Chelm district entered the Seym. For the first time the communists, who
gained two seats, appeared in the Seym. The position of the Centre was
weakened, but nevertheless it remained the strongest group, having obtained
30 per cent of the seats. It was not, however, internally united, because
apart from the “Piast”, which had 70 seats, it also included some smaller
groups. The Right Wing, or Bloc of Christian National Unity, gained 28 per
cent of the seats and was a more coherent force. The left-wing parties were
somewhat weaker, having just over one fifth of the seats and were even
more divided. The “Wyzwolenie” Party had 48 seats, while the PPS had
41. In such a situation a parliamentary government could be carried on only
by a coalition of the Centre with the Right or with the Left Wing. A
government exclusively of the Left or of the Right was impossible. The
Senate, whose political role remained limited, did not differ basically in
THE 1922 ELECTIONS 559
composition from that of the Seym, with the difference that the Right Wing
was slightly stronger, owing to the higher age qualification for election to
the upper chamber. :
From the beginning of the second Seym an alliance of the Centre and
the Right Wing seemed likely and as a result Maciej Rataj of the “Piast”
Party was elected Marshal of the Seym, while Trampczynski, a National
Democrat, was chosen Marshal of the Senate. On the other hand, the
question of electing a president had not been settled beforehand. On the
fifth ballot the choice lay between Count Maurycy Zamoyski and Gabriel
Narutowicz, an eminent professor of the Zurich Polytechnic, who had only
returned to Poland in 1920 and had recently been Minister of Foreign
Affairs. He was supported by the Left Wing, the national minorities and
part of the Centre, and thus obtained a small majority over Zamoyski.
The Right Wing viewed this as a disaster and launched an unusually bit-
ter agitation against his election, employing the argument that the national
minorities could not decide the election of a head of State. Violent street
demonstrations occurred in Warsaw, while the President was taking the oath
of office.
On 14 December, 1922 the President became head of State. Two days
later during the opening of an exhibition of paintings he was shot by the
painter, Eligiusz Niewiadomski, a fanatic acting under the influence of the
agitation conducted by the National Democratic press against the President.
The murder of the first President of independent Poland made a tre-
mendous impression in the country and abroad. In conformity with rules
of the Constitution the Marshal of the Seym temporarily took over the of-
fice of President and appointed a new government headed by General
Sikorski as Prime Minister. Pilsudski became Chief of General Staff and
W. Grabski, Minister of the Treasury. On 20 December the National As-
sembly chose Stanistaw Wojciechowski as President with the same majority
of votes of the Centre, Left Wing and national minorities and confirmed
the Sikorski government in office. The events connected with Narutowicz’s
election and death made impossible, for the time being, an understanding
between the “Piast” and the Right Wing. When this did occur later, Si-
korski had to resign. During his government Poland obtained on 15 March,
1923 a decision of the Conference of Ambassadors, which recognized the
eastern frontier of Poland as determined by the Riga Treaty, which also
meant the final assignment of Eastern Galicia to Poland. Thanks to
Grabski’s action the devaluation of the mark was stopped, though only
for a short time.
The negotiations between the “Piast” and the Right Wing dragged on
owing to the difference of opinions regarding the implementation of the
land reform. Ultimately a compromise was reached and on 15 May an agree-
ment was signed, with a part of the “Piast” members, headed by J. Dabski,
dissenting. As a consequence the coalition which formed a new government
560 PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT (1922-1926)
was very weak in the Seym. On 28 May a cabinet led by Witos was formed.
On the next day Pitsudski resigned as Chief of Staff and also from all his
military functions.
The most important issue with which the new government was faced
was the stabilization of the currency, but the parties representing the prop-
ertied classes did not agree to the demands of Grabski, who remained in
this cabinet as Minister of the Treasury. As a result, Grabski resigned after
a few weeks and the devaluation began to gather a catastrophic impetus.
This was a consequence of the hyperinflation which had overcome Germa-
ny, with which the Polish economy was still strongly connected. While
during Sikorski’s government in the spring of 1923 the dollar was worth
50,000 Polish marks, by the autumn of the same year its value had risen to
200,000 marks in November and to 5 million in December. Inflation
resulted in the fall of real wages and a bitter strike movement began as
a result of the rise in prices. In October 1923 a strike of railway workers
occurred which the government replied by the conscription of the railway
workers. In November the PPS declared a general strike. The government
replied by introducting the state of siege. Bloody disturbances took place on
6 November in Cracow. The army took part in this action and some of
the units joined the workers. Both the army and the workers sufferred
casualties. The government now granted some partial concessions. These
events, which had repercussions in Tarnédw and Borystaw, undermined the
authority of the government. It was not these events, however, which caused
its downfall in the Seym, but the question of the land reform which was
torpedoed by the Right Wing. This caused a small group of deputies to
leave the “Piast”, thus depriving the government of its majority. The
government resigned on 15 December.
WLADYSLAW GRABSKI AND THE STABILIZATION
OF THE CURRENCY
The fall of the right-wing Centre government with a parliamentary ma-
jority showed that the composition of the Seym elected in 1922 did not
favour this kind of system. The President appointed an extra-parliamentary
government headed by Grabski, whose main task was to put the economy
in order. Grabski’s cabinet, though subject to many changes, remained in
power for two years. He obtained powers which made it possible by means
of presidential decrees to change tax legislation, contract loans, introduce
a new monetary system and set up a bank to issue notes. By these means,
Grabski was able in a few months to balance the budget, introduce a new
currency, the zloty, and establish a Bank of Poland whose capital, amount-
ing to 100 million zlotys (20 million dollars), was obtained from shares
Vv vv Ne
50 Miles
International boundaries WARSAW Capital of State A N I
Boundaries of provinces Capitals ; Vilkomir
and Soviet Republics POZNAN of voivodships Cwitkomiensh
Boundaries of voivodships
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25000-100000 —»—"-
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Major railways 26
PWN Warsaw 1979 Imprint PPWK. Zam. 9074/79- x-30 218-10 285 egz.
WLADYSLAW GRABSKI AND STABILIZATION OF THE CURRENCY 561
issued on the domestic market. The part played by the working class in
buying these shares was considerable, but the participation of the large land-
owners and farmers in general was relatively small. The important result,
however, was that the currency was stabilized, though on a level which, as
it was proved later, was too high, with the zloty being equal to one gold
franc.
The immediate result of the stabilization of currency was a fresh eco-
nomic crisis. Industry lost the export hanu-er ~-hich inflation had given it and
immediately showed itself . which teepened -kward by comparison with
Western countries ~ a4 the world markets. This gave
rise 0 a TE" oppos gi -oduction and a consequent fall in
employrin CAG Boviet Russia, ee “5 used in production in the cotton
INGUStic stem of alliances dire Per cent of the 1913 total, but in the next
vese jeace negotiations in pre-war figure. This tendency continued up to
treParis in order to si ped that once the currency had been stabilized
This: treaty. form: flow into Poland, where it would find ~profitable
22 February br, PEs were disappointed. American capital, which began
Bao vminant role in war-devastated Europe, considered Poland, to
Ti. 5e@ extent under the influence of German propaganda, which called
Poland “ein Saisonstaat”, a country unworthy of confidence. The Germans
had an important voice in these affairs because the German banks acted
as intermediaries in the investment of American and British capital in central
and eastern Europe. As a result an immense flow of American and British
capital to Germany took place, while Poland was ignored. From the point of
view of international finance Poland was merely a source of raw materials
and semi-manufactured goods, an attitude which did not assist the backward
economy of Poland. During the inter-war period Poland exported primarily
coal, timber, sugar, agricultural produce and livestock. For this reason
Poland’s balance of payments was now determined by earnings from the
export of raw materials rather than by the export of finished goods. In
these circumstances the Polish economy could be transformed only by a revo-
lutionary change of the entire system, but there were no social forces in the
country strong enough to make such a revolution possible.
The influence of international capital on the Polish economy was felt
all the more because concentration of industry was far advanced and kept
increasing. Towards the end of the 1930’s 69 ‘per cent of the workers were
employed in 4 per cent of enterprises. In general, Polish industry in the
twenty years after the First World War consisted of relatively few large
plants accompanied by an immense number of small and weak workshops.
In 1925 the economic situation was worsened temporarily by a bad
harvest, the fall of world prices for coal, timber and sugar, and chiefly by
the hostile commercial policy of Germany. The Polish-German commercial
convention, concluded after the division of Silesia, expired in June 1925. It
had obliged Germany to buy a specified amount of coal in Poland. The
36 History of Poland
e
562 PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT (1922-1926)
Germans now ceased to makc these purchases, which caused the Polish gov-
ernment to ban the import of a large number of German commodities.
A customs war was begun which Poland won in the end, but the immediate
effects of this war were considerable losses, which undermined the newly
established Polish currency. This took place in July 1925. Expected foreign
aid did not arrive. It is true that Poland was granted an American loan of
60 million dollars in June 1925, but she obtained in fact only 25 million,
having been refused the second instalment in the autumn of 1925.
These events shook the p. ~ ' cki’s government. The Seym
became once more an arena of stru,, ” reform. The radical law
of 1920 had not been carried into efte -+ deferred it
to the time when the currency problen. “he land
reform was restricted to favour the landov. intry.
A new law enacted in November 1925 after prv de-
bates provided for the division of estates of over 1.
eastern territories the area not subject to division was rai.
because it was considered that large landed properties there
stay of the Polish element. The ceiling for industrial estates was .~.scu
much as 700 hectares in order to encourage farming. According to the n..
law the State was to provide credits for the division of land in order to help,
in the first place, the agricultural labourers and small peasants. This was the
theory, but the law itself was not as decisive in practice. As a result there
was a fierce struggle for power and upon it depended the determination of
social conditions in the Polish countryside.
Grabski’s government fell in the middle of November 1925 owing to the
position adopted by the Polish Bank which refused to provide more foreign
currency to prop up the rate of exchange. After a short crisis a coalition
government took office on 29 November, led by A. Skrzynski, up to that
time Minister of Foreign Affairs. The coalition embraced parties from the
National Democrats to the PPS, but the “Wyzwolenie” peasants remained
in opposition. The new cabinet had to struggle, in the first place, with the
problem of a new devaluation. Grabski had set the rate of the zloty at 5.98
to the dollar, but in December it had already fallen to 9.10. The number
of registered unemployed grew to 300,000, which did not take into account
disguised unemployment, both rural and urban. Thanks to economies, a
balanced budget was soon achieved, which was an essential condition for
overcoming the financial crisis. In the spring the value of the zloty actually
began to rise, but unemployment continued to increase. Violent demonstra-
tions took place throughout the country. In this situation the PPS was tired
of measures which continued to place the burdens of economic recovery on
the shoulders of the working classes. The socialists left the coalition in
April 1926 and this led shortly afterwards to the resignation of the cabinet.
On 10 May, 1926 a right-wing Centre government was formed by Witos.
After a few days it was overthrown by Pilsudski.
THE UKRAINIAN AND BYELORUSSIAN QUESTIONS 563
THE UKRAINIAN AND BYELORUSSIAN QUESTIONS
One of the essential causes of the weakness of parliamentary government in
Poland was the problem of the national minorities amounting to one third
of the population who either of their own volition took no part in the
constitutional system, or were not induced to do so. Most acute was the
Ukrainian problem, especially in Eastern Galicia, or as their territory was
called after incorporation to Poland, Eastern Little Poland. This area had
witnessed in 1918-1919 a war which ‘eepened the existing difficulties. There
were, moreover, in this ~- a no strong working class parties
which could oppos | gyn) guts, «tHe Ukrainian Nationalist Party re-
mained in c¢~*}Soviet Russia, ce- West Ukrainian dictator, Petrushevich,
an émifsystem of alliances dire- also found support from the Czech govern-
ment ;eace negotiations in P= 1921 a Ukrainian Military Organization was
CleParis in order to si onip of Colonel Konovalets ; it engaged in armed
This treaty, form ~fror. In the summer of 1922 buildings and crops on
22 February be ere set on fire. In 1921 a Ukrainian nationalist attempted
gation: °- +Y to assassinate Pilsudski, then head of State, in Lwéw. The
Ukrainian Military Organization recruited its cadres from young people
who were unable to find jobs in the civil service, because these remained
exclusively in Polish hands. In this respect the situation of the Ukrainians
grew worse than it had been under Austrian rule. The Ukrainians also failed
to obtain a university. Eventually, on the one hand a secret Ukrainian Uni-
versity was. established in Lwéw, while on the other, many young people
left to study in foreign schools, first of all in Prague. After returning home
this new intelligentsia joined the rapidly developing Ukrainian cooperative
movement which soon became not only an economic, but also a political
power. The Ukrainian press developed and scientific institutions were set up,
but the Ukrainian school system was discriminated again and its position
worsened by comparison with that prevailing in Austrian Galicia. A law
was passed in 1924, which defined the use of Ukrainian in the schools,
courts and civil service. It provided, among other things, in the elementary
and secondary schools for the equality of both tongues, Polish and Ukrainian.
The Ukrainians, however, considered this provision harmful to them, because
they had had purely Ukrainian secondary schools under Austrian rule.
The Ukrainian problem in Volhynia was somewhat different since the
Ukrainian national movement in this province was of more recent origin
and less developed. On the other hand, there were no compact Polish
ethnographic islands in Volhynia, so that the position of the Volhynian
Poles was still weaker than in Eastern Little Poland, where the Polish popu-
lation amounted to one-third of the total. The Polish administration in the
eastern areas harassed the population and often was a discredit to the Polish
State. In this respect the three voivodships of Volhynia, Polesie and Nowo-
grédek were the most discriminated, because these regions had been
36°
564 PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT (1922-1926)
ruined by war and remained economically backward. In the Byelorussian
area the political situation was not much better, though here a local Polish
element existed and some of the Byelorussian politicians were initially in-
clined to cooperation with Poland. The general poverty, however, which was
particularly acute in Polesie, created conditions for a national independence
movement, to some extent connected with the communists. An additional
subject of irritation in the eastern borders was the problem of reclaiming
the Orthodox Churches which had been compulsorily taken from catholics
in Tsarist times. Thus side by side with nationalist antagonism a factor of
religious discontent appeared, which could become especially dangerous
among the rural population of these bach ward ares.
Taking advantage of the general dissat. aus armed detach-
ments were formed in the eastern borderlands . sion and
sabotage. The attack in August 1924 on a train v- Dow-
narowicz was especially noteworthy. As a result, a », “once
Corps was then established.
ere =1 9 |
THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT
The influence of the communists increased not only in the east, but also in
the central voivodships as a result of the worsening of the workers’ position
and the growth of unemployment. Changes within the Communist Party of
Poland favoured the strengthening and broadening of its activities. In 1923
the Party’s Second Congress reconsidered its attitude to the peasant question.
In consequence it was possible to state a few years later that “the growth of
the peasant section of the Party is progressing faster than that of the work-
ers”. Nevertheless, the Party as a progressive though illegal organization
remained relatively small. In 1922 it had 5000 members, in 1923 6000 and
in 1924 7000. The influence of the Party was, of course, much more exten-
sive as was shown during the elections to the Seym when, for example, in
1922 132,000 votes were cast for the communist candidates, while in the
next election of 1928 it obtained almost a million. In 1924 the communists
gained a majority in the elections to the social security boards in the Dabro-
wa Basin. Alongside the KPP the Communist Union of Youth was estab-
lished in Poland in 1922. The Communist Parties of the Western Ukraine and
Western Byelorussia, both of which were active within the Polish State,
cooperated with the KPP. While in 1931 the KPP had 6800 members, the
Communist Party of Western Ukraine and that of Western Byelorussia had
only 2600 each. The Communist Union of Youth had 9400 members and
there were 6000 communists in jail. Thus altogether the number of organized
communists in Poland in that year amounted to 27,000.
The Party was weakened, however, by factional struggles which fre-
quently led to the removal from leading positions of such outstanding mem-
POLISH FOREIGN POLICY AND LOCARNO 565
bers as Horwitz-Walecki, Warski and Maria Koszutska, known under the
pseudonym of Wera Kostrzewa.
In the 1920’s the KPP showed considerable activity. In contrast with
communist parties in many European countries it was illegal ; membership
of it was itself punishable and sentences in such cases became increasingly
severe.
POLISH FOREIGN POLICY AND LOCARNO
In Europe after Versailles the Polish State, reborn after Germany’s defeat
and opposed to Soviet Russia, could seek support only of France and the
French system of alliances directed both against Germany and Soviet Russia.
The peace negotiations in Riga were still dragging on when Pifsudski went
to Paris in order to sign the Franco-Polish alliance on 19 February, 1921.
This treaty, formulated on somewhat general lines, was supplemented on
22 February by a military convention which enumerated their mutual obli-
gations in greater detail. Poland obtained the pledge of French support in
the event of an attack by Germany or war with Russia. A commercial treaty
was linked with this alliance which was clearly unfavourable to Poland.
Nevertheless, the alliance with France gave Poland, who up to this time
had been isolated, its first support in international politics.
It assisted the conclusion of an alliance with Rumania on 3 March, 1921,
directed against Soviet Russia. On the other hand, the attempts of Polish
diplomacy, then and later on to bring about such an alliance with the newly
established Baltic States did not yield results. The attitude of the Soviet
government in the light of the Polish-Rumanian alliance, which guaranteed
to Rumania the possession of Bessarabia, which was not. recognized by the
Soviet Union, prevented closer contact between the Baltic States and Poland.
The alliance with France and the search for contact with the Baltic States
were the guiding lines of Poland’s foreign policy in the subsequent years.
Poland did not enjoy good relations with any of her remaining neighbours.
Germany did not wish to observe the provisions of the Versailles Treaty,
seeking constantly to achieve its revision and regarding its decision relating to
Poland as the easiest field for attacking the treaty. Her task was facilitated
by the fact that Great Britain from the outset, in spite of having signed
the treaty, did not wish to involve herself in guaranteeing the state of affairs
on Germany’s eastern frontiers. Polish-Soviet relations did not develop
favourably after the treaty of Riga. The Soviet government saw in Poland,
not without cause, an area for assembling forces aimed at overthrowing the
new social order in Russia. The Soviet-German Treaty concluded in Rapallo
in 1922 was interpreted in Poland as signifying that both the neighbouring
Powers aimed at revising the Versailles and Riga Treaties at the expense of
Poland.
566 PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT (1922-1926)
Anti-Czech attitudes stimulated by the Cieszyn affair prevented a Cze-
choslovak-Polish agreement. The agreement concluded with Bene$ on 6 No-
vember, 1921 during the visit of the Polish Foreign Minister Skirmunt to
Prague was not ratified by Poland.
Relations with Lithuania were in a bad state. The Lithuanians did not
recognize the possession of Wilno by Poland and rejected all the federalist
plans put forward by Warsaw, though they had the partial support of the
Western Powers. Up to 1938 there were no diplomatic relations between
Warsaw and Kaunas in spite of all the negotiations throughout these years
whether direct or at the League of Nations. The Polish-Lithuanian frontier,
however, was recognized by the League of Nations Council on 3 February,
1923. All these international instruments were to the advantage of Poland,
as a recognization of Polish sovereignty and confirmation of her internal
stability.
In the following years the League of Nations became a centre of inter-
national politics, in which. Poland began to play a more important role,
especially when Skrzynski, who had considerable international repute, be-
came Foreign Minister. Proof of the improvement of Poland’s situation was
the visjt to Warsaw on 27 September, 1925, of Chicherin, the Soviet Foreign
Minister, who in view of the approaching entry of Germany into the League
of Nations wished to have Berlin understand that Polish-Soviet relations
need not always be unfriendly. This was connected also with the final recog-
nition of the Soviet government by Great Britain and France, who wished
to deprive Germany of its monopoly of good relations with the Soviet Union.
All of this did not safeguard Poland from the revisionist aims of Ger-
many, who was rebuilding herself after the defeat. German propaganda
concentrated its attack on the question of Gdansk and the issue of the “Cor-
ridor” as the Germans called it, or Polish Pomerania. The Germans sought
to convince world opinion that the “Corridor” was cutting through the
German nation and that this injustice called for a remedy. The disputes
between the Free City and Poland before the League of Nations were insti-
gated by the Germans to show that Poland was a threat to peace and that
her very existence was a germ of the future war which all nations justifiably
feared. Thus, a small dispute about the placing of Polish post-office boxes
in the area of thé Free City in 1925 became, thanks to this anti-Polish propa-
ganda, a great international issue. Poland won this dispute, but it was one
of the reasons for the withdrawal of some American finance corporations
from investing in Poland, because it was considered an unsafe area, exposed
to war.
In these circumstances Poland had to reconcile herself with the new
European situation with regard to the German question, as a result of the
Locarno Treaty signed on October, 1925. In these agreements the inviolability
of the new frontiers between Germany, France and Belgium was recognized
and the signatories were obliged to defend them. In relation to Czechoslo-
EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND CULTURE 567
vakia and Poland, Germany promised only to conclude arbitration treaties,
in other words she promised not to seek alteration of these frontiers by force.
On the other hand, Poland and Czechoslovakia obtained a French guarantee
for their frontiers, but within the framework of the Covenant of the League
of Nations. This deprived the existing French alliances of immediate imple-
mentation because their application now became dependent upon a slow and
complicated League procedure. This was an obvious weakening of the French
alliance and, what was more important, the different treatment of Germany’s
frontier in the west from the frontier in the east meant that the atmosphere
for German plans of revision in the east became more favourable, although
for the time being Germany did not yet have sufficient military power to
carry out such a change.
At the moment of the collapse of Poland’s parliamentary system in May,
1926, her. internal economic and political situation, like her position in for-
eign affairs, was unfavourable. The new Poland found herself among inde-
pendent nations in a historical moment, when Europe had been devastated
by war and had lost her primacy in the world. The first years of independ-
ence after a century and a half of foreign rule brought no solution of either
her economic, social or national problems.
EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND CULTURE
The tasks facing the Polish State in the field of education were exceptionally
difficult. It was necessary to unify an educational system based on the legis-
lation of the three partitioning Powers, to expand and adapt it to the needs
of the State and open the possibility of education to the mass of the people.
Free primary education for a compulsory period of seven years was organ-
ized, but the authorities succeeded in keeping at school all the children of
school age for only a short time. There was a lack of educational facilities
and provision of teachers. Secondary education, which was on a high level,
embraced mainly young people from the more prosperous social groups. Ex-
tramural education was organized primarily by social organizations like
the Workers University Society and the Peasant Universities.
The Polish Teachers’ Union played a considerable part in shaping a sys-
tem of progressive instruction and in democratizing the schools.
Higher education was soon reconstructed. A Polish university was estab-
lished in Warsaw during the time of the German occupation. Universities
in Cracow and Lwéw existed already. New universities were founded in
Poznan and Lublin and a university was re-established in Wilno. A number
of higher technical schools were also set up. In 1937-1938 there were 27
institutions of higher education in Poland, including 6 universities and 3
technological universities, with 48,000 students including 13,000 women.
-
5368 PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT (1922-1926)
The institutions of higher education were accessible primarily to children of
the more prosperous social groups. High fees and the small number of
scholarships made it difficult for children of working class or peasant origin
to attend and still more to complete higher education. The level of lecturers
and the standard of examinations were generally quite high and in this
respect Poland was among the leading countries of the world, in spite of the
fact that in many fields only the first steps in the organization of learning
were being taken.
After the regaining of independence new prospects of development opened
before Polish science and learning. Scientific research was undertaken by
specialists already appointed to posts, reinforced by Polish scholars return-
ing from abroad. While the State was not able to furnish proper patronage
for science and learning, an essential part was played in this respect by sci-
entific societies and organizations like the Polish Academy of Sciences and
Letters in Cracow, the Mianowski Foundation in Warsaw, and the Warsaw
Scientific Society.
Generally speaking, in the humanities during the years 1918-1938 there
was proliferation of disciplines. The fields which were considerably expanded
included Polish linguistics, classical philology, comparative linguistics, mod-
ern philology and Oriental languages.
Archaeologists, anthropologists and historians undertook research on the
origins of the Polish State of whom J. Kostrzewski, J. Czekanowski, and
Z. Wojciechowski were the most distinguished.
Polish historical writing was marked by a predominance of interest in po-
litical history. The foundations of economic history were laid by F. Bujak, J.
Rutkowski and N. Gasiorowska. Polish sociology had considerable achieve-
ments and it was represented in this period by F. Znaniecki, famous for
his “analytical trend”, L. Krzywicki, a many sided investigator of social
life, and S. Czarnowski, the historian of culture and religion. B. Malinowski,
the creator of the functional method of ethnographic sociological research
did his work in London.
In philosophical studies the Lwow-Warsaw school of logic was outstand-
ing for the work in formal logic and semantics of K. Twardowski.
Two schools of mathematics arose during this period and they rapidly
gained a leading position in the world. The Warsaw school gathered around
the “Fundamenta Mathematica”, under Z. Janiszewski, W. Sierpinski,
S. Mazurkiewicz and K. Kuratowski, and the Lwéw school around the
“Studia Mathematica” of H. Steinhaus and S. Banach.
Important physical and chemical research in the field of inter-phase bal-
ance were also conducted in Poland by W. Swietostawski.
Medical science developed rapidly headed by microbiology under L. Hir-
szfeld and R. Weigl and biochemistry in which J. K. Parnas was famous for
his research into muscular metabolism.
Polish literature in the first years of independence deliberately wished to
EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND CULTURE 569
Stefan Zeromski
depart from national didacticism and consciously strived for contact, above
all, in poetry with the artistic trends in Europe, seeking a subjective expres-
sion for an individual “spiritual adventure”, regarding with optimism trans-
formations of society and civilization. Later, this individualism was to give
place to an attitude of involvement in political and social problems and
optimism was to be replaced by revolt against social injustice and by disquiet
in the face of fascism and the danger of war.
Zeromski was still writing in the first years after the war and gave ex-
570 PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT (1922-1926)
pression in his novel Przedwiosnie (Before the Spring) in 1924 to anxiety
regarding the future of the nation because of the unsolved social problems.
He was also the first to understand the significance of the problem of the sea
for the new state, Wiatr od morza (Wind from the Sea) written in 1922.
A. Strug, a political writer and leader, dealt with the problems of the
past war and of contemporary life in Poland and the world in many of his
novels.
Among the writers, who were then beginning their literary career,
J. Kaden-Bandrowski, Z. Nalkowska and M. Dabrowska come to the fore.
Kaden-Bandrowski, as a follower of Pilsudski, combined political passion
with expressionist anti-aestheticism. In his cycle of contemporary novels
he showed a considerable satirical talent. Z. Natkowska presented a subtle
psychology in her novels like Romans Teresy Hennert (The Love of Teresa
Hennert) in 1923, and at the same time the ability of combining psycho-
logical with social poblems as in Granica (Boundary Line). M. Dabrowska’s
works are marked by a classical narrative style which links up with the
traditions of the nineteenth century. Her novel Noce i dnie (Nights and
Days) presents an epic picture of life among the Polish intelligentsia of
gentry origin in the years 1863-1914, a family saga similar to that of
Mann’s Buddenbrooks.
The next generation of writers included J. Iwaszkiewicz, who revealed
talents as a poet and, above all, as a short story writer.
L. Kruczkowski, a writer connected with the revolutionary movement,
revised the traditional view of the role of the peasantry in the national
liberation struggles of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in his novels
Kordian i Cham (Kordian and the Churl) in 1932 and Pawie pidra (Pea-
cock’s Feathers) in 1935.
In the 1930’s there was an increase in the works showing clear revolu-
tionary and democratic tendencies. Among these were the novels of W. Wa-
silewska, Oblicze dnia (The Face of the Day), P. Gojawiczynska’s Dziew-
czeta z Nowolipek (Girls of Nowolipki), Z. Unilowski’s Wspolny pokdj
(Sharing a Room), G. Morcinek’s Wyrqbany chodnik (Story of a Mining Gal-
lery) and J. Kurek’s Grypa szaleje w Naprawie (Flu Epidemic in Naprawa).
A different trend in prose was represented by those writers who sought
new path in psychological fantasies like B. Schulz in his Sklepy cynamonowe
(Cinnamon Shops) and Sanatorium pod Klepsydrq (Hour-Glass Sanatorium)
or in social criticism like W. Gombrowicz in his Ferdydurke.
The inter-war period witnessed a particularly lively phase in the develop-
ment of poetry. The poets of the “Young Poland” period were still writing
and reaching the heights of their creativeness as, for example, B. Lesmian,
in whose verses symbolism assumed a most fantastic, disturbing and vision-
ary shape, and L. Staff whose work was marked by a Parnassus-like cult of
beautiful form, classical order and affirmation of life.
The new generation of poets who grouped themselves around the month-
EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND CULTURE 571
ly “Skamander” in the years 1922-1928 included J. Tuwim, J. Lechon, A. Sto-
nimski, K. Wierzynski and J. Iwaszkiewicz. These were virtuosos in their use
of words which proclaimed the principle of spontaneity and of a “golden
mean” between tradition and innovation. In subsequent years they developed
into very different but outstanding individuals. The revolutionary poet
W. Broniewski was close to the “Skamander” group, but only in respect of
form, as were the poetesses K. Itakowicz and M. Pawlikowska-Jasnorzew-
ska.
The “traditional” lyrics of the “Skamander” groups were opposed by
the avant-garde, after a short period of experimentation in futurism. This
school included B. Jasienski in the poem Slowo o Jakubie Szeli (Song on Ja-
kub Szela) in 1926, T. Czyzewski and A. Stern. The Cracow “Zwrotnica”
became the centre of the avant-garde with T. Peiper, J. Przybos, A. Wazyk
and, somewhat later J. Czechowicz. On the eve of the Second World War
a “catastrophic” tone was to be noted on an increasing scale in the poetry
of M. Jastrun, J. Zagérski and C. Mitlosz.
In drama, the first years of independence were marked by the plays of
Zeromski like Uciekla mi przepidreczka (Quail Escaped Me). K. H. Ros-
tworowski, at the outset, wrote dramas about classical antiquity in the style
of “Young Poland” like Caligula and Judas, using at the same time modern
means of group staging. After a time he returned to the style of bourgeois
naturalism in Nuiespodzianka (Surprise). The plays of J. Szaniawski,
filled with the spirit of psychological symbolism, were particularly popular.
Plays by Natkowska and Iwaszkiewicz were also performed. The very: emi-
nent expressionist playwright, S. I. Witkiewicz, however, was not performed
or known to a large audience.
Contact with the masterpieces of modern and past world literature was
maintained by numerous translations which were in many cases as brilliant
as the originals. T. Boy-Zelenski was a phenomenal translator who rendered
into Polish several hundred works of French literature ranging from The
Song of Roland :to Proust, but with particular emphasis on the classical
period. Boy-Zelenski was at the same time an able theatre and literary critic,
a satirical writer and journalist who fought against ignorance, backwardness
and clericalism. K. Irzykowski was also an eminent critic whose theories
were derived from Croce.
During the inter-war period dramatic art in Poland was presented in
many permanent theatres in Warsaw and each of the larger cities had a few
theatres. High standards of performance and staging were set by excellent
actors. One of the Polish theatre managers was L. Schiller, a pupil of
E. C. Craig, himself a stage designer of remarkable temperament and culture,
and J. Osterwa, a superb actor and producer, who founded the theatre
“Reduta” as a workshop for new artistic forms. S. Jaracz was an excellent
actor who was the first to take his theatre to the working class. The repertory
was very large. It ranged from Shakespeare and Moliére through the Polish
S72 PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT (1922-1926)
Tadeusz Zelenski (Boy)
EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND CULTURE 573
Xawery Dunikowski, Bolestaw the Bold. Yombstone, 1916-1917
romantics and “Young Poland” to Tretyakov’s Shout, China. The theatre
was faced with financial difficulties and it was often forced to produce light
comedies appealing to the tastes of the petty-bourgeois public.
As in the entire world the cinema had become the basic form of
entertainment of the urban population. Polish film production in the first
period concentrated mainly on the adaptation of well-known works of
Batata oe >
EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND CULTURE 575
H. Kuna, Christ, 1926
literature, but subsequently on comedies and melodrama. In the 1930’s an
avant-garde group of film makers including A. Ford, W. Jakubowska,
S. Wohl and J. Toeplitz introduced the idea of the “socially useful” film like
Legion ulicy (Legion of the Street) and Strachy (Ghosts).
After the regaining of independence, orchestras, operas and musical
publications flourished. The younger generation of Polish composers, A. Ma-
W. Skoczylas, Stone Stairs, c. 1930
576 PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT (1922-1926)
lawski and T. Szeligowski, educated mostly in the Warsaw Conservatory by
K. Sikorski and in Paris by Nadia Boulanger, P. Ducas and A. Roussel, under
the influence of K. Szymanowski’s works continued and developed Polish
musical composition.
Painting during this period did not follow a single trend. About thirty
groups of painters existed of which the “Formists”, A. and Z. Pronaszko,
T. Czyzewski, L. Chwistek, S. I. Witkiewicz and A. Zamoyski were of na-
tional importance. The works of the “Formists” showed along impressionist
lines the influence of cubism and futurism, as well as appealing to Polish folk
art. An important role was played by a group of painters living in Paris, the
“Cercle des Artistes Polonais a Paris” founded in 1928, including L. Got-
tlieb, G. Gwozdecki and E. Zak. Polish painters like Tadeusz Makowski and
Alicja Halicka played an important role in forming the Ecole de Paris. In
particular Makowski’s works dealing with his beloved world of children
were an important element linking Polish and French art.)
The “Block” group of W. Strzeminski, the sculptors K. Kobro, M. Szczu-
ka and H. Berlewi represented abstract art. In 1925 a branch of the Cracow
Academy of Fine Arts was established in Paris headed by J. Pankiewicz.
The group of painters associated with it, Jan Cybis, J. Czapski, J. Jarema,
T. Potworowski and Z. Waliszewski, was especially close to the painting of
P. Bonnard and exerted a great influence on Polish painting evident up to the
present time. In the 1930’s a group of “revolutionary artists” collected
around W. Strzeminski and K. Kobro. At the same time painters and graphic
artists like W. Borowski, W. Skoczylas and Z. Stryjenska and the sculptors,
T. Breyer, H. Kuna, E. Wittig, established the group “Rhytm” ; their paint-
ing tended to be stylized and frequently dealt with folk motifs, while
sculpture was marked by neoclassical tendencies. X. Dunikowski created his
own individual style both in minor works and in his immense statues. The
functioning of the Institute for the Popularization of Art in Warsaw was
of considerable significance for artistic development.
Political independence marked a turning point in town planning. Polish
architecture entered more and more into the general trend of contemporary
European art. The dominant trait was the simplification of the facade
of buildings, an example of which in Warsaw was the Ministry of Education
by Z. Maczenski completed in 1927 and the National Museum by T. Totwin-
ski in 1927. An eminent role was played in the years 1925-1930 by the
Architectural Department of the Warsaw Polytechnic under R. Miller and
R. Gutt and the “Praesens” group of B. Lachert, J. Szanajca and H. and
S. Syrkus. This group dealt with the problem of national housing construc-
tion and the contemporary town planning of residential districts as could be
seen in the Warsaw Housing Cooperative and the Zoliborz Housing Estate.
The work of B. Pniewski, E. Norwerth and C. Przybylski were an original
contribution to Polish architecture.
Chapter XXIV
PROSPERITY AND THE CRISIS:
THE STRUGGLE TO LEGALIZE
PILSUDSKI’$ DICTATORSHIP
(1926-1931)
THE MAY COUP D’ETAT
After the creation of a Centre-Right Wing government in 1923. Pilsudski
withdrew from the army and political life. He settled in Sulejowek near
Warsaw, where he devoted himself to writing. The rank of Marshal had been
confered on him in 1920, when he still held the post of Head of the State.
Pilsudski was resentful that the nation accepted this self-imposed isolation,
because he himself and his followers from the Legions believed that the at-
tainment of independence was the personal and almost exclusive achievement
of the “Commander”. Pitsudski continued to enjoy a great personal authority
in the PPS and the “Wyzwolenie” Peasant Party included people blindly
obedient to him who actively built up a myth around him. The right-wing
parties saw in him a dangerous enemy and cast aspersions against him. He
resented most of all the assertion that the operational plan of August 1920
was not his, but that of either the French General Weygand, which was
certainly not true or, to some extent more accurately, of Gen. T. Rozwadow-
ski, the then Chief of General Staff. A new law defining the position of the
military high command gave Pitsudski the greatest offence. When still Head
of the State he had settled the relations of the Minister of War, the Chief of
General Staff and the Commander-in-Chief in such a way that the two
principal military offices were subordinated to the general designated as Com-
mander-in-Chief. In 1923, during Witos’s government, the Minister of War,
Gen. Szeptycki, tabled a bill in the Seym absolutely contrary to Pilsudski’s
conception. Pilsudski criticized this draft, maintaining that the inner life of
the army would become dependent on party manoeuvres through the inter-
mediary of a Minister of Military Affairs, politically responsible to the Seym.
He indulged in violent polemics on this subject and his adherents demanded
Pitsudski’s return to active service. The situation became acute, when in
1924 the Ministry of War was taken over by General Sikorski who, even in
the time of the Legions, was considered Pilsudski’s rival. A vehement cam-
paign launched by Pitsudski against Sikorski aggravated the relations among
37, History of Poland
578 THE STRUGGLE TO LEGALIZE PILSUDSKI’S DICTATORSHIP (1926-1931)
the senior officers, among whom the supporters of Pilsudski constituted an un-
usually close-knit group amounting to a military conspiracy. After W. Grab-
ski’s fall Pilsudski would not permit Sikorski to remain in the government,
with the result that in Skrzynski’s coalition cabinet Gen. L. Zeligowski,
Pilsudski’s trusted friend, took over the War Min&Stry. Zeligowski made a
number of changes of personnel and in the location of army units, which
later made possible Pilsudski’s military coup.
News about the appointment of Witos as Prime Minister on 10 May,
1926 was understood in left-wing circles and among the workers as paving
the way for a right-wing dictatorship. Pilsudski gave a press interview derog-
atory to the new government and demonstrations were begun on the streets
of Warsaw by Pilsudski’s supporters. On 12 May Pilsudski at the head of
army units loyal to him moved from Sulej6wek to Warsaw to induce Witos
to resign and convince President Wojciechowski of the necessity of changing
the government. At the news of Pilsudski’s approach Witos actually did an-
nounce his resignation, but Wojciechowski, who previously had not been
enthusiastic about appointing Witos as Prime Minister, did not wish to suc-
cumb to military pressure and prevented him from resigning. Wojciechowski
himself went to the Poniatowski Bridge joining Warsaw with its right bank
suburb Praga, which had already been taken over by Pilsudski’s detachments.
A famous encounter took place there, during which Pilsudski demanded
the dismissal of Witos from Wojciechowski, while the President required
Pitsudski to yield to the legal government. After this conversation Wojcie-
chowski issued an order to the army units loyal to the government to open
fire on the rebellious troops. The President’s attitude took Pitsudski by sur-
prise. His officers understood that there could be no turning back and con-
tinued the attack on their own, by evening capturing the northern districts
of Warsaw. The government withdrew to the Belvedere Palace, the Presi-
dent’s residence, and there waited for reinforcements from the provinces. In
fact, the military situation was resolved by the attitude of the railway men who
supported Pitsudski by hampering the movement of the government units and
facilitating the transport of Pilsudski’s troops. During the fierce battles of
13-14 May, talks were conducted through intermediaries which were designed
to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. When on the afternoon of 14
May the situation began to favour Pilsudski, the President and the government
left the Belvedere for the Wilanédw Palace on the outskirts of the city. There,
at a cabinet meeting, in spite of the opposition of the generals, it was decided
to call off the struggle. The government submitted its resignation and the
President decided to gave up his office. According to the Constitution the Pre-
sident’s successor was the Marshal of the Seym, a “Piast” Party representa-
tive, Rataj, who on 15 May in understanding with Pilsudski, appointed as
Premier K. Bartel, professor of the Lwow Technical University and a close
associate of Pilsudski. In the cabinet Pitsudski became Minister of War,
a post he retained until his death in 1935. A. Zaleski, who during the First
THE SOCIAL ASPECT OF PIELSUDSKI’S DICTATORSHIP 579
World War had been the unofficial representative of the NKN in England,
took over the Foreign Affairs. On 16 May the arrest occurred of several
generals who had been on the side of the fallen government. It was later
sought to accuse some of them of offences of a criminal nature to justify the
slogan of “moral rehabilitation” (“sanacja”). For this reason the government
of the Pilsudski régime was commonly called “Sanacja”.
THE SOCIAL ASPECT OF PILSUDSKI’S DICTATORSHIP
Immediately after his victory, Pitsudski stated in press interviews that the
coup would not have revolutionary consequences either in the political or
social sense. This meant that there would be no changes in the social structure
and, more important, that the coup, contrary to the convictions of those left-
wing circles which supported it, would not bring any changes to the benefit
of the working classes. Big business realized this immediately and that is
why it was not inclined to regard the coup with hostility. It was understood
that power over the army had definitely passed into the hands of Pilsudski
and his followers and that foreign policy would assume an increasingly
marked anti-Soviet character.
On 31 May the National Assembly elected Pilsudski President by a large
majority. Only the Right Wing voted for its own candidate. Much to every-
one’s amazement Pilsudski did not accept the post. It is true that he regarded
the Assembly’s vote as a legalization of his coup a’état, but he considered
that the Constitution gave too few prerogatives to a President: for him to
assume this function. Thus, on the next day, upon Pitsudski’s proposal,
Ignacy Moscicki, professor of the Lwow Technical University and a world
famous chemist, in 1912 a professor of the Fribourg Polytechnic in Switzer-
land, was elected President. Not only the Right Wing, but also the PPS no-
minated their candidates against him. It was only in further voting that
Moscicki gained an absolute majority. Bartel again became Premier and the
composition of the new government was practically unchanged. As early
as 16 June the government presented to the Seym a proposal for changing the
Constitution which would give the President the right to dissolve the legisla-
tive bodies and the right to issue decrees with the force of law during the
recess period, subject, however, to parliamentary approval at the next ses-
sion of the Seym. These constitutional changes were passed on 2 August by
a large majority of votes, but on this occasion the PPS was in opposition.
The left-wing parties expected an immediate dissolution of the Seym which
was accused of responsibility for the catastrophic state of affairs, above all,
in the field of finance, but it was more convenient for Pitsudski to keep this
compromised Seym than to call new elections, which would have more than
likely strengthened the Left Wing. Pitsudski wanted to rule above the parties,
37*
580 THE STRUGGLE TO LEGALIZE PILSUDSKI’S DICTATORSHIP (1926-1931)
seeing in his own person and in a strong administration, a guarantee of
government independent of sectional interests. In reality this conception suited
the interests of the upper ruling classes. As a result, the opposition to Pilsud-
ski, which at first was conducted by the Right Wing, now took on a left-
wing character and in the Seym was conducted by the PPS.
THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT
AND THE SEYM
Disputes between the Seym and the government had begun already by the
end of 1926. The government formally followed a legal path, but it actually
attacked and discredited not only the Seym but the Constitution itself. In
connexion with one such incident, Pilsudski took over the office of Premier
himself. In order to get the large landowners to withdraw their support from
the Right Wing he began to woo the conservatives, giving them two cabiner
posts, and in the autumn of 1926 he paid a visit to Nieswiez, the residence
of Prince Radziwill. Anxious to find a broader political backing in the coun-
try, Pitsudski assigned to his-closest collaborator, W. Stawek, a former member
.of the PPS fighting squads and then an intelligence officer in the General
Staff, the task of creating an organization called the Non-Party Bloc for Co-
operation with the Government, under the slogan “moral rehabilitation”. An
attempt was made to secure wider support for the new régime, above all,
among the intelligentsia. Into the ranks of the Non-Party Bloc soon came
numerous careerists and opportunist politicians from various sides who
understood that the old parties had Jost their influence and would not secure
the appointment of their followers to important posts. In the autumn of
1927 Stawek met in Dzikow at Count Tarnowski’s house a group of con-
servatives whom he wished to draw into cooperation with the government.
Shortly afterwards two aristocrats were appointed as voivodes. These efforts,
however, were of little avail. It turned out that the Polish aristocracy lacked
suitably qualified persons to take advantage of the opportunity offered them.
Only Prince J. Radziwill played a prominent political role after May 1926.
No other aristocrat was any longer equal to this. Few diplomatic posts, the
traditional realm of nobility, were held by representatives of the aristocracy.
After taking over the government Pilsudski gained control of the army
where he appointed to key positions only officers loyal to himself. Changes
in the civil administration were less radical, but there too, at first gradually,
but afterwards more rapidly, the rule was followed that key positions could
be held only by the “Marshal’s men”. As the opposition increased, the crimi-
nal courts, formally independent, were brought under control and the press
was more and more severely restricted. All this occurred gradually and the
general public did not become aware at the beginning that the country was
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Density of population, 1931
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wo
under a military dictatorship. The growing role of the political police was
likewise not realized at first. The persons who during Pitsudski’s time took
over the most important positions in the State, came primarily from the
ranks of officers in the Legions or the Polish Military Organization, who
during 1919-1920 had served in the 2nd Bureau of the General Staff
responsible for intelligence and counter-intelligence. Now they applied the
same methods to ruling the State. Personnel departments in civil service as
well as in state enterprises were controlled by officials connected with milita-
$82 THE STRUGGLE TO LEGALIZE PILSUDSKI’S DICTATORSHIP (1926-1931)
ry intelligence, who in this way held in their hands the threads of the entire
machinery of State. The only savage reprisal against enemies of the coup
d@’état was the disappearance of General Zagérski. He was Pitsudski’s person-
al opponent from the days of the war as Chief of Staff to the Legions and
later Chief of the Air Force. He was arrested after the May coup and
undoubtedly murdered by Pilsudski’s followers. There were moreover inci-
dents of assault.on well-known opposition politicians and journalists by
“persons unknown”.
GDYNIA AND MOSCICE
The first years of Pitsudski’s government coincided with economic prosperity.
The British coal strike in 1926 opened possibilities of export for Polish coal.
This immediately balanced the losses which coal exports had suffered after
the lapse of the Upper Silesian Convention and as a result of the tariff war
with Germany. Foreign currency came into Poland in sufficient quantities to
stabilize the zloty and Polish coal won new foreign markets, so that Britain
was forced after the end of the strike to conclude an agreement with Poland
about the limitation of markets. Public opinion, influenced by the govern-
ment press, might have assumed that a “strong-arm” government, independent
of the Seym, had led to the currency stabilization. The years 1926-1929,
moreover, were prosperous on the whole in the capitalist world which helped
to strengthen the régime in Poland and make pro-government propaganda
easier.
Benefiting from a budget surplus and receiving an American loan in the
autumn of 1927 for the purpose of increasing the established capital of the
Bank of Poland and stabilizing the currency, the government undertook in-
vestment. In the first place, at the instance of the Minister of Trade and
Industry, E. Kwiatkowski, who formerly worked with Professor Moscicki in
administering a fertilizer plant in Chorzéw, the building of a port was begun
in Gdynia, a small fishing village on the coast north of Gdansk. In this way
Poland sought to free herself from dependence on the Free City of Gdansk,
which to the detriment of its own interests supported the German anti-Polish
policy. Within a few years, as a result of the devoted efforts of the whole
nation not only was a modern port built, but also a modern city. Another
major investment was the construction, on the initiative of President Mosci-
cki, of a factory of nitrogeneous fertilizers near Tarnow, which was to sup-
ply the farmers and, in case of war, could become a base for the armament
industry. Public opinion was proud of these achievements, without realizing
that in the existing situation in the world and Europe all these efforts could
not create for Poland an economic potential capable of satisfying the re-
Gdynia. Harbour
quirements of a modern society or sustaining the great historical traditions
which the people did not wish to forget. It must be taken into consideration
that only in about 1929, the last year of prosperity, did the Polish economy
manage to achieve the level of 1914. War damage was repaired only after
ten years. It must be remembered also that the destruction was not only the
result of war activities alone but was primarily brought about by the oc-
cupying Powers with the deliberate aim of weakening the Polish nation. On
the other hand, post-war reconstruction was accomplished by the national
effort alone, without decisive help from outside and without the payment of
adequate reparations by the former enemy countries.
In general it may be said, that in the first decade of independence the
necessary conditions for the overall requirements of the country’s economy
were created. Economic and financial legislation was brought into uniformity
and a unified administrative machinery was created. The transport network
was expanded, joining up the districts which were formerly kept divided by
the very fact of partition. A uniform system of social insurance and labour
laws was introduced at a relatively high level by comparison with other
capitalist countries.
584 THE STRUGGLE TO LEGALIZE PILSUDSKI'S DICTATORSHIP (1926-1931)
THE CENTRE-LEFT AND THE BRZESC AFFAIR
During the pertod of prosperity the government was biding its time with
regard to the opposition. The administration remained in the hands of Pitsud-
ski’s group and the majority in the Seym, ever more discredited, did not dare
to begin a battle with the government.
New elections took place only in 1928. By this time the government had
to its credit the stabilization of the economic situation, controlled a well-
organized propaganda machine and had at its command a subservient civil
service, but even though authorities officially engaged in the elections in sup-
port of their own candidates and committed many abuses, the Non-Party
Bloc list obtained less than 30 per cent of the seats. The Left Wing was
victorious. It was astonishing that the communists, even though the KPP
was illegal, obtained around a million votes and won seven seats in the Seym.
The Centre and Right Wing experienced a disaster. It was impossible how-
ever to form a majority in the Seym made up of the Non-Party Bloc, the
PPS and the peasants. The government was decidedly opposed to the parlia-
mentary system. In this situation the legal opposition parties, considering the
demand for parliamentary government futile and pointless, conducted in
1928-1930 a rather hesitant and cautious struggle against the stranglehold
of an ever more anti-democratic dictatorship. These years were characterized
by a reluctance on both sides to seek a trial of strength. Pilsudski wished, for
as long as possible, to maintain the appearance of legality. The opposition
knew its own weakness, though undoubtedly it overestimated it. The Seym
was able to pass budgets owing to the fact that the opposition often refrained
from voting. Besides, two points of view existed in ruling circles. One was
represented by the former Prime Minister Bartel who did not want an open
conflict with the Left and was anxious to retain a maximum of formal
liberalism within the framework of Pitsudski’s régime. The second view was
represented by the “colonels group” with W. Stawek as its leader, who
wished as:soon as possible to get rid of all restraints of legality and to move
perceptibly towards an open dictatorship.
The first major parliamentary clash was the indictment of the Minister
of Finance, Czechowicz, before the State Tribunal for floating large loans for
investment without the approval of the Seym. This involved the Seym’s right
of scrutinizing the budget, which was a fundamental constitutional right.
Pilsudski took the responsibility upon himself before the State Tribunal for
Czechowicz’s infringement of the budget. The Tribunal did not pass a ver-
dict, but remitted the case to the Seym to assess the case on its merits. Pil-
sudski exacerbated the situation with press interviews, in which he abused
the Seym and its representatives in most caustic terms. At the opening of the
autumn session in 1929 a large group of armed officers appeared in the hall
of the Seym, for which reason Daszynski as Marshal of the Seym refused to
THE CENTRE-LEFT AND THE BRZESC AFFAIR S85
open the debate. The session was postponed for a month. After the reopening
of the Seym a vote of no confidence was passed against the government at the
head of which stood one of the “colonels’ group”, Major K. Switalski. The
President again appointed Bartel Prime Minister, a man likely to follow
a milder course, hoping in this way to gain the Seym’s support for the budget.
After the passing of the budget Bartel provoked the Seym into passing a vote
of no confidence in one of the ministers. This resulted in the resignation of
the cabinet and a long government crisis which was a comedy from the point
of view of Pitsudski and allowed him to wait until the constitutional end of
the debates on the budget.
Stawek then became Prime Minister. In answer to this the left-wing
parties and the Centre, who came closer together in opposition to the gov-
ernment, organized a Centre-Left (“Centrolew” in Polish) Congress in
Cracow where decidedly hostile resolutions were passed. On this occasion the
Premiership was taken over by Pitsudski and the Seym was dissolved. On 10
September, 1930, Witos, Lieberman and several other opposition politicians
were arrested. They were imprisoned contrary to the law in a military prison
in the fortress at Brzes¢, where they were maltreated. Shortly after the
elections they were released on bail. A trial was then held of the “Centrolew”
politicians and they were sentenced to several years imprisonment. Some of
them served their term while some, including Witos and Lieberman, went
abroad. The demand for an amnesty became one of the main slogans of the
opposition,. especially the peasant party members.
The 1930 elections, called the “Brzes¢ elections”, were speeded up and
took place under strong administrative pressure which on this occasion gave
rise to many more abuses than occurred two years before. The campaign,
conducted under the slogan of amendments to the Constitution, was to be, like
the BrzeSé incident, a trial of strength to show everyone that the government
was strong, while the opposition could only have recourse to weak demon-
strations, because the masses, in whose name it spoke, did not give it real
support. In this way the government waged battle with its own people as
well as with the strongest national minority group, the Ukrainians in the
south-eastern voivodships. The communist movement there combined the
social struggle with a fight for national independence. At the same time
Ukrainian nationalists engaged in vigorous activity. In 1929 Konovalets set
up abroad a new terroristic organization, the OUN (Ukrainian Nationalist
Organization) with a definite fascist or rather national-socialist character.
It worked in understanding with Hitler and renewed armed subversive and
terrorist action. This action assumed large proportions in 1930 and the
“Sanacja” government began brutal repressions. In the autumn the famous
“pacification” began in Eastern Little Poland. The rural population was ter-
rorized by the army by billeting and investigations. It is true that bloodshed
was avoided, but many acts of violence took place. This considerably discred-
$86 THE STRUGGLE TO LEGALIZE PILSUDSKI’S DICTATORSHIP (1926-1931)
ited the Polish State abroad, especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries, even
though the League of Nations in its answer to the protest brought by the
Ukrainians, stated that they had provoked these repressions on the part of
the Polish government by their own activities. The “pacification” for the
moment achieved its purpose of stifling the subversive activity of the Ukrain-
ians, but in reality it was a severe blow to the Polish State both at home
and abroad. It was denounced in Poland by the communists and socialists.
Other parties, especially the right-wing, sided with the government, alluding
to the anti-Polish character of the Ukrainian nationalists’ actions, which
were in fact directed from Berlin and served German purposes. They sought
to present the Ukrainian’s national struggle as only a terrorist campaign.
The 1930 elections brought victory for the Non-Party Bloc in the sense,
that it obtained an absolute majority, even though it did not have two-thirds
majority needed to amend the Constitution. Nevertheless, the internal situa-
tion underwent a fundamental change, because the government now no longer
needed take into consideration the parliamentary opposition and had obtained
freedom of action. Not only electoral manipulation brought the government
victory. Quite a broad section of the electorate, discouraged by the parlia-
mentary struggle, saw no possibility of changing the system by parlia-
mentary elections. In the eastern regions, moreover, making use of their low
level of education and high percentage of illiteracy, the administration could
influence the elections much more easily, so that in the final analysis the
largest number of pro-government representatives came from areas inhabited
by Byelorussians and Ukrainians in Polesie and Volhynia.
THE GREAT ECONOMIC CRISIS OF 1929-1931
At the time when this new political system was being established, the country
experienced the disaster of the world-wide economic crisis. Poland, as a pri-
marily agricultural country, was especially hard hit, because prices of farm
produce dropped disproportionately to prices of industrial goods. In ad-
dition, the government, which held in its hands all the instruments for
influencing the economy, kept rigidly to one principle, the maintenance of the
rate of exchange, by the sole means of deflation. This rigid currency policy
only intensified the ruinous effects of the depression. Civil service salaries
were cut and State investment reduced to a minimum in the name of defla-
tion. The final result was that Poland emerged from the crisis with a stabilized
currency, but with a ruined economy, a vastly lowered standard of living
for the mass of the people, and large permanent body of unemployed, ir-
reducible even in prosperity, which particularly affected the countryside.
Only after the world crisis had passed, in the last years before the outbreak
THE GREAT ECONOMIC CRISIS OF 1929-1931 587
of war in 1939 was investment begun again by the State and thoughts turned
to changing the agricultural system. But it was already too late not only to
offset the losses suffered by the whole national economy during the crisis, but
also to direct further development onto the proper paths.
The lowest point of the crisis in Poland was in 1932, when the index
of general production fell to 54 per cent of the 1929 level. It began to rise
slowly but up to 1939 it never reached the level pertaining before the
crisis.
Chapter XXV
TOWARDS TOTAL DICTATORSHIP
(1931-1939)
THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PILSUDSKI
The year 1930 was also a turning point in Polish foreign policy. This was
brought about by the appointment of Colonel Jézef Beck as Deputy Minister
of Foreign Affairs. From 1926 he had been Piltsudski’s Chef de Cabinet when
the latter was Minister of War. He became Deputy Prime Minister in the
Pitsudski’s government of 1930 and was responsible, among other things, for
the Brzes¢ affair. When he went to the Foreign Ministry, which he took
over as its head in 1932, he became Pilsudski’s trusted agent in this depart-
ment, which was by now the only sphere of the Marshal’s interest, apart
from military affairs. Pilsudski had ceased to concern himself with domestic
and economic issues. Neither was he interested in the amendments to the
Constitution, handing this matter over to Stawek. In these years Poland had
to conduct a more elastic foreign policy because Germany’s revisionist
tendencies were growing stronger every year. The Western Powers were
inclined to direct German expansion to the East and had no intention of
defending Poland’s territorial integrity.
In 1932 the Soviet Union signed pacts with Finland, Latvia and Estonia.
Eventually a three year Polish-Soviet non-agression pact was concluded on
25 July, 1932. Poland had made the signature of such an agreement dependent
on the conclusion by the Soviet Union of similar pacts with Finland, Latvia
and Estonia. There followed shortly afterwards an exchange of visits by po-
liticians and journalists which led to a distinct improvement of Polish-Soviet
relations.
Taking advantage of this relaxation, Polish diplomacy was determined
to demonstrate Polish rights in Gdansk, where the Senate of the Free City
was constantly conducting a policy hostile to Poland, supported not only by
Berlin but also by British diplomacy. Gdansk complained, amongst other
things, that Poland was aiming at the ruin of the Free City by the building
of Gdynia. This allegation was obviously groundless. On the contrary,
Gdatsk benefited tremendously from the fact that it was the main harbour
of the Polish customs area. Its turnover had increased many times after the
war, from 187,000 tons in 1913 to 8,290,000, tons in 1930.
THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PIZSUDSKI 589
An occasion for such 2 demonstration of Polish rights was provided by
the sending of the Polish destroyer “Wicher” to Gdansk in July, 1932 during
the visit of a British squadron. But it was only Hitler’s coming to power
which led to a crisis that was to initiate a new phase of diplomatic relations
between Warsaw and Berlin.
On 16 February, 1933 the Senate of the Free City unilaterally denounced
the agreement with Poland regarding the administration of the port. Subse-
quently, on 6 March, a battalion of Polish infantry was disembarked on
the Westerplatte in the harbour area where Poland had an ammunition
depot, in order to strengthen the Polish garrison there. The chanceries of
the Western Powers reacted in an unfriendly manner, while Berlin behaved
with reserve, Being aware of the military weakness of the Reich at the time.
Poland agreed to a compromise solution of the dispute, which had been
brought before the League of Nations. The battalion was withdrawn and
the port police were restored. Nevertheless, there was a conviction in Berlin
that the aim of the Polish government was to provoke a preventive war.
In reality the situation was different. Pilsudski and Beck felt themselves
threatened by the suggested plan of a pact of the four great Powers, Great
Britain, France, Germany and Italy, which would override the views of
smaller States. This was a plan Mussolini put forward in March 1933, and
Poland would undoubtedly have had to pay the price for such an agreement.
The “Four Powers’ Pact”, however, did not come to fruition, in part because
of Poland’s opposition. Beck countered it with an attempt to reach an
agreement with Germany by himself. The Polish offer at this juncture was
advantageous to Hitler, who felt himself isolated internationally and for
this reason agreed to a temporary relaxation of German policy with regard
to Poland. The first sign of this new move was a press communiqué issued
after the conversation of the Polish Ambassador, Lipski, with the Chancellor
on 2 May. Shortly afterwards, an improvement of Polish-Gdansk relations
followed ; the Nazi Senate of the Free City undertook, on orders from Ber-
lin, direct negotiations with Warsaw without recourse to the normal interme-
diary of the League of Nations.
Negotiations between Warsaw and Berlin had been in progress since
the autumn of 1933. At that time Germany had left the League of Nations.
This was held to justify the Polish government in its attempt to seek an
arrangement with Germany, which up to now depended in many respects
upon the League. A non-aggression pact for ten years was signed on 26
‘January, 1934. It was advantageous for Hitler, because it safeguarded him
from the danger of Poland launching a preventive war, which was still
feared in Berlin. Polish government circles maintained that for Poland it
was an assurance that Germany would abandon her revisionist propaganda
for some time and, in addition, that other Powers would not be able to
settle their differences with Germany at the expense of Poland’s western
frontier. On the other hand, Polish and European public opinion, as well
590 TOWARDS TOTAL DICTATORSHIP (1931-1939)
as European diplomatic circles, took a decidedly unfavourable view of the
pact with Hitler, because they saw in it a loosening of the Franco-Polish
alliance and Poland’s adoption of a policy of cooperation with Hitler against
the Soviet Union, thus, in effect strengthening fascism. It was also assumed
that the pact contained unpublished secret clauses, which actually did not
exist. Polish diplomacy wanted, however, to continue the policy of holding
the balance between Berlin and Moscow. Therefore when Georing visited
Poland and made allusions to a joint march against Russia Pitsudski gave
a negative reply. Immediately after the conclusion of the pact with Germany
Beck executed a tactical manoeuvre. He went on a visit to Moscow giving
an assurance to the Soviet Union that Poland had no thought of hostile
action against the Soviet Union in collaboration with Germany. This visit
proved to be effective; in May 1934 .the non-aggression pact with the
U.S.S.R. was extended for a further ten years and thus it was to last longer
than the similar pact with Germany.
Consequently Poland did not oppose the entry of the Soviet Union into
the League of Nations but, not wishing to risk the possibility that the U.S.S.R.
would utilize the minorities treaty in the League, she declared on 13 Sep-
tember, 1934, that she would not cooperate in matters arising out of this
treaty with international organizations, as long as the treaty was not bind-
ing on all interested countries. This unilateral denunciation of treaty obli-
gations was, of course, received very unfavourably by European public
opinion, because it placed Poland among the States violating international
agreements.
Polish diplomacy was rendered still more unpopular by its position with
regard to the Eastern Pact conceived by Louis Barthou, the French Foreign
Minister. This pact was to include the Soviet Union and to guarantee the
status quo in eastern Europe. It was known, of course, that Germany would
not want to join this pact and thereby it would be aimed precisely against
her. Polish diplomacy was the first to oppose the pact, objecting openly to
the participation of Czechoslovakia. This was interpreted as a desire to
direct German revisionism against the Czechs, with whom Poland’s relations
now again began to deteriorate. In addition, Beck’s opposition to the Eastern
Pact was derived from the hostility which Pilsudski felt towards the Soviet
Union and from his unwillingness to have closer contact with Poland’s
eastern neighbour. This led to a worsening of Polish-Soviet relations which
had recently shown a definite improvement.
THE DEATH OF PILSUDSKI. THE CONFLICT
IN THE RULING PARTY
A change in the Constitution was carried out while Pilsudski was-still alive.
The Non-Party Bloc, taking advantage of the momentary absence of the
THE DEATH OF PIESUDSKI. THE CONFLICT IN THE RULING PARTY 599
95,1
ae payee -
ill
sifu
Area of farms
O-2 Hectares
V. Structure of small holdings in Poland
(Number of farms in thousands)
opposition deputies in the Seym, who did not wish to cooperate in the
revision of the Constitution, passed a bill for a reform of the Constitution on
26 January, 1934. The rules of procedure were broken, it is true, but because
the Non-Party Bloc had the necessary majority in the Senate the new Consti-
tution was ultimately enacted and proclaimed in April, 1935. It invested the
President with extensive powers by limiting the role of Parliament and, what
is most important, made possible the introduction of a franchise which
contradicted every principle of a democratic State. Those who drafted the
Constitution thought of Pilsudski as the one who would take over the
Population of Poland according to occupation, 1936
Agriculture i
serrate, REY industry] Other occupations
President’s power, but Pitsudski was already mortally ill at the moment
when the Constitution was approved.
From 1930 when the Seym had been reduced to subservience the growth
of the dictatorship manifested itself in the ever greater use of coercive
methods of government. Their organizer, one of the ablest members of the
“colonels’ group”, B. Pieracki, was killed in 1934 by an Ukrainian nationalist
in circumstances which are still far from clear. Pieracki’s death was used as
THE DEATH OF PILSUDSKI. THE CONFLICT IN THE RULING PARTY 593
a pretext for establishing an “isolation camp” in Bereza Kartuska in the
Polesie region. This camp, modelled on the Nazi concentration camps, was
a sign of the progressive growth of fascism. Persons sent there were mostly
communists and members of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian opposition.
It was not only the efficiency of the police machinery which helped to
maintain the Pilsudski régime. An attempt was made to popularize Pitsudski
by encouraging the mystique surrounding his person through all the media of
mass communication, the government press, radio and schools. Many eminent
writers agreed to serve the régime which, desirous also of gaining popularity
among literary circles, set up the Polish Academy of Literature. It was to be
in its way a counterpoise to the Polish Academy of Sciences and Letters in
Cracow, still controlled by liberally minded professors hostile to the régime.
The people were told about the “ideas of Marshal Pilsudski”, but these were
not elaborated in detail. A cult of the State was encouraged in distinction to
the National Democratic cult of the nation. Actually, the cult of Pitsudski
signified the dominance of the State machinery. This served the interests of
the propertied classes, and, to an even greater degree, that of the large
landowners rather than of big business.
The State tried in some sectors of the economy to oppose the malpractices
of foreign capital, a struggle more for show than effect. This was the case in
the conflict over the Zyrardéw Textile Mill and the Warsaw Electric Power
Plant, in which French capital behaved in a manner too obviously contrary
to the interests of the country. In fact, however, the position of international
capital became still stronger in Poland. The economic crisis was an op-
portunity for foreign capital to proceed to further concentration and to
encourage the growth of monopolies. While German capital in Poland
avoided proclaiming itself as such, it often penetrated under the guise of
American companies, and no one dared to offer resistance. .
Pilsudski died on 12 May, 1935 and was buried beside the Polish kings
in the Wawel Cathedral in Cracow. The ruling group now faced the dif-
ficult task of carrying on the dictatorship without the authority of Pilsudski
among those social classes who either actively supported the dictatorship,
though these were very few indeed, or, what is most important, who sup-
ported it passively. Dissension within the ruling party began at once.
A section, harking back to earlier left-wing traditions, desired liberalization.
This group largely included former members of the Polish Military Organiza-
tion and among them the most prominent part was played by M. Zyndram-
Kosciatkowski ; another section, grouped around Stawek, aimed, on the
contrary, at a stronger dictatorship. One of the immediate issues to settle was
the succession to Pilsudski in the army. General Rydz-Smigty became the
Inspector General of the Armed Forces and thus was the presumptive Com-
mander-in-Chief. President Moscicki thought that in his relations with
Rydz-Smigly, whom he appointed, it would be easy to maintain his own posi-
tion. Moscicki was soon able to render Stawek politically harmless and in the
38 History of Poland
/ ¥ : yu,
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a) 2) Ne ©) Medium (c. 5,000 to 10,000 workers;
ow oa Minor (c. 5,000 workers - selected places)
__7 Cantras which were established or extended tollov
| the construction of industrial plants in the
1 Central Industrial Area (COP: after 1935
industrial centres in Poland, 191 8-1 939
Industries prevailing:
re) Mining and mineral @ Chemical re) Textile
e Metai Timber Food processing o) van
THE GROWTH OF OPPOSITION 595
autumn of 1935 Koécialkowski was made Premier. The decisive role in this
cabinet was played by the Vice-Premier, Kwiatkowski, who now became in
effect the director of the government’s economic policy. An end was at last put
to rigid principles of deflation ; it was easier to do so now, because the world
crisis was over. On Kwiatkowski’s initiative the construction of the Central
Industrial Area in the triangle of Tarnow-Skarzysko-Przemysl was begun.
A base for the armament industry was to be laid here at a distance from the
exposed frontiers.
The Kosciatkowski government met with underhand opposition within the
ruling group itself. An agreement between Rydz-Smigly and Moscicki was
reached. In this fashion the head of the army was drawn into political
intrigues and brought to the front as the apparent leader of the nation.
THE GROWTH OF OPPOSITION
In the early period after Pilsudski’s death the legal opposition parties of
the Left were, in effect, impotent. They were even ready to reach a
compromise with the Kosciatkowski government, building their hopes for an
agreement of this type on the person of Rydz-Smigly.
The National Party, the former National Democrats, had broken up.
Some of its members, in view of the hopelessness of opposition, went over
to the government side, while its younger members in imitation of fascism
which was gaining ground in Europe, established the National Radical
Camp with a pronounced nationalist character. Breaking with the remaining
liberal traditions of the former National Democrats they adopted a clearly
fascist tone. From the National Radical Camp there emerged the “Falanga”
group which openly imitated the Nazis.-The Right Wing, both the National
Party and the National Radical Camp, now primarily gave voice to anti-
Semitic slogans.
Changes in the peasant movement occurred still earlier. The various
groups united into one Peasant Party under Rataj. Although the Peasant
Party placed the name of Witos, who was in emigration, on its banners, the
party in effect took on a much more radical appearance. This was due to
the activity of its younger members, organized in the Union of Rural Youth
““Wici” (The Messengers).
The authority of the PPS declined at this juncture, when death had
removed its most popular leaders like Daszynski, Perl and Diamand. At the
same time revolutionary tendencies among the working class increased, thus
strengthening the position of the communists.
Under the influence of the threatening danger of Nazism the KPP is-
sued the slogan of a United Front which met with considerable response in
the left-wing circles among the socialists. The Fourth Plenary Session of the
KPP in 1936 advocated a rapprochement with the PPS for the defence of
Poland’s independence threatened by the Third Reich.
38*
$96 TOWARDS TOTAL DICTATORSHIP (1931-1939)
The United Front policy had a considerable influence on the strike move-
ment which grew in these years, on account of the economic oppression of
the working class and the system of police government which was becoming
more and more discredited. The years 1936 and 1937 witnessed the largest
strikes during the entire inter-war period. In 1936 strikes in industry
embraced 22,000 plants and involved 4 million working days. These strikes
were often victorious and in many of them, though they were begun for
economic reasons, political demands were later voiced.
In the period of the United Front the working-class movement was
weakened, however, by the fear of right-wing leaders of the PPS of starting
a bitter domestic struggle when the external dangers threatened the State. On
the other hand, the KPP was dissolved in 1938 by the Comintern as a result
of unproved charges.
All these political changes resulted from a fundamental transformation in
political thinking. The coming of the great economic crisis immediately after
a period of prosperity first gave rise to a feeling of political depression and
general apathy. This was intensified by unemployment which could not be
shown in figures, because only these were registered, who drew unemployment
allowances. These being available only for a short time caused the unemployed
on their expiry, if possible, to return to the villages where they still had
families. There they gave vent to revolutionary feeling. As a result the peasant
masses, above all, became more radical in the years immediately following
the climax of the crisis. One should remember that it affected agriculture to
a very considerable degree. The big landowners, more sensitive to interna-
tional market conditions, struggled to maintain the profits of their estates
by lowering the wages of their agricultural workers. The resulting strikes
were brutally suppressed by the police. Thus, the radicalization of the masses
in these years progressed from the countryside to the city and then returned
once more, still stronger, to the countryside.
In the spring of 1936 there occurred in Cracow, Lwéw and Czestochowa
violent working class demonstrations of an almost revolutionary character.
There were numerous killed and wounded. The movement soon passed on to
the villages. In the summer, southern Poland as well as the Lublin area wit-
nessed a new kind of strike. The peasants stopped all food deliveries to the
towns. These strikes ended in disturbance and bloodshed. In 1937 the peasant
strike was repeated in southern Poland with still greater effect. It was a clear
political demonstration and a challenge to the dictatorship.
THE NATIONAL UNITY CAMP
Because the opposition parties had not participated in the 1935 elections,
the Seym and Senate were composed entirely of supporters of the ruling party
with the addition of a small fraction of moderate Ukrainian nationalists.
THE NATIONAL UNITY CAMP 597
Ruling circles were bound to feel isolated from ghe people. They therefore
sought a new source of authority and a new basis for support in the
country. Thus General Rydz-Smigly was advanced as the leading figure. On
his initiative General Stawoj-Skladkowski was appointed Prime Minister
in May, 1936. In this cabinet Kwiatkowski remained Deputy Premier for
Economic Affairs, just as Beck remained in charge of foreign affairs and
J. Poniatowski retained the Ministry of Agriculture, seeking some solution of
the hopeless situation in the countryside where the number of “redundant
persons” was estimated at around five million. The new cabinet was the
result of a compromise between Moscicki and Rydz-Smigly. Shortly after-
wards the Premier sent a famous instruction to all officials on 15 July, 1936,
in which he stated that, after the President, Smigly was the second person in
the State, to whom everyone, including the Prime Minister, should “pay due
honour and obedience”. This was not in accord with the Constitution but it
represented the facts of the situation, because the régime, being a military
dictatorship, needed a real dictator.
In the autumn of 1936 the President appointed Smigty a Marshal and
thus he was to be the successor of Pilsudski, but if Pilsudski, especially in the
last years of his life, concerned himself exclusively with the army and
foreign affairs, the new Marshal was not to obtain any great influence on
foreign affairs, because their management lay solely in Beck’s hands.
Beck’s policy was unpopular in the country, because he was regarded as
an ally of Nazi Germany. Smigly attempted to play on these sentiments by
demonstrating sympathy for France. The visit he paid to Paris in 1936 was
interpreted by Polish opinion as a return to the French alliance and it was
thought that Smigly would become a counterweight to the excessive inclina-
tion of Polish diplomacy towards the Fascist powers. Although, in effect, the
personal relations between these two were never close, Beck did not relinquish
the conduct of foreign policy until the very end.
The hopes placed by the left-wing opposition on Smigly were rapidly
dispersed. A confrontation took place during the festivities in honour of
Pyrz, a peasant from the village of Nowosielce who perished in the struggle
against the Tartars in the seventeenth century. The Peasant Party assembled
about 200,000 of its followers who paraded before Smigly when he decorated
Pyrz’s monument with the Cross of Virtuti Militari. The organizers of this
immense manifestation did not achieve the political results they had sought.
The crowd loudly demanded an amnesty for Witos and Smigly felt offended.
For the same reason talks conducted by government politicians and Peasant
Party leaders also failed to yield results. Much more profound causes were
involved. The military dictatorship could look for cooperation only to the
Right. Already, while Pitsudski lived, the government’s agrarian policy
favoured the large landowners. The land reform was not carried out, although
it was indispensable in view of the overpopulation of the countryside which
was felt even more, when after the foundation of the Polish State the possi-
e
598 TOWARDS TOTAL DICTATORSHIP (1931-1939)
bility for emigration had been stopped. During the great world crisis some
States, like France, in fighting against unemployment forced Polish workers,
who in times of prosperity were employed in French coal mining and
industry, to return to their homes.
In order to reach an agreement with the Peasant Party it was necessary to
carry out a land reform. The government group, linked with the large Jand-
owners, was not inclined to do this. In 1929, 164,000 hectares were made
available, a relatively small amount, but by 1934 this figure had declined
to 56,000 hectares. On the other hand, fascist and anti-Semitic slogans could
easily be used for an understanding with the Right. Therefore, when it was
decided to formulate some sort of government programme to obtain the sup-
port of public opinion, Smigly decided that this programme should have
a right-wing, clerical and anti-Semitic character. This led to the formation of
the National Unity Camp which was to become the new government party.
As a result, part of the National Radical Camp went over to the government’s
side. The country soon became the scene of anti-Semitic outrages, especially
in the universities, with the police openly tolerating them. The government
press increasingly had recourse to the necessity of combatting the Jews.
The ruling camp likewise used the tense Ukrainian question to gain sup-
port from the Right Wing. While a part of the Ukrainian nationalists of
Eastern Little Poland participated in the 1935 election, the rest supported
the irreconcilable activity of the underground opposition. It was thus easy for
the government to exploit the reaction of Polish nationalism in the border-
lands for its own benefit. This was shown in relation to the policies of
H. Jézewski, the Voivode of Volhynia, who for many years had tried to put
into effect the conception of an anti-Soviet Polish-Ukrainian agreement. With
this in view he supported the former followers of Petlura. After Smigty had
taken charge of political affairs, the military started to sabotage Jézewski’s
policy, and, finally, in 1938 he was removed from office. In the Chelm district
sporadic attempts were made at forcibly converting Orthodox to Catholicism.
Moreover, a number of abandoned Orthodox churches were blown up. In
the south-eastern voivodships a campaign to win over the so-called village
gentry was launched. Descendants of the former petty gentry were sought
for among the population and attempts were made to establish this group
as a type of privileged élite, which was to be the mainstay of the Polish
element in the borderlands. This odious policy led to a still greater exacerba-
tion of mutual hatred. It followed from the basic tendency of anchoring so
cial support for the dictatorship of the ruling party by means of a nationalist-
fascist campaign.
BECK AND THE CIESZYN QUESTION 599
BECK AND THE CIESZYN QUESTION
In such internal conditions Poland had to face the great international crisis
which was to lead to the outbreak of the Second World War and to the
destruction of the Polish Republic.
‘The key to the situation in these years lay in Germany. In 1935 im-
mediately after Pilsudski’s death Beck paid a visit to Berlin, where he gave
assurances that Polish policy towards Germany would remain unchanged.
On this occasion, however, after the visit in Berlin Beck did not make a trip
to Moscow. The possibilities of manoeuvre had become limited. From 1935
onwards friction between Prague and Warsaw grew and relations with Paris
weakened still further. Poland refused to participate in the Franco-Soviet and
Soviet-Czech alliances. She took an ambiguous position with regard to Italy’s
aggression in Abyssinia and observed the League of Nations resolutions cal-
ling for economic sanctions against Italy only formally. Poland was also the
first to abandon the sanctions and recognize the conquest of Abyssinia, before
the League of Nation had passed a vote on this issue. By these moves Beck’s
policy showed his sympathy with the Fascist powers.
When on 7 March, 1936, the German armies marched into the de-
militarized Rhineland, Beck immediately notified the French ambassador
that he would adhere to the conditions of the Franco-Polish alliance, but
neither France or Great Britain wished to take military action against Hitler,
although it was known that he did not as yet have adequate forces to begin
a war with the Western Powers. The passivity of the Western Powers towards
Nazism gave Beck arguments for leaning towards Germany, especially when
Mussolini became Hitler’s ally. Poland continued to maintain an irrecon-
cilable position on the question of Gdansk as far as her own rights were
concerned. Meanwhile, she tacitly reconciled herself to the Nazis assuming
control of the Free City. In reality both France and Great Britain had ceased
to concern themselves with this issue. The post of the League of Nations’
High Commissioner in Gdansk, generally held by Englishmen, was given at
the beginning of 1937 to a Swiss who did not exercise much influence on
events during the remaining years of the Free City’s existence. On the other
hand, Hitler’s diplomacy sought to appease the Poles during these years
with constant assurances that a war would not be started over Gdansk and
that in general Germany did not have any territorial claims on Poland.
Nevertheless, Poland did continue to feel concern over her relations with
the Western Powers. As a result of Smigty’s visit to France in 1936, Poland
obtained a loan to build the Silesia~Gdynia railway and, in addition, a pro-
mise of assistance for rearmament. While in Pilsudski’s time the Polish army
had remained backward, clinging to outmoded techniques and military
tactics, maintaining, for example, numerous regiments of cavalry instead of
converting to motorized units, after his death the new Inspector General
sought to modernize armaments and to adapt training to new requirements.
600 TOWARDS TOTAL DICTATORSHIP (1931-1939)
Poland lacked, of course, the industrial resources for putting her forces on
a modern footing, especially with regard to the air force and armoured units.
In these years Beck sought a rapprochement with Great Britain in which
he was successful insofar as Britain also conducted an undecided policy and
was anxious to reach a compromise both with Hitler and Mussolini. For
Poland the basic aim of a rapprochement with Great Britain was to strength-
en the military alliance with France. Since from the time of Locarno the
implementation of this alliance depended on the League of Nations, it was
clear that the behaviour of the French government would be determined by
the position of British diplomacy should the casus foederis arise. While court-
ing France and Britain, both of whom followed a vacillating course in respect
of the Fascist powers and the Berlin-Rome Axis, Beck continued to seek
the sympathies of the latter. Thus, during the Spanish Civil War, the law
forbidding Polish citizens to serve in foreign armies was applied to the
Polish volunteers fighting in Spain against the Fascists, for which they were
deprived of citizenship. Similarly the Polish government recognized the
newly established empire of Manchukuo, which was an acceptance of the
partition of China by Japan.
Beck’s policy was put to severe tests in 1938. When the annexation of
Austria by the Reich took place in March, Beck, to save his prestige, sent an
ultimatum to Kaunas demanding that Lithuania immediately establish nor-
mal diplomatic relations with Poland. The very coincidence of these facts
shows that Beck had nothing left but gestures designed to mask the worsening
of Poland’s situation. In fact, the establishment of relations with Lithuania
was advantageous for both sides, but it was, of course, no compensation for
Poland’s weakness in the face of the considerable increase of German power.
The inequality of forces appeared still more vividly in the case of
Czechoslovakia. After 1935 Poland’s relations with this country had been
tense. The theme of anti-Czech propaganda was the ill-treatment of the
Polish population in the western part of Cieszyn-Silesia belonging to Czecho-
slovakia, called the Zaolzie district in Polish. The real reason for attacks on
Prague was the Czech-Soviet alliance of May 1935, which was an integral
part of the Franco-Soviet alliance. When, after the Anschluss of Austria, the
question of the Sudeten Germans arose, Polish diplomacy sought to connect
the Sudeten question with Zaolzie and demanded that both the Western
Powers and the Czech government should accord the same treatment to the
Polish minority as to the other minorities of the country. In May, during
the first Czech-German crisis, Beck obtained this promise both from the
Czech government and, less specifically, from Great Britain and France.
When it became clear in September that the Western Powers had decided to
sacrifice the Sudeten area for the purpose of “saving peace”, Beck resolutely
demanded the incorporation into Poland of areas inhabited by Poles. Ger-
many obtained the Sudetenland at Munich, but the Zaolzie question was
referred to the Powers for a future decision. Beck saw in such a settlement
FACING GERMAN AGGRESSION (1938-1939) 602
of the question a double danger in that either promises would not be kept,
or Germany would make their fulfilment dependent on territorial concessions
by Poland, for example, in Gdansk or Pomerania. For this reason a 24-hour
ultimatum was sent to Prague on 30 September, which the Czechs were
forcéd to accept, and subsequently the Polish armies occupied Zaolzie up
to the frontier set by the Polish-Czech treaty of 5 November, 1918. Small ad-
justments of the border were demanded at the expense of Slovakia in the
Tatra and Pieniny areas. This change of frontiers, accomplished by Poland
by means of the threat to use force at the moment of Hitler’s rape of Czecho-
slovakia, placed Poland among the aggressors, breaking international law
and violating principles of justice. The indignation and shame of the Poles
in opposition to the régime was immense. It was also understood that Po-
land’s situation had deteriorated disastrously, while Germany’s power had
increased immensely as a result of the fall of Czechoslovakia.
FACING GERMAN AGGRESSION (1938-1939)
It soon became obvious that the danger of German aggression, which, ac-
cording to expectations immediately after Munich, was to be postponed
for a long time, had on the contrary increased. For the moment, however,
only Polish diplomacy was aware of this in the autumn of 1938. Already in
October Germany presented her proposals for a “final” settlement of Polish-
German affairs, clearly demanding the annexation of Gdansk and of a strip
of territory to join East Prussia with the rest of Germany. In this situation
Beck was still able to improve the tense relations with the Soviet Union,
which had threatened Poland during the Czech crisis with the denunciation
of the non-aggression pact. In November a Polish-Soviet communiqué was
published, which was supposed to testify to a return to normal good-neigh-
bourly relations between the two States.
Beck acted as if he were not aware of the seriousness of the situation. He
not only concealed German demands from the Polish public, but also from
Poland’s ally, France. He concentrated his efforts instead on obtaining
a common frontier with Hungary by having Hungary annex the Subcar-
patho-Ukraine. As an argument he used the Ukrainian danger, lest this area,
which after Munich was governed by Hitler’s agent, Father Voloshyn, might
become a springboard for German plans with regard to the Ukraine as
a whole. The attempts to win over the Rumanian government for this con-
cept with the offer of a part of Subcarpatho-Ukraine, were of no avail.
Beck also failed to draw the correct conclusions from the fact that the
German demands had been renewed during his visit in Berchtesgaden in
January, 1939 and during Ribbentrop’s visit to Warsaw in the same month.
The Germans were now pressing their demands more firmly and openly
602 TOWARDS TOTAL DICTATORSHIP (1931-1939)
proposed Poland cooperation in aggression against the Soviet Union. Polish
diplomacy rejected all these proposals outright, probably in the belief that
Hitler would not decide to break the understanding with Poland.
The annexation of Bohemia and Moravia in March, 1939 and the procla-
mation of the protectorate over Slovakia finally clarified the situation. While
at that moment Poland was able to obtain a common frontier with Hungary,
this fact did not in any way compensate for a new strategic situation in
which Poland found herself threatened on three sides by German military
bases. At this juncture Ribbentrop set out once more, this time in the form
of an ultimatum in his conversation with Ambassador Lipski on 22 March,
the German demands upon Poland. The Polish government replied by a par-
tial mobilization and concentration of troops on the German frontier and
on 26 March formally and categorically rejected the German demands. Now
the tension between Poland and Germany could no longer be concealed and
not only European diplomacy became aware of it, but the Polish people also.
British intervention followed. On 31 March Neville Chamberlain, the
British Prime Minister, declared in the House of Commons that Poland
would receive a guarantee in the event of agression and her armed opposi-
tion to it. In consequence Beck went to London at the beginning of April
and a Polish-British declaration on mutual assistance was made public. In
reply Hitler denounced on 28 April the pact of non-aggression with Poland
and the treaties with Great Britain. In turn Beck made a Speech in the Seym
on 5 May, in which he rejected the German demands, but left the door open
to further negotiations with Germany. In Poland the danger of war was
understood and the whole country showed a determination to oppose the
threatened attack. An optimistic attitude was prevalent, deriving from the
conviction that the Polish army was properly prepared and that the power
of the Western Allies guaranteed an ultimate victory. In addition, it was
thought that Hitler’s successes had resulted from a lack of resistance on the
part of his opponents and had been based on bluff, and that Hitler, therefore,
this time would not dare to launch a war which had to end in his inevitable
defeat.
Such was also the opinion of the Polish ruling circles, which did not wish
to agree to the Soviet Union joining the defensive alliance. Beck considered
that the moment he signed an alliance with Moscow he would eliminate
finally the possibility of an understanding with Berlin, which he was still
seeking by indirect means. German diplomacy, however, refused to resume
fundamental talks with Warsaw.
In May a Polish-French military agreement was concluded, which guar-
anteed French assistance to Poland in case of German attack and promised
to launch an offensive on the western. front on the seventeenth day after
mobilization, but this agreement was dependent on the conclusion of a po-
litical treaty which, in effect, was signed only after the outbreak of the war,
FACING GERMAN AGGRESSION (1938-1939) 603
on 4 September. In this way the French government retained the possibility
of not fulfilling its obligations as an ally of Poland.
In connexion with the German-Polish tension the German press began
atrocity propaganda about the alleged persecution of Germans in Poland.
The situation in Gdansk also became acute. Hitler aimed at convincing
Western opinion that the Polish-German dispute was caused by the issue of
Gdansk, a city with a German population which wished to join the united
German State. German propaganda sought to present the situation to the
French in such a way as to give the impression that they would “die for
Gdansk” (mourir pour Danzig). In effect, Hitler had already decided to
begin the war in order to destroy the Polish State and incorporate the greater
part of it into Germany.
Meanwhile in Moscow, in August negotiations were taking place between
a British and French military mission and the Soviet Military Staff. The
negotiations did not yield any results. The Polish government would not
agree to the Soviet proposals for mutual defence. On 21 August the signing
of the non-aggression pact between Ribbentrop and Molotov took place,
which, as later emerged, only temporarily put off the outbreak of the Ger-
man-Soviet war. On 26 August Hitler decided to launch military operations.
European diplomacy still thought that Hitler was engaged in bluff, but he
for his part did not believe in Anglo-French assistance to Poland.
In effect, after the conclusion of the pact with Moscow, Hitler was
convinced that the Western Powers had given up the idea of concerning
themselves with east European affairs. In view of this the British government
concluded the alliance with Poland on 25 August to make it quite clear that
an attack on Poland would lead to a European war. In reply Hitler began
negotiations with Great Britain to make it possible for her to withdraw and
for this reason cancelled the order for opening the military operations.
At the last moment German diplomacy played its game in such a way as
to give proof of its desire for an understanding with Poland. Ribbentrop
demanded the despatch to Berlin of a plenipotentiary of the Polish govern-
ment to conclude a final settlement with Germany, but, at the same time,
Germany did not desire such a direct agreement, because it would be shown
then that the German demands could not be reconciled not only with Poland’s
territorial integrity, but even with her independence. On the evening of 31
August the final German conditions, contained in 16 points, were announced.
They called for the immediate incorporation of Gdansk into Germany and
a plebiscite in Pomerania, which was to be evacuated immediately by the
Polish administration and army. The plebiscite was to take place a year
later, but these conditions, which were completely unacceptable to the Polish
government, were considered by the German government to be of no account
even at the moment of their publication, on the grounds that Warsaw had
not sent a plenipotentiary to Berlin in time. The publication of these 16 points
604 TOWARDS TOTAL DICTATORSHIP (1931-1939)
was designed to convince not European opinion but the German people,
to whom they were presented as proof of Hitler’s unlimited willingness to
reach a compromise with Poland.
The German attack on Poland began at dawn on 1 September. Within
a few weeks the Polish army, in spite of its heroic struggle, was defeated.
The Polish nation underwent for almost six years a system of oppression and
destruction which in its frightfulness surpassed anything that the history
of Poland, so full of tragedy, had up to that time experienced.
CONCLUSION
The “Second Republic of Poland”, which emerged after the First World
War in the aftermath of the collapse of the three partitioning Powers, took
shape under difficult conditions which did not carry the promise of a long
life. Without defensible frontiers in the east and in the west and weakened
by the discontent of national minorities which constituted thirty per cent
of her population, Poland was a small and impoverished bourgeois State,
a creation of the Versailles system standing against Bolshevism on the one
hand and against the German policy of revenge on the other. Poland had
no means of conducting an independent foreign policy, except for the brief
periods of tension between Berlin and Moscow. Furthermore, Poland could
not count on the effective assistance of her powerful supporters in Paris and
London.
Poland’s achievements during the twenty years between the two wars,
however, should not be underrated. The scars of war were healed and the
three zones of partition were welded together again. The State was restored
and a new generation of young citizens grew up in conditions of independ-
ence. The government failed in two major tasks. It was unable either to
raise the country out of the economic slump or to ensure its external security.
In the final years of this period before the Second World War Poland’s
industrial production did not succeed in reaching the level for the period
before 1914. Primarily, this was a consequence of the subordination of the
Polish economy to foreign capital, which drew excessive profits from its
old investments without making new ones. This situation reduced to a mere
illusion the cherished concept of the Pilsudski faction, the idea of Poland’s
Participation in power politics independent both of Germany and of the
Soviet Union.
Even the foreign minister, Beck, had to realize that Poland’s cooperation
with Germany against the U.S.S.R. was impossible in view of Hitler’s un-
concealed desire to dismember the Polish State. Cooperation with the U.S.S.R.
against Hitlerism was not acceptable to the powerful supporters of the
606 CONCLUSION
Polish bourgeoisie and landowners, because it carried with it a threat of
social revolution and the loss of the eastern provinces, where the major part
of the population was not Polish. In conflict with her neighbours, weakened
by unemployment, incapable for economic reason of putting a modern army
in the field, unsure of one-third of her population, Poland was completely
defenceless in Sepgember, 1939.
The Second World War and over five years of Nazi occupation were
perhaps the most dramatic episode of Poland’s entire history. Nazism made
its bid for world domination. The Poles were not assigned a place in this
world. The extent of the plans laid down by the invaders is more than well
known from secret documents which were made public after 1945. They
called for the extermination of the entire Polish intelligentsia, for the Ger-
manization of the few elements that could be persuaded that they belonged
to the German race, for the gradual destruction of the mass of the Poles,
pressed into forced labour for the Herrenvolk. This programme was put
into effect with merciless consistency. It was slowed down to an insignificant
degree by the necessity of conducting a war. The means employed were
mass expulsions and deportation of Poles to forced labour in the Reich,
anti-Polish property laws, kidnapping in the streets and public executions,
the cruelty of the Gestapo and the camps of mass extermination of the
Polish people. Millions of Poles were killed by the Nazis ; the overwhelm-
ing part of Polish Jews fell victim to this policy of extermination. The
levelling to the ground of the Jewish district of Warsaw after the rising
in the Warsaw Ghetto in the spring of 1943 and of the entire capital after
the Warsaw rising at the end of 1944 revealed the fate which was in store
for the Poles and the Polish cities in the event of Hitler’s victory.
The nation was fully aware of this formidable danger. There were no
Quislings in Poland during the Second World War, not because the Germans
did not seek to employ them, but rather because they would have found no
faction or social group willing to support them. The Poles unanimously
rejected Hitler’s ultimatum and were the first in Europe to offer him armed
resistance. In this manner the people exerted pressure on the British and
French politicians who in September, 1939 were still thinking of a fresh
Munich. Defeated in the military campaign, the nation did not for a moment
acknowledge defeat. Through the next five years Polish soldiers, pilots and
seamen fought the enemy on all war fronts, from Narvik to Tobruk and
from London to the Oka river. In the occupied country the activity of
Polish partisans grew more powerful year by year and the entire population
Participated in all manner of sabotage and passive resistance. The Polish
underground countered the sentence of extermination passed on Polish cul-
ture by secret secondary schools and universities, clandestine lectures, art
exhibitions and secret artistic publications. The people tried to survive and
despite everything dealt the enemy many a painful blow.
The outcome of the war was sealed when Hitler’s first Soviet offensive
CONCLUSION 607
broke down and more especially after the battle of Stalingrad. From then
on the struggle on all fronts was accompanied by a political struggle for
the future order of the world, in which the Anglo-Saxon Powers treated
with suspicion their ally, the Soviet Union.
From the beginning of 1943 an analysis of the situation on the war
fronts made it clear that the liberation of Poland from Nazi annihilation
could come only from the East and that the Soviet Union would obtain
a predominant influence in the settlement of this part of Europe. The lesson
drawn from the experience of the inter-war years and from the recent strug-
gle against Fascism was that Poland could expect support against the Ger-
mans from her neighbour to the east and that she should adopt social re-
forms that would revive her sluggish economy. Polish communists, assembled
since 1942 in the Polish Workers’ Party, proclaimed this programme, which
found a growing response among the masses and broader understanding
among the progressive intelligentsia. Polish property owners could not give
their support to this programme for the same reason that they rejected
cooperation with the U.S.S.R. before the outbreak of the war. The central
issue was the future social system of the country and its eastern frontiers.
The Polish government-in-exile, transferred in 1940 from France to London,
put all its hope into the restoration, with the support of Britain and the
U.S.A., of the Polish State as it had been before the war or with slightly
altered boundaries, a State which would be ruled by the bourgeoisie.
The two programmes and the two points of view produced in occupied
Poland two competing political centres and two partisan armies. As might
be expected, formations of the Soviet Army together with the First Polish
Army, organized in Russia, crossed the line of the Bug in July, 1944. At this
time, Polish military units of the Polish government-in-exile were fighting
far from Poland, in Italy and on the Rhine. At this precise moment the
headquarters of the underground Home Army, owing allegiance to London,
precipitated the outbreak of an armed rising in Warsaw. The Warsaw upris-
ing, directed in the military sense against the Germans, was in the political
sense a demonstration against the Soviet Union. It was to provide proof
that the London government was entitled to assume power in the country.
The heroic fighting lasting over two months ended with capitulation. Almost
200,000 persons died under the rubble of their capital.
Meanwhile, in the liberated areas east of the Vistula, the Polish Com-
mittee of National Liberation announced land reform, the nationalization
of industry and the transfer of authority into the hands of the working
masses. A few months later, in 1945, Polish soldiers together with the Soviet
armies liberated the western part of the country, crossed the Odra and
placed their standards on the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. The Western
Powers accepted the existing state of affairs and recognized the Govern-
ment of National Unity set up in Warsaw. The point of view represented
by the government-in-exile in London was rejected.
608 CONCLUSION
1000-1975
1 million
inhabitants . #
Rea Ss
3 wee
100 thous. a
sq. km # Ea
Vd Rd
. 2 i
$410 inhabitants a # =
er sq. km # = % a
% % @ %
: a So 4
= a Pa 4 oe
’ 4 a = %
g % % iB #
% % bs RS %
A ¥ g a
4 ia OE e
% % @ &
Z ane a
= me Be
A ; oe B9
a 2S a oe
3 oo KA s oe
Pee cel Sel cee ce
1500 1650 1770 1914 1921 1939 1946 1975 Years
VI. Growth of population in Poland
The Data for 1914 relate to the three partition areas
Post-war Poland recognized the new frontiers in the east and gave up
the regions inhabited by Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Lithuanian majorities.
At the Potsdam Conference Poland recovered the whole of Silesia, Pomer-
ania, Mazuria and Warmia, provinces which in ages past had been conquered
by the Germans. Poland’s present boundaries are roughly coextensive with
those at the dawn of her history under Mieszko I and Bolestaw the Brave.
The population within these boundaries consists of 98 per cent native Polish
nationals.
Diagram VI illustrates clearly the oscillation in Polish population figures
from the early tenth century to the present day. It brings out forcibly the
high price Poland paid in the two world wars. Desiring to avoid a fresh
catastrophe, Poland wishes to become a protagonist of peace in Europe and
ae
e Polish People’s Republic
100 Kms
el
6 50 Miles
= International boundaries B
— —- Boundaries of Soviet Republics ©
————= Boundaries of voivodships
WARSAW Capitals of States
POZNAN Capitals of voivodships
Kutno Other localities
PWN Warsaw 1979
1000 000 or more inhabitants
500 000-1 000 000 —)—"s—»-
100000-500000 —"—1—»-
25000 - 100000 -"—»—-
under 25 000 =
Major railways
nuinyeors yr
Pregel
RFSR
Imprint PPWK. Zam. 9074
779-x-30 218-102
85 gz
CONCLUSION 609
in the world. At home Poland is building socialism ; in her external relations
Poland has an alliance with the Soviet Union and with the neighbouring
States of People’s Democracy. She does not, however, abandon her friend-
ship and cooperation with the nations of the West.
Poland has repaired the enormous devastation of war, she has raised her
capital out of the rubble, wiped out illiteracy and laid the foundations of
modern industry. Poland now occupies the fourth place in world coal extrac-
tion, the second in sulphur extraction, the ninth in the output of refined
copper and the eleventh in building ocean-going ships (as regards high-sea
fishing vessels Poland competes with Japan and the GDR for the first place
in the world). Industrial growth has provided employment for every citizen,
has raised the standard of living and opened doors to social advancement.
Working to make up for centuries of economic and social neglect, the Polish
people wish to insure for themselves a free, secure and prosperous future in
a world free from the horrors of war. ,
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES
POLISH HISTORY
4th-6th
cent.
Beginning of
7th cent.
Middle of
9th cent.
2nd half of
Sth cent.
ist half of
1Cth cent.
Before 963
to 992
966
972
992-1025
1000
1004-1018
1018
39°
westwards of the
southwards of the
Slavonic migrations
Odra (Oder) and
Carpathians
Formation of political organization of
the Slavs south of the Baltic
Foundation of small regional Slavonic
States in the Odra and Vistula basin
Expansion of the Great-Moravian State
into the area of- southern Poland ;
foundation of the State of the Polanie
(the Piase dynasty) in Great Poland
Conquest af Mazovia by the Piasts
Reign of Mieszko I
The Polish Court adopts Christianity
Conquest of Western Pomerania by
Mieszko I
Reign of Bolestaw the Brave
Emperor Orto III recognizes Poland's
independence ; foundation of the arch-
bishopric in Gniezno
Boleslaw the Brave's
Germans
Peace of Bautzen (BudiSyn) ; Boleslaw the
Brave’s expedition against Kiev and the
incorporation of the Czerwied Castles
into Poland
war against the
GENERAL HISTORY
4th-7th
cent.
5th-7th
cent.
800
c. 830
843
Sth cent.
End of 9th
cent.
x06
950
962
987
988-989
The great migration of people
The Merovingian State
Charlemagne's
tion
Foundation of the Great-Mora-
vian State
Treaty of Verdun
Foundation of the
State
Imperial corona-
Bohemian
Foundation of the State of Kiev
Fall of the Great-Moravian State
Bohemia recognizes the suzerain-
ty of the Empire
Orto I crowned Empcror
Beginnings of the Capetian dyo-
asty in France
Duke Vladimir of
adopts Christianity
Ruthenia
612 CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES
1025
1025-1034
1033
1034-1058
1037
1038 ar 1039
1039
1058-1079
1076
1079
1079-1102
1102-1138
1109
4121-1122
1124-1128
1138
1138-1146
1146-1173
1173-1177
1177-1194
1180
1181
1202-1227
Boleslaw I the Brave crowned King of
Poland
Reign of Mieszko II
Mieszko II renounces the royal crown
Reign of Casimir I the Restorer
Casimir I the Restorer expelled from
Poland ; anti-feudal and anti-Christian
rising of the people
The Bohemian Duke Bfetislav invades
Poland
Casimir I the Restorer returns to Poland ;
reconstruction of the State begins
Reign of Boleslaw II the Bold
Bolestaw I] the Bold crowned King of
Poland
Revolt of the nobles and expulsion of
Boleslaw II the Bold
Reign of Wladyslaw Herman
Reign of Boleslaw III] the Wrymouth
Invasion of Poland by Emperor Henry V
Western Pomerania reincorporated into
Poland
Christianization of Western Pomerania
Death of. Bolestaw JI] the Wrymouth ;
beginning of Poland’s territorial division
‘with a Grand Duke as senior among the
provincial rulers
Reign of Wladyslaw II as Grand Duke
of Poland
Reign of Bolestaw IV the Curly as
Grand Duke
Reign of Mieszko III the Old as Grand
Duke
Rule of Casimir IJ] the Just as Grand
Duke
Congress of Leczyca, concessions by
Casimir If the Just in favour of the
clergy
Western Pomerania made dependent on
the Empire
Reign of Leszek the White as Grand
Duke
1024
1054
1066
1077
1096-1099
1122
1147-1149
1152-1190
1154
1171
ce. 1200
1202
1204
1206
1215
Beginning of the Salic dynasty
of the Franks in Germany
Beginning of the Eastern schism
The Norman conquest of Eng-
land
Henry IV in Canaossa
First Crusade
Concordat of Worms
Second Crusade
Reign of Emperor Frederick I
Barbarossa
Beginning of the Plantagenets’
tule in England (Henry IT)
Conquest of Egypt by the Seljuks
Foundation of the University of
Paris
Establishment of the Order of
Knights of the Sword in Li-
vonia
The Crusaders capture Byzantium
Establishment of the Mongolian
State and beginnings of Mon-
golian expansion
Magna Charta
England
Libertatum in
1226
1227
1232-1234
1241
1249-1252
1291-1292
1295
e
1296
1300-1305
1306
1308-1309
1314
1320-1333
1325
1331
1333-1370
1335
1340-1349
Middle of
14th cent.
1355
1364
1370-1382
Conrad of Mazovia brings the Teutonic
Knights into Poland
Death of Leszek the White, decline of
the institution of Senior Duke
Conquest of Little Poland and a part
of Great Poland by the Silesian Duke
Henry the Bearded
First Mongol invasion of Poland ; batrle
of Legnica, death of Henry che Pious
Conquest of the Lubusz Land by the
Margraves of Brandenburg
Conquest of Little Poland by King
Waclaw II of Bohemia
Coronation of Przemyst II] as King of
Poland
Death of Przemyst II
Reign of Waclaw II as King of Poland
Wiadystaw I the Short conquers Little
Poland
The Teutonic Knights capture Gdansk
and Eastern Pomerania
Wladyslaw I the Short conquers Great
Poland
Reign of Wladyslaw the Short as King
of Poland; end of territorial division
Polish-Lithuanian alliance against the
Teutonic Knights
Battle of Plowce, victory of Wiladystaw
the Short over the Teutonic Knights
Reign of Casimir III the Great, the last
king of the Piast dynasty
Congress of VySehrad : John of Luxem-
burg renounces his claims to the Polish
throne and Casimir III the Great—his
rights to Silesia
Poland occupies the greater part of
Viadimir and Halicz Ruthenia
The Statutes of Great Poland and Little
Poland—first codification of the com-
mon law
Privileges for the gentry granted by
Lovis d’Anjou in Buda in return for the
recognition of his succession in Poland
Foundation of the University of Cracow
Reign of Louis d’Anjou
1228-1229
1240
¢. 1241
Middle
13th cent.
1254-1273
1302
1309-1377
1316-1341
1328
1337
1342-1382
1346
1348
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES 613
Sixth Crusade
Tartars capture Kiev and eon-
quer Ruthenia
Establishment of the Hansa
Foundation of parliaments in
France and England
The Long Interregnum in Ger-
many
The States-Genera] constituted
in France
The ‘Avignon captivity’’ of the
Popes
Reign of Giedymin and unifica-
tion of the Lithuanian State
Ivan Kalita gains the title of
Grand Duke of Muscovy
Outbreak of the Hundred Years’
War
Reign of Louis d’Anjou as King
of Hungary
Battle of Crécy
Foundation of the University of
Prague
614 CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES
1384
1385
1386
1386-1434
1399
1400
1410
1420
1422-1433
1434-1444
1440
1444
1447-1492
1454
1454-1466
1466
1473
1492-1501
1492-1506
1496
1497
1501-1506
1505
1506-1548
1514
Jadwiga, daughter of Louis d’Anjou,
becomes Queen of Poland
Polish-Lithuanian Union at Krewa
Baptism of the Lithuanian Grand Duke
Jagiello and his marriage to Jadwiga
Reign of Wladyslaw Jagiello ; begin-
ning of the Jagiellonian dynasty
The Lithuanian Grand Duke Witold in
the battle with Tartars on the Vorskla
river
Restoration of the Cracow University
Battle of Grunwald
Wladyslaw Jagiello rejects the Bobemian
crown offered to him by the Hussites
The gentry obtain the charter Neminem
captivabimus nisi iwre victum
Reign of Wladyslaw III
Whadystaw III ascends to the Hun-
garian throne; Casimir IV—to the
Lithuanian throne; the Prussian Union
formed
Battle of Varna and death of Wilady-
slaw III
Reign of Casimir IV in Poland
Incorporation of Prussiz into Poland
Thirteen Years’ War with the Teutonic
Knights
Peace of Toruf with Teutonic Knights
First printing shop in Cracow
Reign of Joho Albert
Reign of Alexander in the Grand Duchy
of Lithuania
Statutes of Piotrkéw : the rights of peas-
ants and burghers abridged
John Albert’s defeat in Moldavia
Reign of Alexander
Nihil Novi Constitution
Reign of Sigismund I the Old
Muscovite troops take Smolensk ; Polish-
1371
1377-1417
1380
1397
1409
1414-1418
1419-1434
1429
c. 1450
1453
1455-1485
1462-1505
1481
1492
1497-1498
1503-1513
Beginning of the reign of the
Stuarts in Scotland
Western schism
Battle of Kulikovo Pole, victory
of Demetrius Donskoi over the
Tarcars
Union of Denmark, Norway and
Sweden at Kalmar
Theses of Jan Hus
Council of Constance
Hussite wars
Joan of Arc in Orléans
Discovery of print by Johannes
Gutenberg
Constantinople captured by the
Turks; end of the Hundred
Years’ War
War of the Roses in England
Reign of Ivan III and libera-
tioa of Russia from Tartar de-
pendence
Inquisition established in Spain
Discovery of America ; conquest
of Granada—the end of Spain’s
reconquistd
Discovery of the sea-route to
India (Vasco da Gama)
Pope Julius II
1515
1518
1520
1525
1526
1529
1543
1548-1572
156!
1563-157¢
1564
1569
157¢
1573
1573-1574
1576-1586
1577
1577-1582
1578
Lithuanian victory at Orsza
Meeting in Vienna of Sigismund I the
Old, Wiadystaw Jagiello (son of Casi-
mir IV) aod Emperor Maximilian Haps-
burg : the Hapsburgs receive the guaran-
tee to succeed to the Bohemian and
Hungarian throne in case of extinction
of the Jagiellonian dynasty
Arrival to Poland of Bona Sforza, wife
of Sigismund I the Old
First royal edicts against dissenters
Secularization of the Teutonic Order in
Prussia; the Prussian Prince Albrecht
pays hamage to Sigismund I the Old
Extinction of the Mazovian line of
Piasts ; incorporation of Mazovia to the
Crown
Sigismund II Augustus ascends to the
throne of Lichuania
Nicolaus Copernicus De revolutionibus
orbinm coelestium
Reign of Sigismund 11 Augustus
Secularization of the Livonian Order ;
incorporation of Livonia and _ establish-
ment of the Duchy of Courland
The Seven Years Northern War @
Jesuits brought into Poland
The Union of Lublin
Compact of Sandomierz—agreement of
the Protestant denominations for the
defense of religious freedom
The principle of the free election of
kings adopted ; religious peace guaran-
teed
Reign of Henry de Valois
Reign of Stephen Batory
War with Gdatsk
War with the Grand Duchy of Muscovy
for Livonia
Foundation of the Wilno Academy
1517
1519
1519-1521
1519-1522
1521
1524-1525
1526
1527
1531-1536
1534
1545-1563
1547-1584
1556-1598
1558-1603
1572
1574-1589
1576
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES 615
Theses of Martin Luther
Charles V becomes Emperor
Conquest of Mexico by Hernia
Cortés
Ferdinand Magellan’s expedition
round the world
The Edict of Worms outlaws
Martin Luther as heretic
Peasant war in Germany
The succession of the Hapsburgs
in Bohemia and Hungary
“Sacco di Roma”
Conquest of Peru by Francisco
Pizarro
Establishment of the Jesuit Or-
der ; separation of the English
Church from Rome
Council of Trent
Reign of Ivan the Terrible in
Russia
Reign of Philip II as King of
Spaia
Reign of Queen Elisabeth in
England
St. Bartholomew's Night in
France
Reign of Henry III de Valois as
King of France
Ourbreak of rising the in the
Netherlands
616 CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES
1587-1632
1594-1596
1595
1595-1596
1600
1604-1606
1605
1606-1607
1609-1619
1610
1620
1621
1627
1629
1632-1634
1632-1648
1648
1648-1668
1651
1652
1654-1667
1655-1660
1657
1658
1660
1665-1666
1667
1669-1673
1672
1673
Reign of Sigismund III Vasa
Cossack
vaiko
uprising under Severin Nale-
Foundation of the Zamefé Academy
Union of BrzeSé
Outbreak of the war with Sweden
Polish participation in the action of the
False Demetrius
Victory
Rebellion of Mikolaj
over the Swedes at Kirchholm
Zebrzydowski
War with Russia
Stanislaw Zélkiewski’s victory over the
Russian
army at Kluszyn
Defeat of the Polish army in the battle
with the Turks at Cecora
Defense
Turkey
of Chocim and peace with
Battle of the Polish and Swedish navies
at Oliwa
Victory
over the Swedes at Trzciana ;
truce with Sweden
War with Russia
Reign of Wladystaw IV Vasa
Outbreak of the rising under Bohdan
Chmielnicki in the Ukraine
Reign of John Casimir
Victory
over Bohdan Chmielnicki’s army
at Beresteczko
Seym broken up by the first Liberum
veto
Polish-Russian war
Polish-Swedish war
Treaties
Poland
Arians
of Wehlau and Bydgoszcz ;
renounces the Prussian fief
(Antitrinitarians) expelled from
Poland ; compact of Hadziacz
Peace with Sweden at Oliwa
Rebellion of Jerzy Lubomirski
Truce of Andruszéw
Reign of Michael Korybut-Wisniowiecki
Turkish
Victory
invasion of Poland
over the Turks at Chocim
1579
1588
1589-1610
16C0
1603
1611-1632
1613
1618
1620
1632
1642
1648
1649
1653-1658
1654
1661-1715
Establishment of the Republic of
United Provinces in the Nether-
lands
Victory of the English Navy
over Spain's Great Armada
Reign of King Henry IV_ in
France
Establishment of the East India
Company in England
Death of Elisabeth Tudor, be-
ginning of che Stuare dynasty
in England
Reign of Gustavus Adolphus in
Sweden
Beginning of the rule of the
Romanovs in Russia
Beginning of the Thirty Years’
War
Defeat of the Bohemians at Bilé
Hora
Battle of Liitzen and death of
Gustavus Adolphus
Beginning of Revolution in Eng-
land, the Long Parliament
Peace of Westphalia
Execution of Charles I Stuzre
Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell
Compact of Perejasiaw between
Ukraine and Russia
Reign of Louis XIV
1674-1696
1683
1686
1697-1733
1699
1702
1704
1709
1715-1716
1717
{733
1733-1735
1734-1763
1740
1764-1795
1764-1766
1766-1768
1767
1768-1772
1772
1773
1775
1788-1792
1789
1790
Reign of John II] Sobieski
Siege of Vienna by the Turks and the
Polish relief
Peace with Russia (the Grzymultowski
treaty)
Reign of Augustus II the Strong
Peace with Turkey at Karlovci
Swedish invasion of Poland
The opponents of Augustus II proclaim
an interregnum; election of Stanistaw
LeszczyfAski
Augustus II again recognized as King
The Confederation of Tarnogrdédd
The ‘‘Mute Seym”
Double election of Augustus III and
Stanislaw Leszczynski
The struggle of Stanistaw Leszczynski
against Augustus III for the Polish
throne
Reign of Augustus III
The Collegium Nobilium established by
Stanislaw Konarski
Reign of Stanislaw Augustus Poniatow-
ski
Constitutional reforms carried out by
the “Convocation Confederation”
Russian intervention on the side of
reactionary opposition
The Confederation of the Dissenters and
the Confederation of Radom
The Confederation of Bar
First partition of Poland
Establishment of the Commission for
National Education
Establishment of the Permanent Council
The Four Years’ Seym
“The Black Procession’’ of burghers in
Warsaw
“Warnings for Poland’ by , Stanislaw
Staszic
1682-1725
1684
1699
1700-1721
1701
1701-1714
1714
1716-1720
174C-1748
1740-1786
1742
1751
1756-1763
1762-1796
1767
1773
1776
1776-1782
1787
1789
GHRONOLOGICAL TABLES 617
Reign of Peter the Great in
Russia
Creation of the first anti-Turk-
ish League
The Hapsburgs complete the con-
quest of Hungary
The Northern War
Proclamation of the Kingdom of
Prussia
The Spanish war of succession
George 1 ascends to throne in
England, beginning of the Han-
over dynasty
The affair of Joha Law in
France
The war of Austrian succession
and the Silesian Wars
Reign of Frederick II in Prussia
and of Maria Theresa in Austria
Frederick II occupies Silesia
Volume 1 of the Encyclopaedia
published in France
The Seven Years’ War
Reiga of Catherine If in Russia
James Watt's stcam engine
The Jesuit Order dissolved
Fiest Workers’ Union organized
in England
The American War ot Inde-
pendence
Proclamation of the Constitu-
tion of the United States of
America
Outbreak of the Great Revolu-
tion
618 CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES
1791
1792
1793
1794
1795
1797-1803
1800
1806
1807
1808
1809
1811-1823
1812
1815
1816
1817-1823
1819-1825
1823-1825
1828
1830-1831
1831
1832
1833
1834-1836
1834-1840
1835
1835-1838
1840-1844
1842-1845
Constitution of the 3rd May
The Confederation of Targowica and
war with Russia
Second partition of Poland
The Kosciuszko Insurrection
Third partition of Poland
Polish Legions at the side of the French
army
The Society of Friends of Sciences
established in Warsaw ; reorganization
of the University in Wilno
Napoleon’s Prussian campaign ;_ rising
in Great Poland ; Warsaw occupied by
the French
Establishment of the Duchy of Warsaw ;
its Constitution
Introduction of the Code of Napoleon
Polish-Austrian war; the territory of
the Duchy of Warsaw extended
Enfranchisement of peasants in Polish
provinces under Prussian rule
The army of the Duchy of Warsaw
participates in Napoleon's Russian cam-
paign
Foundation of the Kingdom of Poland
and of the Free State of Cracow
Foundation of the University of Warsaw
Activities of the Philarets and Philo-
maths io Wilno
Activities of the National Freemasonry
and of the Patriotic Society
Contacts of the Patriotic Society with
the Decembrists in Russia
Establishment of the Bank Polski
The November Insurrection
Beginning of che Great Emigration
The autonomy of the Kingdom of Po-
land abridged ; the Polish Democratic
Saciety formed in France
Jézef Zaliwski’s expedition
Activities of the secret independence
organization ‘Young Poland”
Conctruction of the “Huta Bankowa”
ironworks
The association ‘‘Lud Polski’ (Polish
People) formed (The Grudziqz Com-
mune)
Szymon Konarski's activities in Podolia,
Ukraine and Lithuania
Father Piotr Sciegienny’s activities in
the Kielce region
Activities of the ‘‘Plebeian Union” in
Poznan
1792
1795-1799
1799
1804
1806
1807
1809
1812
1814
1814-1815
1815
1820-1823
1825
1830
1830-1832
1832
1833
1834
1837-1901
1839-1842
Overthrow of the monarchy in
France
The Directory in France
The comp d'état of the 18th
Brumaire
Napoleon Bonaparte Emperor of
the French
End of the Roman Empire of
the German Nation
Peace of Tilsit
French-Austrian war
Napolecn’s campaign in Russia
Napoleon abdicates; George
Stephenson’s first locomotive
Congress of Vienna
The “Holy Alliance’’ formed
Liberation of the Latin American
countries ; revolutionary move-
ments in Spain and Italy ; libe-
ration of Greece
The Decembrists’ rising in St.
Petersburg
The July Revolution ia France
Revolution in Belgium
Electoral reform in England
Abolition of slavery in the Eng-
lish colonies
Giuseppe Mazzini forms ‘Young
Europe”’
Reign of Queen Victoria in Eng-
land
Opium War in China
1846
1848
1848-1849
1851
1853
1860~1862
1862
1863-1864
1863
1866-1885
1867
1873
1876
1878
1880
1882
1885-1886
1886
1889
Cracow revolution ; peasant rising in
Galicia ; the Free State of Cracow abol-
ished
Uprising in Great Poland ; revolutionary
ferment in Galicia and Silesia ; Warsaw-
Vienna railway inaugurated; enfran-
chisement of peasants in Galicia
Polish participation in the revolutionary
events in Europe
Customs union of the Kingdom of Po-
land and the Russian Empire
Ignacy Lukasiewicz discovers the kero-
sene lamp
Patriotic manifestations in the Kingdom
of Poland
Central Committee of the Reds estab-
lished in Warsaw ; Aleksander Wielopol-
ski becomes chief of the civilian govern.
ment in the Kingdom of Poland; in-
auguration.- of the Main School (Uni-
versity) in Warsaw
The January Insurrection
Manifesto on the enfranchisement of
peasants issued by the leadership of the
Insurrection
Gradual elimination of the Polish lan-
guage from the schools in the Kingdom
of Poland
Autonomy of Galicia
The Academy of Sciences and Letters
established in Cracow
Abolition of the separate judiciary in
the Kingdom of Poland and introduction
of the Russian language into courts
First socialist organizations formed in
Poland
Trial of Ludwik Waryfski and his as-
sociates in Cracow
The ‘‘Proletariae’” formed
Trial of the ‘Proletariat’ leaders
The Colonization Commission in Great
Poland established by che Prussian author-
ities ; foundation of the Polish League
Polish Workers’ Union formed
1847
1848-1849
1850-1864
1852-1871
1853-1856
1857
1859-1860
1861
1864
1866
1867
1869
1870-1871
1871
1871-1886
1878
1882
1889
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES 619
The Workers’ Union formed in
London
Revolution in France, Austria
Germany, Italy, Hungary ; the
Communist Manifesto of Karl
Marx and Friedrich Engels
Taiping rebellion in China
The Second Empire in France
The Crimean War
Uprising in India
Struggle for the unification of
Italy
Enfranchisement of peasants in
Russia ; Abraham Lincoln inau-
gurated as U.S. President; Amer-
ican Civil War (1861-1865)
The First International formed
Prussian-Austrian war, battle of
Sadova
The Austrian State transformed
into a Dual Monarchy
Opening of the Suez Canal ; es-
tablishment of the Workers’ So-
cial-Democratic Party in Ger-
many
Franco-Prussian War
Proclamation of the German
Reich ; the Paris Commune
The Kulturkampf
The Congress of Berlin
The Triple Alliance formed
The Second International formed
620 CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES
1890
1892
1893
1894
1895
1897
1898
1901
1905-1907
1906
1906-1907
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1918-1919
1919-1920
1919-1921
The First Workers’ May Day in Poland
Foundation of the Polish Socialist Party
Foundation of the Social-Democratic
Party of the Kingdom of Poland (since
1900: Social-Democratic Party of the
Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania) and
of the Polish Social-Democratic Party
of Galicia and Silesia; foundation of
the National League
The ‘‘Hakata”’ formed in the Prussian-
annexed part of Poland
Foundation of the Peasant Party in Ga-
licia (from 1893—Polish Peasaut Party)
Foundation of the National Democratic
Party
Anti-Polish emergency laws in the Prus-
sian-annexed part of Poland
Strike of school children in Wrzefnia
against the Germanization of schaols
Revolution in the Kingdom of Poland
The Polish Socialist Party (PPS) split
into the PPS Lefc and the PPS Revo-
lutionary Wing
School strike in the Prussian-annezed
part of Poland
Supreme National Committee in Ga-
licia ; formation of the Polish Legions
at the side of the Austrian army
The Kingdom of Poland occupied by
the German and Austrian armies
Act of the German and Austrian govern-
ments on the Polish question (5 Nov.)
The Legions dissolved ; establishment of
the Polish National Committee in Lau-
sanne (it later functioned in Paris);
establishment of the Regency Council
Ignacy Daszyfski forms a government
in Lublin ; Jézef Pilsudski becomes chief
of the independent Polish State on 11th
November ; establishment of the Polish
Communist Workers’ Party (since 1925 :
Communist Party of Poland—KPP)
Uprising in Great Poland ; Councils of
Workers’ Delegates in Poland
Polish-Soviet war
Silesian uprisings
1890
1894
1898
1900
1903
1904-1905
1905-1907
1907
1911-1912
1912-1913
1914
1916
1917
1918
1919
The First Workers’ May Day
celebrations in London
The Russo-French Alliance
Discovery of radium by Pierre
Curie and Maria Sklodowska-
Curie ‘
Establishment of the Labour
Party
The Nobel Prize awarded to An-
toine Henri Becquerel, Pierre
Curie and Maria Sktodowska-
Curie
Russia-Japan War
Revolution in Russia
The Triple Entente formed
Revolution in China and procla-
mation of the Republic
The Balkan wars
Outbreak of World War I
Battle of Verdun
February Revolution in Russia,
Tsardom overthrown; U.S.A.
enters war ; victary of the Great
Socialise October Revolution in
Petrograd ; the Petrograd Work-
ers’ Soviet recognizes Poland's
right co independence
Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points of
Peace ; declaration of the Soviet
government on the annulment
of treaties on the partitions of
“Poland ; outbreak of revolution
in Germany ; surrender of Aus-
tria and Germany
Peace treaty signed in Versailles ;
establishment of che League of
Nations ; the Third Interaation-
al formed
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1926
1929
1931
1932
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
4939
Plebiscites in Warmia, Mazuria and
Powisle
The Constitution of March voted ; peace
treaty of Riga; plebiscite in Silesia
Assassination of President Gabriel Naru-
towicz ; Stanislaw Wojciechowski elected
President
Second Congress of the KPP; workers’
rising in Cracow
Financial reforms of Wladyslaw Grab-
ski; establishment of the Bank Polski;
construction of the port of Gdynia
launched
Jézef Pilsudski’s May coup d'état
The “Centrolew’’ (Centre-Left) formed
The trial of Brzegé
Non-aggression pact with the U.S.S.R.
Non-aggression pact with Germany
The Constitution of April passed
Strikes in Cracow and Lwéw ; peasant
strikes in Little Poland
National Unity Camp farmed
The Communist Party of Poland dis-
solved by the Communist International ;
annexation of the Zaolzie region (part
of Cieszyn Silesia) by Poland
Nazi Germany attacks Poland (1 Sep.);
the September campaign (1 Sep.-5 Oct.) ;
the Sovier army enters Wese Ukraine and
Wese Byelorussia (17 Sep.) ; Gen. Wla-
dysiaw Sikorski forms the Polish Gov-
ernment-in-exile in France; establish-
ment of the General-Gouvernment by
the Nazi occupying power
1922
1925
1929-1933
1933
1935
1936
1936-1939
1937
1938
1939
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLES 621
Benito Mussolini’s coup d’éeat
Treaties of Locarno
The great depression
Hitler assumes power; the
Reichstag fire trial
Remilitarization of Germany ;
Icalian aggression in Abyssinia
The Berlin-Rome Axis formed
Fascist cowp and civil war in
Spain
Japanese aggression in China ;
Italy joins the German-Japanese
pact
Annexation of Austria by Ger-
many ; Germany occupies the
Sudetenland ; the Munich agree-
ments
Annexation of Czechoslovakia by
Germany ; Soviet-German non-
aggression pact; outbreak of
World War II
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
A. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL WORKS
Bibliografia historii Polski (Bibliography of Polish History), ed. by H. Madurowicz-Urbanska
Vol. I-III, Warszawa 1965-1974 et sqq.
Bibliografia historit polskie; (yearly Bibliography of Polish History—contains current biblio-
graphy), ed. by J. Baumgart and co-workers, Wroclaw-Warszawa-Krakéw 1952 et sqq.
L. Finkel, Bibliografia historii polskie} (Bibliography of Polish History). Vol. I-III with
supplement. Lw6w-Krakéw 1891-1914. Anastatic reprint, Warszawa 1955.
S. Skwirowska, Bibliographie des travaux des historiens polonais en langues étrangéres parus
dans les années 1945-1968, Wroclaw 1971.
B. MORE IMPORTANT TEXT-BOOKS AND SYNTHETICAL WORKS
Atlas Historyczny Polski (Historical Atlas of Poland), 3rd ed., Warszawa 1973.
J. Bardach, B. Lesnodorski, M. Pietrzak, Historia panstwa i prawa polskiego (History of the
Polish State and Legislation), Warszawa 1976.
A. Briickner, Dzieje kultury polskie; (History of Polish Culture), 3rd ed. Vol. I-III, War-
szawa 1958; vol. IV, Krakéw-Warszawa 1946.
The Cambridge History of Poland, Cambridge 1950-1951.
Dzieje Polski (History of Poland), ed. by J. Topolski, Warszawa 1975. ~
Dzieje Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego (History of the Jagiellonian University), ed. by
K. Lepszy. Vol. I, II, Krakéw 1964-1965 et sqq.
Historia chtopow polskich (History of the Polish Peasants), ed. by S. Inglot. Vol. I-II,
Warszawa 1970-1972.
Historia nauki polskie; (History of Polish Science), ed. by B. Suchodolski. Vol. I-VII,
Wroclaw 1970-1975,
Historia panstwa i prawa Polski (Constitutional and Legal History of Poland), ed. by
J. Bardach. 2nd ed. Vol. I, II, Warszawa 1964-1966.
Historia Polski (History of Poland), ed. by the Institute of History of the Polish Academy
of Sciences. Vol. I (parts 1-3), vol. II (parts 1-4), vol. III (parts 1-3), vol. IV (part 1).
Warszawa 1955-1974 et sqq.
Historia sztuki polskie; w zarysie (History of Polish Art, An Outline), ed. by T. Dobro-
wolski, W. Tatarkiewicz. Vol. I-III, Krakéw 1962, 2nd ed. 1965.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 623
*Koscidl w Polsce (The Church in Poland), ed. by J. Kloczowski. Vol. I: Sredniowiecze
(Medieval Poland), Krakéw 1966; vol. II: wiek XVI-XVIII (16th-18th Centuries),
Krakow 1969. :
Miasta polskie w tysiqclecix (Polish Towns in Millennium). Vol. I, 1], Wroctaw-Warszawa-
Krakéw 1965-1967.
La Pologne au X* Congrés International des Sciences Historiques a Rome, Warszawa 1955.
Poland at the 11th International Congress of Historical Sciences in Stockholm, War-
szawa 1968.
La Pologne au XII* Congrés International des Sciences Historiques a Vienne, War-
szawa 1965.
La Pologne au XIII° Congrés International des Sciences Historiques @ Moscon, Warsza-
wa 1970.
Poland to the 14th International Congress of Historical Seiences, San Francisco, War-
szawa 1975,
Polski Slownik Biograficzny (Polish Biographical Dictionary), ed. by W. Konopczynski,
K. Lepszy, E. Rostworowski. Vol. I-XX, Krakéw-Wroclaw 1935-1977 et sqq.
J. Rutkowski, Historia gospodarcza Polski (Economic History of Poland). Vol. I, II, Poz-
nan 1946-1950.
Slownik Historii Polski (Lexicon of Polish History), VI ed., Warszawa 1973.
Zarys historit gospodarstwa wiejskiego w Polsce (An Outline of the History of Polish
Agriculture). Vol. I, II, Warszawa 1964.
Zarys dziejéw wojskowosci polskie} do roku 1864 (An Outline of Polish Military History
up to 1864), Warszawa 1965-1966.
C. TEXT-BOOKS COVERING LONGER PERIODS
R. Grodecki, S. Zachorowski, J. Dabrowski, Dzieje Polski sredniowiecznej (History of
Medieval Poland). Vol. I, II, Krakéw 1926.
W. Konopcezynski, Dzieje Polski nowozytnej (History of Modern Poland), 2nd ed. Vol. I,
II, London 1958-1959.
M. Kukiel, Dzieje Polski porozbiorowej 1795-1921 (History of Poland after the Partitions),
London 1961.
D. HISTORY OF VARIOUS REGIONS AND TOWNS
M. M. Drozdowski, A. Zahorski, Historia Warszawy (History of Warsaw), 2nd ed., War-
szawa 1974,
Dzieje Szczecina (History of Szczecin), ed. by G. Labuda. Vol. II (up to 1805), War-
szawa 1963.
Dzieje Wielkopolski (The History of Great Poland), ed. by J. Topolski, W. Jakébczyk.
Vol. I-II, Poznan 1965-1973.
Dzieje Wroctawia (History of Wroclaw), ed. by K. Maleczynski. Vol. I, Warszawa 1958.
Dziesieé wiekow Poznania (Poznan’s Ten Centuries), ed. by K. Malinowski. Vol. I-III,
Poznan-Warszawa 1956.
I. Gieysztorowa, A. Zahorski, J. Lukasiewicz, Cztery wieki Mazowsza. Szkice z dztejow
1526-1914 (Four Centuries of the History of Mazovia. Sketches from the History 1526-
1914), Warszawa 1968.
Historia Pomorza (The History of Pomerania), ed. G. Labuda. Vol. I-II, Poznan 1971-1976.
624 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
Historia Slaska (History of Silesia), ed. by K. Maleczynski. Vol. I, Wroclaw 1960-1961:
Krakow. Studia nad rozwojem miasta (Cracow. Studies on the Development of the City),
ed. by J. Dabrowski, Krakéw 1957.
G. Labuda, Polska granica zachodnia. Tysiqe lat dziejéw politycznych (Poland’s Western
Frontier. A Thousand Years of Political History), 2nd ed., Poznan 1974.
Osiemnascie wiekéw Kalisza (Kalisz and Its Eighteen Centuries), ed. by A. Gieysztor and
K. Dabrowski. Vol. I-III, Kalisz 1960-1962.
Szkice z dziejéw Pomorza (Sketches from the History of Pomerania), ed. by G. Labuda
and S. Hoszowski. Vol. I, II, Warszawa 1958-1959.
MEDIEVAL POLAND
(Up to the End of the fifteenth Century)
A. MAIN PUBLICATIONS OF SOURCES
Monumenta Poloniae Historica. Vol. I-VI Anastatic reprint, Warszawa 1960-1961.
Monumenta Poloniae Historica. Nova Series. Vol. I-III, IV, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X,
Krakéw-Warszawa 1946-1976 et sqq.
)
B. MAIN REFERENCE BOOKS
P. David, Les sources de Vhistoire de Pologne a Pépoque des Piasts, Paris 1934.
J. Dabrowski, Dawne dziejopisarstwo polskie (do roku 1480) (Ancient Polish Historio-
graphy till 1480), Wroctaw-Warszawa-Krakéw 1964.
Dzieje sztuki polskiej (The History of Polish Art). Vol. I: Sztuka polska przedromanska
i romanska do schylku XIII w. (Pre-Romanesque and Romanesque Art in the Late
13th Century), ed. by M. Walicki, Warszawa 1971.
Z. Kozlowska-Budkowa, Repertorium polskich dokumentow doby piastowskiej (Register
of Polish Documents of the Piast Era). Vol. I, Krakéw 1947. (In the introduction major
publications of collections of medieval documents are also recorded).
Stownik starozytnosci stowianskich (Lexicon Antiquitatum SJavicarum). Vol. I (A-E) ;
vol. II (F-K); vol. III (L-M); vol. IV (P-R); vol. V (S-$), Wroctaw 1961-1975
et sqq.
C. MORE IMPORTANT AND RECENT WORKS RELATED TO
VARIOUS PERIODS AND PROBLEMS
1. SLAVONIC ANTIQUITY
W. Hensel, Ziemie polskie w pradziejach (Ancient Polish Territories), Warszawa 1969.
K. Jazdzewski, Ancient Peoples and Places of Poland, London 1965.
H. Lowmianski, Poczqtki Polski (The Rise of Poland). Vol. I-V, Warszawa 1963-1973.
K. Tymieniecki, Ziemie polskie w starozytnosci. Ludy i kultury najdawniejsze (Polish
Lands in Ancient Times. Peoples and Culture), Poznan 1951.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 625
2. THE ORIGINS OF THE POLISH STATE
J. Kostrzewski, Kultura prapolska (Ancient Polish Culture), 3rd ed., Warszawa 1962.
French translation of the 2nd ed. : Les Origines de la civilisation polonaise. Préhistoire—
protohistoire, Paris 1949.
Poczqtki panstwa polskiego. Ksiega Tysiqclecia (The Beginning of the Polish State. Book
of the Millenium). Vol. I, II, Poznan 1962.
Z. Podwinska, Zmiany form osadnictwa wiejskiego na ziemiach polskich we wezesnym
Sredniowieczu (Changes in Rural Settlement on Polish Lands in the Early Middle Ages),
Wroctaw 1971.
Polska pierwszych Piastow. Panstwo, spoleczenstwo, kultura (Poland of the First Piasts.
State, Society, Culture), 2nd ed., ed. by T. Manteuffel, Warszawa 1973.
S. Trawkowski, Jak powstala Polska (The Foundation of Poland), 4th ed., Warszawa 1968.
A. Zaki, Archeologia Matopolski wezesnosredniowiecznej (Archaeology of Early Medieval
Little Poland), Wroclaw 1974.
3. THE YOUTH OF THE POLISH STATE
K. Buczek, Ziemie polskie przed tysiqcem lat. Zarys geograficzno-historyczny (Polish
Lands Thousand Years Ago. A Geographical and Historical Outline), Wroclaw 1960.
S. Ketrzynski, Polska X-XI wieku (Poland in the 10th and 11th Centuries), Warszawa 1961.
L’Europe aux IX°-XI° siécles. Aux origines des Etats nationaux, ed. by T. Manteuffel
and A. Gieysztor, Varsovie 1968.
K. Maleczyfski, Bolestaw III Krzywousty (Bolestaw III the Wrymouth), Wroclaw 1975.
4. THE AGE OF MATURITY
Mistrza Wincentego kronitka polska (Polish Chronicle by Master Wincenty), ed. K. Abgaro-
wicz, B. Kiirbis, Warszawa 1974.
Les Origines des villes polonaises, ed. by P. Francastel, Paris 1960.
S. Smolka, Mieszko Stary i jego wiek (Mieszko the Old and His Age), 2nd ed., War-
szawa 1959.
T. Wojciechowski, Szkice historyczne jedenastego wieku (Historical Sketches of the 11th
Century), 3rd ed., Warszawa 1951.
5. THE AGE OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND THE CHANGING SOCIETY
J. Baszkiewicz, Powstanie zjednoczonego panstwa polskiego na przetomie XIII i XIV w.
(The Rise of a United Polish State at the Turn of the 13th Century), Warszawa 1954.
H. Dabrowski, Rozw6j gospodarki rolnej w Polsce od XII do potowy XIV wieks, in:
Studia z dziejow gospodarstwa wiejskiego (The Development of Agriculture in Poland
from the 12th till the Mid-14th Century in: Essays on the History of Rural Economy).
Vol. I, Warszawa 1962.
Polska dzielnicowa i zjednoczona. Panstwo, spoleczenstwo, kultura (Poland of the Ducal
Provinces and United Poland. State, Society, Culture), ed. by A. Gieysztor, War-
szawa 1972.
Z. Swiechowski, Budownictwo romanskie w Polsce. Katalog zabytkéw (Romanesque Archi-
tecture in Poland. A Catalogue of Monuments of Art), Wroclaw 1963.
B. Zientara, Henryk Brodaty i jego czasy (Henry I the Bearded and His Time), War-
szawa 1975.
40 History of Poland
626 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
6. CORONA REGNI POLONIAE AT THE PEAK OF ITS POWER
M. Biskup, Trzynastoletnia wojna z Zakonem Krzyzackim 1454-1466 (The Thirteen
Years’ War with Teutonic Knights 1454-1466), Warszawa 1967.
J. Dabrowski, Korona Krolestwa Polskiego w XIV wieku (The Polish Crown in the
14th Century), Wroctaw 1955.
Z. Kaczmarczyk, Monarchia Kazimierza Wielkiego (The Kingdom of Casimir the Great).
Vol. I, II, Poznan 1939-1946.
P. W. Knoll, The Rise of the Polish Monarchy, Piast Poland in East Central Europe,
1320-1370, Chicago 1972.
S. Kuczynski, Wielka wojna z Zakonem Krzyzackim w latach 1409-1411 (The Great War
with the Teutonic Knights 1409-1411), 3rd ed.. Warszawa 1966.
H. Samsonowicz, Ztlota jesien polskiego sredniowiecza (The Golden Autumn of Medieval
Poland), Warszawa 1971.
Sztuka i ideologia XIV wieku (Art and Ideology of the 14th Century), ed. by P. Skubi-
szewski, Warszawa 1975.
M. Walicki, Malarstwo Polskie. Gotyk, renesans, wezesny manieryzm (Polish Painting.
Gothic, Renaissance and Early Manierism), Warszawa 1961.
THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE GENTRY
(From the sixteenth to the eighteenth Century)
A. MAIN PUBLICATIONS OF SOURCES
Akty powstania Kosciuszki (Acts of the Kogciuszko Insurrection). Vol. I-III, Krakow-
Wroclaw 1918-1955.
Materialy do dziejéw Sejmu Czteroletniego (Source Material for the History of the Four
Years’ Seym), compiled by J. Wolinski, J. Michalski, E. Rostworowski. Vol. I-V,
Wroclaw 1955-1964 et sqq.
(Volumina legum). Prawa, konstytucye y przywilete Krolestwa Polskiego y Wielkiego
Xiestwa Litewskiego y wszystkich Prowincyi nalezgacych... uchwalone (The Laws,
Constitutions and Privileges of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania). Vol. I-VIII, Warszawa 1733-1782; vol. IX, Krakéw 1889; vol. X,
Poznan 1952.
B. MORE IMPORTANT AND RECENT WORKS RELATED TO
VARIOUS PERIODS AND PROBLEMS
B. Baranowski, Kultura ludowa w XVII i XVIII w. na ziemiach polskich (Folk Culture
in the 17th and 18th Centuries on Polish Territories), L6dz 1971.
J. S. Bystron, Dzieje obyczajow w dawnej Polsce, wiek XVI-XVIII (The History of
Customs in the Past in Poland, 16th-18th Centuries), 3rd ed. Vol. I-II, Warszawa 1976.
W. Konopezyfski, Dzieje Polski nowozytnej (History of Modern Poland), 2nd ed. Vol. 1
(1506-1648) ; vol. 2 (1648-1795), London 1958.
W. Konopezynski, Le liberum veto. Etude sur le développement du principe majoritaire,
Paris 1930.
Kosciot w Polsce (The Church in Poland), ed. J. Kloczowski. Vol. 2: wieki XVI-XVIII
(16th-18th Centuries), Krakéw 1969.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 627
S. Kot, Rzeczpospolita Polska w literaturze politycznej Zachodu (The Polish Common-
wealth in Western Political Literature), Krakéw 1919.
W. Kula, Teoria ekonomiczna ustroju feudalnego (The Economic Theory of the Feudal
System), Warszawa 1962. ;
J. Maciszewski, Szlachta polska i jej panstwo (The Polish Gentry and Their State), War-
szawa 1969.
H. Olszewski, Sejm Rzeczypospolite; epoki oligarchit 1652-1763 (The Seym of the Com-
monwealth in the Age of Oligarchy 1652-1763), Poznan 1966.
A. Wyczanski, Polska Rzeczqpospolitqa szlachecka 1454-1764 (Poland the Commonwealth
of the Gentry), Warszawa 1965.
1. THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC QUESTIONS
M. Bogucka, Gdarisk jako osrodek produkcyjny w XIV-XVIII w. (Gdansk as a Produc-
tion Centre), Warszawa 1962.
H. Lowmianski, Uwagi w sprawie podtoza spotecznego i gospodarczego unii jagiellonskie}
(Remarks on the Social and Economic Background of the Jagiellonian Union),
Wilno 1935. :
S. Mielczarski, Rynek zbozowy na ziemiach polskich w drugiej potowie XVI i pierwszej
XVII wieku (The Grain Market on Polish Territories in the Late 16th and Early 17th
Centuries), Gdansk 1962. ;
R. Rybarski, Handel i polityka handlowa Polski w XVI stuleciun (Poland’s Trade and Her
Commercial Policy in the 16th Century), 2nd ed. Vol. I, II, Warszawa 1958.
A. Tarnawski, Dzialalnosé gospodarcza Jana Zamoyskiego kanclerza i hetmana w. kor.
(1572-1605) (The Economic Activity of Jan Zamoyski), Lwéw 1935.
A. Wyczanski, Studia nad folwarkiem szlacheckim w Polsce w latach 1500-1580 (Studies
on the Gentry’s Manor Farm in Poland 1500-1580), Warszawa 1960.
L. Zytkowicz, Studia nad gospodarstwem wiejskim w dobrach koscielnych XVI w. (Studies
on Agriculture of Church Estates in the 16th Century), Warszawa 1962.
2. LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
K. Grzybowski, Teoria reprezentacjt w Polsce epoki Odrodzenia (The Theory of Represen-
tation in Poland at the Renaissance Period), Warszawa 1959.
I. Kaniewska, Malopolska reprezentacja stanowa za czas6w Zygmunta Augusta, 1548-1572
(Little Poland Class Representation During the Reign of Sigismund Augustus), Kra-
kéw 1974,
A. Sucheni-Grabowska, Monarchia dwu ostatnich Jagiellondw a ruch egzekucyjny (The
Monarchy during the Reign of the Last Two Jagiellons and the “execution movement”).
Part 1: Geneza egzekucji dobr (Genesis of the Movement to Bring about Legislation
for the Restitution of the Royal Gifts to the Magnates in the Form of Landed Estates),
Wroclaw 1974.
3. GENERAL PROBLEMS OF THE RENAISSANCE PERIOD
Odrodzenie w Polsce. Ksi¢ga zbiorowa (The Renaissance in Poland. Collective Work).
Vol. I—History, Warszawa 1955.
Polska w epoce Odrodzenia. Panstwo-spoleczenstwo-kultura (Poland during the Epoch
of the Renaissance. State-Society—Culture), ed. by A. Wyczanhski, Warszawa 1970.
Spoteczenstwo staropolskie. Studia i szkice (Society in Ancient Poland. Studies and Sketches),
ed. by A. Wyczanski, Warszawa 1976.
628 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
Swojskosé i cudzoziemszczyzna w dziejach kultury polskiej (Polish and Foreign Influence in
the History of Polish Culture), ed. by Z. Stefanowska, Warszawa 1973.
Tradycje szlacheckie w kulturze polskiej (Gentry Traditions in Polish Culture), ed. by
Z. Stefanowska, Warszawa 1976.
4, POLITICAL HISTORY
A. Dembinska, Polityczna walka o egzekucie dobr krolewskich w latach 1559-1564 (The
Political Struggle for Treasury Contributions from Royal Estates in 1559-1564), War-
szawa 1935.
L. Kolankowski, Zygmunt August wielki ksigte Litwy do roku 1548 (Sigismund Augustus
Grand Duke of Lithuania up to 1548), Lwéw 1913.
W. Pociecha, Kroélowa Bona (1494-1557) (The Queen Bona, 1494-1557). Vol. I-IV, Poz-
nan 1949-1958.
Z. Wojciechowski, Zygmunt Stary (1506-1548) (Sigismundus the Old, 1506-1548), War-
szawa 1946.
5. THE REFORMATION AND THE COUNTER-REFORMATION
A. Briickner, Réznowiercy polscy (The Polish Dissidents), 2nd ed., Warszawa 1962.
L. Chmaj, Bracia polscy. Ludzie, idee, wplywy (The Polish Brethren. People, Ideas and
Influence), Warszawa 1957.
A. Jobert, De Luther a4 Mohila. La Pologne dans la crise de la Chrétienté 1517-1648,
Paris 1974.
K. E. Jordt Jorgensen, Okumenische Bestrebungen unter den polnischen Protestanten bis
zum Jabre 1645, Kobenhavn 1942.
S. Kot, Socinianism in Poland. The Social and Political Ideal of the Polish Antitrinitarians
in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, Boston 1957.
S. Kot, Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski. Studium z dziejow kultury polskie; XVI w. (Andrzej
Frycz Modrzewski. A Study on the History of Polish Sixteenth Century Culture),
2nd ed., Krakéw 1923.
G. Schramm, Der polnische Adel und die Reformation, 1548-1607, Wiesbaden 1965.
Studia nad arianizmem (Studies on Arianism), ed. by L. Chmaj, Warszawa 1959.
L. Szezucki, W kregu myslicieli heretyckich (In the Milieu of Heretic Philosophers),
Wroclaw 1972.
J. Tazbir, A State without Stakes. Polish Religious Toleration in the Sixteenth and Seven-
teenth Centuries, New York—Warszawa 1973.
6. SCIENCE AND CULTURE
Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski i problemy kultury polskiego Odrodzenia (Andrzej Frycz-Mo-
drzewski and Cultural Problems of the Polish Renaissance), ed. by R. Bienkowski,
Wroclaw 1974.
C. Backwis, Szkice o kulturze staropolskie; (Sketches on Ancient Polish Culture), War-
szawa 1975.
H. Barycz, Dzieje nauki w Polsce w epoce Odrodzenia (The History of Science and Learn-
ing in Poland at the Renaissance Period), Warszawa 1957.
L. A. Birkenmajer, Mikolaj Kopernik (Nicolaus Copernicus). Part 1, Krakéw 1900.
Kultura staropolska (Ancient Polish Culture), Krakéw 1932.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 629
T. Mankowski, Genealogia sarmatyzmu polskiego (The Genealogy of Sarmatism), War-
szawa 1946.
Renesans. Sztuka i tdeologia (Renaissance. Art and Ideology), Warszawa 1974.
P. Rybicki, Odrodzenie (Renaissance), in: Historia nauki polskie; (History of Polish
Science). Vol. 1, ed. by B. Suchodolski, Wroctaw 1970.
T. Ulewicz, Sarmacja. Studium z problematyki stowianskiej XV i XVI w. (Sarmatia.
A Study on Slavonic Problems 15th and 16th cent.), Krakow 1950.
7. THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
E. Angyal, Die slawische Barockwelt, Leipzig 1961.
H. Barycz, Barok (Baroque), in: Historia nauki polskie} (History of Polish Science). Vol. II,
Wroclaw 1970.
W. Czaplinski, O Polsce siedemnastowiecznej (Seventeenth-Century Poland), Warsza-
wa 1966.
W. Czaplinski, Wladystaw IV i jego czasy (Wtadystaw IV and His Time), 2nd ed., War-
szawa 1976.
A. Kersten, Stefan Czarniecki (1599-1665), Warszawa 1963.
J. Maciszewski, Wojna domowa w Polsce (1606-1609) (The Civil War in Poland 1606-
1609). Part 1, Wroctaw 1960.
O naprawe Rzeczypospolite; XVII-XVIII w. (For the Improvement of the Common-
wealth, 17th-18th Centuries), ed. by J. Gierowski, Warszawa 1965.
Z. Ogonowski, Socynianizm a Oswiecenie. Studia nad myslq filozoficzno-religijng arian
w Polsce XVII w. (Arianism and the Enlightenment. Studies on the Philosophical and
Religious Thought of the Arians in 17th-century Poland), Warszawa 1966.
Polska XVII wieku. Pankstwo-spoleczenstwo-kultura (Seventeenth-Century Poland. State-
Society-Culture), ed. by J. Tazbir, 2nd ed., Warszawa 1974.
Polska w okresie drugie} wojny pétnocnej 1655-1660 (Poland During the Second Northern
War 1655-1660), ed. by K. Lepszy. Vol. I-III, Warszawa 1957.
J. Tazbir, Rzeczpospolita a swiat. Studia z dziejow kultury XVII wieku (The Common-
wealth and the World. Studies on the History of 17th-century Culture), Wroclaw 1971.
M. Wajsblum, Ex regestro arianismi. Szkice z dziejow upadku protestantyzmu w Polsce
(Essays on the History of the Downfall of Protestantism in Poland), Warszawa 1947.
Wiek XVII-Kontrreformacja-Barok. Prace z historii kultury (Seventeenth-Century-Counter-
Reformation. Work on the History of Culture), ed. by J. Pelc, Wroctaw 1970.
Z. Wojcik, Traktat andruszowski i jego geneza (The Truce of Andruszéw and Its Genesis),
Warszawa 1959.
8. THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
W. Borowy, O poezji polskiej w wieku XVIII (On Polish Poetry in the 18th century),
Krakow 1948.
W. Konopezynski, Fryderyk Wielki a Polska (Frederic the Great and Poland), Poznan 1947.
W. Konopczynski, Polscy pisarze polityczni XVIII w. (Eighteenth-Century Polish Political
Writers), Warszawa 1966.
J. Rutkowski, Poddantstwo wloscian w XVIII w. w Polsce i niektérych innych krajach
Europy (The Serfdom of the Peasantry in 18th Century Poland and in some other
European Countries), Poznan 1921.
630 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
9. THE SAXON TIMES
S. Bednarski, Upadek i odrodzenie szkot jezuickich w Polsce (Downfall and Revival of
Jesuit Colleges in Poland), Krakéw 1933.
J. Feldman, Stanislaw Leszezynski, 2nd ed., Warszawa 1959.
J. Gierowski, Migdzy saskim absolutyzmem a zlotqa wolnoscig. Z dziejow wewnetrznych
Rzeczypospolite; w latach 1712-1715 (Between Saxon Absolute Rule and the Golden
Freedom. Internal Problems of the Polish Commonwealth in 1712-1715), Wroclaw
1953.
W. Konopczynski, Polska w dobie wojny siedmioletniej (Poland During the Seven Years’
War). Part I, II, Warszawa 1909-1911.
E. Rostworowski, O polskq korone. Polityka Francjt w latach 1725-1733 (For the Polish
Crown. Policy of France in 1725-1733), Wroclaw 1958.
Um die Polnische Krone. Sachsen und Polen wahrend des Nordischen Krieges, 1700-1721
(Collective work of Polish and German scholars), Berlin 1962.
10. THE ENLIGHTENMENT PERIOD. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
W. Kula, Szkice o manufakturach w Polsce XVIII wieku (Studies' on Manufactures in
18th-Century Poland), Warszawa 1956.
R. Rybarski, Skarbowosé Polski w dobie rozbioréw (Finances of Poland in the Period of
Partitions), Krakéw 1937.
11. POLITICAL HISTORY
B. Dembinski, Polska na przelomie (Poland at Cross-Roads), Lwéw-Warszawa—Poznan
[1913].
O. Forst-Battaglia, Stanislaw August Poniatowski und der Ausgang des alten Polenstaates,
Berlin 1927,
W. Kalinka, Der vierjabrige Polnische Reichstag 1788-1791 (Aus dem polnischen sber-
setzte deutsche Originalausgabe). Vol. I, II, Berlin 1896-1898.
H. H. Kaplan, The First Partition of Poland, New York-London 1962.
W. Konopczyfiski, Konfederacja Barska (Bar Confederation). Vol. I, II, Warszawa 1936-
1938.
W. Konopczynski, Geneza i ustanowienie Rady Nieustajqcej (The Origins and the Establish-
ment of the Permanent Council), Krakéw 1917.
Lefnodorski, Polscy jakobini (The Polish Jacobins), Warszawa 1960. French edition :
Les jacobins polonais, Paris 1965.
. H. Lord, The Second Partition of Poland, Cambridge 1915.
Rostworowski, Ostatni krol Rzeczypospolite;j—geneza i upadek Konstytucji 3 maja
(The Last King of Commonwealth. The Origin and the End of the Constitution of
3rd May), Warszawa 1966.
W. Tokarz, Insurekcja warszawska (The Warsaw Insurrection), 2nd ed., Warszawa 1950.
bs
12. CULTURE IN THE AGE OF REASON
M. Chamcéwna, Uniwersytet Jagiellonski w dobie Komisji Edukacji Narodowej (The Jagiel-
lonian University at the Time of the Commission for National Education). Vol. I, II,
Wroclaw 1957-1959.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 631
J. Fabre, Stanislas-Auguste Poniatowski et l'Europe des Lumiéres, Paris 1952.
A. Jobert, La Commission d’Education Nationale en Pologne (1773-1794), son ceuvre
d’instruction civique, Paris 1941.
W. Smolenski, Przewrét umystowy w Polsce wieku XVIII (The Intellectual Revolution
in Eighteenth Century Poland), 3rd ed., Warszawa 1949.
POLAND UNDER FOREIGN RULE
(1795-1918)
A. MAIN PUBLICATIONS OF SOURCES
Dyaryusz sejmu zr. 1830-1831 (Minutes of the Seym Proceedings in 1830-1831), ed. by
M. Rostworowski. Vol. I-VI, Krakéw 1907-1912.
Galicyjska dziatalnosé wojskowa Pilsudskiego 1906-1914 (Pilsudski’s Military Activity in
Galicia), ed. by S. Arski, J. Chudek, Warszawa 1967.
Polskie programy socjalistyczne 1878-1918 (Polish Socialist Programmes). Selection and
commentary by F. Tych, Warszawa 1975,
PPS-Lewica. Materiaty i dokumenty 1906-1918 (The PPS Left Wing. Materials and Docu-
ments, 1906-1918), ed. by F. Tych, J. Kancewicz, J. Kasprzakowa. Vol. I, II, War-
szawa 1961-1962.
Socjaldemokracja Krolestwa Polskiego i Litwy. Materialy i dokumenty (The Social-
democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania. Materials and Documents), ed. by
H. Buczek, F. Tych. Vol. I, II, Warszawa 1957-1963.
Ustawodawstwo Ksiestwa Warszawskiego (The Legislation of the Duchy of Warsaw), ed. by
W. Bartel, J. Kosim, W. Rostocki. Vol. I-III, Warszawa 1964-1967.
Walki chtopéw Krélestwa Polskiego w rewolucji 1905-1907 (The Fighting of the Peasantry
of the Kingdom of Poland in the 1905-1907 Revolution), ed. by S. Kalabinski, F. Tych.
Vol. I-III, Warszawa 1958-1961.
Vosstanie 1863 goda. Materialy i dokumenty. Pows:anie styczniowe. Materialy i doku-
menty (The January Insurrection. Materials and Documents), ed. by E. Halicz, L. Ja-
kovlev, S. Kieniewicz, V. Koroluk, I. Miller, F. Ramotowska, Moskva—Warszawa 1961
et sqq.
2rédta do dziejéw klasy robotniczej na ziemiach polskich (Sources for the History of the
Working Class on Polish Territory). Vol. I (part 1, 2), II, ed. by N. Gasiorowska-Gra-
bowska, Warszawa 1962; vol. III (part 1), ed. by S. Kalabinski, Warszawa 1968.
B. MORE IMPORTANT AND RECENT WORKS RELATED TO
VARIOUS PERIODS AND PROBLEMS
B. Bajer, Przemys! wihékienniczy na ziemiach polskich od poczatku XIX wieku do 1939 roku
(The Textile Industry in Polish Territory from the Early 19th Century till 1939),
£édz 1958.
Ekonomika gornictwa i hutnictwa w Krolestwie Polskim 1840-1910 (The Economics of
Mining and of the Iron and Steel Industry in the Kingdom of Poland 1840-1910), ed.
by W. Kula. Vol. I, I], Warszawa 1959-1961.
K. Grzybowski, Galicja 1848-1914. Historia ustroju politycznego na tle historii ustrojx
Austrii (Galicia 1848-1914. Constitutional History against the Background of the
Austrian Constitutional History), Wroclaw 1959.
632 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 6
W. Jakébezyk, Studia nad dziejami Wielkopolski w XIX w. Dzieje pracy organiczne;
(Studies on the History of Great Poland in the 19th Century. The History of “Organic
Work”). Vol. I, II, Poznan 1951-1959.
A. Jezierski, Handel zagraniczny Krolestwa Polskiego 1815-1914 (The Foreign Trade of
the Kingdom of Poland, 1815-1914), Warszawa‘ 1967.
S. Kieniewicz, The Emancipation of Polish Peasantry. The University of Chicago Press, 1969.
S. Kowalczyk, J. Kowal, W. Stankiewicz, M. Stanski, Zarys histori: polskiego ruchu ludo-
wego (Outline of the History of the Polish Peasant Movement). Vol. I (1864-1918), War-
szawa 1963 ; vol. II (J. Borkowski, J. Kowal, S. Lato, W. Stankiewicz), Warszawa 1970.
W. Kula, Historia gospodarcza Polski w dobie popowstaniowej 1864-1918 (Economic
History of Poland after the Insurrection, 1864-1918), Warszawa 1947.
W. Kula, Ksztaltowanie sie kapitalizmu w Polsce (The Shaping of Capitalism in Poland),
Warszawa 1955.
T. Lepkowski, Poczqtki klasy robotnicze} Warszawy (The Origins of Warsaw’s Working
Class), Warszawa 1956,
J. Lukasiewicz, Przewrdt techniczny w przemyile Krolestwa Polskiego 1852-1886 (The
Technical Revolution in the Industry of the Congress Kingdom of Poland, 1852-1886),
Warszawa 1963.
K. Orzechowski, Chlopskie posiadante ziemi na Gérnym Slasku u schylku epoki feudalnej
(Peasant Land-Holdings in Upper Silesia during the Decline of Feudalism), Opole 1959.
I. Pietrzak-Pawlowska, Krolestwo Polskie w poczqtkach imperializmu 1900-1905 (The
Kingdom of Poland at the Beginning of Imperialism, 1900-1905), Warszawa 1955.
W. Pobdg-Malinowski, Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski (The Newest Political History
of Poland). Vol. I-III, Paris 1953-1960.
R. Rozdolski, Stosunki poddancze w dawnej Galicji (Serfdom Relations in Former Galicia).
Vol. I, I], Warszawa 1962.
J. Wasicki, Ziemie polskie pod zaborem pruskim (Polish Lands under Prussian Rule).
Vol. I. (South Prussia 1793-1806) ; vol. II (New Eastern Prussia 1795-1806), Wroclaw
1957-1963.
H. Wereszycki, Historia polityczna Polski w dobie popowstaniowej 1864-1918 (Political
History of Poland after the Insurrection, 1864-1918), Warszawa 1948.
1, THE NAPOLEONIC ERA
S. Askenazy, Napoleon a Polska (Napolcon and Poland). Vol. I-III, Warszawa 1918-1919.
E. Halicz, Geneza Ksiestwa Warszawskiego. Studia (The Origin of the Duchy of Warsaw.
Essays), Warszawa 1962.
M. Handelsman, Napoléon et la Pologne (1806-1807), Paris 1909.
M. Kukiel, Czartoryski and European Unity 1770-1861, Princeton 1955.
G. Zych, Armia Ksiestwa Warszawskiego 1807-1812 (The Army of the Duchy of Warsaw,
1807-1812), Warszawa 1961.
2. THE CONGRESS KINGDOM OF POLAND AND THE NOVEMBER INSURRECTION
S. Askenazy, txkasiriski. Vol. I, I], 2nd ed., Warszawa 1929.
J. Dutkiewicz, Francja a Polska w 1831 r. (France and Poland in 1831), Lédz 1950.
R. F. Leslie, Polish Politics and the Revolution of November 1830, London 1956.
M. Meloch, Sprawa wloscianska.w powstaninu listopadowym (The Peasant Question during
the November Insurrection), 2nd ed., Warszawa 1948.
W. Tokarz, Wojna polsko-rosyjska 1830-1831 (The Polish-Russian War of 1830-1831),
Warszawa 1930.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 633
S. Wachholz, Rzeczpospokta Krakowska. Okres 1815-1830 (The Free State of Cracow.
Period from 1815 to 1830), Warszawa 1957.
W. Zajewski, Walki wewnetrzne ugrupowan politycznych w powstanin listopadowym
(Internal Political Struggle in the November Uprising), Gdansk 1967.
3. THE GREAT EMIGRATION AND THE EUROPEAN REVOLUTION 1848
M. Handelsman, Czartoryski, Nicolas I et la question du Proche Orient, Paris 1934.
M. Handelsman, Adam Czartoryski. Vol. I-III, Warszawa 1948-1950.
S. Kieniewicz, Ruch chlopski w Galicji (The Peasant Movement in Galicia), Wroclaw 1951.
S. Kieniewicz, Spoleczeristwo polskie w powstaniu poznanskim 1848 (The Polish People in
the Poznan Uprising 1848), Warszawa 1960.
E. Koztowski, Generat Jozef Bem (General Jézef Bem), Warszawa 1958.
4. THE JANUARY INSURRECTION
S. Bébr-Tylingo, Napoléon III, PEurope et la Pologne en 1863-1864, in: Antemurale.
Vol. VII, VIII, Roma 1963.
Feldman, Bismarck a Polska (Bismarck and Poland), 3rd ed., Warszawa 1966.
. H. Gentzen, Grosspolen im Januaraufstand. Das Grossherzogtum Posen 1858-1864,
Berlin 1958.
. Kalembka, Towarzystwo Demokratyczne Polskie w latach 1832-1846 (The Polish Dem-
ocratic Suciety in 1832-1846), Torun 1966.
. Kieniewicz, Powstanie styczniowe (The January Uprising), Warszawa 1972.
Koberdowa, Wielki Ksiqze Konstanty w Warszawie 1862-1863 (The Grand Duke
Constantine in Warsaw 1862-1863), Warszawa 1962.
R. F. Leslie, Reform and Insurrection in Russian Poland 1856-1865, London 1963.
H. Wereszycki, Anglia a Polska w latach 1860-1865 (England and Poland in 1860-1865),
Lwoéw 1934.
S. Zielinski. Bitwy i potyczki 1863-1864 (Battles and Skirmishes 1863-1864), Rapperswil
1913.
oo
Nn
mt YY)
5. THE BEGINNING OF THE WORKERS MOVEMENT
L. Baumgarten, Dzieje Wielkiego Proletariatu (History of the Great Proletariat), War-
szawa 1965.
Historia polskiego ruchu robotniczego (History of the Polish Labour Movement). Vol. I:
1864-1939, ed. by T. Daniszewski, Warszawa 1967.
S. Kalabinski, F. Tych, Czwarte powstanie czy pierwsza rewolucja. Lata 1905-1907 na
ziemiach polskich (The Fourth Uprising or the First Revolution. The years 1905-1907
on Polish Territories), Warszawa 1969.
P. Korzec, Walka rewolucyjna w Lodzi i okregu todzkim w latach 1905-1907 (Revolution-
ary Struggle in Lédz and the Lédz Area, 1905-1907), Warszawa 1956.
F. Tych, Zwigqzek Robotnikow Polskich 1889-1892, Anatomia wezesnej organizacji robot-
niczej (Union of Polish Workers 1889-1892. The Anatomy of Early Working-Class
Organizations), Warszawa 1974.
A. Zarnowska, Klasa robotnicza Kroélestwa Polskiego 1870-1914 (The Working Class in
the Polish Kingdom 1870-1914), Warszawa 1974.
634 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
6. WORLD WAR I
L. Grosfeld, Polityka paristw centralnych wobec sprawy polskie; w latach 1914-1918
(The Policy of the Central Powers Regarding the Polish Question in 1914-1918), War-
szawa 1962.
Holzer, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna w latach 1917-1919 (The Polish Socialise Party in
1917-1919), Warszawa 1962.
Holzer, J. Molenda, Polska w czasie I wojny Swiatowej (Poland during World War 1),
Warszawa 1963.
. Jablonski, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna w czasie wojny 1914-1918 (The Polish Socialist
Party during the 1914-1918 War), Warszawa 1962.
Komarnicki, Rebirth of the Polish Republic. A Study in the Diplomatic History of
Europe, 1914-1920, London 1957.
. Leczyk, Komitet Narodowy Polski a Ententa i Stany Zjednoczone 1917-1919 (Poland’s
National Committee, the Entente and the United States 1917-1919), Warszawa 1966.
af 7 &
=
POLAND
(1918-1939)
A. MAIN PUBLICATIONS OF SOURCES
Dokumenty i materiaty do historii stosunkéw polsko-radzieckich (Documents and Materials
for the History of Polish-Soviet Relations). Vol. I-V, Warszawa 1962-1966.
K. W. Kumaniecki, Odbudowa panstwowosci polskie}. Najwazniejsze dokumenty 1912-sty-
czen 1924 (The Rebirth of the Polish State. Most Important Documents 1912-January
1924), Krakéw 1924.
Materialy archiwalne do historii stosunkéw polsko-radzieckich (Archival Materials for the
History of Polish-Soviet Relations). Vol. I, Warszawa 1957.
B. MORE IMPORTANT AND RECENT WORKS RELATED TO
VARIOUS PROBLEMS
M. Drozdowski, Polityka gospodarcza rzqdu polskiego 1936-1939 (The Economic Policy
of the Polish Government 1936-1939), Warszawa 1963.
H. Jabtonski, Narodziny Drugiej Rzeczypospolite} 1918-1919 (The Birth of the Second
Republic 1918-1919), Warszawa 1962.
H. and T. Jedruszczak, Ostatnie lata I] Rzeczypospolite; (The Last Years of the Second
Republic of Poland), Warszawa 1970.
J. Kowalski, Trudne lata. Problemy rozwoju polskiego ruchu robotniczego 1929-1935
(Difficult Years. Problems of the Development of the Polish Workers’ Movement,
1929-1935), Warszawa 1966.
J. Krasuski, Stosunki polsko-niemieckie 1919-1925 (The Polish-German Relations 1919-
1925). Part 1, Poznan 1962.
J. Krasuski, Stosunki polsko-niemieckie 1926-1932 (The Polish-German Relations 1926-
1932). Part 2, Poznan 1964.
Z. Landau, J. Tomaszewski, Zarys historii gospodarczej Polski 1918-1939 (Outline of
Polish Economic History 1918-1939), 3rd ed., Warszawa 1971.
C. Madajezyk, Burzuazyjno-obszarnicza reforma rolna w Polsce 1918-1939 (The Agrarian
Reform of the Bourgeoisie and Landlords in Poland 1918~1939), Warszawa 1956.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 635
K. Ostrowski, Polityka finansowa Polski przedwrzesniowej (The Treasury Policy of Poland
before September 1939), Warszawa 1958.
J. Popkiewicz, F. Ryszka, Przemyst ciezki Gérnego Slaska w gospodarce Polski migdzy-
wojennej 1922-1939 (The Upper Silesian Heavy Industry and the Economic Policy of
Poland between the Two World Wars 1922-1939), Opole 1959.
A. Préchnik, Pierwsze pietnastolecie Polski niepodlegle; (The First Fifteen Years of Inde-
pendent Poland), 2nd ed., Warszawa 1957.
P. Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies 1919-1925. French-Czechoslovak-Polish Rela-
tions from the Paris Peace Conference to Locarno, Minneapolis 1962.
M. Wojciechowski, Stosunki polsko-niemieckie 1933-1938 (The Polish-German Relations
1933-1938). Part 3, Warszawa 1965.
J. Zarnowski, Spoteczenstwo I] Rzeczypospolitej, 1918-1939 (Society in the Second Re-
public of Poland, 1918-1939), Warszawa 1973.
J. Zarnowski, Struktura spoteczna inteligencji w Polsce w latach 1918-1939 (Social Struc-
ture of the Intelligentsia in Poland in 1918-1939), Warszawa 1964.
INDEX
Abramowski Edward (1868-1918) 513
Abyssinia 599
Academy of Science and Letters 463, 468,
568, 593
“Activists” 526, 528, 533
St. Adalbert, Wojciech (c. 955-997), Bishop
of Prague 44, 48, 52, 56, 64, 106
Adamski Stanistaw (1875-1967) 489
Administrative Council 367, 382, 391, 437,
454
Adriatic 122
Agency (Paris, 1795) 342
Agricultural Society in Warsaw 433, 436,
437, 439
Aigner Piotr (1756-1841) 299
Aiguillon Emmanuel-Armand, duc de (1720-
1782) 280
Akkerman 112, 122, 148
Albert (-c. 1377) magistrate in Cracow 85,
101
Albert, Albrecht, II of Hapsburg (1397-
1439), King of Germany, Hungary and
Bohemia 119
Albrecht Frederick (1553-1618), Duke of
Prussia 168
Albrecht I of Hapsburg (1255-1308), Ger-
man King 99
Albrecht of Hohenzollern (1490-1568), Duke
of Prussia 147, 157
Alexander (-1156), Bishop of Plock 78
Alexander (1461-1506), King of Poland
146, 148, 150
Alexander I (1777-1825), Emperor of Rus-
sta, King of Poland 345, 346, 347, 356-
358, 363, 364, 373, 374, 377, 392
Alexander II (1818-1881), Emperor of Rus-
sia 431, 435, 439, 441, 512
Alexander III (1845-1894),
Russia 491
Aleksandrow 369
Alexis (1629-1676), Tsar of Russia 214
Alfred of Wessex (c. 848-899), King of
England 37
“Alldeutscher § Verband”
Union) 490, 515
“Allgemeiner Deutscher Verband” (General
German Union) 490
Allied Supreme Council 549
Allies, Allied Powers 523, 528, 532, 543,
547, 548, 555, 556, see Entente
All-Polish groups 516, 518, 520
Alps 29, 173
Alsace 243
Altmark (truce of, 1629) 190
Alvensleben Gustav (1803-1881) 441
America 170, 471, 499
Amsterdam 233
Andrusikiewicz Jan (1815-1850) 411
Andruszéw (truce of, 1667) 217, 222, 223
Andrzej (-c. 1317), Bishop of Poznan 99
Andrzej Gatka of Dobczyn (ec. 1400-c. 1450),
professor 133
Andrzej Laskarz of Goslawice (1362-1426),
Bishop of Poznan 117
Angevins 107, 114
Ankwicz Jézef (c. 1750-1794) 327
Anna (1693-1740), Tsarina of Russia 244
Anna (1795-1865), Grand Duchess of Russia
357
Emperor of
(Pan-German
Anna (1476-1503), Duchess of Western Po-
merania 125
Anna Jagiellonka (1523-1596), Queen of
Poland 167
Apukhtin Alexandr (1822-1903) 491
Aquileia 29
Arab East 50
Archetti Giovanni Andrea (1731-1805) 284
Arcole (battle of, 1796) 343
Arians 155, 160, 161, 169, 191, 197, 200, 217,
225, 229, 231, 233
Armenians 131, 132, 136, 293
Arnholdt Jan (1841-1862) 439
d’Arquien de la Grange Marquis (1613-1707)
220
Arrovaise 78
Askenazy Szymon (1867-1935) 504
Asnyk Adam (1838-1897) 472
Asow 238
Association of the Polish Nation 407
Association of the Polish People 405, 406
Atlantic 225
Attila (-453), Chief of the Huns 33
Auerstadt (battle of, 1806) 346
Augsburg 50, 62
Augusta, Maria Augusta (1782-1863), Prin-
cess of Saxony 317
Augustus II (1670-1733), King of Poland
235-243, 246, 247, 250
Augustus III (1696-1763), King of Poland
236, 244, 245, 247, 248, 253, 256, 264,
266, 268, 270
Auk&tote 115
Austerlitz (battle of, 1805) 346
Austria 21, 77, 192, 198, 216, 219-222, 235,
239, 242, 244, 245, 247, 251, 268, 271,
275, 280, 281, 305, 306, 309, 320, 322,
339, 341-344, 346, 395, 358, 363, 364,
380, 389, 410-422, 435, 443, 450, 456,
459, 460, 475, 480, 492, 494, 516, 522,
526, 528, 531, 534, 535, 549, 600
Austro-Hungary 483, 513, 514, 556, 557
Avars 33, 45
Axentowicz Teodor (1859-1938) 504
Bacciarelli Marcello (1731-1818) 299
Baden (insurrection of, 1849) 421
Badeni Kazimierz (1846-1909) 494
Balicki Zygmunt (1858-1916) 484, 492, 493
Balkans 21, 32, 33, 208, 280, 281, 341, 346,
404, 447, 484, 514
Baltic 17, 19, 28, 36, 45, 48, 50, 51, 56, 59,
INDEX 637
62, 75, 85, 87, 93, 107, 117, 122, 126,
147, 156, 190, 204, 215, 228, 239, 244,
288, people 34, 36, 40, 46, 91, 93
Balts 37, 38, 40
Bar see Confederation of Bar
Baranéw 174, 179
Bardowski Piotr (1846-1886) 477
Barnim I (c. 1209-1278), Duke of Western
Pomerania 85, 92
Baroque 202, 226, 227, 230, 253, 257, 259,
297
Barss Franciszek (1760-1812) 315, 342
Bartel Kazimierz (1882-1941) 578, 579, 584,
585
Barthou Jean Louis (1862-1934) 590
Basel 333, 343
Bathsheba 106
Baudouin de Courtenay Jan (-1822) 315
Baudouin de Courtenay Jan (1845-1929) 466
Bautzen (Budi§yn) 53
Bavaria 37, 49, 50, 228, 305, 322
Bavarian Geographer (9th cent.) 39
Bayle Pierre (1647-1706) 233
Bayonne (treaty of, 1808) 351
Bebel August (1840-1913) 474, 489
Beck Jozef (1894-1944) 588-590, 597, 599-
603, 605
Beghards 104
Beguines 104
Belcredi Richard (1823-1902) 459
Belgium 77, 380, 551, 566
Bem Jozef (1794-1850) 421, 422
Benedek Ludwig (1804-1881) 411
Benedict KIV, Pope (1740-1758) 263
Benedictus Polonus (13th cent.) 104
Benedictines 77, 78, 102, 105
Bene Eduard (1884-1948) 566
Berchtesgaden 601
Berek Josclewicz (1764-1809) 353
Berent Wactaw (1873-1941) 502
Bereza Kartuska 593
Berezina (battle of, 1812) 358, 550
Berg 68
Berg Fiodor (1790-1874) 445, 454
Beresteczko (battle of, 1651) 214
Berlewi Henri (1894) 576
Berlin 267, 268, 275, 306, 309, 346, 394,
414, 417, 433, 453, 456, 489, 490, 500,
516, 525, 530, 534, 566, 586, 589, 590,
599, 600, 603, 605, 607
Bernard (Spanish missionary) 67
Bernardines 131
638 INDEX
Berrecci Bartolommeo (c. 1480-1537) 174
Berwinski Ryszard (1819-1879) 426
Besangon 399
Beseler Hans (1850-1921) 525, 526, 527, 528,
530
Bessarabia 565
Bestuzhev-Riumin Alexis (1693-1766) 246
Bethlen Gabor (1580-1629), Duke of Tran-
sylvania 189
Beust Friedrich Ferdinand von (1809-1886)
459
Bezdany (raid of, 1908) 519
Bezprym (986-1031), Duke of Poland 55
Biala Cerkiew (Byelaya Tserkov) 214
Biatobrzeski Marcin (c. 1530-1586) 201
Bialystok 258, 347, 384, 394, 476, 549, 551,
557
Biecz 174
Bielecki Marian (1876-1912) 512
Bielski Marcin (c. 1495-1575) 173
Biernat of Lublin (c. 1465-c. 1529) 171,
173 :
Bilinski Leon (1846-1923) 518
Bilgoraj 196
Biron Ernst Johann (1690-1772) 244, 268
Biskupin 27
Bismarck Otto (1815-1898) 441, 456, 458,
483, 490
Black Death 127
Black Sea 19, 29, 87, 107, 112, 115, 120,
122, 126, 127, 148, 188, 190, 281, 288,
289, 305, 320, 340
Block of Christian National Unity 558
“Block” (group of artists) 576
Blocke Abraham van den (1572-1628) 230
Blocke Wilhelm van den (c. 1550-1628)
230
Bobola Andrzej (1540-1616) 185
Bobrowski Stefan (1841-1863) 443
Bobrzanie 40
Bobrzynski Michat (1849-1935) 470, 517,
518, 522
Bochnia 292
Bochum Polish Workers’ Union 489
Bodin Jean (1530-1596) 146
Bogumit (-1092), Archbishop of Gniezno
65
Bogusfaw I (-1187),
Pomerania 92
Bogustaw X (1454-1523), Duke of Western
Pomerania 125
Duke of Western
Bogustaw XIV (1625-1637), Duke of West-
ern Pomerania 206
Bogustawski Wojciech (1757-1829) 300
Bogusza (-1320), judge of Gdansk-Pome-
rania 101
Bogusz family 411
Bohemia 28, 31, 37, 41, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52,
53, 65, 66, 67, 77, 87, 99, 101, 107, 108,
118, 119, 121, 126, 148, 168, 187, 189,
190, 252, 422
Bohemian Brethren 159, 160, 161, 199
Bohomolec Franciszek (1720-1784) 259, 300
Bohuszewicz Maria (1865-1887) 478
Bolestaw I the Brave (966-1025), King of
Poland 52, 55-57, 59, 62, 65, 73, 75,
608
Bolestaw II the Bold (1039-1081), King of
Poland .65, 72, 77
Bolestaw III the Wrymouth (1086-1138)
Duke of Poland 66-68, 71, 76, 78, 89
Bolestaw II the Curly (1125-1173), Grand
Duke of Poland 68, 69, 90
Bolestaw the Pious (1221-1279), Duke of
Great Poland 91, 131
Bolestaw the Chaste (1226-1279), Duke of
Cracow-Sandomierz 86, 89, 90
Bolestaw George of Mazovia
Prince of Vladimir-Halicz 112
Bolestraszycki Samuel (17th cent.) 200
Bolko II (1312-1368), Duke of Swidnica
126
Bologna 104
Bolsheviks 545, 550, 605
Bona Sforza (1494-1557), wife of Sigis-
mund I 150, 171, 179
Bonaparte Jerdme (1784-1860) 347
Bonaparte Napoleon Joseph (1822-1891)
435
Boner family 174°
Boniface VIII Pope (1294-1303) 99
Boris (1112-1155), Prince of Hungary 67
Bornholm 29
Borodino (battle of, 1812) 357
Borowski Waclaw (1885-1954) 576
Borystaw 487, 560
Borzykowa 91
Bosnia 514
Bosphorus 208
Bossuta-Bozeta
Gniezno 64
Boulanger Nadia (1887) 576
Bonnard Pierre (1867-1947) 576
(-1340).
(-1028), Archbishop of
Bourbons 243
Boznanska Olga (1865-1940) 504
Braclaw 217, 220, 222
Brandenburg, Brandenburges 91, 92, 95, 99,
101, 111, 125, 211, 216-218, 200, 222,
228, 235
Brandenburg-Prussian State 251, 253
Branicki Jan Klemens (1689-1771) 258, 265,
269-271
Branicki Ksawery (1730-1819) 277, 283, 284,
286, 287, 306, 308, 309, 315, 320, 322
Brasil 498
Breinl Joseph 410
Bretislav I (c. 1012-1055), Duke of Bohemia
56
Breyer Tadeusz (1874-1952) 576
Brodnia 368
Brodnica 390
Brodowski Antoni (1784-1832) 379
Brody 196
Broniewski Whadystaw (1897-1962) 571
Brozek Jan (1585-1652) 175, 232
Brihl Heinrich von (1700-1763) 245, 246,
250, 251, 266
Bruno of Querfurt (c. 974-1009), Arch-
bishop gentium 48, 64
Brusilov Alexie} (1853-1926) 526
Brussels 401, 413, 425, 474
Bryansk 115
Brzeg 126, 204
Brzesc (Brest Litovsk) 118, 173, 552, 584,
585
— privilege of (1425) see Law
— treaty of (1917-1918) 531, 532, 534
— union of (1595/1596) 183, 189
Brzezinski Mieczystaw (1858-1911) 466
Brzostowski Pawet (1739-1827) 290
Budny Szymon (c. 1530-1593) 160
Budénny Semion (1883) 550, 552
Bug 55, 64, 117, 288, 333, 406, 450, 550,
551, 607
Bujak Franciszek (1875-1953) 568
Bulgaria, Bulgars 47, 120, 465
Biillov Bernhard (1849-1929) 515
Bund, Jewish Socialist Party 508
Buonarotti Filippo Michele (1761-1837) 399
Burgundy 29, 52, 104, 105
Burian Stephen (1851-1922) 534
Burschenschaften 373
Burski Adam (c. 1560-1611) 232
Byczyna 181, 233
Bydgoszcz 27, 153, 196, 331, 350
INDEX 639
Byelorussia, Byelorussians 115, 169, 214, 223,
234, 246, 255, 278, 293, 345, 357, 371,
376, 339, 345, 357, 373, 378, 384, 391,
431, 444, 453, 543, 548, 552, 564, 586
Bytom 93
Bytéw 206, 216
Byzantium 19, 34, 55, 63, 120
Calatrava Order 94
Calvinists 155, 159, 161, 163, 169, 174, 199,
200
Campo Formio (treaty of, 1797) 343
Canaletto (Bernardo Belotto) (1720-1780)
299
Canons of the Holy Sepulchre 77
Canons Regular 105
Canute the Great (c. 995-1035), King of
England, Norway and Danemark 51
capitaneus 108 see starosta
Caprivi Leo (1831-1899) 490, 491, 495, 496
Carbonarism 375, 399-401, 405
Carnuntum 29
Carolingian Empire 39
Carpathians, Carpathian Mountains 17, 25,
28, 30, 33, 50, 421, 523
Casimir I the Restorer (1016-1058), Duke
of Poland 55, 56, 57, 64, 65, 77
Casimir II the Just (1138-1194), Duke of
Cracow-Sandomierz 68, 71, 89, 93
Casimir III the Great (1310-1370), King of
Poland 108, 111-114, 119, 124, 126, 127,
131-135
Casimir IV (1427-1492), King of Poland
120, 122, 125, 131, 134, 136, 146, 170
Casimir I (c. 1211-1267), Duke of Kujawy
91
Casimir (1351-1377), Duke of Stupsk 112,
113
castellans 58, 68, 75, 76, 94, 108, 111, 149
Castlereagh Henry Robert Stewart (1769-
1822) 363
cathedral chapters 77
Catherine II (1729-1796), Tsarina of Russia
235, 267, 269, 270, 271, 272, 275, 276,
277, 305, 320, 322, 332, 334, 340
Catholic League 189
Caulaincourt Armand de (1773-1827) 357
Cavour Camillo (1810-1861) 435
Cecilia Renata (1611-1644), Queen of Po-
land 204
Cecora (battle of, 1620) 189
Cedynia (battle of, 972) 51
640 INDEX
Celts 28, 29, ,30
Celtis Conrad (1459-1508) 134
Central Board, “‘Centralizacja” see Polish
Democratic Society
Central Industrial Area 595
Central Land Office 548 ,
Central Powers 522, 525-527, 529-536, 539
“Centralizacja” (of Lwow, 1796) 341
Centre 547, 558-560, 577
Centre-Left, “Centrolew” 584, 585
“Cercle des Artistes Polonais a Paris” (1928)
576
Chalubitski Tytus (1820-1889) 430
Chamber of Deputies see Parliament
Chamberlain Neville (1869-1940) 602
chancellor’s office 108
Charlemagne (742-814),
West 36
Charles (1733-1796),
266, 268, 270
Charles IV (1316-1378), Emperor, King of
Bohemia 113 ‘
Charles VI (1685-1740), Emperor 242, 243,
244, 252
Charles X Gustavus (1622-1660), King of
Sweden 211, 214, 215, 216
Charles XII (1682-1718), King of Sweden
237, 239
Charles IX (1550-1574), King of France 167
Charles I Robert d’Anjou (1289-1342), King
of Hungary 99
Charles I (1887-1922), Emperor of Austria,
King of Hungary 535
Chartres 106
Chassidic movement sce Jews
Chelm 455, 514, 532, 558, 588
Chelmno 37, 43, 85, 94, 95, 174
— law of, 1235 see Law
Chelmonski Jézef (1849-1914) 473
Chernishev Zachar (1722-1784) 280
Chicherin Georgij (1872-1936) 566
China 369, 600
Chiopicki Jézef (1771-1854) 382-384
Chmielenski Ignacy (1837-c. 1865) 438, 439
Chmielnicki Bohdan (c. 1595-1657), 208,
210, 212-214, 217, 400
Chmieléw 174
Chocholow (insurrection of, 1846) 411
Chocim (battle of, 1673) 189, 190, 220
Chodkiewicz Jan Karol (1560-1621) 183
Choiseul Etienne Frangois, duc de (1719~
1785) 277, 280
Emperor of the
Duke of Courland
Chomentowski Michal (-1794) 329
Chopin Fryderyk (1810-1849) 17, 380, 426
Chortyca 188
Chorzéw 582
Chosciszko (9th cent.), Duke of Polanes 42
Chreptowicz Joachim (1729-1812) 284, 285,
290, 302, 317
Christana (1626-1689), Queen of Sweden
213
Christian (-1245), Bishop of Prussia 94
Chrzanowski Wojciech (1793-1861) 421
Chrzanowski Bernard (1865-1944) 516
Chwistek Leon (1884-1944) 576
Cienia (privilege of, 1228) see Law
Cieszkowski August (1814-1894) 425
Cieszyn 79, 320, 535, 546, 549, 566
circumequitatio, circuitio (custom) 82
Cisalpine Republic 343
Ciszewski Jozef Feliks (1877-1937) 612
Citeaux 104
Cistercians 77, 83, 92, 94, 102, 104, 106
City Committee (1861) see Reds
cives, burgenses, hospites 83
civitas 60
Classical School 378, 379
Clement XIV, Pope (1769-1774) 283
Collegium Maius (Cracow) 136
Collin Ludwig (1781-) 410
colloquia (assemblies of the lords and the
gentry) see Parliament
Cologne 57, 78, 79, 422
Colonization Commission 482-484, 491, 495
Comintern see International Third
Commission of Confederated Independence
Parties 521
Commission of Justice 454
Commission of National Education 283, 298,
302-304, 307, 310, 316, 345
Committee of National Defense 524
Commune Parts (1871) 451
Communist Party of Poland (KPP) 545,
550, 564, 584, 586, 595, 596
Communist Party of Western Byelorussia
564
Communist Party of Western Ukraine 564
Communist Union 413
Communist Union of Youth 564
Communists 558, 564, 584, 593, 595
Condé Louis de (“The Great Condé”) (1621-
1686) 219
Condillac Etienne Bonnot de (1715-1780)
299, 303
“confederation” (1439) 119
Confederation of Warsaw (1573) 161, 164,
183, 200
— of Sandomierz (1702-1716) 237
— of Sroda (1703-1704) 237.
— of Warsaw (1704-1709) 237
— of Tarnogréd (1715-1717) 240, 241
— of Dzikéw (1734-1735) 244
— of Radom (1767) 275, 279, 285, 321
— of Bar (1768-1772) 277, 279, 289, 296-
298, 306
— of Targowica (1792-1793) 321-324, 327,
328, 332, 337
Confederation (1796) 341
— (1812) 357
Conrad III (c. 1093-1152), German King 68
Conrad I (c. 1187-1247), Duke of Mazovia
91, 94, 95, 104
Conservatives 522, 531, 580
Constance (Council of, 1414-1418) 117
Constantine (1779-1831), Grand Duke of
Russia 321, 332, 367, 373, 382, 383, 388
Constantine (1827-1892), Grand Duke of
Russia 439, 440, 445
Constantinople 113, 280
Constitution of
— Nihil Novi (1505) 150
— 3rd May (1791) 294, 304, 315-321, 323,
324, 330, 357
— the Duchy of Warsaw (1807) 348, 350,
353, 354, 364
— the Kingdom of Poland (1815) 364, 373-
375, 380, 389, 391
— Organic Statute (1832) 391
— “Little” (1919) 547
— March (1921) 547, 555, 556, 558, 559,
578-580, 588
— April (1935) 591, 597
Conti Frangois Louis, Prince de (1664-1709)
235
Conti Louis Francois, Prince de (1717-1776)
245
Convention 533, 536
Copernicus Nicolaus (1473-1543) 17, 134,
146, 175, 176, 179
Corazzi Antonio (1792-1877) 379
Corneille Pierre (1606-1684) 230
Cossacks 184, 188-191, 195, 206-208, 210-
215, 217, 220, 223, 238, 239, 246, 248,
277
Council of Ambassadors 552
Council of Regency 533, 536-538
41 History of Poland
INDEX 641
Council of State 454, 528, 531, 533, 536
Councils of Workers and Soldiers Delegates
545, 548
Counter-Reformation 176, 180, 189, 191,
197-199, 202, 215, 216, 226, 227, 229,
230, 232, 252, 255
coup d’état (of May 1926) 577-579, 582
see Pitsudski Jozef
Courland 157, 236, 237, 242, 244, 246, 266,
268, 293
Cracow 30, 31, 33, 36, 37, 41, 45, 49, 51,
52, 60, 62-65, 68, 71, 75-79, 83, 85-91,
93, 95, 98, 101, 105, 106, 111-114, 120,
122, 126, 127, 129, 131-133, 135, 150,
153, 158, 167, 173, 175, 178, 196, 199,
215, 223, 225, 230, 235, 237, 252, 261,
308, 324, 325, 331, 333, 341, 355, 358,
363, 379, 392, 394, 397, 398, 405, 410-
412, 418, 423, 443, 463, 472, 475, 479,
487, 493, 500-504, 522, 523, 536, 560,
567, 568, 571, 585, 593, 596
— Academy see University of Cracow
— Academy of Fine Arts 576
— Duchy of 364
— Free City of 411, 460
— Republic of 392
— Scientific Society 430
“Cracow lords” 111, 112, 114
Cracow-Sandomierz duchy 89
Craig Eduard Gordon (1872-1966) 571
Crell Jan (1590-1633) 233
Crimea 208
Croats, Khorvats 32, 421
Croce Benedetto (1866-1952) 571
Crusading movement 77
cubism 576
Curzon George Nathaniel (1859-1925) 551
Cybis Jan (1897) 573
Cyprus 113
Czacki Tadeusz (1765-1813) 345
Czaplinski Daniel (17th cent.) 208
Czapski Jézef (1896) 576
Czarniecki Stefan (1599-1665) 215, 216, 218
Czarnkowski Stanislaw (1526-1602) 169
Czarnowski Stefan (1879-1937) 568
Czartoryska Izabella (1746-1835) 345
Czartoryska Zofia (1699-1771) 250
Czartoryski Adam Jerzy (1770-1861) 346,
357, 358, 363, 367, 377, 382, 383, 388,
389, 399, 404, 420, 422
Czartoryski Adam Kazimierz (1734-1823)
642 INDEX
269, 270, 283, 287, 294, 302, 304, 306,
309
Czartoryski August (1697-1782) 250, 268,
272, 275
Czartoryski Michal (1696-1775) 250, 268
Czartoryski Wladyslaw (1828-1894) 541
Czartoryskis 227, 243, 248, 250, 251, 265,
266, 269, 270, 271, 275, 278, 282, 287,
300, 355, 404 see “The Family”
Czech styles 257
Czechoslovak National Council 535
Czechoslovakia, Czechs 21, 33, 421, 462,
535, 555, 566, 567, 590, 599, 601
Czechowic Marcin (1532-1613) 160
Czechowicz Gabriel (1876-1938) 584
Czechowicz Jozef (1903-1939) 571
Czechowicz Szymon (1689-1775) 258
Czekanowski Aleksander (1833-1876) 471
Czekanowski Jan (1882-1965) 568
Czernihé6w 187, 217
Czernin Ottokar (1872-1932) 534
Czerski Jan (1845-1892) 471
Czerwien 55
Czerwienski Bolestaw (1851-1888) 475
Czerwinsk 105
Czestochowa 216, 255, 278, 596
Czorsztyn 213
Czynski Jan (1801-1867) 387, 399
Czyzewski Tytus (1880-1945) 571, 579
Danes 92
Danube 28, 29, 148, 188, 236, 355
Darasz Wojciech Wladystaw (1808-1852)
402
Daszynski Ignacy (1866-1936) 487, 494,
536-538, 551, 584, 595
Davout Louis Nicolas (1770-1823) 350
Dabrowa Basin 370, 394, 469, 521, 545, 564
Dabrowska Maria (1889-1965) 570
Dabrowski Jan Henryk (1755-1818) 331,
343, 344, 346, 347, 348
— Legions 406-408, 342-344, 539
Dabrowski Jarostaw (1836-1871) 438, 439,
440, 444, 451
Dabréwka Jan (15th cent.), professor 134
Dabski Jan (1880-1931) 552, 559
decadentism 501
Decembrists 373, 377, 388
decree of December (1807) see Peasants
Deczynski Kazimierz (1800-1838) 369
Dekert Jan (1738-1790) 315
Delegation Municipal (1861) 436
Dembinski Henryk (1791-1864) 387, 422
Dembowski Edward (1822-1846) 407, 408,
411, 420, 426
Demetrius Donskoi (1362-1389), Grand Du-
ke of Moscow 115
Denisko Joachim Mokosiej (1756-c. 1812)
341
Denmark 51, 67, 77, 92, 101, 111, 113, 125,
157, 216, 237, 275
“Deutscher Ostmarkenverein” (The German
Union of the Eastern Marches) 496
Deputation (Paris, 1795) 343, 344
Dérouléde Paul (1846-1914) 492
Deulino (truce of, 1618) 187, 188
Debe Wielkie (battle of, 1831) 384
Deblin 464
Debno 136
Diamand Herman (1860-1931) 595
Diebitsch Ivan (1785-1831) 384, 385
Dietl Jozef (1804-1878) 430
Dietrich 52
Directory (1861) see Whites
dissenters 155, 169, 179, 183, 185, 199, 202,
203, 215, 227, 231, 233, 254, 275, 276,
277
Dtugosz Jan (1415-1480), historian 134
Dtuski Kazimierz (1855-1930) 475
Dmochowski Franciszek (1762-1808) 302,
313, 323, 328, 329, 342
Dmowski Roman (1864-1939) 492, 493, 506,
508, 511-514, 520, 522, 524, 529
Dnieper 19, 25, 28, 31, 148, 156, 188, 207,
217, 220, 226, 237, 238, 268, 357, 450,
461, 532
Dniester 31, 190, 268, 290, 550
Dobrava, Dubravka (-977),
Poland 49, 64
Dobrolyubov Nicolaus (1836-1861) 434
Dobronega Maria (c. 1012-1087), Duchess
of Poland 57
Dobrzyn Land 112
Dogiel Maciej (1715-1760) 264
Dolabella Tommaso (c. 1570-1650) 230
Dolgoruki Grigory (1656-1723) 241
Dotega-Chodakowski Zorian (Czarnocki
Adam) (1784-1825) 378
Dominicans 93, 104
Doroshenko Piotr (1627-1698) 220
Dowbér-MuSnicki Jézef (1867-1937) 530,
533
Downarowicz Medard (1878-1934) 564
Dretkaiserbund 483
Duchess of
Dresden 236, 257, 263, 270, 277, 297, 349,
350, 421
Drohobycz 487
druzyna 38, 47
Drzymata Michal (1857-1937) 495
Dubienka (battle of, 1792) 321, 323
Dukas Paul (1865-1935) 576
Dukla Pass 62
Duma 513, 528
Dumouriez Charles
278
Dunajec 62, 88
Dunikowski Xawery (1875-1964) 576
Dupont de Nemours Pierre Samuel (1739-
1817) 298
Dutch art 230
Dvina 156, 168, 169, 190, 217, 357
Dybowski Benedykt (1833-1930) 471
Dygasinski Adolf (1839-1902) 467, 472
Dyneburg, Daugavpils 169, 552
Dziadoszanie, Dadodesani 40
Dzierzyfski Feliks (1877-1926) 488
Dzikéw (agreement of, 1927) 580
Francois (1739-1823)
Ehrenberg Gustaw (1818-1895) 406
Elba 363, 364
Elbe river 31-33, 36, 363
Elblag 37, 87, 95, 101, 121, 133, 167, 174,
228, 282, 289
Eleanor of Hapsburg (1653-1697), Queen
of Poland 219
Elector of Brandenburg see Frederick Wil-
liam, “Great Elector”
Elisabeth of Hapsburg (1436-1505), Queen
of Poland 121 °
Elisabeth of Poland (1305-1380), Queen of
Hungary 114
Elisabeth (1709-1762), Tsarina of Russia
266-268
Elster 357
emancipation of women 426, 453
emigration 450, 452, 484, 498, 499, 500, 517,
597
Emigration Great 399, 450
Emperor 204 (Ferdinand III, 1608-1657) ;
219, 221 (Leopold I, 1640-1705) ; 411,
418, 420 (Ferdinand I, 1793-1875)
Enfranchisement see Parliament see also
Peasants
franchise see Parliament
Engels Friedrich (1820-1895) 390, 413, 447
England 19, 179, 233, 235, 242, 244, 254,
at”
INDEX 643
263, 272, 275, 281, 306, 363, 443, 493,
578 see Great Britain
Enlightenment 22, 234, 235, 287, 288, 294,
296-300, 302, 306, 309, 354, 373, 377
Entente 514, 529, 534, 545
Enthusiast Circle 426 see emancipation of
women
Erfurt (programme of, 1891) 488
Eric Segersaller (-c. 995), King of Sweden
51
Eric I (1382-1459), Duke of Siupsk, King
of Danemark, Norway and Sweden 125
Ernest of Hapsburg (1553-1595), Archduke
183
Estonia 157, 183, 588
Eugene III, Pope (1145-1153) 69
Eugene IV, Pope (1431-1437) 120
Evans Brothers 370
Executive Committee (1864) 452
expressionism 473
“execution-of-the-law” 169
Eylau, Itawka (battle of, 1807) 348
Ezzon Herenfried (10th/11th cent.), Pala-
tine of Lorraine 53
“Falanga” see National Radical Camp
False Demetrius, first (Gregory Otrepiev)
(-1606) 184, 186
False Demetrius, second (-1610) 186
“The Family” 250, 251, 265, 266, 269-272,
274, 288, 309 see Czartoryskis see also
Poniatowskis
Far East 490, 514
fascism 591, 597, 599, 600, 607
Felifski Alojzy (1771-1820) 378
Ferdinand d’Este (1781-1850), Archduke of
Austria 354, 355
Finland 588
Firley Jan (c. 1521-1574) 163
Five Brothers Eremits (c. 1003) 64
Flanders 87
Flemings 84
Flemming Jakob Heinrich (1667-1728) 240,
250
Florence 421
Florentine della Lora Francis (-1516) 174
Fontana Jakub (1710-1773) 299
Ford Aleksander (1908) 575
“Formists” 576
forum liberum see Law
Fouché Joseph (1757-1820) 345
France, Frenchmen 103, 104, 134, 168, 179,
644 INDEX
189, 193, 204, 217-221, 233, 235, 237,
239, 241-244, 247, 248, 251, 255, 257,
263, 268, 275, 278, 281, 282, 297, 299,
322-324, 333, 339, 342-344, 346, 351,
354, 355, 357, 361, 363, 380, 388, 389,
399, 400-404, 412, 420, 456, 460, 465,
493, 514, 525, 528, 535, 548, 551, 555,
556, 565, 566, 598-601, 607
Franciscans 102, 104, 131, 135
Franco de Polonia (13th cent.), astronomer
103
Frank Jakub (1726-1791) 294
Frankfurt on the Odra 126
Frankists 294
Frankowski brothers 438
Franz Joseph I (1830-1916) Emperor 435,
459, 522, 527
Fraczkiewicz Antoni (1st half of the 18th
cent.) 258
Frederick Augustus J, Elector of Saxony see
Augustus II, King of Poland
Frederick Augustus (1750-1827), Elector,
King of Saxony, Grand Duke of War-
saw 317, 348, 350
Frederick Barbarossa (c. 1122-1190), Empe-
ror 69, 92
Frederick Christian (1722-1763), Elector of
Saxony 270
Frederick I (1657-1713), King of Prussia
238
Frederick II (1712-1786), King of Prussia
246, 252, 253, 266-268, 270, 273, 275,
276, 278, 280-282, 288, 305, 320, 334,
360
Frederick William “Great Elector” (1620-
1688) 204, 219, 233, 238
Frederick William I (1688-1740), King of
Prussia 242, 244
Frederick William II (1744-1797), King of
Prussia 306
Frederick William III (1770-1840), King of
Prussia 346
Fredro Aleksander (1793-1876) 378, 426
Fredro Andrzej Maksymilian (c. 1620-1679)
230
freeholds see Peasants
free-masonry 263, 298, 341, 376, 400, 484
see carbonarism
Freytag Adam (1608-1650) 230
Fribourg 579
Friedland (battle of, 1807) 348
Frontier Defence Corps 564
Frycz-Modrzewski Andrzej (c. 1503-1572)
146, 155, 161, 171, 174, 175, 176, 178
functionalism 504
futurism 571, 576
Galicia 306, 308, 339, 340, 342, 343, 355,
383, 393, 396, 405-407, 409-413, 415,
416, 418, 419, 420, 427, 444, 446, 455,
459-463, 466, 468, 475, 479-481, 493,
494, 498, 510, 514, 517-519, 522, 523,
527, 530, 532, 536, 543, 546, 547, 549-
551, 558, 563
Gallus Anonymus (11th/12th cent.), chro-
nicler 78
Gapon Gieorgij (1870-1906) 506
Garczynski Stefan (c. 1690-1755) 264
Garibaldi Giuseppe (1807-1882) 435
Gaul 29, 36
Gasiorowska Natalia (1881-1964) 568
Gdacius Adam (c. 1610-1688) 233
Gdansk 28, 43, 60, 74, 75, 83-85, 87, 89, 91,
101, 121, 126, 129, 133, 136, 151, 153,
158, 167, 168, 174, 190, 196, 204, 225,
228, 235, 244, 257, 261, 264, 274, 280-
282, 288, 289, 305, 306, 308, 348, 363,
535, 588, 599-601, 603
— Free City 549, 566, 582, 599
Gdow 411
Gdynia 582, 588, 599
Gembicki Piotr (1585-1657),
Cracow 213, 230
“Generality” (1769) 278
Geneva 474, 475
Genoa 421
— colonies 112, 122
George of Podiebrad (1420-1471), King of
Bohemia 121
George Frederick of Hohenzollern (1539-
1603), Duke of Prussia 168
George II Rakoczy (1621-1660), Duke of
Transylvania 213, 216,
Gepidae 29
German Law see Law
German Order of St. Mary (Knights of the
Cross) 95
German Social-Democratic Party 488, 489
Germany, Germans 17, 28-30, 33, 36, 49,
52, 53, 55, 56, 64, 65, 69, 84, 87, 97, 99,
107, 121, 125, 126, 131, 134, 136, 158,
179, 229, 231, 233, 241, 252, 257, 310,
337, 350, 360, 370, 380, 395, 400, 412,
413, 417, 420, 422, 447, 456, 457, 459,
Bishop of
462, 465, 474, 475, 480, 483, 484, 488-
491, 496-498, 514, 515, 517, 521, 525-
535, 537, 538, 543, 544, 546, 547, 549,
550, 555, 556, 557, 560, 561, 565-567,
582, 588, 590, 596, 597, 599-604, 606,
607
Gerson Wojciech (1831-1901) 430
Gertrude of Poland (c. 1025-1108), Grand
Duchess of Kiev 77
Geyer Ludwik (1805-1869) 394
Giecz 60, 63
Giedymin (c. 1275-1341), Grand Duke of
Lithuania 107
Gierymski Aleksander (1850-1901), 473
Gierymski Maksymilian (1846-1874) 473
Giller Agaton (1831-1887) 440, 443
St. Gilles en Provence 77, 79
Girey dynasty 122
Gizewiusz Gustaw (1810-1848) 398
Glayre Maurice (1744-1819) 298
Glifski Michal (c. 1470-1534) 148
Glabinski Stanistaw (1862-1943) 517
Glogéw 60, 66, 85, 88
Glowacki Bartosz (c. 1758-1794) 327
Gniezno 41, 44, 51, 52, 56, 62-65, 67, 68,
71, 74, 76-78, 88, 92, 98, 99, 104, 106,
117, 126, 136, 457, 489
Gobi 104
Godunov Boris (c.
Russia 183, 184
Goering Hermann (1893-1946) 590
Gojawiczynska Pola (1896-1963) 568
Goleszyce, Golensizi 40
Goluchowski Agenor (1812-1875) 459, 462
Gombrowicz Witold (1904-1969) 570
Gonta Ivan (-1768) 278, 400
Goplo 60
Gorajski family 196
Gorchakov Michail (1793-1861) 436
Gorchakov Alexandr (1798-1883) 512
Gorczycki Grzegorz (c. 1665-1734) 258
Gorlice 525
Gorzkowski
356
Gorzkowski Ludwik (1811-c. 1857) 410
Gorzow, Landsberg 95
Goslar Julian (1820-1852) 420
Goszczynski Seweryn (1801-1876) 379
Gothic 106, 136, 173, 174, 379
Goths 28, 29
Gottlieb Leopold (1883-1934) 576
Government of National Unity 607
1551-1605), Tsar of
Franciszek (1760-1830) 342,
INDEX 645
Gérnicki Lukasz (1527-1603) 172
Gérsk 88
Gérzno 190
Grabowski Stanistaw (1780-1845) 373
Grabowski family 373
Grabski Stanislaw (1871-1949) 545
Grabski Wladyslaw (1874-1938) 550, 559,
560, 562, 578
Great Britain 281, 346, 368, 404, 492, 514,
528, 531, 535, 549, 551, 555, 565, 566,
582, 589, 599, 600, 602, 603, 607 see
England
Great Poland 36, 38, 43, 50, 56, 63, 66, 68,
73, 77, 80, 84, 86, 89, 90-93, 95, 98, 99,
101, 105, 108, 111, 120, 124, 126, 127,
131, 133, 156, 158, 215, 216, 227, 246,
263, 278, 290, 306, 321, 331, 352, 355,
417
Greece 465
Gregory VII, Pope (1073-1085) 65
Gregory XVI, Pope (1831-1846) 407
Gregory Tsamblak (15th cent.), Greek Me-
tropolitan 117
Grochéw (battle of, 1831) 384, 436
Grodno 322, 324, 332
Grotniki (battle of, 1439) 119
gréd (castle-town) 38, 58, 60, 72, 75
Grudziadz 402
“Grudziaz Commune of the Polish People”
402
Grunwald (battle of, 1410) 116, 135, 137
Grzegorz Pawel of Brzeziny (c. 1525-1591)
160
Grzegorz of Sanok (c. 1407-1477), Arch-
bishop of Lwéw 134
Grzegorzewski Aleksander (1806-1855) 410
Grzybowski Piotr (-1651) 213
Grzymultowski Krzysztof (1620-1687) 219
Guibert de Gembloux (12th cent.), scholar
105
guilds 131, 135, 371
Gurowski Adam (1805-1866) 387
Gutakowski family 373
Gutt Romuald (1888) 576
Guzéw 185
Gwozdecki Gustaw (1886-1935) 576
Habich Edward (1835-1909) 471
Hapsburgs 107, 119, 122, 147-149, 168, 181,
183, 184, 187, 189, 198, 204, 221, 226,
239, 242, 244, 252, 337, 412, 418, 422,
452, 459, 461-463, 535, 539 ,
646 INDEX
Hadziacz (compact of, 1658) 217
Haithabu, Hedeby 37
Halicka Alicja (1894) 576
Halicz 104, 112, 113
Haller Jozef (1873-1960) 523, 530, 532, 548
Hansa 85, 95, 125
Hansemann Ferdinand (1861-1900) 496
Hauke-Bosak Jézef (1834-1871) 445
Hedwig, Jadwiga, Duchess of Silesia see Jad-
wiga, Hedwig
Hegel Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770-1831)
425
St. Hélier 402
Heltman Wiktor (1796-1878) 375, 401, 402
Hennin Pierre Michel (1728-1807) 265
Henrician Articles see Law
Henry I (-1309), Duke of Glogéw 99, 101
Henry (-1166), Duke of Sandomierz 68,
69
Henry of Valois (1573-1574), King of Po-
land 163, 164, 167, 179
Henry IJ the Bearded (c. 1163-1238), Duke
of Silesia 85, 89, 90, 98
Henry II the Pious (c. 1191-1241), Duke of
Silesia 89, 90, 93, 98
Henry II (973-1024), German King and
Emperor 52, 53
Henry IV (1050-1106), German King and
Emperor 65, 66, 90
Henry IV Probus (c. 1258-1290), Duke of
Wroclaw 90, 98, 103
Henry V (1081~1125), German King 66
Henryk Kietlicz (c. 1150-1219), Archbishop
of Gniezno 91
Henrykow 82
Herodotus (5th cent. BC) 28
Hertzberg Ewald Friedrich (1725-1795) 306,
320
Hertzen Alexandre (1812-1870) 434, 440
Herzegovina 514
Hetmen 167, 239-242, 246, 247, 250, 269,
284, 287, 309, 310, 316, 324
Heurich Jan (1873-1925) 504
Highlanders (in the Tatra) 462
“Hirsch-Duncker Unions” 474
Hirszfeld Ludwik (1884-1954) 568
Hitler Adolf (1889-1945) 585, 589, 590,
599-603, 606
H.K.T. (Hakata) 496
Hodo (-993), German Margrave 51
Hohenlinden (battle of, 1800) 344
Hohenstaufens 93
Hohenwart Karl Siegmund (1824-1899) 463
Hohenzollerns 157, 251, 252
Holland 235, 263, 306, see Netherlands
Holstein 267
Holy Alliance 21, 373, 380, 388, 392, 404,
409-413, 447
Holy Land 77
“Holy League” 221
Holy Roman Empire 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55,
93
Holy See 169, 171, 175, 198, 221, 226, 263,
266, 389 see Papacy
Horodto (union of, 1412) 117
Horwitz-Walecki Maksymilian (1877-1937)
512, 565
Hosius Stanislaus (1504-1579) 179, 201
Hospitallers 126 see Templars
hospites 85 °
Hospodar of Moldavia 149 (Peter IV Rare§&,
~1538)
Hotel Lambert 404, 422, 435, 443 see Czar-
toryskis
Hoyer Henryk sr (1834-1907) 466
Hubertsburg (treaty of, 1763) 267
Huczwa 55
Huguenots 163
L’Huillier Simon (1750-1840) 303
Humanism 146, 170, 171
Human (masacre of, 1768) 278
"Human Commune of the Polish People”
402
Hungary, Hungarians 21, 42, 46, 48, 51, 52,
55, 62, 66, 93, 95, 101, 107, 111-114,
120, 121, 148, 171, 179, 187, 188, 221,
222, 271, 280, 412, 420, 421, 422, 462,
463, 534, 601, 602
Huns 33
Hurko Osip (1828-1901) 491
Huss John (c. 1369-1415), Czech Reformer
117
Hussitism 104, 118, 131, 133
Taxa (12th cent.), Polish lord 77
Ibrahim ibn-Yaqub (10th cent.), Jewish mer-
chant 47, 62
Ibsen Henrik (1826-1906) 504
al Idrisi (12th cent.), Arabian geographer 76
Iganie (battle of, 1831) 384
IiHtakowicz Kazimiera (1892) 571
Imeretinsky Alexandr (1837-1900) 492
immunities 84, 108
impressionism 504
-
incompatibilitas (principle of) see Law
Independent Peasant Union 526
Innocent III, Pope (1198-1216) 93
Institute of the Popularization of Art in
Warsaw 576
interdictio, inhibitio, hereditatis see Law
International First 448, 541
International Third 595
Irzykowski Karol (1873-1944) 571
Isaac of Troki (1533-1594) 229
St. Isidore Labourer (c. 1070-1130) 202
Israel ben Eliezer (Beszt) (c. 1700-1761)
294
Italy 36, 49, 62, 63, 103, 104, 107, 131, 134,
231, 241, 244, 257, 258, 263, 299, 342-
344, 350, 380, 400, 420, 435, 459, 532,
535, 555, 599, 607
Italian style 174
jus civile see Law
aus Culmense see Law
ius municipale see Law
ins Novi Fort Sredense see Law
jus stapulae, depositorit see Law
ius terrestre, indicia terrestria see Law
ins Tentonicum see Law
Ivan IV the Terrible (1530-1584), Tsar of
Russia 157, 184
Iwaszkiewicz Jarostaw (1894) 568, 570
Izaslav (c. 1024-1078), Grand Duke of Kiev
65, 77
“
Jabtonowski Antoni (1793-1855) 376
Jackowski Maksymilian (1816-1905) 478
Jacobinism 310, 323, 328-332, 339, 341, 342,
344, 347, 354, 356
Jadwiga, Hedwig (c. 1174-1243), Duchess
of Silesia 104
Jadwiga, Hedwig of Anjou (1374-1399),
Queen of Poland 114, 115, 116, 135
Jagiellons 19, 107, 120, 122, 136, 145, 148,
149, 163, 1753 187, 190, 236
Jagiello, Togailas see Wtadystaw II Jagietlo
Jakub of Paradyz (-1464), theologian 134
Jakub Swinka (-1314), Archbishop of Gnic-
zno 98
Jakub (James) (-c. 1148), Archbishop of
Gniezno 68
Jakubowska Wanda (1907) 575
Jakuszowice 33
Jan of Glogéw (1445-1507), professor 134
Jan of Ludzisko (c. 1400-c. 1450) 134
INDEX 647
Jan Muskata (-1320), Bishop of Cracow
101 ~
Jandotowicz Marek (1713-1799) 277
Janicki Klemens (1516-1543) 174
Janiszewski Zygmunt (1888-1920) 568
Janko of Czarnkéw (c. 1320-c. 1387), his-
torian 113, 134
Jankowo 44
Janocki-Janisch Jan Daniel (1720-1786) 263
Janowicz Ludwik (1858-1902) 476
Janowski Jan Nepomucen (1803-1888) 399
Jansenism 255
Janusz (13th cent.), Palatine of Cracow 99
Janusz Suchywilk (c. 1310-1382), Chancel-
lor, Archbishop of Gniezno 113
Japan 490, 506, 600
Jaracz Stefan (1883-1945) 571
Jarema Jozef (1900) 576
Jarostaw Bogoria (-1376), Archbishop of
Gniezno 136
Jaroslawiec (negotiations of, 1848) 416
Jasienski Bruno (1901-1939) 571
Jasinski Jakub (1759-1794) 327, 329, 331,
332
Jasto 487
Jassy (peace of, 1792) 320
Jastrun Mieczyslaw (1903) 571
Jaskiewicz Jan (1749-1809) 302
Jaworéw (alliance of, 1675) 220
Jazdow 93, 94
JedInia 118
Jelski Florian (2nd half of the 18th cent.)
329
Jena (battle of, 1806) 346
Jersey Island 402
Jesuits 169, 184-186, 197, 198, 200-202,
230, 252, 254, 259, 264, 265, 283, 269,
302, 303
— Academy 231
Jews 36, 76, 84, 131, 132, 136, 229, 257,
278, 285-296, 312, 319, 339, 352, 433,
437, 439, 453, 472, 598, 606
Jewish Enlightenment (Haskala) 294 see
Enlightenment
Jezierski Franciszek (1740-1791) 302, 313
Jezowski Jozef (1798-1855) 375
Jedrzejowski Bolestaw Antoni (1867-1914)
512
Jedrzejow 101, 185
Joachim Frederick of Hohenzollern (1546-
1608), Duke of Prussia 187
Joannites 93
648 INDEX
Jodko-Narkiewicz Witold (1864-1924) 512
Joffe Agolf (1883-1927) 552
John Albert (1459-1501), King of Poland
122, 125, 126, 146, 147, 148, 150
John Casimir Vasa (1609-1672), King of
Poland 211, 213-217, 219
John III Sobieski (1629-1696), King of
Poland 180, 183, 218, 220-223, 225, 226,
235, 238, 252
John Christian (1591-1638), Duke of Brzeg
and Legnica 204
John of Luxemburg (1296-1346), King of
Bohemia 99, 101, 111, 112
Jordan (-984), Bishop of Poland 49
Joseph II (1741-1790), Emperor, 280, 305,
339, 340, 409
Jézefowicz Herszel (2nd half of the 18th
cent.) 315
Jozewski Henryk (1892) 598
Judith-Maria of Salic Dynasty
c. 1105), Duchess of Poland 66
Jurgens Edward (1823-1863) 433
Jurkowski Jan (17th cent.) 232
Jutland 37
(1047-
Kaden-Bandrowski Juliusz (1885-1944) 570
Kaffa 112, 122
Kakowski Aleksander (1862-1938) 531
Kalinka Walerian (1826-1886) 470
Kalisz, Kalisia 30, 41, 60, 86, 88, 112, 131,
350, 368, 369, 379, 393, 521
Kallimachus-Buonaccorsi
1496), humanist 134
Kaluga 276
Kamienieg Podolski 220, 222
Kamienna 370
Kamien 59, 66, 67, 92, 106
Kamienski Henryk (1813-1865) 408, 426
Kamienski Mikotaj (1799-1873) 421
Kaminski Kazimierz (1865-1928) 503
Kaniéw, Kaniov (battle of, 1918) 306, 532
Kartowice (treaty of, 1699) 222, 237, 238,
248
Karlowicz Mieczyslaw (1876-1909) 504
Karpinski Franciszek (1741-1825) 300
Kartuzy 498
Karwicki Dunin Stanislaw (1640-1724) 240
Kashuby, Kashubians 253, 462, 498
Kasprowicz Jan (1860-1926) 501, 502
Katowice 489
Kazimirski Mikolaj (-1598) 169
Kazimierz 132
Filippo (1437-
Kazimierz Dolny 153, 196, 214, 230
Kennemann Hermann (1815-1910) 496
Kettler Gotthard von (1517-1587), Duke of
Courland 157
Kiejstut, Kestutis (-1382), Duke of Lithua-
nia 115, 119
Kielce 230, 292, 370, 393, 407, 441, 521
Kiev 19, 37, 48, 55, 57, 62, 77, 117, 158,
217, 220, 222, 305, 375, 376, 464, 514,
550
Kilia 112, 122, 148
Kilinski Jan (1760-1819) 327, 493
King of Prussia 464 see Frederick Wil-
liam HI
Kirchholm (battle of, 1605) 183
Kisiel Adam (-1653) 212
Kisielewski Jan August (1876-1918) 502
Kherson 290
Kleck 148
Klemensow 395
Kliszéw (battle of, 1702) 237
Klonowic Sebastian (c. 1545-1602) 229
Kluczbork 233
Kluk Krzysztof (1739-1796) 302
Klodzko Pass 28
Kluszyn (battle of, 1610) 186
Kmita family 174
Knapius Grzegorz (c. 1565-1639) 230, 232
Kniaziewicz Karol (1762-1842) 344
Kniaznin Franciszek Dionizy (1750-1807)
300
Knights of Christ, Dobrzyn friars 94
Kober Marcin (c. 1580-c. 1609) 230
Kobro Katarzyna (1898-1950) 576
Kochanowski Jan (1530-1584) 146, 161, 173-
176, 178, 233
Kochowski Wespazjan (1633-1700) 232
Kolberg Oskar (1814-1890) 468
Kotakowski Wojciech (-1651) 213
Kolbacz 92, 106
Kollataj Hugo (1750-1812) 298, 302, 304,
310, 311, 312, 313, 315, 317, 318, 319,
321, 323, 328, 330, 332, 342, 346, 354,
356
“Koltataj’s Forge” 313, 324
Koto 124
Kolobrzeg 36, 52, 59, 66, 75, 92, 125
Kotomyja 149
Komarzewski Jan (1744-1810) 286
Komensky Jan Amos (1592-1670) 231
Konarski Adam (1518-1574) 163
Konarski Stanislaw (1700-1773) 264, 265,
269, 298, 302, 309
Konarski Szymon (1808-1839) 405
Konaszewicz-Sahajdaczny Piotr (-1622) 189
Konicz Tadeusz (1733-1793) 258
Koniecpolski Aleksander (1620-1659) 208,
227
Koniecpolski Stanislaw (c. 1590-1646) 208
Koniecpolski family 192
Konigsberg 121, 190, 233, 289
Konopnicka Maria (1842-1910) 472
Konovalets Evhen (1891-1938), 563, 585
Konstantynéw 369
Kopczynski Onufry (1735-1817) 302
Képrilii Ahmed (1635-1676), Visir 220
Koprzywnica 106
Korfanty Wojciech (1873-1939) 497
Kornecki Piotr (1st half of the 18th cent.)
258
Korsun (battle of, 1648) 208
Korytowski Witold (1850-1923) 519
Korzeniowski Apollo (1820-1869) 438
Korzeniowski Jézef (1797-1863) 426, 430
Korzon Tadeusz (1839-1918) 504
Kofice (privilege of, 1372) see Law
Kosinski Krishtof (-1593) 189
Kossakowski Jézef (1738-1794) 327
Kossakowski Szymon (1740-1794) 327
Kostka Napierski Aleksander (c. 1620-1651)
213
Kostrzewski Franciszek (1826-1911) 430
Kostrzewski Jozef (1885) 568
Koszutska Maria (Kostrzewa, Wera) (1876-
1939) 512, 565
KoScielski Jézef (1845-1911) 490, 494
Kosciuszko Tadeusz (1746-1817) 294, 321,
324, 325, 327, 330-332, 334, 337,
339, 341, 342, 344
Kot Stanislaw (1885) 523
Kowno, Kaunas 566, 600
Kozmian Kajetan (1771-1856) 378
Kozminek (union of, 1555) 160
Krakus (tumulus of) 45
Krasicki Ignacy (1735-1801) 300
Krasinski Adam (1714-1800) 277
Krasinski Michal (1712-1784) 277
Krasinski Zygmunt (1812-1859) 425, 426,
430
Kraszewski Jézef Ignacy (1812-1887) 426,
430
Kraziewicz Julian (1829-1895) 478
Kremlin 184, 187
INDEX 649
Kretchetnikov Piotr (1727-1800) 278
Krewo (union of, 1385) 116
Krepowiecki Tadeusz (1798-1847)
387, 388, 399, 400, 402
Kromer Marcin (1512-1589) 173, 179
Kronenberg Leopold (1812-1878) 439, 443
Krotowski Jakub (Krauthofer) (1806-1853)
416
Krowicki Marcin (c. 1500-1583) 160
Kruczkowski Leon (1900-1962) 570
Krukowiecki Jan (1770-1850) 389
Kruszwica 31, 41, 60, 79
Kruzlowa 136
375,
Krytski Adam Antoni (1844-1932) 466
Krzemieniec 345
Krzesz6w 106
Krzycki Andrzej (1482-1537) 175
Krzywicki Ludwik (1859-1941) 468, 568
Krzyzanowski Seweryn (1787-c. 1839) 376
Krzyztopér 230 see Ossolitski family
Kubicki Jakub (1758-1833) 299
Kucharski Aleksander (1741-1819) 299
Kudak 207
Kufstein 406
Kujawy 36, 68, 75, 77, 89-91, 99, 101, 105,
108, 112, 114, 158
Kukiel Marian (1885) 519, 523
Kulturkampf 456-458, 483, 489, 496
Kuna Henryk (1885-1945) 576
Kunicki Stanistaw (1861-1886) 476, 477
Kuratowski Kazimierz (1896) 568
Kurek Jalu (1904) 570
Kurozweki 112 see Poraj
Kurpie 223
Kwiatkowski Eugeniusz (1888) 582, 595, 597
Kwidzyn (customs of, 1765) 274
family
labour dues, labour services see Peasants
Lachert Bogdan (1900) 576
Lachy 40
Lad 41
Lambert (10th/11th cent.) son of Mieszko I
49
Lambert If (Sula) (-1071), Bishop of Cra-
cow 64
Lanckorona (battle of, 1770) 279
Land Credit Society 368
Jand diets see Parliament
land reform (1919-1925) 548, 549, 551, 562
see Peasants
Langiewicz Marian (1827-1887) 443
Laon 77
650 INDEX
Latvia 552, 588
Lausanne 524, 529
Law
mos liberorum hospitum (12th cent.) 80
interdictio, inhibitio hereditatis (12th
cent.) 82
of Magdeburg (1188) 85
forum liberum (12th/13th cent.) 83
tus stapulae, depositorit (12th/13th cent.)
87
ius municipale (12th/13th cent.) 111
tus Teutonicum, German law, ins civile
(13th cent.) 84-87, 95, 111, 127
locatio civitatis (13th cent.) 85, 86
of Libeck (13th cent.) 85
Polish law (13th cent.) 86, 111, 127
of Sroda, Novum Forum ducis Henrici,
Novi Fori Sredense (1221) 85
privilege of Cienia (1228) .89
of Chetmno, ins Culmense (1235) 85, 95,
155
ius terrestre, i€dicia terrestria (13th/14th
cent.) 111
privilege of KoSice (1372) 114
privilege of Brzesé (1425), Neminem
captivabimus nisi inure victum 118,
185
Nieszawa Statutes (1454) 121, 125, 131
incompatibihtas (16th cent.) 150
pacta conventa 163, 183
Henrician Articles (1573) 163, 164, 170
Napoleonic Civil Code (1807) 350, 353,
355, 359, 453
League of Nations 549, 566, 586, 589, 599
Le Brun André (1737-1811) 299
Lechon Jan (Serafinowicz Leszek) (1899-
1956) 571
Lednica 63
Ledéchowski Mieczystaw (1822-1902) 457
Ledéchowski Stanistaw (-1725) 240
Legnica 60, 93, 126, 133, 168, 204
Leipzig (battle of, 1813) 358
Leitha 462
Lelewel Joachim (1786-1861) 380, 381, 384,
387, 389, 390, 400, 401, 404, 405, 425
Leliwa family 112
Lenartowicz Teofil (1822-1893) 428
Lengnich Gotfryd (1689-1774) 264
Lengyel 40
Lenin Vladimir (1870-1924) 362
Lenkai 40
Leo XIII, Pope (1878-1903) 489
Leoben (armistice of, 1797) 343
Leszczynski Jan (-1678) 219
Leszezynski Rafat (c. 1526-1592) 155
Leszezynski Rafat (1579-1636) 199
Leszczynski Stanislaw see Stanistaw Lesz-
czyhski
Leszezynski family 230
Leszek, Lestek, Lestko (9th/10th cent.), Duke
of Polanie 42
Leszek the Black (c. 1241-1288), Duke of
Cracow-Sandomierz 91, 98, 104
Leszek the White (c. 1186-1227), Duke of
Cracow-Sandomierz 86, 89, 91, 104
Leszno 199, 230, 233
— Academy of 231
Lesmian Boleslaw (1878-1937) 570
Lewin Mendel Satanower (1741-1819) 294
letters patent of Joseph II (1780-1790) see
Peasants
Lezajsk 230
Lezno 44
Lebork 206, 216
Ledzice, Lendizi 40
Libel Karol (1807-1875) 406, 407, 417,
425
liberum veto see Parliament
Lieberman Herman (1870-1941) 585
Liebknecht Wilhelm (1826-1900) 474, 48%
Liege 49, 50, 78
Limanowa 523
Limanowski Boleslaw (1835-1935) 474, 475,
488
Linde Samuel Bogumil (1771-1847) 345
Lipski Jézef (1894-1958) 602
Liske Ksawery (1838-1891) 470
Lisowski Aleksander (-1616) 189
Lithuania, Lithuanians 21, 28, 37, 84, 93,
95, 101, 104, 107, 111, 113, 115, 116,
118, 120, 121, 122, 128, 133, 136, 148,
150, 156-158, 163, 164, 173, 211, 214,
215, 217, 223, 229, 238, 253, 254, 275,
278, 279, 280, 293, 302, 331, 339, 342,
345, 357, 373, 376, 384, 385, 387, 437,
440, 444, 445, 453, 475, 531, 548, 549,
551, 552, 566, 600
Little Poland 36, 38, 43, 50, 68, 73, 76, 80,
83, 84, 89, 90, 98, 99, 101, 104, 111, 112,
114, 119, 124, 126, 127, 131, 132, 135,
136, 156, 158, 159, 227, 239, 240, 563,
598
Livonia 156-158, 168, 169, 183, 190, 217,
236, 237, 242
Livonian Order of the Knights of the Sword
95, 156
Livy (59 BC-17 AD) 134
local diets see Parliament
Locarno (treaty of, 1925) 566, 600
locatio civitatis see Law
Locke John (1632-1704) 233
Loga 329
Lombardy 79, 105, 343, 412, 421
Lompa Jézef (1797-1863) 398, 417
London 281, 388, 401, 413, 440, 444, 447,
568, 602, 605, 606, 607
Lorraine 49, 55, 77, 244
Lothair III (1075-1137), German King and
Emperor 67
Louis d’Anjou (1326-1382), King of Hun-
gary and Poland 113, 114
Louis I (c. 1311-1398), Duke of Brzeg
126 ;
Louis Henri de Bourbon, duc (1692-1740)
243 :
Louis XIV (1638-1715), King of France 219,
220, 235, 239
Louis XV (1710-1774), King of France 239,
243, 245, 266
Louis (Dauphin) (1729-1765), son of Louis
XV 266
Louis-Philippe (1773-1850), King of the
French 413
Low Countries see Netherlands
Liibeck 85, 87, 91
— law see Law
Lubecki-Drucki Ksawery (1778-1846) 368,
369, 373, 374, 377, 382, 394, 463
Lubiqz 106
Lubienietki Stanislaw (1623-1675) 232
Lublin 60, 77, 93, 98, 136, 153, 158, 179,
185, 199, 214, 264, 355, 356, 384, 393,
407, 469, 525, 527, 537, 596
— Provisional Government of the
Republic 537, 538
— Union of (1569) 158, 164, 168, 192
Lublinski Julian (1799-1872) 375
Lubomirski Jerzy (1616-1667) 211, 216, 218,
219
Lubomirski Stanislaw (1719-1783) 283, 284,
286
Lubomirski
1702) 230
Lubomirski Zdzistaw (1865-1941) 531
Lubomirski family 227, 230, 300
Lubranski Jan (-1520) 175
Polish
Stanislaw Harakliusz (1642-
INDEX 651
Lubusz, Lebus 67, 68, 91, 95, 98, 111, 126,
154, 263
Lucchesini Girolamo (1751-1825) 308
Ludgarda of Mecklemburg (c. 1261-1283),
Duchess of Great Poland 104
Lugii 28, 29
Lunéville (treaty of, 1801) 263, 344
Lusatia, Luzyce 25, 27, 33, 53, 55, 85, 122,
148
Luslawice 173
Luther Martin (1483-1546) 148, 158
Lutheranism 148, 159, 174, 199, 254, 257
Lutomys] 98
Liitzen (battle of, 1813) 357
Luxemburg dynasty 101, 107
Luxemburg Rosa (1871-1919) 488, 489
Lwow 112, 113, 122, 126, 131, 136, 153,
196, 214, 216, 220, 226, 257, 264, 341,
392, 405, 418, 461, 463, 475, 487, 493,
504, 518, 522, 543, 552, 563, 568, 578,
579, 595
Lancut 230, 300 see Lubomirski family
Laski Jan, John a Lasco (1499-1560) 160
Laski Jan (c. 1455-1531), Archbishop 148,
160, 163
Laszcz Samuel (c. 1590-1649) 201
Leczyca 31, 43, 60, 63, 68, 88, 89, 101, 102,
105
Lomza 348, 552
Lowczéwek 523
Lédz 369, 370, 394, 433, 435, 464, 476, 487,
510, 511
Lubienski Feliks (1758-1848) 350, 354, 356
Lubienski Henryk (1793-1883) 394
Lubienski Tomasz (1784-1870) 394
Luck 226
Lukasinski Walerian (1786-1868) 376
Lukéw 93
Lysiec Mount see Swietokrzyskie Mountains
Lyszczynski Kazimierz (c. 1634-1689) 225.
Mably Gabriel, Bonnot de (1709-1785) 279,
298
Maciej Kolbe of Swiebodzin (15th cent.)
professor 133
Maciejowice (battle of, 1794) 332
“Macierz Szkolna” (School Union) 513
Madalifski Antoni (1739-1805) 325
Maeterlinck Maurice (1862-1949) 504
Magdeburg 36, 62, 85, 155, 530
— law see Law
652 INDEX
Magnus of Denmark (‘King of Livonia”)
(1540-1583) 157, 169
Magyars see Hungarians
Main School see University of Warsaw
Mainz 36
Majer Jézef (1808-1899) 430
Makowski Tadeusz (1882-1932) 576
Malawski Artur (1904-1957) 576
Malbork 121, 136
Malczewski Antoni (1793-1826) 379
Malczewski Jacek (1854-1929) 504
Malinowski Bronistaw (1884-1942) 568
Malinowski Marian (1876-1948) 526
Malinowski Tomasz (1802-1880) 402
Malonne 78
Malachowski Stanislaw (1736-1809) 307,
309, 310, 317, 321, 347
Matachowski family 263
Manchuria 506
Manchukuo empire 600
Mann Thomas (1875-1955) 570
mansus 127
Mantua (capitulation of, 1799) 431
manufactory 143, 197, 262, 263, 288, 292,
461
Marcin Krél of Zurawica (c. 1422-1460)
professor 134
Marcinkowski Karol (1800-1846) 395, 413
Marconi Henryk (1792-1863) 430
Marie-Casimira (1641-1716), Queen of Po-
land 220, 235
Marie d’Anjou (1371-1395), Queen of Hun-
gary 114
Marie-Josephine (1699-1757), Queen of Po-
land 242
Maria Leszcezynska (1703-1768), Queen of
France 243, 244
Marie-Louise de Gonzague
Queen of Poland 208, 213
Maria Theresa (1717-1780), Empress 280
Markomanns 29
Marmaros Sziget 534
Marne (battle of, 1914) 523
Martin the Pole (-1279), Archbishop of
Gniezno 104
Maruszewski Tomasz (1769-c. 1834) 329
Marx Karl (1818-1883) 413, 447
Masaryk Tomas Garrigue (1850-1937) 535
Massalski Ignacy (1725-1794) 298
Matejko Jan (1838-1893) 472
Mateusz of Cracow (c. 1330-1410), pro-
fessor 134
(1611-1667),
Matthias Corvinus (c. 1443-1490), King of
Hungary and Bohemia 121, 122, 126
Matuszewicz Marcin (1714-1773) 256
Matuszewicz Tadeusz (c. 1765-1819) 356
Mauersberger Ludwik (1796-1823) 375
Max von Baden (1867-1929) 536
Maximilian I (1459-1519), Emperor 148
Maxilimian II (1527-1576), Emperor 167
Maximilian of Hapsburg (1558-1618) 181
Mazepa Ivan (1644-1709) 238
Mazovia, Mazovians 36, 38, 44, 50, 56, 57,
60, 62, 66, 68, 73, 83, 84, 85, 89, 91,
93, 94, 108, 127, 128, 133, 135, 156, 158,
163, 369
Mazuria, Mazurians 127, 253, 397, 398, 457,
498, 549, 552, 555, 607
Mazurkiewicz Stefan (1888-1945) 568
Mazzini Giuseppe (1805-1872) 400, 401
Maczenski Zdzislaw (1878-1961) 576
Maczynski Jan (c. 1520-c. 1584) 172
Matwy (battle of, 1666) 219
Medical Academy 433, 434 see Warsaw
Mecklenburg 47, 101
Mediterranean basin 28
Meissen 62, 99
Mejer Jozef (-1825) 329
Melsztyn see Leliwa family 112
Memel 320
Mendelson Stanislaw (1858-1913) 474, 475,
488
Mendelssohn Moses (1729-1786) 294
Merlini Dominik (1730-1797) 299
Merovingian Kingdom 33
Messianism 425
Mestvin II, Méciwdj (-1294),
Gdansk-Pomerania 91, 92°
Methodius (-885), Apostle to the Slavs 41,
50
Metternich Klemens (1773-1859) 363, 412
Meuse 77, 106
Medrzecki Adam (1762-1832) 315
Miarka Karol (1824-1882) 458
Michael Romanov (1595-1645) 187
Michal Korybut Wisniowiecki (1640-1673),
King of Poland 219, 220
Michalowski Aleksander (1851-1938) 504
Michalowski Piotr (1801-1855) 427
Mickiewicz Adam (1798-1855) 17, 359,
375, 376, 379, 380, 421, 424-426, 492,
500
Miechowita Maciej (c. 1457-1523), profes-
sor 173, 176, 179
Duke of
Miechéw 77
Mieclaw, Mojstaw, Mastaw (-1047), Duke
of Mazovia 56, 57
Mielnik (act of unia, 1501) 150, 157
Mielno 117
Mielzytski Maciej (1790-1870) 413
Mieroslawski Ludwik (1814-1878) 409, 415,
416, 421, 434, 435, 438, 443
Mieszko I (-992), Duke of Poland 34, 42,
47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 56, 57, 59, 62,
64, 93
Mieszko II Lambert (990-1034), King of
Poland 50, 55, 57, 60, 64, 77 ‘
Mieszko III the Old (c. 1126/7-1202), Duke
of Great Poland 68, 69, 89, 90, 92
Mikolaj of Radom (15th cent.), composer
135
Mikolaj Traba (c. 1358-1422), Archbishop
117 Fi
Milan 421
“Millenaries” 433, 435, 438
Milsko, Milzenland 53
Milyutin Nicholas (1818-1872) 445
Milkowski Zygmunt (1824-1915) 484
Mitostaw (battle of, 1848) 416
Milosz Czestaw (1911) 571
Minin Kuzma (-1616) 187,
Minsk 530, 551
Misiowski A. (mid-18th cent.) 258
Mitzler de Kolof Wawrzyniec (1711-1778)
263
Miawa 464
Miodzianowski Tomasz (1622-1686) 226
Mniszech Jerzy (-1613) 184
Mniszech Jerzy August (1715-1778) 251,
269
Mniszech Maryna (-1614) 184
Mochnacki Maurycy (c. 1804-1834) 375,
379, 381, 387, 390
Modlin 38%
modernism 499
Mogilno 77, 79
Mohammed IV (1641-1692), Sultan 220
Mohyléw 255 see Orthodox Church
Mokronowski Andrzej (1713-1784) 298, 302
Moldavia 116, 122, 148, 188, 222, 232, 238,
271, 281, 290, 341
Moliére Jean Baptiste (1622-1673) 259
Molotov Viacheslav (1890) 603
Mongol Empire, Mongols 86, 93, 98, 104
Moniuszko Stanistaw (1819-1872) 430
42 History of Poland
INDEX 653
Montesquieu Charles Louis (1689-1755) 312,
313, 315
Monti Antoine (1684-1738) 243
Montpellier 104
Moraczewski Jedrzej (1870-1944) 536, 538,
543, 545, 546
Moravia 31, 41, 44, 45, 50, 53, 55, 122, 148,
252
Moravian Gate 28, 62
Morcinek Gustaw (1891-1963) 570
Morsztyn Jan Andrzej (c. 1613-1693) 229
Morsztyn Zbigniew (c. 1628-1689) 229, 233
mos liberorum hospitum see Law
Moscow 157, 212, 357, 464, 512, 550, 590,
603, 605
Moftice 582
Moécicki Ignacy (1867-1946) 579, 582, 593,
595, 597
Moulin Pierre de (-1658) 200
Muraviev Michail (1796-1866) 445, 450,
453
Mszana 522
Minchengratz (treaty of, 1833) 392
Munich 600, 601, 606
Murmansk 532
Muscovy 115, 146, 147, 148, 149, 156, 157,
168, 169, 184, 186, 187, 198, 214, 219,
222, 227 see Moscow
Mussolini Benito (1883-1945) 589, 599, 600
Myszkowski Zygmunt (1562-1615) 185
Myszkowski family 175
Nalevaiko Semen (-1597) 189 ;
Natkowska Zofia (1884-1954) 570, 571
Natkowski Waclaw (1851-1911) 468
Namysiéw 112
Nancy 263
Naples 343
Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821), Emperor
of the French 341, 343-349, 351-353,
354-360, 363, 364, 367, 377, 502, 523
— Civil Code see Law
Napoleon III (1808-1873), Emperor of the
French 431, 435, 441, 444
Narew 37
“Narodnaya Volya”, Narodniks 476, 485
“Narodni Vybor” (National Council) 535
see Czechoslovakia
Naruszewicz Adam (1733-1796) 302
Narutowicz Gabriel (1865-1922) 559
Narva (treaty of, 1704) 237
Narvik (battle of, 1940) 606
654 INDEX
Natanson Jakub (1832-1884) 464
National Central Committee (1863) 440-
443, 521 see Reds
National Committee (Poznan uprising, 1848)
414, 415
National Committee (Cracow, 1848) 418
National Council (Lwéw, 1848) 418, 419
National Democratic Party, National Demo-
crats 492, 493, 494, 508, 513, 516, 517-
519, 522, 523, 533, 534, 536-538, 545,
550, 559, 562, 593, 595
National Party 516
National Government (Cracow, 1846) 410
National Government 443, 444-446 see
National Central Committee
National League 492, 493, 497, 506°511,
513, 514-516, 519, 539
National Liberals 483
National Peasant Union 516, 519
National Radical Camp 595, 598
National Unity Camp 598
National Workers Union 511, 516, 519
nationalism 482, 483, 486, 492, 513, 515,
518, 520, 531, 598
nazism 589, 595, 599, 606
Nax Ferdynand (1736-1810) 302
Near East 50, 404
Neman 288, 348, 552
Neminem captivabimus nisi iure victum see
Law
Neo-classicism 377
Neo-slavy movement 513
Nero 29
Nertchinsk 407
Netherlands 189, 229, 231
Newton Isaac (1642-1727) 233
Nicholas I (1796-1855), Emperor of Rus-
sia, King of Poland 377, 380, 383, 387,
391, 407, 414, 422, 431
Nicholas II (1864-1918), Emperor of Russia
491, 529
Nicolaus of Poland (13th cent.), physician
104
Niemcewicz Julian Ursyn (1758-1841) 377,
464
Niemcza 64
Nida 119
Niemirich Jurij (c. 1612-1659) 217
Niemojewski Jakub (c. 1532-1584) 169
Niemojowski Bonawentura (1787-1835) 374
Niemojowski Wincenty (1784-1834) 374
Niepotomice 174
Niestecki Kasper (1682-1744) 264
Nieszawa 385
— Statutes see Law
Nieswiez 173, 258, 580 see Radziwill family
Nietzsche Friedrich Wilhelm (1844-1900)
502
Niewiadomski Eligiusz (1869-1923) 559
Nikolai Nikolayevich (1856-1929), Grand
Duke of Russia, 522, 528
Nisztad, Neustadt 280
Nobel Prize 471, 502
nomads 34
Non-Party Block for Cooperation with the
Government 580, 584, 586, 591
Norbert of Magdeburg (c. 1080-1134),
Archbishop 67
Norblin Jean Pierre (1745-1830) 299
North March 52
Norway 101
Norwerth Edgar Aleksander (1884-1950) 576
Norwid Cyprian Kamil (1821-1883) 428
Noskowski Andrzej (1492-1547) 174
Novara (battle of, 1849) 421
Novosiltzov Nikolai (1762-1838) 367, 374,
375
Nowa Huta 30
Nowe Miasto Korezyn 119, 142
Nowogroédek 563
Nowosielce 597
Nowogréd Siewierski 217
Nowy Sacz 88, 216
Nowy Targ 191
Nuremberg. 87, 136
Nysa river 85
Nysa 280
Obertyn 149
Obodrits 32, 47
Oda (19th/11th cent.), Margravine of North
March, Mieszko’s I second wife 52
Odessa 340, 375
Odra 17, 19, 25, 29, 31, 32, 33, 43, 45,
48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 59, 60, 62, 64, 67,
92, 95, 126, 252
Odrowaz family 79
Ogariev Nicholas (1813-1877) 440
Ogitiski Michal (1728-1800) 279, 280, 288,
299, 306
Oginski family 300
Ogrodzieniec 174 see Boner family
Oka 606
Okét 88
Okrzeja Stefan (1886-1905) 511
Olgierd, Algirdas (c. 1296-1377),
Duke of Lithuania 115
Olesnica 126
Oliwa (peace of, 1660) 106, 190, 217
Olkusz 127
Olsztyn 176
Olszewski Karol (1846-1915) 470
Olbin 79
Opalinski Krzysztof (1600-1655) 215, 227
Opalinski Lukasz (1581-1654) 195
Opalinski family 230
Opava 104
Opitz Martin (1597-1639) 233
Opolanie, ‘Opolini 40
Opole 60, 74, 204, 233, 397, 555
Orchowski Jan Alojzy (1767-1832) 329
Order of the Knights of the Sword see
Livonian Knights
Order of the Teutonic Knights see Teutonic
Knights
Organic Statue see Constitution
“Organic work” 395-397, 407, 426, 433,
435, 438, 465, 466, 482
Orléans 243
Orlik Filip (Fytyp Orlyk) (1673-1742) 238
Ortowski Lukasz (-1765) 258
Orsza (battle of, 1514) 148
Orthodox Church 173, 183, 185, 186, 187,
189, 192, 200, 206, 225, 254, 255, 271,
391, 455, 494, 564, 598
Orthodox Empress 277 see Catherina II
Orzelski Swietostaw (1549-1598) 161
Orzeszkowa Eliza (1841-1910) 472
Osinski Antoni (mid-18th cent.) 258
Osinski Jozef (1738-1802) 302
Osman II (1604-1622), Sultan 189
Ossolinski Hieronim A 576) 155
Ossolinski Jézef Maksymilian (1748-1824)
345, 392
Ossolinski Jerzy (1595-1650) 212, 213
Ossolinski family 230
Ossowski Michal (1743-) 319
Ossowski Michat (1863-1886) 477
Osterwa Juliusz (1885-1947) 571
Ostrorédg Jan (c. 1436-1501), political writer
134
Ostrowiec 512
Ostréda 398
Ostrég 264
Ostrogski Konstanty (1527-1608) 183
Ostrogski Vasilii (1526-1608) 192
Ostrogski family 192
Grand
42°
INDEX 655
Ostroleka (battle of, 1831) 385, 387
Ostrowski Jézef (1850-1924) 531
Ostrowski Teodor (1750-1802) 302
Ostr6w Tumski 88
Oswiecim (Duchy of) 120
Otto (c. 1060-1139), Bishop of Bamberg
67
Orto I (912-973), German King and Empe-
ror 42, 49
Otto II (955-983), German King and Empe-
ror 51
Orto III (980-1002), German King and
Emperor 52, 62
Ottoman Empire 169, 188, 189, 220 see
Turkey
— Sublime Porte 221, 222
Ozarowski Piotr (-1794) 327
Pabianice 369
pacta conventa see Law
Paderewski Ignacy (1860-1941) 504, 524,
529, 546, 548
Padlewski Zygmunt (1835-1863) 441, 444
Padniewski Filip (-1572) 175
Palij Semen (~1710) 239
Palmerston Henry (1784-1865) 431
Pan-Germanism 492
Panin Nikita (1718-1783) 275, 280, 281,
284, 305
Pankiewicz Jézef (1866-1940) 504, 576
Panslavism 421
“Panta Koina” (“Everything in Common”)
375
Papacy 51, 65, 93, 148, 154, 167, 176, 183,
221, 226, 255, 284, 455
Parliament see Constitution
Chamber of Deputies 149, 164, 185, 284,
316, 318, 350, 354, 364
colloquia, assemblies of the lords and
the gentry 124 7
land diets (conventiones particulares)
122, 125, 149, 150
land diets (sejmiki) 121
liberum veto 218, 272, 275, 276, 281,
285, 310
Jocal diets 184, 185, 192, 224, 232, 239,
241, 253, 269, 285, 308, 309, 311,
312, 315, 316, 317, 350
Polish Parliamentary Club (in the
Austrian Parliament) 494, 517, 518
Polish Parliamentary Club (in the Prus-
sian Area) 534
Privy Council 149
686 INDEX
Senate 149, 150, 161, 164, 168, 203, 217,
234, 278, 350, 364, 377, 392, 528,
555, 559, 591, 596
Senate of the Free City Gdansk 588, 589
Seym 125, 149, 150, 153, 155, 156, 157,
160, 161, 163, 164, 167, 170, 172,
185, 192, 195, 200, 203, 206, 217, 218,
219, 224, 232, 235, 239, 240, 241, 242,
265, 269, 271, 272, 274, 275, 276, 281,
284, 289, 292, 294, 298, 302, 303, 306,
308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 315, 316, 318,
319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 328,
330, 334, 339, 348-350, 354, 357, 364,
374, 377, 381, 384, 385-388, 391, 392,
396, 459, 462, 463, 479, 517, 519, 527,
536, 537, 538, 547-549, 555, 558-560,
562, 577, 578, 580, 584, 594, 596, 602
viritim (principle of election) 170
voting system 513
Paris 77, 97, 104, 133, 163, 167, 219, 263,
281, 310, 323, 328, 341, 343, 352, 357,
363, 388, 404, 405, 413, 418, 421, 426,
430, 434, 435, 443, 444, 471, 473, 529,
532, 545, 565, 576, 597, 605
Parnas Jakub Karol (1884-1949) 568
Parkany (battle of, 1683) 221
Partynice 30 :
Pasek Jan Chryzostom (c. 1636-c. 1701)
239, 256
Paskevich Ivan (1782-1856) 385, 389, 391,
394, 395, 416, 422
“Passivists” 526, 532
Pastorius Joachim (1611-1681) 233
Patek Stanislaw (1866-1945) 550
Patriotic Society 376, 383, 387, 388, 399
Paul I (1754-1801), Tsar of Russia 340
Paul IV, Pope (1555-1559) 160
Paul V, Pope (1605-1621) 186, 189
Paulines 216 —
Paulus Vladimiri of Brudzen (1370/3-c.
1434), professor 117, 134
Pawel of Przemankowo (-1296), Bishop of
Cracow 90
Pawlikowska-Jasnorzewska
1945) 571
Pawlikowski Jézef (c. 1770-1829) 310, 311,
312, 313, 329, 344
Pawlikowski Tadeusz (1862-1915) 504
Peasant Association 407 see Sciegienny
Peasant Party (in Galicia) 494, 517, 536 see
Polish Peasant Party “Piast”
Maria (1894-
Peasant Radical Party 518
Peasant Party 597, 598
— Universities 567
Peasants
decree of December (1807) 367
enfranchisement 337, 338, 350
woods and pastures question 419, 420,
451, 452, 460, 479, 481, 508, 537
freeholds 441, 444, 445
labour dues, labour services, serfdom,
serf labour 151, 153, 191, 196, 197,
198, 223, 225, 261, 262, 277, 284,
289, 293, 312, 318, 327, 328, 337,
340, 341, 350, 351, 358-361, 364-
368, 383, 385, 387, 392, 393, 401,
404, 409, 411, 412, 418, 419, 431,
433, 435, 437, 441, 444, 452, 460
land reform (1919-1925) 548, 549, 551,
562
letters patent of Joseph II (1780-1790)
339, 340
Manifesto of Polaniec (1794) 325
Manifesto of the Temporary National
Government (1863) 441
movement 479, 493, 494, 516, 526, 535
“Regulation Reform” (in the Prussian
area, 1848-1850) 450 serf fight 324
“Settlement Decree” (in the Prussian
area, 1807-1811) 361, 362
“ ukase of the Tsar (1864) 445
Peiper Tadeusz (1891) 571
Pelplin 106
People’s Supreme Council (Prussian area)
546 see Polish People’s Council
Perejastaw (compact of, 1654) 214
Perl Feliks (1871-1927) 595
Permanent Council (1775-1788) 283, 284-
287, 295, 302, 303, 305-309; (1793-1794)
322, 325, 327
Persia 186, 243
Petcheneguians 52
Peter I (1672-1725), Emperor of Rusia 235,
238, 241, 242, 243, 245, 247, 254, 255
Peter III (1728-1762), Emperor of Russia
267
St. Peter’s Pence 41, 93, 101, 102 see Papacy
Peter of Lusignan (14th cent.), King of
Cyprus 113
St. Petersburg 268, 269, 270, 272, 274, 280,
281, 284, 285, 305, 307, 320, 322, 332,
333, 355, 357, 377, 383, 392, 433, 434,
437, 438, 439, 441, 455, 461, 473, 474,
491, 492, 493, 506, 514, 524
Petlura Semen (1877-1926) 550, 598
Petrograd 530 see St. Petersburg
— Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Depu-
ties 529
Petrushevich Eugen (1863-) 563
Petrycy Sebastian of Pilzno (c. 1554-1624)
229, 232
Philippe d’Orléans (1674-1723) 243
Philomats 375, 379
physiocracy 262, 298, 299, 319
Piarists 259, 264
Piast, mythical founder of the dynasty 42
Piast (dynasty) 19, 42, 51, 58, 60, 62, 89,
107, 108, 118, 126, 168
— of Kujawy 114
— of Silesia 126, 206, 252
Piattoli Scipione (1749-1809) 298, 316, 317,
319
Pieniny 601
Pieracki Bronistaw (1895-1934) 592
Pieskowa Skata 174
Pictrusinski Jan (1864-1886) 477
Pilica 333
Pila 310
Pitawce (battle of, 1648) 212
Pitsudski Jézef (1867-1935) 488,
512, 519, 520, 521-524, 525,
532, 533, 536, 537, 538, 543, 545, 546,4
547, 550, 552, 559, 560, 562, 563, 565,
570, 577-582, 584, 585, 588-595, 597,
599, 605
Pidczéw 173, 174, 179
— Academy of 174 see Calvinists
Piotr of Byczyna (14th cent.), historian 134
Piotr of Silesia, son of Wlost (-1153), Si-
lesian lord 68, 78, 79
Piotrkéw 122, 156, 310
Piramowicz Grzegorz (1735-1801) 302
Pisecki Tomasz (c. 1578-c. 1648) 233
Pistorius Szymon (17th cent.) 233
Pius VII, Pope (1800-1823) 353
Pius IX, Pope (1846-1878) 420
Plautus (c. 250 BC-180 BC) 186
Pliny the Elder (23-79), Roman naturalist
29
Plock 37, 60, 65, 68, 78, 79, 196, 348, 393,
550
Plowce (battle of, 1331) 141
Pniewski Bogdan (1897-1965) 576
Poczobut Marcin (1728-1809) 302
Podgorze see Cracow
Podhajce (battle of, 1667) 220
492,
527,
506,
530,
INDEX 657
Podhorce 304 see Rzewuski Waclaw
Podhale 191, 213, 223
Podlasie 84, 127, 158, 223, 258, 342, 441,
510, 532
Podolia 113, 220, 222, 223
Poincaré Raymond (1860-1934) 529
Poitiers 401 see Polish Democratic Society
— Manifesto 401, 406, 408, 409, 411
Pokucie 149
Pol Wincenty (1807-1872) 426
Polanie, Polani, Polanes 40, 41, 42, 47, 64
Polanowo (peace treaty of, 1643) 180, 188,
204
Polesie 552, 563, 564, 586
Polish Academy of Literature 593
Polish Auxiliary Corps 534
Polish Brethern see Arians
Polish Committee of National Liberation
-- 607
‘Polish Democratic Society 399-404, 406, 408,
421
Polish Democratic Society (Prussian area,
1907) 516
Polish law see Law
Polish League (Poznan, 1848) 417
Polish League 484, 485, 492, 514 see Nation-
al League
Polish Liquidation Commission 535
Polish Military Organization (POW) 523,
525, 527, 533, 537, 538, 581, 593
Polish National Committee (1831) 399, 400
Polish National Committee (1917) 524, 529,
532, 535, 545, 548
Polish National Council 535
“Polish National Venta”
masonry
400 see free-
Polish Parliamentary Club see Parliament
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) “Piast” 517,
547, 551, 558-560
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) ‘“Wyzwolenie”
526, 537, 577
Polish Peasant Union (Congress Kingdom,
1904-1907) 516
Polish People’s Councils 546
Polish Progressive Party 519
Polish Social-Democratic Party of Galicia
and Cieszyn-Silesia (PPSD) 487, 518,
519, 536
Polish Socialist Party (PPS) 488, 489, 506-
513, 516,.519, 520, 521, 526, 527, 533,
536, 550, 551, 577, 580, 595, 596
658 INDEX
Polish Socialist Party (PPS) of the Prussian
area 489, 497
Polish Teachers’ Union 567
Polish Technical University 378
Polish Workers’ Party (PPR) 607
Political Circle in Lausanne see Polish Na-
tional Committee
Polock 169
Polaniec (Manifesto of,
Peasants
Polttawa (battle of, 1709) 238
Pomerania, Pomeranians 21, 28, 31, 35, 37,
43, 48, 50, 52, 59, 60, 66, 73, 75, 77, 91,
92, 97, 116, 121, 127, 180, 206, 245, 257,
289, 331, 362, 397, 398, 405, 407, 417,
456, 462, 480, 484, 495, 515, 535, 566,
601, 608
Gdansk 28, 43, 44, 57, 62, 66, 84,
86, 89, 91, 94, 95, 98, 99, 106, 111,
112, 121, 397, 494, 549, 555
Eastern 60
Western 36, 43, 50, 57, 60, 66, 67, 68,
73, 84, 85, 89, 91, 92, 95, 101, 106,
111, 112, 125, 126, 168, 179, 206, 216,
238, 251, 397, 498
Poniatowski Jézef (1763-1813) 321, 330,
348, 354, 355, 357, 358
Poniatowski Juliusz (1886) 699
Poniatowski Michat (1736-1794) 285, 292,
302, 304
Poniatowski Stanislaw (1676-1762)
264, 268-272
Poniatowski Stanistaw (1732-1798) see Sta-
nistaw Augustus
Poniatowski family 250, 265, 266, 312,
316
Poninski Adam (1732-1798) 281, 308
Pope 186, 189 (see Paul V); 353 (see Pius
VII)
Popiel, mythical dynast 42
-Popiel Michat 455
Poptawski Antoni (1739-1799) 302
Poplawski Jan Ludwik (1854-1908) 485, 492,
493
Poprad 52, 88
Poraj family 112
Portsmouth 402
positivism 430, 449, 465, 466, 472, 482,
500
postimpressionism 504
Potemkin Grigori) (1739-1791) 284, 285,
305, 309 ~
1794) 325 see
250,
\
Alfred (1817-1889) 463
Andrzej (1861-1908) 518
Antoni (-1766) 265
Franciszek Salezy (-1772) 269
Ignacy (1750-1809) 309, 310, 314,
316, 317, 318, 321, 323, 330, 332
Potocki Jan (1761-1815) 300
Potocki Prot (-1801) 290, 319
Potocki Stanislaw (1755-1821) 287, 302,
Potocki
Potocki
Potocki
Potocki
Potocki
315,
323, 345, 348, 354, 373, 378
Potocki Szezesny (1751-1805) 306, 315, 320,
322
Potocki Waclaw (1621-1696) 229
Potocki family 227, 243, 247, 248, 250,
251, 265, 283
Potsdam (treaty of friendship, 1805) 346
Potworowski Gustaw (1800-1860) 413
Potworowski Tadeusz Piotr (1898-1952) 576
Powodowski Hieronim (c. 1547-1613) 201
Pozharski Dimierii (1578-c. 1642) 187
Poznan 31, 41, 60, 62, 65, 68, 79, 85, 86,
87, 88, 89, 117, 129, 133, 153, 196, 199,
225, 264, 347, 348, 361, 362, 363, 369,
383, 392, 393, 395, 397, 398, 406, 407,
409, 410, 414, 415, 416, 417, 420, 422,
426, 446, 456, 457, 478, 480, 481, 491,
495, 496, 504, 515, 524, 547, 549, 555
e— Society of the Friends of the Sciences
430
PPS Fighting Organization see Polish So-
cialist Party
PPS Left Wing 512, 520, 526, 533, 545 see
Polish Socialist Party
PPS Revolutionary Wing see Polish Socialist
Party
“Praeséns” (group of architects) 576
Praga (masacre of, 1794) 332
Prague 50, 56, 62, 133, 461, 514, 563, 566,
599, 601
Prandocin 79
Prazmowski Mikotaj (1617-1673) 18
Pradzynski Ignacy (1792-1850) 384
Premonstratensians 105
Premyslids dynasty 49
Presov 278
Pripet’ 288
Privy Council see Parliament
“Proletariat Great” 476, 478, 488
“Proletariat Second” (‘Little’) 478
Pronaszko Andrzej (1888-1961) 576
Pronaszko Zbigniew (1885-1958) 576
Prészynski Konrad (Promyk) (1851-1908)
466
Prosna 30
Prosnica 59
Protestants 159, 172, 174, 180, 189, 198,
200, 202, 204, 226, 227, 232, 254 see
dissenters
Proust Marcel (1872-1922) 571
Provincial School Council (Galicia) 479, 494
Provisional Commission of Confederated In-
dependence Parties 519
Provisional Council of State 530
Provisional Revolutionary Committee of Po-
land (Bialystok, 1920) 551
Provisional Substitutional Council (1794) 327
Prus Bolestaw (Glowacki Aleksander) (1847-
1912) 467, 472
Prussia, Prussians 21, 95, 127, 131, 133, 135,
137, 148, 156, 157, 158, 159, 168, 170,
175, 187, 190, 200, 204, 211, 216, 220,
223, 228, 233, 239, 242, 244-248, 251-
254, 266-268, 270, 271, 275, 277, 280-
282, 289, 305, 306, 307, 309, 316, 320,
321, 322, 323, 331-334, 338-341, 346,
351, 352, 354, 360-364, 370, 380, 389,
392, 397, 398, 402, 408, 410, 411, 414-
417, 419, 422, 435, 441, 450, 456-459,
474, 475, 478, 480, 482, 483, 489-491,
495, 498, 515, 516, 523, 531, 533, 535,
543, 547, 549, 552, 601
“Prussian Alliance” 121
Prusso-Nuremberg style 504
Prut (treaty of, 1711) 238
Pruthenia, Prussia, Prussians 31, 37, 50, 52,
56, 62, 69, 77, 84, 85, 88, 93, 95, 121
Przedborz 369
Przemyst I (1220/1-1257), Duke of Great
Poland 91
Przemyst If (1257-1296), Duke of Great
Poland, King of Poland 90, 91, 92, 98,
99, 104
Przemysl 55, 60, 62, 226, 595
Przesmycki-Miriam Zenon (1861-1944) 500
Przeworsk 230
Przybos Julian (1901-1970) 571
Przybylski Czestaw (1880-1936) 504, 576
Przybyszewski Stanislaw (1868-1927) 500,
504
Przyluski Jakub (-1554) 155, 175
Przypkowski Samuel (c. 1592-1670) 233
pseudo-Byzantine style 504
Pskov (battle of, 1581) 136, 169
INDEX 659
Pszezyna 253
Ptolemy Claudius (2nd cent.), geographer
30
Pudtowski Stanislaw (1597-1645) 232
Puck 190, 498
Pulaski Aleksander Kazimierz (1800-1833)
387, 399, 402
Pulaski Jézef (1704-1769) 277
Pulaski Kazimierz (1747-1779) 279
Pulawy 214, 287, 300, 345, 346, 356, 524
Pultusk 79, 174, 385
Pyrz Michat (-1624) 597
Pyrzyczanie, Prisani 40
Quisling Vidkun (1887-1945) 606
Raciborz 206
Ractawice (battle of, 1794) 327
Raczkiewicz Wladystaw (1885-1947) 530
Radom 88, 276, 355, 379
Radziejowski Hieronim (1622-1667) 215
Radziwit! Antoni Henryk (1775-1833) 392
Radziwill Bogustaw (1620-1669) 211, 215
Radziwill Ferdynand (1834-1926) 534
Radziwit! Janusz (1612-1655) 215
Radziwill Janusz (1880-1967) 580
Radziwill Karol (1734-1790) 269, 271, 276,
306
Radziwil! Michal (1778-1850) 384
Radziwilt Urszula (1705-1753) 258
Radziwill family 211, 227
railways 394, 464, 551, 599
Rakoczy, Duke of Transylvania see George
II Rakoczy
Rakéw 179, 231, 233
— Academy of 200
Ramorino Girolamo (1792-1849) 389
Rapallo (treaty of, 1922) 565
Raszyn (battle of, 1809) 354
Rataj Maciej (1884-1940) 559, 578, 595
Ratisbona, Regensburg 37, 50
“Realists” 506, 508, 510 see Conservatives
Red organization, Reds 438-440, 443, 444,
459, 517-520, 522-524, 540, 632
Red Guard 545 see Communists
Reformation 154, 158-163, 168, 172, 173,
183, 189, 197, 198
“Regulation Reform” see Peasants
Reichenbach (convention of, 1790) 316
Re} Mikolaj (1505-1569) 155, 173, 174, 179
Renaissance 19, 21, 117, 146, 149, 153, 161,
660 INDEX
170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 178,
180, 227, 228, 229, 231, 233, 299, 430
Repnin Nikotaj (1734-1801) 276, 277
Reszel 88
retrait lignager (custom) 72
Revel 157, 168
Reymont Wladyslaw (1867-1925) 502
Reytan Tadeusz (1742-1780) 282
Rhine 244, 322, 607
Rhineland 29, 45, 105, 480, 599
“Rhytm” (group of artists) 576
Richeza (-1063), Queen of Poland 55
Richeza, Ryksa, of Poland (1288-1335),
Queen of Bohemia 99
Ribbentrop Joachim (1893-1946) 601-603
Riga 167, 168; (peace of, 1921), 552, 559,
565
Rittner Tadeusz (1873-1921) 502
Rococo 257
Rojecki F. (mid-18th cent.) 358
Romanesque art 63, 78, 105, 106
Roman Empire 29, 32, 33
Romanticism 300, 377-380, 422, 424, 472,
500, 573
Romanowski Mieczystaw (1834-1863) 428
Rome 19, 77, 92, 198, 203, 222, 226, 256,
263, 407, 455
Rome 48, 208, 298, 343, 421, 473, 600
St. Romuald (956-1027), hermit 64
Ronsard Pierre (1524-1585) 146
Rostkowski Franciszek (-1862) 439
Rostock (land peace, 1283) 92
Rostworowski Karol Hubert
502, 571
Rousseau Jean Jacques (1712-1778) 279, 298,
310, 315
Roussel Albert (1869-1937) 576
Rozwadowski Tadeusz (1866-1928) 577
Rozdzienski Walenty (c. 1560-c. 1622) 233
Rézycki Ludomir (1884-1953) 504
Rudawski Jan (1617-c. 1690) 232
Rudolf I of Hapsburg (1218-1291), German
King 99
Riigen 67
Rulhiere Claude Carloman de (1735-1791)
279
Rumania, Rumanians 232, 404, 412, 421,
565
Ruric dynasty 112
Russia, Russians 17, 21, 37, 45, 46, 51,55, 57,
62-65, 66, 75, 77, 87, 93, 113, 116, 136,
148, 157, 163, 168, 169, 183, 184, 186-
(1877-1938)
189, 197, 204, 211, 214, 216, 218, 222,
234, 235, 237-239, 241-244, 251, 254,
266, 267, 268, 270-282, 285, 305-307,
309, 316, 321, 322, 323, 324, 327, 331-
333, 337, 338, 339-341, 345, 346-348,
354-358, 363, 364, 369, 373, 376, 377,
380, 383, 384, 388, 391, 392, 394, 395,
408, 411, 412, 421, 422, 431, 433, 434-
436, 438-440, 444, 445, 447, 449, 451-
454, 455, 460, 461, 463-465, 474, 476,
480, 483, 488, 491, 493, 500, 505, 506,
512, 514, 520, 522, 523, 525, 528-532,
536, 539, 545, 546, 549, 550, 565, 590,
°607
“Russians Little’ 461 see Ukrainians
Russophils, Old Ruthenians 461
rustict ducis 71
Ruthenia 37, 45, 51, 55, 57, 62, 63, 65, 66,
75, 77, 84, 87, 93, 104, 107, 113, 116, 124,
127, 129, 158, 173, 217, 227, 440, 519
see Ukraine
Rutkowski Jan (1885-1949) 567
Rybifiski Maciej (1784-1874) 389, 397, 399
Rydz-Smigty Edward (1886-1941) 537, 593,
595, 597, 598, 599
Rytwiany 230 see Opaliaski family
Rzewuski Henryk (1791-1866) 426
Rzewuski Seweryn (1743-1811) 276, 284,
287, 306, 309, 315, 320, 321, 322, 332
Rzewuski Waclaw (1706-1779) 258, 276
Sadova (battle of, 1866) 460
Sala Sebastian (17th cent.) 230
“Salamander Society” 121
Saldern Kaspar von (1711-1786) 275, 280
Salomea (c. 1101-1144) 68
Salomon Polonus (2nd half of the 18th cent.}
315
Sambia 37
Samogitia, Zmudz, Samogitians 115, 116,
117
Samus (Samijto Iwanowicz) (2nd half of the
18th cent.) 239
San 55
San Domingo (Haiti) 344
Sandomierz 31, 40, 60, 62, 68, 88, 89, 90,
93, 98, 106, 129, 136, 153, 174, 185, 196,
355, 441 ;
Sapieha Kazimierz Nestor (1754-1798) 284,
298, 307, 355, 441
Sapieha Leon (1802-1878) 396
Sapieha family 227, 238
Sarbiewski Maciej (1595-1640) 229
Sardinia (Savoy-Sardinia) 244
“sarmatism” 173, 228, 230, 232, 253, 256,
257, 272, 297-300, 377
Satanéw 295 see Levin Mendel
Sava 32
Savannah (battle of, 1779) 279
Savoy 400 see Sardinia
Saxon times 235, 249, 251, 257, 258, 261,
262, 276, 285, 292, 300
Saxony, Saxons 235, 237, 240-247, 248, 250,
252, 254, 261, 263, 265, 266, 268, 270,
276, 277, 278, 285, 292, 300, 317, 322,
348, 357, 358, 362, 364, 368, 369
Sacz Nowy see Nowy Sacz
Sacz Stary 88
Scandinavia, Scandinavians 28, 29, 45, 48,
49, 51, 63, 77
Scheibler Karl Wilhelm (1820-1881) 433
Schiller Leon (1887-1954) 571
Schlisselburg 376
Schlichting Jonasz (1592-1661) 233
Schmerling Anton (1805-1893) 459
Schénbrunn (peace treaty of, 1809) 355
Schulz Bruno (1892-1942) 570
Scott Walter (1771-1832) 378
scultetus 83, 86, 127
“secession” 504
secular canons 77
Semigalia 157 see Livonia
Senate see Parliament
Senate of the Free City Gdansk see Gdansk
see also Parliament
Serbia 31, 525
serfdom, serf labour see Peasants
serf fight see Peasants
“Settlement Decree” see Peasants
Seyda Marian (1879-1967) 516
Seyda Whadystaw (1863-1939) 534
Seym see Parliament
— Galician see Galicia
Sep-Szarzynski Mikolaj (1550-1581) 175
Shakespeare William (1564-1616) 571
Shein Michal (-1634) 187
Shuiski Vasili (1552-1613), Tsar of Russia
184, 186
Shuvalov Paul (1830-1918) 491
Siberia 168, 279, 391, 406, 407, 453, 455,
472, 475, 488, 500
Sicily 421
Sicinski Wladystaw (-1664) 218
INDEX 661
Sicz 188, 208
Sieciech, Sethec (11th/12th cent.), Palatine
of Poland 66
Siedlce 355
Siemomyst (10th cent.), Duke of Polanie 35,
42
Siemowit (9th cent.), Duke of Polanie 42
Siemowit I (1224-1262), Duke of Mazovia
91
Siemowit IV (c. 1352-1426), Duke of Mazo-
via -114
Sieniawska Zofia see Czartoryska Zofia
Sienicki Mikotaj (c. 1521-1582) 155, 161
Sienkiewicz Henryk (1846-1916) 466, 472,
482, 524
Sieradz 43, 60, 68, 76, 101, 124, 369
Sierakowski Zygmunt (1827-1863) 434, 433,
439, 444
Sieroszewski Waclaw (1858-1945) 502
Sierpinski Waclaw (1882) 568
Siewierz 120, 187
Sigismund, son of Korybut (-1435), Lithu-
anian Prince 118
Sigismund, son of Kiejstut (-1440), Lithu-
anian Prince 119
Sigismund I (1467-1548), King of Poland
126, 132, 146, 148, 150, 155, 466
Sigismund Augustus (1520-1572), King of
Poland 145, 155, 156, 159-161, 167, 173,
175, 181, 188
Sigismund III Vasa (1566-1632), King of
Poland 158, 181, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187,
189, 196, 198, 200, 203, 218
Sigismund of Luxemburg (1368-1437), King
of Hungary and Bohemia, German King,
Emperor 114, 119
Sigrid Storrada, Swietostawa, of Poland
(c. 970-c. 1014), Queen of Sweden and
Denmark 51
Sikorski Wladystaw (1881-1943) 519, 523,
524, 560, 577°
Sikorski Kazimierz (-1895) 576
Silesia, Silesians 28, 36, 40, 43, 48, 51, 53,
56, 57, 60, 66, 68, 73, 80, 84, 85, 90, 93,
97, 98, 102, 103, 104, 106, 118, 119,
121, 122, 126, 127, 129, 131, 133, 135,
136, 148, 153, 158, 168,*°180, 187, 199,
204, 215, 216, 219, 233, 236, 242, 360-
362, 369, 397-398, 407, 417, 449, 456,
457, 458, 473, 474, 555, 561, 599, 607
— Cieszyn 535, 600
662 INDEX
— Lower 38, 44, 62, 82, 84, 89, 90, 93,
263, 397
— Upper 21, 28, 84, 89, 97, 361, 362, 393,
394, 396-398, 417, 457, 458, 474, 480,
489, 496, 497, 515, 555, 557
Simokattes Teophylaktos (6th/7th cent.), By-
zantine historian 33
“Skamander” (group of poets) 571
Skarbek Fryderyk (1792-1866) 378
Skarbimir (c. 1117), Palatine of Poland 67
Skarga Piotr (1536-1612) 185, 186, 201,
226
Skarzysko 595 see Central Industrial Area
Skirmunt Konstanty (1866-1951) 566
Skladkowski Felicjan Stawoj (1885-1962)
597
Sklodowska-Curie Maria (1867-1934) 17,
471
Skoczylas Wladystaw (1883-1934) 576
Skrzetuski Wincenty (1745-1791) 302
Skrzynecki Jan (1787-1860) 385-387
Skrzynski Aleksander (1882-1931) 562, 566,
578
Skulski Leopold (1878-c. 1942) 549, 550
Slovakia, Slovaks 31, 33, 278, 42%, 601,
602
Sluch 550
Stawek Walery (1879-1939) 580, 584, 588
Stawno 92
Stomniki 159
Stonim see Oginski family 300
Stonimski Antoni (1895-1976) 568
Stowacki Juliusz (1809-1849) 425, 426, 500
Stuck 275
Stupie 47
Stupsk 92, 112, 113, 206
Smarzowa 411 see Szela Jakub
Smith Adam (1723-1790) 319
Smolensk 115, 156, 186, 187, 217, 357, 464
Smolenski Wladyslaw (1851-1926) 486, 504
Smolka Franciszek (1810-1899) 405, 418
Smuglewicz Franciszek (1745-1807) 299
Sobieski Jan see John III
Sobieski Jakub (1667-1737), son of John III
222, 234
Sobieski family 196
Sobiestaw (-1178),
Pomerania °89
Sobolewski family 373
Social Democracy of the Kingdom of
Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL) 488,
506-510, 520, 526, 533, 536, 545
Viceroy of Gdansk-
socialism 457, 474-476, 482, 483, 486, 487,
488-491, 492, 494, 532
Society of the Friends of Sciences 378, 379,
391
Society of Philomats see Philomats
“Societies of Polish Workers” 489
Society of Polish Republicans 342
Society of Primary School Teachers of the
Polish Kingdom 510
“Sodalitas Litteraria Vistulana” 134
Sofia 514
Sokotowo6 (battle of, 1848) 416
Solski Ludwik (1855-1954) 503
Solski Stanistaw (1622-1701) 230
Soldiers’ Councils 538
Soltyk Kajetan (1715-1788) 276
Soltyk Stanislaw (1753-1831) 340
Sophia of Holszany (c. 1405-1461), Queen
of Poland 118, 119, 135
Sosnkowski Kazimierz (1885) 519
“Southern Society” 376
Soviet Union 17, 532, 552, 565, 566, 588,
590, 601-603, 605, 607, 609
Sowitiski Jézef (1777-1831) 389, 435
Spa (conference of, 1920) 551
Spain, Spanish people 36, 47, 198, 204,
244, 268, 282, 351, 354, 600
Spasowicz Wlodzimierz (1829-1906) 492
Spielberg 406
Spiritual College in St. Petersburg 455
Spisz 280
Spytek of Melsztyn (-1431), Hussite Chief,
Castellan of Biecz 119
Spytko of Melsztyn (-1352), Castellan of
Cracow 113
Stablewski Florian (1841-1906), Archbishop
489
Stackelberg Otto Magnus von (1736-1800)
283, 284, 285, 306, 307
Stadion Franz (1803-1853) 418, 419
Stadnicki Stanistaw (c. 1551-1610) 195
Staff Leopold (1878-1957) 501, 568
Stalingrad (battle of, 1942/3) 607
Stalmach Pawel (1824-1891) 458
St. Stanislaw (-1079), Bishop of Cracow
65, 101, 104
Stanislaw of Skalbmierz (-1431), profes-
sor 134
Stanistaw I Leszczynski (1677-1766), King
of Poland 199, 237, 238, 239, 243, 244,
250, 263, 264
Stanislaw Augustus
Poniatowski (1732-
1798), King of Poland 234, 269-277,
279, 282, 284, 285, 286, 288, 290, 292,
297, 298-300, 302, 303, 305, 306, 307,
309, 310, 316, 317, 318, 319, 321-324,
332, 333, 334
Stanislawski Jan (1860-1907) 504
Stanczyk 464, 517
“Stanczyk” group 470, 494, 501
Stapinski Jan (1867-1946) 494, 517
Starosta, starostwa 86, 92, 108, 126, 132,
154, 159, 167, 191, 195, 197, 269, 308,
319, 339
Starowolski Szymon (1588-1656) 198, 231
Starza (Polish noble clan) 90
Staszic Stanislaw (1755-1826) 310, 311, 312,
345, 354, 370
State Council 348, 353, 437
State Defence Council 551
State Tribunal 584
Statorius Piotr (-1591) 172
Stefanowicz (17th cent.) 230
‘Stein Heinrich Karl (1757-1831) 361
Stefanski Walenty (1813-1877) 407, 409, 415
Steinhaus Hugo (1887) 568
Steinkeller Piotr (1799-1854) 394
Stempkowski Jézef (-1790) 278
Stephen Batory (1533-1586), King of Po-
land 156, 167, 169, 170, 179, 181, 187,
188, 195, 236
Stephen III (-1504), Great Prince of Mol-
davia 122, 148
Stern Anatol (1899) 571
Sterne Laurence (1713-1768) 378
Stochéd 525
Stockholm 212, 215
Stojatowski
493
Stolzman Karol (1793-1854) 401
Stolowicze (battle of, 1771) 279
Stralsund 125
Strojnowski Hieronim (1752-1815) 302
Strug Andrzej (Galecki Tadeusz) (1871-
1937) 570
Stryjenska Zofia (1894-) 576
Strzelno 105
Strzeminski Wladyslaw (1893-1952) 576
Stiirmer Borys (1848-1917) 528
Styr 525
suburbia 60, 72, 85, 87, 88
Suchorzewski Jan (2nd half of the 18th
cent.) 315
Stanislaw (1845-1911) 479,
INDEX 663
Sudeten 25, 28, 33, 361, 393, 600
Sudetenland 600
Sudovia, Ja¢wiez, Sudovians 31, 37, 48, 56,
93, 94
Sulejéw 106
Sulej6wek 577, 578
Sula see Lambert II
Sulkowski Jézef (1768-1798) 344
Supreme Council 551, 555 see Council of
Ambassadors
Supreme Council of Wilno (1794) 327
Supreme National Committee (Naczelny
Komitet Narodowy, NKN, 1914) 522-
525, 579
Supreme National Council (1794) 325, 327,
332
Supreme Polish Military Committee (1917)
530
Suvorov Alexandr (1729-1800) 278, 331,
332
Suwalki 379, 549
Svatopolk (978/9-1019), Grand Duke of
Kiev 55
Svatopolk-Mirski Petr (1857-1914) 510
Swabia 77
Swarog-Swarozyc 43
Sweden, Swedes 51, 77, 101, 157, 183, 184,
186, 190, 200, 204, 206, 211, 214, 215,
216, 217, 218, 222, 224, 236, 237, 238,
239, 242, 243, 244, 275, 306, 316
Sweyn Forkbeard (964/5-1014), King of
Denmark 51
Switzerland, Swiss 107, 263, 400, 491, 524,
599
symbolism 504
Syrkus Helena (1900) 576
Syrkus Szymon (1893-1964) 576
Syrokomla Wiadystaw (Kondratowicz Lud-
wik) (1823-1862) 428
Szachowski Stanislaw (1843-1906) 438
Szafranek Jézef (1804-1874) 417
Szafraniec Stanislaw (-1598) 161
Szanajca Jdédzef (1902-1939) 576
Szaniawski Jerzy (1886-1970) 571
Szaniawski Jozef Kalasanty (1765-1843)
329, 342, 356
Szaniecki Jan Olrych (1783-1840) 387
Szarffenberg Maciej) (-1547) 173
Szarffenberg Marek (-1545) 173
Szezebrzeszyn 230
Szczecin 50, 59, 66, 76, 85, 87, 92, 125, 157,
217, 252
664 INDEX
Szczekociny (battle of, 1794) 330
Szczuka Mieczyslaw (1898-1927) 576
Szela Jakub (1787-1866) 412
Szeligowski Tadeusz (1896-1963) 575
Szeptycki Stanislaw (1867-1956) 577
Szermentowski Jézef (1833-1876) 430
Szreder Jakub (—1853) 376
Sztumska Wie’, Stumsdorf (truce of, 1636)
204, 215
Szujski Jozef (1835-1883) 470
Szydtowiec 174
Szydtowiecki family 174
Szymanowski Karol (1882-1937) 504, 576
Szymonowic Szymon (1558-1629) 175, 229
Sciegienny Piotr (1800-1890) 407
Slezanie, Sleenzani 40
Sleza — Sobétka 28, 44, 78
Sliwicki Piotr (-1862) 439
Smiglecki Marcin (1564-1618) 198
Sniadecki Jan (1756-1830) 302, 345
Sniadecki Jedrzej (1768-1838) 345
Sniatyn 149
Sroda 85, 124, 417 see Law
Swidnica 126
Swidrygiello, Svitrigailas
Duke of Lithuania 119
Swieca (Polish noble clan) 101
Swiezynski Jézef (1868-1948) 536, 537, 538
Swietochowski Aleksander (1849-1938) 466,
471
Swietokrzyskie Mountains 30, 72, 263
Swietostawa see Sigrid Storrada
Swietoslawski Wojciech (1881-1968) 568
Swiety Krzyz (Holy Cross) see Swietokrzys-
kie Mountains
Swiniarski Michal (1740-1793) 315
Switalski Kazimierz (1886-1962) 585
(-1452), Grand
Taborites 118
Talleyrand Périgord Charles Maurice (1754-
1838) 364
Tamerlane (c. 1336-1405), Mongol Conque-
ror 116
Targowica see Confederation of Targowica
Tarnogréd see Confederation of Tarnogrdéd
Tarnopol 355
Tarnowski Jan (1488-1561) 149
Tarnowski family 174
Tarnowski Zdzistaw (1862-1937) 580
Tarnéw 112, 136, 174 see Leliwa family
Tartars 19, 113, 116, 122, 148, 157, 167,
206, 208, 211, 214, 221, 227, 238, 248,
293, 411 :
Taszycki Gabriel (1755-1809) 329
Tatra 280
Tchernyshewski Nicolas
Tczew 86
Templars 93, 126
Temporary National Government (1863) 441
(see Peasants) 443, 521
Teodor (12th/13th cent.), Palatine of Cracow
90
Terespol 464
Tetmajer-Przerwa
501
Teutonic Knights 85, 88, 93, 94, 95, 101,
108, 111, 116, 121, 146, 147, 156, 176,
253
Teutonic Prussia see Mazuria
Teczyn 112, 174 see Topors
Teczynski family 174
Thietmar (975-1018), Bishop of Merseburg
44
Thomas II (-1292), Bishop of Wroclaw 90
Tiedemann-Seeheim Heinrich (1843-1927)
496
Tilsit (secret parleys of, 1807) 348, 356
Tobruk (battle of, 1940-1942) 606
Tochtamish (14th cent.), Tartar Khan 116
Toeplitz Jerzy (1909) 575
Tokyo 506
Tolwinski Tadeusz (1888-1951) 576
Tomaszéw 369
Tomicki Jan (c. 1510-1575) 163
Topors (Polish noble clan) 112
Torun 84, 87, 88, 95, 106, 121, 133, 135,
136, 153, 174, 196, 228, 233, 254, 275,
306, 308, 321, 364, 478
Towianski Andrzej (1799-1898) 425
Transylvania 190, 200, 211, 213, 216, 236
Traugutt Romuald (1826-1864) 445
Trampczynski Wojciech (1860-1953) 547,
559
Trebbia (battle of, 1799) 344
Trembecki Stanistaw (c. 1740-1812) 300
Trent (Council of, 1545-1563) 197
Trentowski Bronistaw (1808-1869) 425
Trepov Alexandr (1862-1928) 528
Tretyakov Siergie) (1892-1939) 573
Trebicki Antoni (1764-1834) 313
Troki 115 see Krejstut
Truso-Druzno 37
Trzebnica 88, 106
Trzecieski Andrzej (16th cent.) 172
(1828-1889) 434
Kazimierz (1865-1840)
Trzemeszno 63, 77, 79
Tukhachevsky Michail (1893-1937) 551
Turkey, Turks 107, 120, 122, 132, 148, 149,
169, 175, 181, 183, 188, 189, 190, 197,
206, 214, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224,
227, 237, 238, 242, 243, 244-247, 251,
257, 268, 271, 277, 278, 289, 305, 306,
323, 331, 337, 341, 404, 422, 465, 513
Tuwim Julian (1894-1953) 571
Twardowski Kazimierz (1866-1938) 568
Twardowski Samuel (-1661) 229
Tylkowski Wojciech (c. 1629-1695) 232
Tylman de Gameren (c. 1632-1706) 231
Tymawa 94 see Calatrava Order
Tyniec 77, 79
Tyssowski Jan (1817-1857) 410, 411
Tyszowce 216
Tyzenhaus Antoni (1733-1785) 289
St. Udalrich (10th cent.), Bishop of Augs-
burg 50
Ujejski Kornel (1823-1897) 428
ukase of the Tsar (1864) see Peasants
Ukraine, Ukrainians 19, 21, 115, 188, 191,
192, 195, 200, 206, 208, 213, 214, 217,
223, 232, 234, 238, 246, 248, 255, 277, 278,
289, 290, 293, 294, 306, 308, 331, 339,
340, 357, 373, 377, 378, 385, 391, 402,
405, 419, 437, 451, 454, 461, 462, 548,
550, 558, 563, 564, 585, 586, 592, 596,
598, 601
Ukrainian Military Organization 563
Ukrainian National Democracy 518
Ukrainian Nationalist Organization (OUN)
585
Ukrainian Nationalist Party 563
Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party 518
Ungler Florian (-1543) 173, 174
Uniates 254, 255, 391, 455, 510
Unilowski Zbigniew (1909-1937) 570
Union of Free Poles (1820) 375
Union of the Plebeians, ‘“‘Plebeians” 407,
409, 413
Union of Polish Cooperatives 490
Union of Polish Socialists Abroad 488
Union of Polish Youth (“Zet”) 508, 516
Union of Primary School Teachers 510
Union of Rural Youth “Wici” (The Mes-
sengers) 595
Union of Socialist Youth 508
United Front 595, 596
United Provinces see Netherlands
INDEX 665
United Slavs Society 377
United States of America 279, 315, 323,
324, 498, 524, 531, 607
University of
Cracow 117, 133, 136, 172, 174, 195, 231,
252, 264, 265, 302, 310, 378, 405,
567
Greifswald 125
Lublin 567
Lwéw 470, 517, 567
Paris 117, 133
Poznan 567
Prague 133, 563
Warsaw, Main School 375, 378, 439, 454,
463, 466, 467
Wilno 231, 302, 345, 375, 378, 379, 567
U.S.S.R. see Russia
Uznam, Usedom 66, 67
Valachia 116, 188, 232, 280
Valdensians 104
Varangians 56
Varna (battle of, 1444) 120, 189
Vasas 180, 215, 231, 236
Vatican see Papacy
Veleti 31, 49, 50, 51, 52, 64
Velikye Luki 169
Venice 208, 221
Venceslaus see Waclaw II
Verdun (battle of, 1916) 527
Versailles 258, 272, 402, 406, 408
— treaty of (1919) 549, 565, 605
Vevey 524
Vienna 29, 149, 189, 212, 219, 221, 242, 280,
364, 369, 373, 377, 380, 388, 392, 394,
396, 413, 418, 419, 421, 433, 444, 460-
463, 464, 473, 479, 512, 517, 530, 534,
553, 563,
— Congress of (1815) 362, 363, 380
viritim (principle of election) see Parliament
Vislanes, Wislanie 40, 50
Vistula 17, 28, 29, 31, 32, 37, 40, 43, 45,
48, 60, 62, 87, 88, 91, 93, 101, 153, 190,
214, 244, 288, 322, 332, 333, 346, 354,
358, 363, 368, 381, 384, 385, 388, 397,
450, 464, 523, 607
Vitelo (13th cent.), astronomer 103
Volhynia 112, 113, 158, 191, 345, 464, 527,
552, 558, 563, 586, 599
Voloshyn August (1874) 601
Voltaire Francois-Marie Arouet (1694-1778)
373
666 INDEX
Vorskla (defeat of, 1399) 116
Vota Maurizio Carlo (1629-1715) 226
voting system see Parliament
Waclaw, Venceslaus, II (1271-1305), King
of Bohemia, Poland and Hungary 98, 99,
108
Wactaw III (1289-1306), King of Bohemia,
Poland and Hungary 99
Wagram (battle of, 1809) 355
Waliszewski Zygmunt (1897-1936) 576
Walloons 79, 83, 84
Walter (-1169), Bishop of Wroclaw 78
Wapowski Bernard (c. 1450-1535) 173, 176
Warcistaw I (c. 1147), Duke of Western
Pomerania 67, 89
Wargocki Andrzej (16th/17th cent.) 201
Warmia 121, 158, 216, 397, 457, 498, 552,
555, 608
Warsaw 94, 132, 153, 157, 158, 161, 196,
206, 215, 216, 225, 230, 231, 235, 236,
237, 241, 256, 257, 263, 264, 271, 275,
276, 278, 280, 287, 289, 292, 295, 297,
300, 305, 307, 308, 309, 310, 315, 318,
323, 324, 327, 328, 331, 332, 333, 347-
350, 352-355, 357, 358, 363, 364, 369-
372, 374, 375, 377-387, 389, 391-394,
397, 398, 406, 407, 415, 416, 426-430,
433-440, 443, 445, 464, 466, 468, 474,
475, 476, 484-487, 492, 493, 500-504,
506, 508, 521, 525, 527, 528, 531, 533,
538, 543, 545, 547, 550-552, 566, 568,
576-578, 589, 593, 599, 601, 602, 606,
607
— Duchy of 338, 344, 348, 350, 351-356,
361, 362, 364, 446
— Conservatory 576
— Hausing Cooperative 576
— Society of the Friends of Science 345
— Soldiers’ Council 538
Warski Adolf (1868-1937) 564
Warszewicki Krzysztof (1543-1603) 185
Warta 41, 44, 51, 60, 95, 126, 322, 348
Warynski Ludwik (1856-1889) 474-478
Wasilewska Wanda (1905-1964) 570
Wasilewski Leon (1870-1936) 512
Wasilewski Gustaw (1839-1863) 438
Wawel 60, 64, 78, 106, 136, 174, 175, 258,
593
Wawer (battle of, 1831) 384
Wawrzecki Tomasz (1753-1816) 332.
Wazyk Adam (1905) 571
s
Wachock 106
Weigl Rudolf (1883-1957) 568
Wejherowo 498
Welawa 216, 220
Wends, Veneti 25, 28, 29
Western Powers 535, 549, 555, 566, 588,
589, 599, 602, 603
Westerplatte 589
Westphalia 217, 489
Wettins 236, 237, 242, 266, 268, 270
Weygand Maxime (1867-1967) 551, 577
Weyssenhoff Jézef (1860-1932) 502
Wegierski Kajetan (1775-1787) 300
Wegréw 179
White Party, Whites 438, 439, 441-444,
459
Widukind (-1004) Saxon chronicler 50
wiec 38
Wielhorski Michal (-1790) 298
Wieliczka 127, 197
Wielopolski Aleksander -(1803-1887) 412,
437, 439, 440, 445, 491, 512
Wielopolski Jan (-1688) 218
Wielopolski Zygmunt (1833-1902) 491
Wieckowski Aleksander (1854-1920) 474
Wieluf 118
Wieprz 48, 55, 551
Wierzynski Kazimierz (1894-1969) 571
Wietor Hieronim (-1536) 173
Wilanow 578
Wild Plains 188, 248
Wilhelm (1370-1406) Prince of Austria 114
William of Holland (c. 1227-1256) King of
Germany 93
William J (1797-1888), King of Prussia,
German Emperor 435, 483
William If (1859-1941), King of Prussia,
German Emperor 527
Willisen Wilhelm (1790-1879) 415
Wilno 119, 136, 150, 230, 324, 327, 331,
345, 357, 375, 378, 391, 406, 453, 488, 519,
531, 550, 552, 566
— Academy see University of Wilno
— Jesuit Academy see Jesuits
Wilson Thomas Woodrow (1856-1924) 528,
529, 534-536
Wincenty Kadtubek (c. 1160-1223), Bishop
of Cracow 102
Wincenty of Kielce (13th cent.), hagiograph-
er 102
Wiszowaty Andrzej (1608-1678) 233
Wiklica 60, 69, 124, 136, 185
Wisnicz 174
Wisniowiecki Jarema (1612-1651) 192, 212,
213, 220
Wisniowiecki family 184, 192
Wit Stosz, Stwosz (c. 1445-1533), sculptor
136
Witkiewicz Stanislaw
(1885-1939) 570
Witold, Vytautas (1350-1430), Grand Duke
of Lithuania 116, 117, 118
Witos Wincenty (1874-1945) 517, 536, 537,
547, 551, 558, 560, 577, 585, 595, 597
Witte Serghei (1849-1915) 505, 512
Wittig Edward (1879-1941) 576
Wadystaw I Herman (1040-1102), Duke of
Poland 65, 66
Wladystaw II the Exile (1105-1159), Grand
Duke of Poland 68, 69, 77, 90
Wladystaw I the Short (c. 1260-1333), King
of Poland 91, 98, 99, 101, 108, 111, 112,
114, 124
Wiadystaw II Jagielto (c. 1351-1434), Grand
Duke of Lithuania, King of Poland 115,
116, 117, 118, 119, 135, 136
Wiadystaw III (1424-1444), King of Poland
and Hungary 119, 120
Wiladystaw IV Vasa (1595-1648), King of
Poland 180, 186, 188, 200, 203, 204, 206,
208, 213
Wladyslaw Spindleshanks (c. 1165-1231),
Duke of Great Poland 89, 90, 91
Wladystaw, son of Odo (c. 1190-1239),
Duke of Great Poland 90
Wladystaw the White (-1388), Duke of Ku-
jawy 114
Wladyslaw (-1401), Duke of Opole 114
Wiadystaw II (1456-1516), King of Bohe-
mia and Hungary 119, 122, 126, 148
Wladyslawowo 204
Wloclawek, Wlodzislaw 60, 68, 79
Wilodzimierz, Vladimir 112, 113
Wohl Stanislaw (1913) 575
Wojciech of Brudzewo (1446-1495), profes-
sor 134
Wojciechowski Stanistaw (1869-1953) 513,
559, 578
Wojciechowski Zygmunt (1900-1955) 568
Wojniakowski Kazimierz (1772-1812) 299
Wolborz 91
Wolfowicz Szymel (2nd half of the 18th
cent.) 315
Wolin 50, 59, 66, 67
Ignacy (Witkacy)
INDEX 667
Wolinianie, Velunzani 40
Wotezyn 232
Woltogoszcz, Wolgast 92
Worcell Stanistaw (1799-1857) 403, 434
Workers University Society 567
working-class movement 449, 473, 476, 478,
482, 487, 488, 500, 515
— eight-hour day 546, 548
Wroclaw 30, 31, 52, 60, 62, 65, 66, 68, 76,
78, 79, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 98, 99,
102, 104, 105, 106, 126, 129, 131, 135,
168, 252, 360, 393, 394, 417, 474, 516
Wréblewski Walery (1836-1908) 451
Wréblewski Zygmunt (1845-1888) 470
Wrzesnia (affair of, 1901) 495
Wschowa 253
Wszebor, Palatine 68
Wulfstan (9th cent.), traveller 37
Wybicki Jozef (1747-1822) 284, 343, 346
Wyczotkowski Leon (1852-1936) 504
Wyhowski Jan (-1664) 217
Wystouch Bolestaw (1855-1937) 493
Wysocki Jozef (1809-1873) 421
Wysocki Piotr (1799-1875) 380
Wyspianski Stanistaw (1869-1907) 501-504
Xavier, son of Augustus III (1730-1806)
270
Yam Zapolsky 169
Yaroslav (c. 980-1054), Grand Duke of Kiev
57
Yermak (-1585) 168
“Young Germany” 400
“Young Italy” 400
“Young Poland” 401, 405
“Young Poland” 500-504, 570, 571
Zabiello Jozef (-1794) 327
Zabtocki Franciszek (1750-1821) 300, 315
Zagérski Jerzy (1907) 571
Zagorski Whlodzimierz (1882-1926) 582
Zahorowski Hieronim (1582-1634) 202
Zajaczek Jdzef (1752-1826) 329, 332, 347,
356, 367
Zalewski August (1883) 578
Zaliwski Jézef (1797-1855) 400, 405
Zaluski Andrzej Stanistaw (1695-1758) 263-
265
Zaluski Jézef Andrzej
276
Zaluski family 263
(1701-1774) 264,
668 INDEX
Zambocki Jan (-1529) 175
Zamos¢ 196, 261
— Academy of 231
Zamoyski Andrzej (1716-1792) 274, 284,
289, 290, 302, 310
Zamoyski Andrzej (1800-1874) 395, 433,
436, 437, 440
Zamoyski August (1893) 576
Zamoyski Jan (1542-1605) 163, 167, 169,
170, 181, 188, 231
Zamoyski Maurycy (1871-1939) 559
Zamoyski Stanistaw (1775-1856) 355
Zamoyski Family 196, 355, 393
Zan Tomasz (1796-1855) 375
Zaolzie 601
Zapolska Gabriela (1860-1921) 472
Zaporozhe 188, 207, 208
Zastawski Dominik (c. 1618-1656) 192
Zator 120
Zawady 47
Zawadzki Stanistaw (1743-1806) 299
Zawichost 104, 106
Zawisza Czarny of Garbowo (-1424), Polish
knight 117
Zawisza of Kurozweki (-1382), Bishop of
Cracow 114
Zbaraz 213
Zbigniew (-1112), Duke of Poland 66, 77
Zbigniew of Olesnica (1389-1455), Bishop
of Cracow 118, 119, 120
Zborowski Jan (-1605) 163
Zborowski Samuel (-1584) 169, 181
Zboréw 196, 213
Zbruch 548, 550, 552
Zdunska Wola 369
Zebrzydowski Mikolaj
185, 186, 198
Zejssner Ludwik (1807-1871) 430
“Zemlya i Volya” (Land and Liberty) 439,
440
“Zentrum” 457, 458, 483, 496, 497
Zgierz 369, 476
Zhelezniak Maxim mid-18th cent.) 278
Zielence (battle of, 1792) 321
Ziembice 126
Ztororyja (in Auro) 85
Znaniecki Florian (1882-1958) 568
Zurich 559
“Zwiazek Walki Czynnej” (Uriion of Active
Struggle) 519, 539
Zwolen 175
Zyndram-Koéciatkowski Marian (1892-1946)
593, 595 °
(1553-1620) 181,
Zak Eugeniusz (1884-1926) 576
Zelenski-Boy Tadeusz (1874-1941)
571
Zeligowski Lucjan (1865-1946) 552, 578
Zeromski Stefan (1864-1925) 571
Zolibérz Housing Estate 576
Zotkiew 196
Zétkiewski Stanistaw (1547-1620) 186, 189.
196
Zdlte Wody (battle of, 1648) 208
Zérawno 220
Zyrardéw 476, 593
570,
Errata
Ripe aeeher ae
| Page | Line | For | Read
=~ '
118 9 Victory | Viceroy
149. 34 of voivodship | or voivodship
245 | 23 Augustus II | Augustus III
275 | 38 clumsy alliance a clumsy alliance
309 10 Russia Russian
History of Poland
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